# Aff --- Disability --- K lab

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## 1AC

### 1AC --- Definitions

#### Definition of mad blackness :: black madness

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 4-5, JMH]

Despite my academic and personal proclivity for politesse and rigorous specificity, I choose to rest in the vagueness and insult mad brings.8 I mobilize this word as part of my critical armature because this discussion requires a direct engagement with slippery and insulting language.9 Mad carries a lexical range that includes (in)sanity, cognitive disability, anger, and, for anyone who remembers the slang of the 1990s, excess (usually synonymous with too or really). In common parlance, it is used pejoratively and remains rather vague. However, mad studies takes up madness to “represent a critical alternative to ‘mental illness’ or ‘disorder’ as a way of naming and responding to emotional, spiritual, and neuro-diversity.”10 Mad studies perspectives mobilize activist and scholastic impulses in their refusal of the historical definitions of madness as “irrationality, a condition involving decline or even disappearance of the role of rational factor in the organization of human conduct and experience” and the equation of madness with lack or inability.11 In this field, the biopsychiatric definitions of madness that proceed from this historical definition—wedded to inability and irrationality—no longer hold since they disenfranchise the perspectives of those harmed by psy-disciplines. In this study, I take seriously the critical impulses of mad studies: I keep a tension between psychosocial definitions of madness (without attributing causality) and biomedical definitions (without attributing authority), while resisting an uncritical celebration of madness as experience or as metaphor. Even though this project focuses on those who would be labeled mad or embrace being mad, I also do not veer too far away from the critical possibilities of madness as a “slippery and unruly object.”12 When **madness does not solely refer to the experience of a mad person but rather pans outward as a larger discourse, it challenges how “the psychic, cognitive, and affective dimensions of experience are parceled out into categories . . . all under the supposedly ‘empirical’ authority of medical science and psychiatric expertise as much as through the exercise of legal and juridical power.”**13 In other words, **it is everywhere and affects everything. Maddeningly so.** In Black Madness :: Mad Blackness, **Black functions as a racial category, cultural affiliation, and social position. I use Black for its lexical and sociocultural range. It includes a wide variety of people and experiences within the diaspora and does not limit the discussion to a specific geopolitical imaginative space**. Unfortunately, my discussion is limited in scope to the parts of the diaspora that share an intellectual inheritance with North America and Europe. As Julie Livingston’s Debility and the Moral Imagination in Botswana (2005) and Nirmala Erevelles’s Disability and Difference in Global Contexts (2011) make clear, definitions of Blackness and disability cannot and should not be moved carelessly across transnational borders.14 Yet, given the vastness of colonial and imperial projects where race determines life and death, **the study of Blackness emerges as a fecund space to think through how material consequences manifest**. As I have claimed elsewhere, a turn to Blackness “authorizes a reconceptualization of history, culture, and politics” if the field is understood as “a set of traditions, reading practices, and valuation systems operating alongside, intertwined with, but also independent from those of whiteness.”15 Like madness, Blackness is also everywhere and affects everything. It is my hope that despite the necessary geopolitical limitations of my project, it later proves useful for those studying other Blacknesses. I choose to nominalize Black and mad by adding the suffix “ness” to attend to the two words as both description and category. I bring them together grammatically to theorize about the constellation of relationships that comprise the two. Nirmala Erevelles, in writing about the Middle Passage, rereads Hortense Spillers’s work to point out that the simplified causal relationship—slavery produces disability—does not fully encompass the way disability and Blackness function. Rather, “disability/impairment and race are neither merely biological nor wholly discursive, but rather are historical material constructs imbricated within the exploitative conditions of transnational capitalism.”16 My staged grammatical intervention in the title calls attention to how a revision of this sort works**. It is at once a ref erence to the material conditions and consequences as well as a discursive attending to the categories’ imbrication. Nominalizing the two also staves off what Rachel Gorman argues is “the mad subject . . . constituted as the white subject at the horizon of whiteness”17: that is, the mad white subject who can be embraced by whiteness through a discourse of universality.** In this formulation, Blackness modifies (and I use the grammatical term deliberately) who and what is mad. Madness as noun calls attention to what Sami Schalk insists is a useful slippage between materiality and metaphor in Black studies. She argues that within Black literature, disability takes on “concrete and metaphorical meanings” such that disability can “symbolize something other than disability while still being about disability.” In so doing, “disability metaphors therefore allow us to explore the historical and material connections between disability and other social systems of privilege and oppression.”18 As with Erevelles’s formulation, the two categories do not exist in a simple causal or analogic relationship; they inform each other such that madness modifies how we understand Blackness.19

#### Vitaltiy politics explanation

**Knadler 19 -**  ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac<http://library.lol/main/D8D265377A8F7623EB4F5A75223D22AB>) Dōgen

The term “vitality politics” in the chapters to follow, thus, identifies a post-Reconstruction politicization of biological health as an instrument for insisting on a racial state of exception in which African Americans’ own unhealthy habits and disease susceptibility justified their legitimate suspension from full rights to social justice, economic opportunity, political equality, and freedom. I use the term “vitality” deliberately because of its layered meanings: first to invoke the language widely cited in early twentieth-century discussions about racial destiny that debated the private bodily practices and life processes of African Americans to determine (allegedly on an objective scientific basis) the developmental tendencies of freedmen and women and to medicalize economic, social, and political discriminations (see chapter 1). But, second, vitality politics also registers the focus of African American reformers on hygienic behaviors and environments to rehabilitate African Americans into “vital” citizens practicing self-care and private risk management promoted within modern liberal (and now neoliberal) multicultural racial capitalism.14 Vitality Politics synthesizes multiple strands within the broad field of what is collectively identified as biopolitics, including theories of vulnerability, medicalization, disability studies, slow death, necropolitics, mad studies, and vital materialism to get at the complicated, and not always consistent, ways that both the literal physical and mental health—the matter of Black lives— and the semiotic meanings and larger discursive narratives attached to them functioned as key tactics shaping and controlling African Americans’ place as part of the shift toward modern liberal governmentality. These practices of vitality politics, as a consequence, require an attention to a complex notion of Black personhood, one which necessitates us as literary and cultural critics to avoid privileging representations over physicality or culture over biology, and to acknowledge how post-Reconstruction material Black personhood and its representation were being mutually transformed.15

### 1AC --- Mad Blackness

#### Emerging technologies create disinformation campaigns, expanding state influence to justify its mistreatment of racialized and disabled subjects through the weaponization of cognitive dissonance in algorithmic fashion

Zach **Naqvi 21** [Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Madness, Migration and Media in the Modern Digital Age, April 14th 2021, pg.2-7, -ekh-]

Citizenship, migration and international relations informing how we conceptualize policy get inextricably tied to sovereign states that determine the fate of refugees. The framework that facilitates this process has followed a chaotic trajectory in recent years. Understanding the rise of populist rhetoric emerging in North America and Europe, among others, points to recent developments in international relations requiring greater scrutiny, with specific practices necessitating a closer look by communities at home and abroad. I argue that we have fallen short of our collective humanitarian promise of dignity and fundamental human rights for everyone, regardless of race, gender, religion, class, or country of origin. Unsurprisingly, the sovereignty of the state and a universal humanitarian aim have had difficulties getting reconciled. In theory and practice, pragmatism and utopia and things related to realist necessity versus a more utopian idealism – international relations are plagued with a disconnect between what ought to be and what is. The reason is that states, unlike individuals, families and communities are not concerned primarily with such lofty ideals as human dignity, fraternity, equality, and the like. Instead, they get inseparably linked with the fundamental objective of consolidating, maintaining, and executing powers that we as individuals upon the grounds of elections, citizenship and birth or connection have authorized the state to have. Furthermore, many view frameworks of citizenship and migration from a privileged standpoint, concerned with realist undertones of security, sovereignty, and the success of their state above all else. The dire question here is whether those immigrating, seeking asylum or even completely stateless can reasonably expect to be accommodated by sovereign states.

First, alternative facts or the designation by some that we are entering a post-truth world, amplified by improvements in technology moving us collectively towards increasingly interconnected existence, lay bare for all to see a new power dynamic playing out over the past decade. The aim of alternative facts is “to establish power: they are lying to flaunt power. They are saying to us: ‘we know that you know that this is a lie, and we don’t care, because there is absolutely nothing you can do about it’ … over years, ceaseless propaganda and spectacle, exacerbated by corrections and retractions, can destroy your sense of reality. Time spirals forward and lurches backwards.” (Kendzior, 2020, p.18) Take Franz Fanon, for example. Despite his death decades ago, his lived experience then provides critical insight now. Fanon was a doctor and the acclaimed author of Black Skin, White Masks. Despite his subjective personhood being complex and multifaceted, not constrained simply to role or race, when practicing medicine, it is a mistake made as a black doctor if he made a mistake. Similarly, refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers are broadly categorized as if the totality of their being constitutes race – and nothing more. Other times, we simply view things based on monetary or pragmatic conditionality. As Fanon notes, it is society, unlike biochemical processes, that do not escape human influence. Yet, it is us that brings society into being. (Fanon, 2008, p. XV) We saw this media makeover take place in society with the portrayal of Muslims, migrants and more recently with the Chinese during COVID-19, among a myriad of other examples through the ages. Kendzior notes how, “a media makeover is a peculiar wound. It is a terrible feeling to be in pain and ignored – as a place, as a person. It is worse to be given a mask and told it’s your face.” (Kendzior, 2020, p. 22) In other words, alongside ordinary people behaving rationally according to human psychology, some behave pathologically according to inhuman psychology. (Fanon, 2008, p. 15) We have forgotten sense from nonsense and implemented it ubiquitously as if it held any semblance of truth.

Take Wiener’s (1960) framing of the coming difficulties of technological advancement. It still proves influential because he generalized it beyond literal human–machine cooperation to any situation in which two systems work together at different temporal and perceptual scales. Because choices made today with limited information can have terrible long-term consequences that we cannot foresee, Wiener warns that “the purpose put into the machine — be it a literal machine like a Twitter algorithm, or a metaphorical one like the corporation that runs it — should be the purpose that we ‘really desire’ and not a colourful imitation.” (Wiener, 1960; Prier, 2017) That colourful imitation has become the norm with associations of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers based not on dignity but premised on race and identity politics masquerading as genuine discourse. In terms of how to meaningfully address this inversion, I believe it necessary to borrow from the very tactics we aim to illuminate. In a manner reminiscent of Darko Maver, where “the borders between reality and false, if they exist at all, are so thin that often the roles exchange and reality copies imitation,” Deseriis (2010) theorizes their method as a form of ‘media homeopathy.’ Where “the idea was to inject into the media bloodstream stories whose patent falsity would eventually induce the media immune system into a reaction of its own.” This example brings us to the most suggestive connection to the present. The QAnon conspiracy, from the beginning, fixated on the lurid idea of hidden child molestation rings. However, historically this is nothing new. The middle ages were plagued with conspiracies concerning Jewish cabals and children. (Spence, 2019) Recently, Swami (2012) noted a positive relationship between right wing authoritarianism and beliefs in anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, but a negative relationship with general beliefs in conspiracy theories. It points to how individuals may well pick and choose theories that fit with a particular political view or belief system. Moreover, the 90s saw Italy face its version of “Satanic Panic” around child sex abuse. Feeling that people were baselessly targeted, Luther Blissett activists responded in an unconventional way — with a multiyear campaign of interconnected, multi-city media pranks.” (Davis, 2018) As Q-Anon has gotten ‘unmasked’ recently in the HBO (2021) documentary Q, Into the Storm, and used to get hosted on a site whose slogan is ‘embrace infamy’, it would appear history has repeated itself through the injection of blatantly false narratives, except this time – it led to a clear and definitive mass mobilization. Furthermore, states profoundly benefit from this obfuscation, and I believe, as was the case with Trump in 2016, can have real success from dividing people into distinct categories and subsequently pitting these separate groups against each other. Rhetoric based on this divisive and obfuscated nature is the link I explore that differentiates arguments about justice, human rights, and dignity on the one hand and the actual telos of institutions on the other. Migration, immigration, and asylum frameworks have particularly gotten affected by this developing phenomenon detaching its purpose from actions. What I mean is instead of being concerned with the framework on which migration gets premised, we have forgotten that the framework’s telos or point in favour of the outcomes that result from it. As a means to an end, the frameworks are politicized in a Machiavellian manner, not ends in themselves. Likewise, social media is not free as one would like to believe. It follows a similar path as it is us who are the product, which is done by commodifying our data. Additionally, migratory narratives are often not concerned with promoting virtue but instead are concerned with outcomes. Kantian autonomy and human dignity help one to discern how this plays out; as is the case with varied frameworks, we treat people as a means to an end and not an end in themselves. The result: utilization of polarization for populist ends that often scapegoat’s foreigners, migrants, and refugees – among other fashionable outgroups, dependent on time, place, and circumstance. (Muslims after 9/11, Turkish with BREXIT, Chinese during COVID,)

Unfortunately, as much as we have never been more connected, we are also divided and polarized by the very tools that promote this connectivity. Similarly, the problem with Trump’s rhetoric, as with big tech, is that the purpose or telos gets obfuscated, and as a result, many lack the ability or context necessary to discern fundamental conceptions such as the difference between a migrant, internally displaced person, and refugee from broader conversations on what migratory regimes ought to look like. A clear example of this was illustrated during Hurricane Katrina, where many government representatives mistakenly referred to the displaced persons as refugees. Additionally, “the U.S. government did not adequately protect the rights of Gulf Coast residents during displacement, failing in many cases to prevent discrimination against the poor, immigrants, and people of colour, and allowing children, the elderly, disabled persons and other vulnerable populations to be put in life-threatening situations.” (Brookings, 2008, p. 5) If this occurred to those already in the US, it is unsurprising to see this outcome on a more pervasive scale for those with no citizenship or legal standing. On a more positive note, despite state powers, we also have the power to articulate concerns and voice expectations – albeit without a monopoly on violence like the state. (Weber, 1965) As Kendzior points out, “There is a difference between expecting autocracy and accepting autocracy. It is necessary to expect it so that you can plan how you will fight. But the battle lines change, and you often end up changing with them.” (Kendzior, 2020, p. 15) The sentiment as mentioned above is echoed in Nietzche’s quip how “he who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.” (Nietzsche & Zimmern, 1997, p. 52) Building on Nietzsche, I surmise the reason for our collective spiral into distrust, fueling anti-immigrant populist rhetoric, reflects how misinformation embodies the tale of the mythological hydra. What I mean is, when you cut one head off – three grow back to replace it. Similarly, when attempting to debunk blatantly false narratives, it only feeds further into conspiratorial rhetoric, reinforcing the person’s views that they are getting confronted because what they view is correct. Exchanges like this rob potential discourse of being constructive and cannot reasonably assess the credibility of varied points of view. Moreover, cognitive dissonance is a powerful influence on the mind causing hesitations regarding the credibility of contradictory information, especially pertaining to conspiracies. (Leman & Cinnirella, 2013) A typical interaction I have personally experienced many times manifests as such:

One person critical of conspiratorial narratives can say, “Not everything is intentional, and not everything has meaning,” referring to some real or imagined cabal, deep state, or conniving billionaire suiting their predispositions (Soros, Gates, Zuckerberg, Musk, Bezos, Trump, etc.) In response, the person defending their blatantly false views can say, “Well… that is just your opinion,” “You fell for the misinformation,” or “I did my research, you should do yours.”

The distrust is so pervasive that even asking for sources for the ‘research’ is met with hostility, contempt, or stonewalling. As a result, honest and credible debate cannot occur when the very foundation the conversation rests on is negated through open-ended Socratic style musings that talking heads like Tucker Carleson implore regularly. (Kaufman, 2021; AP, 2020) To clarify precisely how this presents itself, suppose I ask you, “are illegal aliens a burden to our country?” This is precisely the bad faith musings that presuppose a determined answer. By calling migrants, refugees, or asylum speakers’ illegal aliens,’ you are already denoting them in a negative light, grouping distinct cases into a bundle premised on the negation of the group’s humanity. Additionally, by using loaded words like ‘burden’ with negative connotations, the answer is built into the question. Unfortunately, despite various politicians, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and citizens’ repeated assurances that it is absurd to give this type of discourse credence, one must never forget – even the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Interestingly, Swami et al. (2012) demonstrated in a controlled study how belief in entirely fictitious conspiracy theory was significantly associated with stronger belief in other real‐world conspiracy theories, stronger paranormal beliefs, and lower crystallized intelligence. Nevertheless, we must remember these subtle influences that guide the narratives we tell ourselves and society collectively are not spirits, hydras, or demons but rather,

“bots and opaque algorithmic processes, which alternately and capriciously curse or bless us. One such force is, of course, Internet memes and online content generally. Amplified and circulated by complex proprietary information platforms hidden behind corporate obfuscation and often too complicated even for their own engineers to fully comprehend, these systems make their users vulnerable to external predation by harmful forms of social influence. The common factor in all the fears about rampaging memes is the belief that memes are like magic, with powers to cause real-world effects.” (Elkus, 2021)

#### Disability studies is essential to their paradigm of bioethics – without it biotechnology will inevitably regress onto the structures of disability that pathologize and normalize unequal power relations.

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Disability studies and biomedical ethics have each been criticized for their respective omissions of the experiences, concerns, and contributions of people of color. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, scholars began demonstrating that the first-person accounts, normative guidelines, and framings of embodiment within these interdisciplinary fields tended to prioritize the experiences of disability, pain, illness, health, and clinical treatment from a white perspective (e.g., Myser 2003; Bell 2006). In response, both fields have attempted to transform the focus of their research, activism, and clinical guidelines to include historical and present patterns of neglect, oversight, and harm impacting communities of color. Both fields have also begun to highlight insights, methods, and political strategies employed by people of color within disability activism and clinical settings. The cross-pollination of these fields of study occurred during the mid-1990s through the development of disability bioethics, even prior to coinage of the term “disability bioethics.” This new area of research urged practitioners to understand the importance of insights and methodologies from disability studies within the formation and regulation of ethical guidelines and clinical practices in biomedicine. Such insights included, specifically, that the experiences and contributions of disabled people are necessary in the field of bioethics. Regarding race, founding theorists of disability bioethics engaged race and racism to varying degrees in their respective writings. For example, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has been described by Sami Schalk as “one of the first disability studies scholars to provide sustained race and disability analysis in the final chapter of her book Extraordinary Bodies, published in 1997” (Schalk 2018, 10). Accordingly, disability bioethics, as this volume suggests, from its inception has attempted to examine the intricacies and structural conditions of race and racism within the biomedical sciences. As a brief caveat, it is important to note that, although the focus of this chapter is on race, disability, and bioethics, the study of the intersection of race and disability exceeds the scope of the biomedical sciences. That is, as Shelley Tremain (2017) has cautioned her readers, to reduce disability to biomedical and health discourses is to potentially reify the broader societal and historical conditions that shape the pathologizing and/or normalizing relations of power that negatively impact disabled people. For this reason, although the focus of this volume is on disability bioethics, uncovering the broader relevance of the intersection of disability and race beyond medical and health discourses remains an important ongoing project. Accordingly, the analysis offered here will be limited, but will serve as a piece of a broader scholarly and political movement focusing on the relationships between race and disability more generally. To foreground a disability bioethics that grapples with the structural and intimate presence of oppression in its many valences and that emphasizes the lives and work of disabled people of color, this chapter focuses on two overlapping areas that thread together disability studies, bioethics, and critical approaches to race. First, the chapter examines work addressing the existential and conceptual relationships between race and disability. This section underscores writings by authors who analyze embodied experiences of community belonging, illness, pain, motility, madness, desire, futurity, and barriers to affirmation and care, all of which are in conversation with processes of racialization. Building on this discussion, the second section shifts to a focus on race and institutions. This section includes an examination of the functions of disability and race in contexts of clinical diagnosis and treatment, medical education and research, as well as disability and health activist movements that have challenged systemic oppressions impacting communities of color. I Existential/Conceptual Analyses of Race and Disability within Biomedical Ethics As noted above, recognizing the necessity and value of the perspectives of disabled people has been a critical turn that distinguishes disability studies more generally, and has surfaced within bioethics more recently. The common English-language refrain within disability rights activism since the 1990s “Nothing about us without us” presents a demand for policymakers, theorists, and organizers to prioritize the experiences, worldviews, and resources of people who identify as disabled or who may be socially marked as disabled or debilitated. Likewise, critical race studies and Indigenous studies have long recognized the need to prioritize the perspectives of people of color and Indigenous peoples to avoid the exoticizing, commodifying, or otherwise misinformed views developed within the anthropological, biological, and medical sciences. Social epistemologist, Charles Mills (1998), for example, considers the novel Invisible Man by Ralph Ellison a classic illustration of the existential conditions of Black Americans who have experienced patterned epistemic erasure and invalidation by white Americans. Or, as Anishinaabe theorist and literary author, Gerald Vizenor (1994) proposes, the fact that vastly distinct Indigenous societies of the Americas have been placed under one homogeneous label “Indian” has required Native peoples to devise “postindian” strategies to subvert and survive the damage caused by settler colonial imaginaries. Given this shared methodological stance across these fields, we find the study of race, disability, and the biomedical sciences similarly taking on such a priority. As such, we can turn to accounts of the relationship between race and disability that explore the existential and conceptual conditions of encounters with clinical, research, and other medical settings. First, regarding existential conditions that frame the interconnected relationships between race and disability within biomedical contexts, a number of theorists have explored the differing forms of medical treatment, attitudes and expectations of medical providers, and the everyday forms disregard for people of color within clinical settings. Notably, women of color authors of the 1970s–1990s utilized descriptions of embodied pain, illness, and disability to critique heterosexual norms and post-racial framings of “color blindness” within medical settings. Works of fiction, nonfiction, and poetry by authors such as Gloria Anzaldúa, Audre Lorde, Evelyne Accad, and Leslie Marmon Silko (Laguna Pueblo) each respond, in differing ways, to conditions of pathologization and debilitation impacting communities of color. For example, Lorde’s The Cancer Journals (1980) analyzes the author’s experiences of breast cancer, including biopsy, diagnosis, and mastectomy, and the text documents her refusal to be objectified or shamed within the clinical encounters that she endures. She describes her experience of breast cancer as stemming explicitly from a Black lesbian feminist perspective, and the text is framed throughout by excerpts from the author’s journal from the years 1978–1980. Seizing control of her narrative, Lorde opens The Cancer Journals by describing the “transformation of silence into language and action” (18). Specifically, she outlines the double binds often experienced by Black women, including their hypervisibility and simultaneous invisibility within allied political movements with white women. Within such settings, Black women, she writes, have had to fight and still do, for that very visibility which also renders us most vulnerable, our blackness. For to survive in the mouth of this dragon we call america [sic], we have had to learn this first and most vital lesson—that we were never meant to survive. (21, 17) Against this deathly tendency, she states, survival depends on “teach[ing] by living and speaking those truths which we believe and know beyond understanding” (22). In the context of The Cancer Journals, she intimates that writing about her experiences with breast cancer, including the patterned harms that she underwent within the clinical setting, is vital to her own survival and to the survival of other Black women. Additionally, “know[ing] without understanding” appears to refer to the inchoate existential awareness of one’s own sensations, emotions, and other embodied experiences, experiences that are not fully transparent to oneself or others. According to Lorde, the act of bringing such pre- or non-discursive forms of awareness, including experiences of pain and illness, into expression becomes a method to reshape personal and collective possibilities. On this point, Therí A. Pickens (2014) notes that Lorde “wrestles with the appropriate ethical response to her pain” and configures her writings as a means “to move toward awareness, discussion, and activism” (130–131). The importance of highlighting such a relationship between pain and expression is that Lorde is able to demonstrate the many ways in which Black lesbian women struggle through cancer and amputation. Among the themes that emerge in Lorde’s work is the dominance of the medical establishment over patients’ own narrative descriptions. Thus, describing her pain through evocations of joy and sensuality, including phantom pains, becomes a resistant act against the power of clinical medicine’s force relations. For example, after her mastectomy, Lorde writes that “the pain returned home bringing all of its kinfolk” (Lorde 2014, 31–32). Through drawing on familiar vernacular, Lorde’s description serves as a response to the insufficiency of medical discourses to describe the experiences of Black American women in pain (Pickens 2014, 132). The Cancer Journals also underscores Lorde’s decision not to wear a prosthesis following her mastectomy. Specifically, nurses and volunteer staff encourage her to wear a pink prosthetic breast following her surgery, and the reasons offered are that such a prosthesis will make Lorde and others around her feel more comfortable (1980, 42). The artificiality of the pink prosthetic contrasts with Lorde’s descriptions of her own “soft brown skin” after surgery, and her remarks critique the white aesthetic norms that exist within biomedical technologies of the flesh (44). Pickens also notes the heteronormative encounters Lorde describes while being encouraged to wear the prosthesis, including the suggestions by medical staff that wearing the prosthesis would allow her to remain attractive to men (2014, 135). In these ways, Lorde’s writings refuse these tendencies to foreclose her own appreciation of her body and desires, and her descriptions reopen a discursive space for a distinctively Black lesbian response to the misunderstandings and erasures that stem from the medical world around her. As such, Lorde’s writings offer a counternarrative to the whiteness of clinical medicine, and provide a descriptive opening for the existential conditions of illness, pain, and pathologization experienced by queer women of color. Alongside the pivotal work by Black, Indigenous, and other women of color in the 1970s and 1980s, more recent scholarly and activist work operating through framings of disability justice has focused on the specific existential and conceptual tools necessary for disabled, queer and trans people of color. For example, although authors like Lorde and Gloria Anzaldúa wrote extensively of experiences of illness, medical intervention, pain, and blindness, these authors were often reluctant to interpret themselves in terms of “disability” or as “disabled.” Along these lines, Moya Bailey and Izetta Autumn Mobley (2019) and Aurora Levins Morales (2013) have respectively explored the relationships between race and disability, examining the reasons why people of color may choose not to politically organize around disability rights or through identification as “disabled.” Namely, Bailey and Mobley note that tropes of the “crazy Black woman” are weaponized against Black women leading to high rates of violence committed against them, and that such violence occurs while simultaneously failing to address the needs of Black people with psychiatric or physical disabilities (2019, 31). Additionally, they point out that: Black women and other women of color do most of the labor in the service of disability despite the impact on their ability to care for themselves or their families. Caregivers are often engaged in debilitating work for disabled people and become disabled themselves. (32) These concerns, along with others, may thus complicate political and personal mobilization through a framing of disability for people of color. Bailey and Mobley also note, however, that growing work is currently being done among Black authors and activists to explore the terms of a disability within Black communities, including as their work attests, developing a Black feminist disability framework from which to theorize and mobilize. Along similar lines, Morales notes that for Gloria Anzaldúa, as a “dark-skinned working class Tejana lesbian,” to have affirmed disability as an identity would likely have required “a strong, vocal, politically sophisticated, disability justice movement led by queer working class women and trans people of color who understood [her] life” (2013, 5). From this insight, Bailey and Mobley, as well as disability justice activists have resisted individualist rights- and autonomy-based models of justice to focus on collective resistance to ableism in its many instantiations. Instead, disability justice activists and scholars demand a recognition of the interdependence of shared struggles against systemic oppressions and how disability functions across all forms of oppression—all of this while foregrounding the desires, joys, and networks of care among disabled people who are fighting against those systemic oppressions. For example, disability justice organizers Talila A. Lewis and Dustin P. Gibson, through their social media, workshops, and collective public actions, offer powerful critiques of the forms of systemic ableism that undergird US prison systems and policing, while also dedicating time and energy to curate Black disability solidarity music, art, film, and history (Lewis 2020; Gibson 2020). Additionally, Sins Invalid, founded in 2005 by disability justice activists Patty Berne and LeRoy F. Moore, is a performance-based artist collective composed of artists of color and LGBTQ/gender-variant artists that explores themes of sexuality, the non-normative body, and social and economic justice through their performances and workshops (Sins Invalid 2020). These examples of disability justice activism thus illustrate the important point made by Bailey and Mobley that there are creative aesthetic, embodied, and political contributions founded in the experiences of disabled people of color, and that organizing work done within a disability justice framework celebrates both the lives and experiences of disabled people of color while also critiquing the very systematic patterns of harm that would seek to erase, reduce, or eliminate their very existence. Lastly, regarding the relationship between disability and race, Nirmala Erevelles (2011) explores the “racialization of disability” and the “dis-abilization of race,” a process that Erevelles offers to bring both categories into material relation. Specifically, she argues that whiteness, defended as a form of property right, is “the ideological discourse that has been used to justify the racial superiority of white people over people of color by using the logic of dis-ability (e.g., inferior genes, low IQ) to decide who has the rights to citizenship” (166). By this, Erevelles suggests that the racialization of disability is the process by which white, able-bodied heterosexual cisgender men become centered as the most productive (and thereby valuable) citizens within capitalist societies. In this, the productive possibilities of such white citizens are protected through institutions such as the law, education, and health care. Regarding education, for example, the criminalization and pathologization of Black children in k-12 settings, as well as the segregation of educational institutions by “cognitive ability” seeks to shore up protected educational resources for those deemed more deserving or more capable of making “positive” contributions to society. Regarding the dis-abilization of race, Erevelles notes that people considered outside the productive metrics of advanced capitalism are often relegated to the welfare state, and thereby stigmatized as burdensome on the civic body. The responses to such so-called “dependency” on social welfare programs, however, is also a lucrative business, she argues. Testing companies, metrics and measurements for success, juvenile detention facilities, and other programs designed to manage or “uplift” children of color effectively foreground a life marked by pathologization and deviance for many people. Moreover, Erevelles proposes that the debilitating conditions of labor for many people of color in the USA also lead to increased marginalization, vulnerability, and medical precarity for such populations within advanced capitalism.

#### Disability is not solely a material codification but operates on invisible registers which doom its subjects to endless encounters with ableism.

**Kattari et al. 18** – Shanna K. Kattari, PhD, is an associate professor at the [University of Michigan School of Social Work](https://ssw.umich.edu/faculty/profiles/tenure-track/skattari), the Department of Women and Gender Studies, and Director of the [[Sexuality|Relationships|Gender] Research Collective](http://twitter.com/SRGCollective). Their practice and community background is as a board certified sexologist, certified sexuality educator, and social justice advocate. Dr. Kattari’s [extant research](https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Uq1RjxAAAAAJ&hl=en) focuses on understanding how power, privilege and oppression systematically marginalize, exclude, and discriminate against people regarding their identities/expressions through negative attitudes, policies reinforcing oppression, oppressive actions and isolation. (Shanna K. Kattari, Miranda Olzman, Michele D. Hanna, “‘You Look Fine!’: Ableist Experiences by People With Invisible Disabilities”, Sage, Journal of Women and Social Work, 2018, pgs. 1- 4, [https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109918778073](https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0886109918778073) ) || PZ

In the literature on diversity, a significant amount of work has been undertaken on issues of racism, sexism, and more recently, heterosexism, and their corresponding privileges. However, despite discussion on disability being more than decades old, with the mainstream disability rights movement gaining momentum in the 1960s and 1970s (Wolbring, 2012), and the Americans with Disabilities Act having been enacted in 1990 (United States Code, 2008), notably less academic literature has addressed ableism, particularly within the field of social work. Even disability policy as an area of focus in the literature is relatively new, given the large number of disabled individuals in the United States (Schriner, 1990). This study examines whether and how the experiences of ableism by people with invisible disabilities (someone who might not be assumed to be disabled at first meeting, such as individuals with chronic pain, traumatic brain injury, multiple sclerosis, HIV, etc.) are disparate from those whose disabilities may be more evident to others. Although members of this community use both identity-first (disabled people) and person-first (people with disabilities [PWD]) language (Dunn & Andrews, 2015), this article will focus primarily on identity-first language, as this language comes from a self-determination paradigm in line with both social work and feminist values (Ladau, 2014; National Association of Social Workers, 2017). The United States Census Bureau (2012) reported that in the 2010 Census, 21.3% of those of age 15 years and older had a disability or impairment. From these statistics, it can be inferred that approximately one fifth of U.S. residents are currently living with a disability or impairment. Disability in and of itself is a community with blurred lines—people can acquire disabilities (both short term and long term) throughout their lives, making the concept of membership to the disabled community one that is frequently difficult for other marginalized groups to understand (Davis, 1999). Although individuals with “invisible” disabilities (those that are not always, or ever, apparent to others) may not receive as much overt or explicit social stigma as those with more apparent disabilities, they are still exposed to forms of rejection, ableism, and discrimination; in fact, they may even have more trouble accessing support services than their visibly disabled counterparts due to being expected to prove their disability (Davis, 2005). Disabled individuals with invisible disabilities may struggle with “passing” as nondisabled persons in many settings (Samuels, 2003). While passing may be seen as a privilege, it can also be a challenge for these individuals to find community and be validated by disabled people. The decision on whether to pass or not comes with not only personal implications of stigma and discrimination but also more societal and political implications of outing themselves as disabled (Brune & Wilson, 2013). They may also have issues in accessing the services, support structure, and even physical spaces that they need, given assumptions about what their bodies and minds are able to do, and whether those given the power to make the distinction decide whether they are “disabled enough” (Lightman, Vick, Herd, & Mitchell, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that members of this community experience ableism in different ways than those who have apparent disabilities. Ableism is the overarching act of prejudice and/or discrimination against disabled people and the devaluation of disability (Hehir, 2002) and corresponds with able-bodied/neurotypical privilege, the set of unearned privileges held by nondisabled individuals. They are both interconnected systems that maintain stratification around disability. Ableism values physical, emotional, and mental capital, following socially constructed expectations of ability (Loja, Costa, Hughes, & Menezes, 2013). Queer/disability theorist McRuer (2006) posits that like the ideal of compulsory heterosexuality, ableism results in a compulsory able-bodiedness, demanding that disabled individuals do whatever it takes to enact a nondisabled identity however possible. While sexism, racism, and other isms certainly are prevalent in all types of systems and interactions, Wolbring (2008) argues that ableism is one of the most accepted and widespread isms in society and works in conjunction with many other isms. Because of the lack of conversation around ableism and able-bodied/neurotypical privilege, prejudice against disabled people may at times be more prevalent and socially acceptable than many others types of prejudice (Ford, 2009). Although ableism is insidious and apparent in all aspects of society, little research has been conducted to understand the lived experiences of ableism by disabled individuals, nuanced disabled identities (such as those who have invisible/less obvious disabilities), and intersections of other marginalized identities with disability identities. Moreover, while there have been some publications in the field of social work around ableism, much of it focuses on policy (El-Lahib & Wehbi, 2012), sanism (discrimination around mental health) specifically (Poole et al., 2012), or the general need for better culture competency in social work practice and education regarding disabled populations (Carter, Hanes, & MacDonald, 2012; Dupre´, 2012). Disabled individuals also experience higher rates of poverty and chronic health issues than their nondisabled counterparts (Hehir, 2002; Roux et al., 2001; Storey, 2007), and there are few instances of social work around the experiences of disabled people of color, transgender disabled people, and the ways that other marginalized identities interplay with disability and ableism. Feminist disability scholars in particular have brought up the need for intersectional frameworks and connecting disability to conversations around diversity (Kafer, 2013; McRuer, 2002; Olkin, 2002). In Feminist, Queer, Crip, feminist disability studies, scholar Kafer (2013) explains that not only did feminist theory gave her the ability to critically examine notation of disability but also emphasizes the bridge between theory and practice, something incredibly relevant to the discussion of disability and ableism in social work. Microaggressions: Death by a Thousand Papercuts The concept of microaggressions is used to explain the phenomena of the implicit perpetuation of racism, sexism, heterocentrism, transphobia, anti-Semitism, and other forms of power and oppression in society (Sue, 2010). Microaggressions are everyday interactions that perpetuate inequalities and stereotypes against people who belong to marginalized communities (Solo´ rzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000; Sue, 2010). They are perpetuated against many individuals holding many different identities, including race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and disability (Solo´ rzano et al., 2000; Sue, 2010). Frequent exposure to microaggressions, including ableist microaggressions, can result in higher incidence of negative mental health outcomes, feelings of being excluded, and lower positive outcomes including reduced academic performance (Khattari, 2017; Nadal, Griffin, Wong, Hamit, & Rasmus, 2014). Microaggressions are a common means of perpetuating ableism. These may include telling someone that they speak very well for a deaf person, telling someone they are lucky to get to bring their dog everywhere with them, asking a group of people to all stand for an activity (making the assumption that everyone can stand), or making a joke about how fast someone can go in their wheelchair (Storey, 2007). Many of these microaggressions are a result of assumptions about disabled people. Storey (2007) found that perpetuation of these microaggressions and assumptions result in disabled people feeling excluded or unwelcome in educational settings and produce outcomes including anger, frustration, and other feelings that can be harmful to an individual’s engagement with their community. Invisible Disabilities People with invisible disabilities or illness may be more likely to experience ableism indirectly, including through ableist microaggressions. For example, while someone might not use language like “lame” in front of someone they perceive to be mobility impaired, they may be less reticent to use such language in front of those they identify as nondisabled, whether or not those individuals actually are. Additionally, people with invisible disabilities may experience ableism when using adaptations for PWD, such as disability-designated parking spaces or elevators, when others view them as nondisabled individuals. It is possible that this is a result of unintentionally fulfilling the role of compulsory able-bodiedness suggested by McRuer (2006), simple by not having disabilities that might make themselves visibly distinct as disabled to outsiders. Disabled bodies are frequently othered and feared by society at large (Hirschmann, 2013), but there is little knowledge on how this may be experienced by those with invisible physical disabilities. Mad studies, a subset of disabilities focusing on mental health and sanism, have noted similarities in the “coming out and facing stigma/not being out and facing different marginalization” decision as faced by other individuals with sometimes invisible identities (Pilling, 2012). Therefore research is needed to help understand how disabled individuals who may not be read as disabled experience ableism in their lives. Bridging the theoretical understanding of ableism into the lived experiences of this community is a crucial move forward in creating more disability inclusive social work practice. This study explores the experiences of ableism specifically for individuals with invisible disabilities because, given that this invisibility often prevents these individual from being viewed as disabled, it is likely that their experiences may differ from disabled individuals with more apparent disabilities.

#### Moves towards progress through an embracement of a collective humanity relies on an Enlightenment reading of humanism that is incoherent for accounting for black disabled life. Black life is not locked into the position of being fully human nor fully slave; instead you should understand black life as lived within social death.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 74-78, JMH]

The ideological conceit of the human materializes at every turn. It operates as the main thrust of an argument about the (in)validity of Black and mad subjects’ existence. As it becomes an appeal to or for a purported universal experience, it ironically denies some humans a humanity according to Western European ideals, which are fundamentally anti-Black and sanist. Since it masquerades as normalcy, it insidiously functions as an apparition—ghosting a text or an event. Conceptually, humanity separates the human from flora and fauna and ostensibly guarantees that a human will be thought of as an autonomous subject, operating with agency and securing the legal, social, cultural, political, and material conditions to do so. **For mad Black subjects, this definition of the human does not apply.** This understanding of humanity, forged in the crucible of the Enlightenment period, undergirds our analytic praxis as well. Its materiality affects the access Black mad subjects are granted to particular conditions and, as a discursive construct, adherence to it affects the theoretical paradigms with which we work in literary criticism. This is the break where the criticism reveals itself to itself: this notion of humanity lingers in the criticism that art—exclusive to humans, of course—must have specific characteristics (formalism). As the previous conversation intimates, it subtends our attention to and preoccupation with ocularity and the logos (deconstruction, structuralism). It assumes that readers’ seldom autonomous interpretations evince the value of meaning in a text (reader-oriented criticism). It occupies our concerns about interiority (psychoanalysis) and labor (Marxism) since it finds critical purchase in the energy expended by certain human bodies and minds (feminist criticism, queer studies, disability studies, ethnic studies, etc.). Sedimented within our interpretive strategies and invested with promise— so much so since we refer to ourselves as humanists—the concept of the human becomes nearly impossible to critically examine. The ideology of the human carries with it an exclusivity: namely, that the category of human belongs solely to a figure Rosemarie Garland Thomson terms the normate. Such a figure—white, male, cis gendered, straight, able-bodied, Protestant— excludes multiple identity categories on its face.1 **Because of its origins in the Enlightenment and entanglement with the Middle Passage, eugenics, imperialism/colonialism, and the carceral system, the human poses a set of ontic and narratological problems for Black madness and mad Blackness.** In the previous conversations within this text we’ve seen how the concept of the human could be opened up, the cut widened, when an artist-theorist places Blackness and madness at the center rather than the periphery. For instance, Butler uses Ina to theorize about the constellation of intimate relationships available when Blackness and madness form the crux of a new identity. Hopkinson’s cognitively disabled and mentally ill characters shift the narratological terrain when their specific minds become the locus of the novel. Each artist-theorist questions how capacious the category of human can be. What boundaries keep humans fundamentally human? If remaining human is possible or preferable, what exactly does it mean to be one? How might we read and interpret if we cannot assume the validity of the human? Following a politics of curiosity,2 I conjecture about what it might mean to unmake madness and Blackness, detract from the critical and narrative power each has accrued as derogatory. Though I consider that both discourses were fomented in the Enlightenment as a way of defining and disciplining nonnormative bodies, I am not interested in turning to con versations between Enlightenment thinkers (or those wrestling within that tradition). **I am much more interested in the critical gaps and folds explored by Black studies and disability studies thinkers**. Their analyses invaginate our discussions, forcing us to examine how we think about madness and Blackness in a world hostile to them. This discussion comes from two strains: one, from the previous conversations in this project in which nonhuman characters populate the landscape, and, two, from a larger conversation beyond this project about the potential of madness and Blackness to be disruptive once one divests from the human as a category or concept. I turn to those in disability and Black studies who have theorized about the creation of human and humanity as a concept vis-à-vis madness and Blackness. I purpose to trace their understanding of this concept and, since the two have often implicated but not involved each other, I also aim to find the common conceptual ground between them.3 Last, I turn to artist-theorist Tananarive Due’s African Immortals series as a mad Black text that operates as a heuristic, questions the validity of human as a concept, and explores the repercussions of abandoning it. Though I read the text as a set of experiments, I concentrate on a few overarching story lines—desiring Blackness, understanding the ideology of ability, and forming new interpretive strategies—that question whether the conception of the human has particular narrative power. Other F-Words: Fugitivity, Fungibility, & Futility Scholars within Black studies have long contested the category of human for Black people. Sylvia Wynter’s oeuvre contains a rigorous and adroit critique of this concept, designating the human as a localized Judeo Christian concept that she terms Man.4 She traces it through the Enlightenment to the late twentieth-century Caribbean, citing that the human was ideologically designed to exclude Indigenous people and Blacks.5 There could be no room for those whose subjugation made colonial and imperial life possible. To be clear, this subjugation was not simply about putting those bodies to work, and harnessing their labor, but also about the intellectual subjugation and cultural denigration of those bodies. **They had to be deployed in service of the colonial and imperial subject physically, and simultaneously disregarded as a space of intellectual and cultural complexity.** The prohibitions against reading, gathering, and marriage (just to name a few) ensured that the Black cultural and social institutions developed did not carry with them the validating stamp of approval from social institutions that had power. Excising Blackness from histories (read: time) makes permissible the kind of erasure that facilitates thinking of Blacks as outside the realm of the human. Moreover, the emphasis on labor sustained a set of practices that sought to create a permanent underclass from the antebellum period to the present. Blackness then not only bears the mark of being thought of as having a fundamental lack of humanity, but that lack is determined, and circumscribed, by fungibility and fugitivity. **Race, then, and Blackness specifically, determines who lives and who dies.**6 As a result of this thanatological constraint, Blackness remains exteriorized, consistently unaccounted for in the construction of the modern world.7 Even after Man, to deploy the term in Wynter’s lexicon for the human, definitions of Blackness must contend with abjection. The analytical praxis consistently turns and returns to the areas where Blackness has a circumscribed agency, limns a limited radicality, and remains enmeshed with histories of violence and degradation. Scholars differ on their responses to abjection such that some attempt to maneuver out of it, and others accept it as part of the experiences of Blackness. To be clear, accepting abjection is not equivalent to accepting institutionalized racism. Instead**, it requires viewing Black social life as lived in light of social death,8 or finding freedom in unfreedom. Jared Y. Sexton’s notion that Blacks live in light of social death dovetails with Fred Moten’s understanding of freedom in unfreedom in one crucial way: that abjection must be circumnavigated if one exists.** The difference between the two scholars’ arguments resides in how that navigation takes place and with what affective residues. That is, radicality and resistance evince an ontology circumscribed by the discourses of fugitivity and fungibility. Locating the origins of these discourses in the antebellum period, some scholars also find that abjection must be understood as a fundamental aspect of Black life post–Middle Passage. These scholars— among them Kimberly Juanita Brown, Saidiya Hartman, Christina Sharpe, Hortense Spillers, and Alexander Weheliye—all understand the long reach of the antebellum period as having direct repercussions to how Black life functions currently. **Slavery as a vast hemispheric project fundamentally shapes how Blacknesses operate discursively and materially.9** The residues of unspoken, ethical grammars force those who find some degree of maneuverability possible to wrestle with some exigencies, such as the queered and erotic Black/white encounter or the presumed degradation of male rape as a locus of Black radical power.10 Man tethers itself to Blackness through abjec tion, requiring Blackness to make meaning through a grammar that enfolds within it the resistance to itself. Abjection becomes the facet of Blackness (not Blackness in toto) typified by the fact that “you can’t win. You can’t break even. And, you can’t get out of the game.”11 Whereas the field of Black studies has chosen to question the validity of the human as a concept, disability studies has taken a decidedly different strategy. Disability studies makes a particular claim on the human even as it acknowledges that the category excludes disability as a matter of course. For instance, myriad scholars clarify that the conception of health and ability determines who is included and who is worthy of living. Lives thought to be too painful, deformed, or requiring too much medical intervention often fight for the right to live at all.12 **The typical disability studies response has been to depict disability as a part of human variance, a part of the spectrum of human experience. This particular formulation correlates to the idea that if one lives long enough, one will become disabled.** The kingdom of the sick, as Sontag puts it, always welcomes new visitors and permanent residents.13 Undergirding this idea is the conception of the human as potentially inclusive of disability, where disability can function as an absent presence. According to disability studies scholars, this absent presence surfaces in narrative, art, and rhetoric, among other cultural and social spaces. For instance, the Venus de Milo makes its current claim to beauty based on its amputee status.14 In Keywords for Disability Studies, the entry on aesthetics positions disability as hopeful prospect despite its position and history: “The close proximity of aesthetic judgment to carceral isolation and rationalized euthanasia is the darker side of Enlightenment knowledge, even as the increased visibility of the disabled body creates the occasion for its liberation.”15 Narrative relies on intellectual disability even when it is not named as such or embodied within a character.16 Communication requires the disabled body to establish itself not only as coherent but also saleable in terms of diversity.17 In each of these instances, the human is a category to which disabled people already belong, albeit in abjected and absented form. The idea is not only that the human relies on disability to perform conceptual work but also that enfolded into the human is the experience of disability.

#### Our embracement of Black madness :: mad blackness operates as a discursive move against the imposition of whiteness and being able bodied through speaking on realities that are inherently unspeakable. Absent this mode of analysis, logics of white eugenics will lock mad blackness into a position of unfreedom.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 24-29, JMH]

Seemingly in answer to Bell’s work, scholars developed a reading strategy that clarifies how race and disability operate: mutual constitution. Specifically, mutual constitution impresses upon readers how these two discourses operate as interrelated and simultaneously present. This reading strategy performs several useful functions within the scholarship. In the interest of carving space to examine our critical conversations and open them up with the work of artists-theorists, I turn to several key moments in our use of mutual constitution to think through when it works and when it does not. This critical reading strategy becomes useful when understanding how disability has been used as a discursive tool. For example, racial and gendered groups have tended to justify their cases for civil rights in opposition to individuals with disabilities. The rhetorical invocation of disability here only functions to undergird the validity of another people groups’ personhood (at the expense of the personhood of the disabled).4 **Disability, in this case, does not quite exist as a material reality but rather as a hauntological presence that helps create race and gender, sometimes as superlative. In thinking of race and disability as material, one must consider that contexts of oppression and war create disability, often with detrimental effects on those already disenfranchised by institutional racism.**5 In this case, disability shores up the physical evidence of institutionalized racism and systemic injustice, helping to define race as a matter of life and death. In addition to highlighting the discursive and material effects of race and disability in tandem, such mutuality also serves an argumentative function. Since it is a critical reading practice, it also shapes how critics write about the two subjects. This project, in its interest in openoing up the critical literature to itself, invests in discussing this as a writing and reading strategy for how it roadmaps intellectual possibility (and, as the metaphor goes, closes off certain avenues). Within Ellen Samuels’s monograph Fantasies of Identification: Disability, Gender, Race (2014), she pinpoints that “the mutual entangled and constitutive dynamic of disability, gender, and race in modern fantasies of identification determines the shape and trajectory of [her] book” and, in articulating her main argument, states that “if, at times, one of these embodied social identities comes to the foreground, such that parts of the book address disability or race or gender more centrally, the overarching argument remains structured around the inseparability of their meanings.”6 An incredibly useful proposition. Samuels’s caveat guarantees that readers do not miss the way that all discussions heavily rely on each other. Historically speaking, the creating of disability, race, and gender occurs at the same time. The strands of what would become modern medicine worked to differentiate bodies from each other, specifically normal bodies from abnormal ones, where abnormal was constituted in gendered, raced, and abled terms. These fantasies of identification found their justification in what Samuels terms “biocertification,”7 a process that further links the construction of abnormality (and with it the construction of Blackness and disability) to objective science, aspiring to some semblance of truth. What becomes clear is not just that one cannot read race without disability nor disability without race, but that their entanglement requires a robust critical armature that grapples with them both. When I trace the use of mutual constitution, two critical reading practices emerge: first, recuperation projects that seek to historicize, and, second, retrieval projects that read against ableism to find agency. In this way, mutual constitution performs as scholarly shorthand for “It’s complicated.” Intussuscepted (that is, enfolded) in these readings are several challenges to the practices themselves: specifically, scholarship is stagnated between recuperation and resistance. What of the projects that are neither? Is there a space between these or next to them, narratologically speaking? How can we read the moments when race and disability have a wider range of relationships? In what follows, I read the spaces where the critical material breaks open the possibilities for new readings of Blackness and disability in tandem. Though much of this material analyzes Blackness and disability broadly, I find that the distillate reveals the critical material to itself, suggesting that madness, Black madness in particular, troubles the impulses of retrieval and radicality. First, **Blackness and madness encounter the problem of existing on the same temporal plane, particularly when whiteness is a factor. The Black mad subject gets evacuated from history while the white able subject or white disabled subject dictates the terms of history’s narration.** Second, **Black mad subjects cannot always serve as the prompts for others’ freedom from ableism.** It is possible for Black individuals, institutions, and cultural spaces to be ableist.Moreover, when Black spaces function as examples of freedom for others, they do not exist on their own terms, a logical concern that lands us back in the terrain where whiteness instrumentalizes Blackness for its own ends. Later in this conversation, I turn to Octavia E. Butler’s Fledgling (2005) and her archive for how she theorizes Blackness and madness.8 Butler’s texts and her archive offer alternative analytic strategies to the problems posed by mutual constitution in its current form. Recuperating, Historicizing Mutual constitution attends to the fiction of fixity often ascribed to race and disability writ large. Reading race and disability in this way yokes the discourses to each other, since they typically cannot be pinned down elsewhere. When Ellen Samuels traces the way this mutual constitution functioned within the nineteenth century, she finds that the discourses that created and sustained ideas about race and ability were not only created at the same time but also reliant on each other for validity. These national fantasies were created by physicians who scrupulously searched the body for clues about its difference.10 Both the physically or mentally abnormal body and the racially abnormal body were understood as close cousins, demonstrating in their difference the validity and supremacy of the white able body by contrast. Samuels writes, “At the core of the fantasy of identification lies the assumption that embodied social identities such as race, gender, and disability are fixed, legible, and categorizable. This assumption, by now deeply naturalized in our social and ontological structures, in fact required elaborate construction and ongoing policing through the nineteenth century and early twentieth.”11 The very mutability of these social categories makes necessary the fiction of their fixity and the necessity of their policing by parties for whom that mutability causes concern. Mutual constitution offers a conceptual corrective, given the discursive history, and allows for an analysis to take shape around that history and the cultural context of its object(s) of inquiry. Ensuring that this corrective attends to history authorizes critics to acknowledge the plasticity of Blackness and madness in tandem. Consider that the United States census of 1840 was the first to provide statistics about mental illness. The faulty statistics counted a higher incidence of madness among Blacks in the North at numbers that far exceeded the amount of Black people full stop. This pseudoscientific evidence not only arrogated madness to Blackness generally but also provided putative proof that Blacks were unfit for freedom, claiming that free Blacks were eleven times more likely to have mental illness than the enslaved or white populations.12 The postbellum environment does not undergo a dramatic shift in this regard; the definitions of Blackness available hinge on definitions of sanity. Kim Nielsen’s A Disability History of the United States (2012) traces the early conception of citizenship as tied not only to enslavement but to mental illness as well.13 This connection and its mutability continue into the mid-twentieth century when wider public scrutiny of mental health institutions (and some scandal), advocacy from the family of president John F. Kennedy, and civil rights discourse made it possible to imagine integrating mentally ill and cognitively disabled people into public spaces.14 This integration effort occurs simultaneous to that which occurred for Black people, linking the two populations in the public sphere. This history pertains mostly to those categorized as mentally ill or cognitively disabled. Though the definition of madness for this text is more expansive than that (given the healthy skepticism of psy-disciplines based on this history), sketching the relationships between the two discourses and social identities over time permits a closer look at how Blackness and madness rely on each other for concretization. Such an analysis also reveals how tenuous they are**. This history makes clear that within the United States’s cultural zeitgeist, there is no Blackness without madness, nor madness without Blackness. Yet, the discourses’ fragility suggests that the two have been forced together out of political convenience and presumed abjection.** Notwithstanding the utility of mutual constitution as a historicizing tool, it cannot—as a methodology—fully account for how race and disability interact on a body or between bodies. **To be mutually constituted implies a reciprocity of creation. I put pressure on reciprocity because mutual implies simultaneity while occupying the temporal plane**. I put pressure on creation because constitution assumes that, where discourses or material conditions related to race and disability exist, they develop and are sustained completely and consistently. In other words, the phrase mutual constitution implies race and disability announce themselves at the same time and both exert pressure in constant fashion. Case in point: Michelle Jarman’s work exposes this fold. In her hermeneutic reading of lynch mobs and eugenic discourse, she writes that the two discourses are “not equal or competing” but rather “dynamic social and discursive processes that inform each other.”15 What her rhetorical sleight of hand allows is the possibility that one discourse will occupy more space than another or affect the material reality more than the other particularly within interracial encounter. Jarman pinpoints the hefty pull of eugenics discourse on the eventual castration of Benjy Compson (in Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury). Because the action of the novel takes place during the early twentieth century, she links this eugenics discourse to the pervasive nature and likely rationales for lynch mob murders. Though her link to lynch mobs undergirds her argument by positioning the two discourses as reliant on each other, her readings reveal that they do not affect material reality equally. For instance, Jarman’s opening gambit points to a tragic illustration of when both ableist and racist discourses collide in the real life beating of Billy Ray Johnson, a Black cognitively disabled man, and its aftermath. Here, the full force of racist eugenics comes to bear on the availability of justice for Johnson. There is a slippage in the way these two discourses occupy space: news outlets, civil rights organizations, and law enforcement could not conceptualize Johnson as both Black and cognitively disabled (I say more about this invisibility in the second discussion). He was either one or the other in their imagination. **The material consequence— suspended sentences and probation for his assailants instead of jail time— exacerbates the violence already inflicted**. What Jarman’s example reveals is that race and disability do vie for narrative space and, in this instance, determine material consequence based on which narrative is told and which is believed. Billy Ray Johnson’s story ghosts that of Faulkner’s Benjy because it undermines how we read the interlocking ideas about Blackness and madness within Sound and the Fury Here lies the critical lacuna we have yet to address. The historicization approach to discussions about race and disability presumes a linear progression of time, an unfolding that takes place at a pace to which we have become accustomed delineated by demarcations of second, minute, hour, day, month, and year. However, as calendars themselves often lay bare, few cultures think of time in the same way. Which New Year do you celebrate? Is your calendar lunar or solar? Time does not progress in the same fashion for everyone. It becomes useful to think of history in terms of the fold. Here, I yoke Spillers’s concept of the flesh with Deleuze’s understanding of the fold (a point of connection between ideas where one begets the other) to Fred Moten’s conceptualization of being, living, writing, meaning “in the break” (where history and narrative converge—invaginate or intussuscept to use his terms—as a requisite part of being intertwined). **If we are to linger in the fold, in the break, then we must reckon with the way madness and Blackness force us to render history countermnemonically: attending to gaps, mistakes, deferrals, silences, glitches.** It is in this break, cut, fold that the relationship between Blackness and madness becomes most clear. Here is the relationship between Blackness and disability writ large, a relationship sutured at times by its connections, but also turned in and turned out by missed connections, erasures, and gaps.16 Despite the fact that both disability and race as ideas emerged at the same moments in history, they do not necessarily occupy the same temporal plane when conjoined in quotidian interaction. In thinking of interracial encounter for instance, Sharon P. Holland reminds us of a “persistent problem in the Black/white encounter,” specifically that we must question “what happens when someone who exists in time meets someone who only occupies space?”17 As she delineates, Blackness appears as the antithesis of history, its excretion, whereas whiteness stands in for progression, being in time. Our sense of the two interacting in the same moment then is skewed by the fact that Blackness is not meant to be a part of history but rather its object. Black cultural production has consistently expanded upon this idea through its skepticism of linear progressive narratives that assume Western origins, choosing instead to position Africa (usually the continent, broadly conceptualized) as a futuristic space or elide Western notions of time and space.18 **Thinking through the Black mad subject, we must consider that this person is meant not only to occupy space but to be consistently removed from space in order to make room for the more recognizable subject: the white able body**. It is this body that dictates the terms of history and narrative. In the case of Billy Ray Johnson, the criminal justice system determined that his assailants were allowed to move on with their lives regardless of the violence and damage done to his body. If we are to consider Bell’s modest proposal, the Black mad subject is removed from time to make space for the white disabled body as well. In other words, the Black disabled subject exists only to shore up the value of others. So, when the Black/white encounter is divided along ability lines such that the disabled body is white and the able body is Black, what emerges is a dynamic of relationships that force Blackness and disability into the realm of unspeakability, troubling the idea that both are created and sustained at the same time.

#### The 1AC operates as an intervention against white able-bodied structures that seek to bracket out forms of black. Absent this analysis, whiteness will always seek to control the uncontrollable of mad black life.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 50-54, JMH]

As I mentioned, I deploy the term madness because of the critical possibilities it offers in its vagueness. It operates as a way to describe impairments such as cognitive disability or mental illness as well as a catchall phrase designed to reference those not behaving according to culturally prescribed norms. Here, **I harken back to the idea that madness is maddeningly everywhere with biopsychological and sociocultural valences.** Within Black cultural contexts, madness not only has this critical purchase but also carries with it the vernacular appeal of excess (e.g., mad as equivalent to very) and anger. For the purposes of this discussion, I loosely bifurcate madness into two categories, keeping in mind that each carries with it the cultural valences of excess: cognitive impairment (read: autism, Down syndrome, traumatic brain injury, dementia, etc.) and mental illness (read: bipolar, depression, schizophrenia, etc.). I split these experiences in order to attend to the differences in the way madness writ large is treated within Black cultural contexts.3 There are overlapping concerns, to be sure, but **the reactions within Black communities shift depending on the particular kind of madness one demonstrates.** Lurking within each discussion of madness— cognitive impairment or mental illness—is the idea, simply put, that Blackness changes things. **A Black cultural context mandates a different set of interpretive strategies because of the confluence of structural racism from the outside and its impact on the intracultural community, and structural patriarchy and ableism emanating from within the community**. Parsing mental illness and cognitive disability allows for a certain type of granularity when discussing Black cultural contexts and madness. The conversation that follows relocates the discussion of Blackness and madness outside the confines of the interracial encounter in order to under stand what may constitute disability cultures within Blackness. What analytics become necessary when examining madness within Blackness? There are of course two caveats to this discussion. First, it **is not entirely possible to get outside the confines of white cisheteropatriarchy, since it structures so much of what is possible within Black contexts**. For that reason, I turn to Nalo Hopkinson’s work because she dares to theorize a set of Black cultural contexts that are largely independent from white cisheteropatriarchal structures. Hopkinson’s theorizing about intraracial contexts relies on the particular tools of Black speculative fiction, even though her ideas resonate outside of that creative context.4 I also focus on cultural narratives because of what they offer in terms of theorizing from below, especially since “through analysis, texts on disability can be made to reveal the texture of community life.”5 The second caveat is that there are a wide variety of Black cultural contexts available to examine. The intention of this discussion is not to provide a rubric that suits all of them but to provide an inroad to examination, one that exists as a set of overarching analytical possibilities until others develop. As a way to develop this schema, I read the current strategies for discussing madness within Blackness. Again, the critical literature reveals itself to itself through the gaps it leaves unattended. **I propose the mad Black as a way to reimagine and reread.** Nalo Hopkinson, as an artist-theorist, creates mad Black characters—one with a cognitive disability and another with a mental illness—in her mad Black novel Midnight Robber (2000). The two narratives twin each other and open up the possibilities for interpreting madness within Black communities. In considering mental illness within Black communities, two interpretive moments in the critical literature open up the parameters to think through how madness lays bare common culturally accepted narratives about Blackness. For example, in Anna Mollow’s meditation on Meri Nana-Ama Danquah’s Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman’s Journey through Depression, A Memoir (1998), Mollow concludes that Danquah’s narrative of depression foregrounds her race, class position, and immigrant status as a barrier to receiving adequate health care for her depression. Contrary to most within the ex-patient/survivor/consumer movement, Danquah’s concern is not overmedication or forced medication but a lack thereof. Not only do health care professionals demonstrate a lack of competence in discussing the influence of racial discrimination on Danquah’s depression, but Danquah also has to combat the following ideas: that depression is not real, that she is particularly strong as a Black woman, and (specific to her identity as an immigrant) that she only need work harder to overcome her sadness. Mollow reads Danquah’s narrative as a structural critique of the medical establishment’s tendency to ignore and/or underestimate Black women’s pain. I would add that Danquah’s memoir is a cultural critique of intraracial dictums that diminish Black women’s experiences with mental illness. What Mollow’s reading reveals is that Danquah’s depression exceeds the parameters in which she is expected to operate as a Ghanaian immigrant woman in the United States, parameters set by both dominant cultures and her own. To my mind, Danquah becomes circumscribed by her inability to appropriately perform the scripts of Black womanhood because of her mental illness. Here, the critical gap lies in the space between how Danquah’s depression indexes structural critique and how it also points to sociocultural critique. Whereas Mollow’s reading of Danquah’s narrative reveals how structural racism materially compounds the assault of oppressive intracultural narratives, literary interpretations within African American Studies unmask the limited space available for Black characters who experience madness. When discussing August Wilson’s oeuvre, which includes his cadre of cognitively disabled characters, Harry Elam describes “racialized madness” as a “trope that became operative in clinical practice, literary creation, and cultural theory in the modern period as artists, critics, and practitioners in all these arenas identified social and cultural roots for Black psychological impairment.”6 Elam usefully locates this trope in Frantz Fanon’s and W. E. B. Du Bois’s work as a diagnosis of what ails African descended people. The solution with August Wilson’s (and others’) work is to upend the social, cultural, and discursive elements that comprise a world hostile to Blackness. Elam argues that August Wilson creates characters that experience madness to clarify how much social and spiritual change would be necessary for a group of people who have already been driven mad by a mad world. This is a sociogenic madness, madness without pathos.7 I reference Elam and his work in African American literary study because of the way sociogenic theories have particular critical purchase for this field. **They denounce the pathologization of Black people for being Black yet embrace the understanding of the world as anti-Black. Yet, this is also madness without the multidimensionality that accompanies embodiment or aesthetic intervention: madness in service of sanity.** Mollow, Elam, and others abide by one delimited script: madness is not a biological or psychosocial impairment with experiences all its own. Rather, those who are Black and mad are societal bellwethers. Their madness either presages or pinpoints putative larger issues at stake. This idea rests on the politicization of both Blackness and madness, where either or both are primarily or solely political identities. Black madness then becomes revelatory for the rest of the world and the Black mad folks—real or imagined—stand in for an examination of what is happening. Their existence functions as an analysis tout court, an explication de texte that the world operates according to antiBlack logics. This script is of course not new. We have consistently thought of people who occupy marginalized social positions as markers of whether our governments, cultures, and communities fulfill ethical or moral obligations of caretaking. However, we cannot completely shunt aside the way the idea of a societal bellwether objectifies and distances the Black mad, stripping them of the multidimensionality that would emerge within a communal context. Critics attend to this conceptual problem by considering these characters or people within intraracial communities, but often these communities embrace this script as well. From this critical impulse follows the erroneous idea that the Black mad do not have community, or they operate as lone soldiers. **Here, their existential or ontological homelessness becomes a vehicle for other (sometimes, non-Black or non-mad) characters or people to discover their own missing humanity. Or, said homelessness results in death.** Read in the fold, in the break. **The Black mad as societal bellwether moves according to a linear progression of time, where their existence must be incorporated or excised in order to demonstrate progress of some sort.** (Billy Ray Johnson echoes here.) Typically, **that results in an erasure of either their Blackness or their madness**. Removing the impulse to view the Black mad as living analyses, they become invaginated into the moments of a text and do not function in the service of others but rather have their own plotlines and, sometimes, create their own resolutions. Or don’t. Narrative time no longer stands still, but it also does not operate strictly in linear fashion, preferring to intussuscept itself or create gaps and pauses.

#### The role of the judge is to be an immediator not a mediator, mediation is undergirded by logistical whiteness that seeks out the destruction of the excessive share. Immediation is not a neutral process, rather a subjective force of thirdness that interjects between the two in the name of liberation from the logistical path of existence.

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We already know how the story ends. On May 29, 2021, the headline reads: “Canada mourns as remains of 215 children found at indigenous school.”8 It wasn’t an indigenous school, of course. It was a residential school, a Canadian school, in the clearing. The picture says it all: sparse trees growing in the background, empty yard, an architecture completely at odds with the environment, cleared of life, of all that immanently interconnects. The violence of logistics is inscribed in the ghost trees of its whitened surround. How we organize bodies, we who sidle whiteness, how we excise (from clear sight) the ravages of an earth desecrated, of a people brutally murdered—these are the workings of logistics. Logistics mediate existence by keeping it at arm’s length, soothing us into believing that we are not responsible. The deaths are newsworthy, and we’re sorry, but we must move on. It’s not really about us and in any case, there’s nothing we can do about it. Let’s get a mediator and sort this out! At arms length, we see these workings—the cleared forest, the dying planet, the dead children—as somehow disconnected. We do not acknowledge the felling of the trees as the wanton destruction of all that transversally connects. And yet logistics, in its power of mediation, is all about the forests. It’s all about the cotton planted in their wake. The ghostly outline of Proulx’s pine table haunts the residential school, its absence equal to the absence of education. Because what the residential school really does is unteach. Taking the place of pedagogy, what is practiced here is theft. Theft of thought, of imagination. This theft is a rape. A physical rape, a sexual aggression, but also a conceptual rape, a clearing—“to snatch, to grab, to carry off by force”—of all that lives in the abyss of what has been left behind.9 Rape, relation severed, cuts the fragile interwoven threads of existence, wresting life from life-living, from the more-than that gives it its spirited and spiritual contour. If body is land, if bodying is only ever worlding, what residential school does, in this most recent form of clearing, is sever this imbrication, leaving the body lifeless. All that remains is the clearing. And a mess. But this can be handled. This is how mediation does its work, in the name of and as logistics. From here on in, things will be managed. Managers will be appointed to organize, to administer, the now-reduced environment. This science of loss—“which is to say the science of whiteness, or logistics”—is predicated on the end of sharing, on the destruction of the excessive share, the annihilation of that which exceeds the one-two form whose dramaturgy relies of the intervention of the mediator.10 The mediator will take the form of the “yellow eyebrows” in Proulx’s account, but it also need not take a simple human form. Repetition of the same is the form it takes in a dramaturgy of extinction. Scene 3 Clearing produces property. Property produces dispossession. “All property is loss because all property is the loss of sharing.”11 The accursed share of all that exceeds interpersonality, mediation, whiteness, logistics, all that cannot be accounted for, sickens the field. And sometimes rejuvenates it. The force of the transindividual, of all that exceeds and precedes the individual, does rewild. But its vitality is weakened, and as perception is honed to single out the individual over the field, the human increasingly becomes the focal point, becoming synonymous with life. This is how the logistics of genocide—the genocide of relation—does its work. The genocide of relation can never be traced back, quite. Relation cannot be propertied. What is lost cannot be parsed. The yellow eyebrows have a role to play, of course, and we could call on the archbishop for that missing apology, but the truth is, it was never just one. He was never just the one. He is a logistical pattern, a commitment to the dramaturgy of (white) man as self-centered orchestrator of existence cleared. Logistics: the slave ship, but also the body-as-individual. “The first odious vessel produced by and for logistics is not the slave ship, but the body—flesh conceptualized—which bears the individual-in-subjection.”12 In the clearing, man is revealed as the loss of relation. Humanism is born here, in the empty space of the stolen land, in the vast expanse of the 1+1, the infinite regress of nothing-in-between. How to fill the emptiness? How to create an account for all that is lost and yet claimed? Mediation offers to fill the shape of the between. Mediation as the figure of what comes between, of what fills that “empty” space. The adjuster, the divorce lawyer, the priest, the government agent. A quick intervention to make sense of all that has become unclear, to fill in the lines, to provide context. And perhaps this does make things clearer, perhaps we understand each other a bit better now that we’ve mediated all we couldn’t make sense of in the vast emptiness of our difference. But the problem is: mediation never goes away. It sits there, inert but active, facilitating the ongoing impoverishment relation by adhering to all that takes the shape of the 1+1 of body-as-individual, of interpersonality. Because in advance of the gesture of inserting the mediating influence, he is already there. Long before the divorce, he hovers, betweener, judging, parsing, condoning, condemning. His take doesn’t really matter. What matters is that he remains in the offing, holding things apart. Mediation is the father of the control society. It is the way surveillance takes on a personality from the outside in. Whether formally or informally, mediation sets the tone for an interpersonality that, by definition, can only be lived at a distance. Playing at impartiality, mediation haunts the surround, reducing it to what is already known, what is already valued, what is already within the scope of the expressible. 2+1, always less than 3, mediation is passive aggressor, poised for judgment, always in the know (while it listens carefully). Because its role is to keep existence in its track, on its logistical path. It doesn’t really matter who is right. It matters that it needs mediation. Mediation knows best, trampling on any detail of middling, sewing interactivity into a twoness without excess. Hardening the between of interpersonality into the amplification of the self-same, mediation lodges at the interstice, cutting it into a hyphen, setting up its colony on the bridge. Settler, it speaks from a place it has never had to truly encounter because its role is only to order things apart. Harney and Moten might speak of mediation with the same disdain as they do of logistics, which they call the “science of whiteness.”13 Mediation is the logistic category par excellence of whiteness. It has no content, is not in itself an agent of transformation, does nothing but cannibalize the life it parses. Its intervention happens in the beat of enter and retreat, leaving the uneasy twoness of existence to sort itself out. In the name of property and propriety, mediation solves all uncertainties of zoning. That it never actually leaves is its dirty secret. But the logistics of mediation can only fail. The interface is shaky—we know this both from the endemic code 404, page not found, and from the impossibility of truly domesticating our surrounds. Ultimately, the squirrels, the black flies, the birds, the worms, the fungi, the weeds, the viruses, the hackers cannot be kept in their place. The disarray is handled, of course, with more mediation, with more logistics. The interface claims a distance, a secure between-two that repeats the refrain of nature colonized, of culture denatured. It promises a security of inhabitation, a zone that can be controlled, a slip through which we can safely enter, we who claim the place. Here, in the logistics of passage that beats at the cadence of the one-two, me-you, the outcome is always the same. Police to subjugate. Code to organize. Clear to colonize. Logistics aims to straighten us out, untangle us, and open us to its usufruct, its improving use; such access to us, in its turn, improves the flow line, the straight line. And what logistics takes to be the shortest distance between us requires emplotting us as bodies in space where interiority can be imposed even as the capacity for interiority can be denied, in the constant measure and regulation of flesh and earth.Scene 5 Deleuze and Guattari speak of man as the white wall of the black hole of existence.15 Think landscape painting, especially the kind that excises that very life that breathed it into existence. If you’re not familiar, search for “Canadian art.” And if you don’t know the history of the mansplaining of the Canadian landscape, search for the Group of Seven, the early twentieth-century Canadian landscape painters, and notice not only the ubiquity of the vast open, uninhabited space, notice the clearing. Very little has changed over the last hundred years. We still see Canada through the clear, in the emptiness of nature cultured. The denuded land, the empty north, is how we art ourselves still today, we who property the land. The Group of Seven, those painters of the land pristine, of the great white north, the painters of the land of the (single) pine and of the distant ridges, they are still with us, still managing the imagination, orchestrating the field, playing the dramaturgy of extinction. Logistics are also aesthetic (if not artful). The white man is a specter. That is to say, the white man is without content, without shape. He is the shift in form that allows all takings-place to be propertied inhabitations, which is to say, sites already claimed. This is whiteness: the pretense that the lines that demarcate the boundary between me and you protect you, protect me, from the wilderness of all that cannot be contained (and must be kept at bay). The truth is, the wilderness was cleared, but never quite colonized. And that is why whiteness is alive and well. To police a job half-done. Scene 6 Mediation makes many promises. It promises clarity: think, drop-down menu. It promises fairness: think, divorce court. It promises health: think, therapy. The gesture is cast as innocuous. A simple third, a neutral agent. A little bit of reason. A moment of distance. An interlude so that things can be tied up again and smooth functioning can resume. A representation of the useful.16 But what is it to insert distance into a field of relation if not violence of the highest degree? Whose distance? At what cost? To what ends? Guattari fights against this at every turn, refusing mediation either in politics or in psychiatry. Schizoanalysis is the proposition, a call for a transversal operation that breaks the pretense of neutrality in the encounter. A therapeutics of transversality. No more triangle. No more transference. Schizoanalysis is the event of the encounter itself, the practice of encountering. To be in the relation is to have been changed by it. What this looked like: a years-long institutional arrangement housed at a clinic called La Borde in the north of France whereby to be in the therapeutic encounter was to live with the effects of encounters in the everyday and to learn from them how to continue to live. Nothing very complicated, really. But infinitely complex in its transversality. Because to live in the encounter, to allow ourselves to be changed by it, is to be continuously undone, and to be sensitive to all that comes alive in that undoing. Who we are is a question that can only really be asked (and answered) by the mediator. The mediator, after all, looks in from outside to tell us how our actions are affecting the world. Without the mediator there is no steady external gaze, no calm interface for the mirroring. That’s why “who we are” is always a white question, a question of whiteness, of colonization. Blackness, write Harney and Moten, is not a thing, or a state (of being). It is the way the doing expresses. It is not a subject, not a person, not a property. It is a field. It is the excess on itself of a body claimed, blackened by hate. Blackness is the celebration of refusing to claim, to be claimed. “Meanwhile, Michael Brown is like another fall and rise through man—come and gone, as irruption and rupture, to remind us not that black lives matter but that black life matters; that the absolute and undeniable blackness of life matters; that this is not a judgment of value but a description of a field of activity that obliterates the worldly distinction between the organic and the inorganic.”17 Blackness is not the simple descriptor of what has been enfleshed. Blackness cannot be mediated into a form imposed (exposed). Blackness is the force of living that exceeds colonization, its accursed share. And in that sense, the wildness of the surround, it too is black. As is the earth. This is what Guattari means when he entreats us to move from schizoanalysis as a therapeutic-political dispositif, an agencement more than an apparatus, a moving-forth of encounterings afield, toward the transversality of what he calls the “three ecologies.”18 These three ecologies, the mental/conceptual, the environmental, and the social, are the overlap, as I see it, of a commitment to a blackening of the earth, out of the clear. (Necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that extracts and excepts himself from the earth in order to confirm his supposed dominion over it. And just as the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed, man must forcefully speciate himself in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement. The world is posed as the way to live on the earth as the individual is posed as the way to live in the world. To live in the world as an individual is therefore to be logistic, and to be logistic is to settle into a rhythm that kills, to beat out that rhythm over the undercommon track that keeps (giving away) its own measure.19 Scene 7 Guattari wrote The Three Ecologies in what have come to be known as his winter years. The winter years came after a sustained attempt at working with the Green Party in the aftermath of the terrible letdown of post-1968 politics in France. This attempt to connect to state politics left Guattari with a sour taste. He knew better, of course, than to trust state politics to be a site of transformation. Schizoanalysis had been the wager that there were other ways—that to work “in common,” “toward the common” is, ultimately, always to commit to the logic of mediation. In The Three Ecologies, he makes a plea to invent new ways of being committed to and involved in the urgent call to transversalize experience, ways that move beyond how the state lays claim to existence: In the domain of social ecology there will be times of struggle in which everyone will feel impelled to decide on common objectives and to act “like little soldiers,” by which I mean like good activists. But there will simultaneously be periods of resingularisation in which individual and collective subjectivities will take their marbles and go home without a thought for collective goals, and in which creative expression as such will take precedence. This new ecosophical logic—and I want to emphasize this point—resembles the manner in which an artist may be led to alter his work after the intrusion of some accidental detail, an event-incident that suddenly makes his initial project bifurcate, making it drift [dériver] far from its previous path, however certain it had once appeared to be.20 There is an echo in this ecosophic call to Moten and Harney: Rather than dissipate our preoccupation with how we live and breathe, we need to defend our ways in our persistent practice of them. It’s not about taking the streets; it’s about how, and about what, we take to the streets. What would it be and what would it mean for us jurisgeneratively to take to the streets, to live in the streets, to gather together another city right here, right now?21 Ecosophic logic is a refusal of the clearing, of the ways in which we seek to inhabit the space already colonized. It recognizes the lure, and understands the commitment to change that the gesture of taking the streets embodies. But ecosophic logic asks a different question: What if instead we practiced living by creating new conditions that didn’t center us, that didn’t inadvertently redeem that central and self-centering figure of man and its mediating logistics? What if we painted into the dérive of artfulness’s angle on experience? What if we moved at the pace of that accidental detail tangled with the weeds we have been wasting so much time clearing? Ecosophic logic is an urgent call to refuse the ongoing clearing that denies, decries, and violates the force of blackness in the ongoing genocide of all that resists the count. To refuse does not mean to face and challenge. Frontality, the neurotypical activity par excellence, only cements into place what is already there, what is already claiming the ground of existence. To refuse means to move into the accursed share of life-living twisting in the troubled interstice, to move with that anarchic share of existence that keeps giving life. For life-living to thrive, life has to be activated at those interstices that exceed man. Life’s expression as tangle has to be attuned to from the edges in. Conditions have to be crafted to honor what is not about us. This is what the First Nations in Barkskins of course already knew. And for this they were cleared. To see, to feel, what was always already there, to pulse with a force of life-living that cannot be claimed—owed or owned—this was always the crime. Scene 8 The many years Guattari spent practicing schizoanalysis, which is to say, living at La Borde and encountering, daily, the shape of an existence unmediated, an existence committed, always, to a refusal of normopathy—these are what he takes into the project of the three ecologies. And it is specifically the orientation of La Borde toward neurodiversity, I believe, that makes it necessary to underscore what he calls the mental, or conceptual, ecology as the inflecting force that must, and will, change the contours of the environmental and the social. La Borde taught him this: to skirt the question of the subject leaves the black hole wide open, filled to the brim with neurotypicality, whiteness. In the sickness that has befallen the earth—the ongoing genocide of all that eludes the count—subjectivity, too, has fallen ill. Replaced by the face of man, given the guise of whiteness in all its logistical powers of mediation, subjectivity has been swallowed, engulfed by the subject. “The main feature of the colonial-capitalistic unconscious is the reduction of subjectivity to its subject’s experience.”22 But subjectivity, as Guattari understands it, is nothing other than its ongoing production. It is not the subject. It is the transversal, the emergent unmediated middle, the collectivity that must never be reduced to the one. This is why, for a renewed project of the earth, or as Moten and Harney would have it, for the blackening of the earth—“we are the moving, blackened, blackening earth”23—“it will be a question of literally reconstructing the modalities of ‘group-being’ [l’être-en-groupe], not only through ‘communicational’ interventions but through existential mutations driven by the motor of subjectivity.”24 To construct modalities for group-being is a call for an aesthetics of sociality which exceeds the 1+1 of interpersonality. Group-being, or what Guattari refers to as the “group subject,” is not countable. The group subject is never the sum of its parts. As solitary as it is multiplicitous, the group subject makes felt how subjectivity is produced in the excess on itself of coming into relation. The group subject is how the more-than of the relational field finds expression. It is the emergent collectivity of an expression of life-living shared (in its accursed excess), expression irreducible to the one, always beyond consensus. Without mediation, the group subject is activated in the renunciation of summing up. To produce the modalities for this excess of existence requires a mutation on existence itself, a mutation that in every sense rethinks subjectivity as a position. The group subject reminds us that what we produce is never solely ours. We are not simply our-selves. We are fieldings of complex imbrication. Any other account of experience is subjected to mediation, organized by logistics. Anarchival to the core, the production of subjectivity is not an account of a life contained. It is not condensable to something like identity. It is not reducible to the form of the human. It is always more-than, always in movement, a motor or conduit of a worlding. The production of subjectivity bodies in the same gesture that it refuses to be a body, an “individual-in-subjection.”25 That is to say: in the production of subjectivity the bodying is always a being of relation. Always in movement, it does its living in the unlimited exposure that exceeds any body-world separation. Subjectivity is not inside. It is not in me. It is out of me. Rather than speak of the “subject,” we should perhaps speak of components of subjectification, each working more or less on its own. This would lead us, necessarily, to re-examine the relation between concepts of the individual and subjectivity, and, above all, to make a clear distinction between the two. Vectors of subjectification do not necessarily pass through the individual, which in reality appears to be something like a “terminal” for processes that involve human groups, socio-economic ensembles, data-processing machines, etc. Therefore, interiority establishes itself at the crossroads of multiple components, each relatively autonomous in relation to the other, and, if need be, in open conflict.26 “That abolition starts with the self.”27 In the drift, subjectivity’s dérive is irreducible to the human. Active in the interval of worlds making themselves, subjectivity is never reducible to a subject. The production of subjectivity is the activity of the interstice: vector, not form. Schizoanalysis works at this uneasy juncture. The task of schizoanalysis is not to get between body and world, between-two. Its task is to make way for all that already populates the between, and to agitate, from within the field of relation, orientations already in germ. Fostering the germination, tending the field, schizoanalysis vectors the inflection. The vectoring requires a subtraction from the open field of all that is still in potentia. Schizoanalysis culls from potential a shape, a way. This excision from process is a subtraction from infinitude to the finite. From the side of infinitude, in the field of immanence, Whitehead calls this activity that sparks a standing out of experience “importance.” From the side of finitude, in the field of activity, Whitehead calls it “expression”: Expression is founded on the finite occasion. It is the activity of finitude impressing itself on its environment. Thus it has its origin in the finite; and it represents the immanence of the finite in the multitude of its fellows beyond itself. The two together, namely importance and expression, are witnesses both to the monistic aspect of the universe and to its pluralistic character. Importance passes from the world as one to the world as many; whereas, expression is the gift from the world as many to the world as one.28 Importance and expression function as intensifiers of experience, bringing into activity the singularity of a life that nonetheless continues to carry its anarchic share. In this account, the human is not singled out. There is no externalizing voice, no mediator. Arrows of experience are their own force, importance not a question of what matters to me, but of what actually (but always also in potentia) makes a difference. Importance makes way for precision in experience. That is to say, importance is what fosters a certain specific angle of existence, allowing certain qualities of experience to take precedence over others. We have come to believe that mediation is necessary to parse experience. But as Whitehead emphasizes, the world is always in its own pursuit of amplification. Incessant clearing, colonialism without end, in the afterlife of slavery, results in systems out of kilter. Ecological destruction has finally begun to register, centuries too late. The question of how to bring things into a metastability that is conducive to life-living must involve a reckoning with the deadening force of mediation. We don’t need another apology. We need to get out of the way. The blackening of the earth requires the production of something entirely other than me, or you.The infraface29 of the three ecologies—“the world as one to the world as many … the world as many to the world as one”—is immediating.30 Immediation is not the opposite of mediation. Rather, it is the force of a thirdness irreducible to a between-two. Immediation is the more-than, the n+1 that is by necessity n-1, one as many, many as one, the qualitative force of an uncountability that diagonalizes to give rise to what else moves in the relation. The production of subjectivity is immediating to the degree that it is not produced by something outside itself. Immediating, always at once body and world, its own perspective. That is to say, its angle on existence is not ours, cannot be reduced to us. The production of subjectivity is a making-conceptual of existence. It is an attuning to the deadly violence of the body-world split produced in the wake of the clearing.31 There are not three ecologies. There is one ecology multiply intertwined. To get to the potential of what the three ecologies in their transversality offer, the production of subjectivity must be attended to. We have failed each other at the juncture of the production of subjectivity in particular, and nothing will be possible without that shift. In the words of The Invisible Committee, the exhaustion of natural resources is probably much less advanced than the exhaustion of subjective resources, of vital resources, that is afflicting our contemporaries. If so much satisfaction is derived from surveying the devastation of the environment it’s largely because this veils the frightening ruin of subjectivities. Every oil spill, every sterile plain, every species extinction is an image of our souls in rags, a reflection of our lack of world, of our intimate impotence to inhabit it.32 To become in excess of a person, to activate the conditions for a life-living that worlds in the bodying, is a social and environmental act. The emergent sociality of becoming-environmental never happens through the clearing. In happens in the midst, black flies and all. The production of subjectivity in the transversality of the three ecologies is the way the more-than of nature naturing crafts a sociality ecosophically. A sociality, as Harney and Moten might say, all incomplete. Guattari calls the ecology he associates with the production of subjectivity “mental.” I prefer conceptual, to produce a stronger sense of how the world itself is alive with the movement of thought. A turn to Whitehead brings the two together. For Whitehead, the conceptual share is that excess of experience that tunes the occasion to its potential. All activity in the world has a conceptual share, but it is true to say that some aspects of existence make use of it more emphatically. Whitehead calls this “mentality.” Mentality, as in Guattari, is not reducible to the mind. Mentality is the force of existence. It is the world’s capacity to exceed itself. All incomplete, the world continuously renews itself. Scene 10 We don’t need to look to some far off lands: it’s already here. Isn’t that what Tommy Orange means when he says, “Being Indian has never been about returning to the land. The land is everywhere or nowhere”?33 The work has already begun. The accursed share of life-living is too unwieldy, too uncountable, to be mediated. It cannot be governed. This is its potency, but also its fallacy. The work is not where we’ve been taught it is. And the tools we need are not the ones we own. a nascent subjectivity a constantly mutating socius an environment in the process of being reinvented34 The three ecologies are a proposition. They are not a place. To follow the artist-architects Arakawa and Madeline Gins, we might call them an architectural procedure.35 An architectural procedure is not an architecture. It is a fielding of potential that brings into constellation enabling constraints for the construction of a world. Procedurality is key. An architectural procedure must produce itself propositionally. This means that what emerges will never be a thing, a site. It will undercommon itself into existence, perhaps—as Arakawa and Gins once said—“only making an appearance indirectly.”36 Because to see-feel it is to have created the conditions for feeling, conditions that were never reducible to a subject as given in advance. The event of the three ecologies is here, in the productive looping of a field of experience that is at once constitutive of its expression and constituted by it. Because when importance and expression meet, it is never at our bidding.

#### **The role of the negative is to offer novel creative epistemologies that reorients modernity’s understanding of subjectivity**

Manning 20 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty, “For a Pragmatics of the Useless” (pgs 289-297) published in November 2020 by [Duke University Press - For a Pragmatics of the Useless (dukeupress.edu)](https://www.dukeupress.edu/for-a-pragmatics-of-the-useless) accessed on July 13, 2022 by AP]

Neurodiverse qualities of attention can make getting going an issue; spaZe emerged as a technique for activating study. How we practice matters, and no change can occur without practice. This includes practicing value differently. What we most want to avoid with 3e is any return to the service economy and any kind of transactional economic politics. 3e is about asking how else we can value beyond the economy of credit that orients education today. What is the credit we exchange in the name of neurotypicality, of whiteness? What kind of sociality can be crafted that honors that debt, too immense to ever repay, turning it into the gift of Glissant’s poetics of relation, a living practice that reminds us at every turn that we must consent not to be a single being (1997, 5, 27)? We invite those of you who want to participate, who care to invent with us what else learning and living can be, to practice three modes of entry. We ask that you bring to the platform of exploratory learning one of these techniques: knot: a paradox or temporary impasse in one’s work, life, thinking, or creative practice that might become newly productive if staged in a way that opens it to a collaborative exploration, in language or between language and other modes of expression. juncture: a known conjunction reopened for further exploration through new techniques reconfiguring its potential; the juncture might be a theoretical perspective, a set of established techniques informing a particular practice, an already-operating collaboration or project, or an existing disciplinary, interdisciplinary, or intermedia platform, restaged with a new inflection. vector: a move out from known junctures into a wander line that is oriented by a proposition, and in that sense directionally constrained, but is at the same time open-ended in way that invites new takings-form on the fly. Platforms for relation are never set in stone. We only propose to begin here. Together we will see where the practice leads. What we know is this: platforms for relation are everywhere active in our everyday lives. We need to learn how to seed them across undercommoning environments. Through these platforms we need to germinate new practices, and to practice failing together. Content delivery is not what changes the conditions of experience. There is no production of desire there. What moves experience are practices that reorient the place of knowledge in experience, practices that ask how the being of relation produces the kind of transformative justice livingloving requires.

### 1AC --- Black Cyborg

#### Rejection is a pain like no other, one that projects deep into your soul.

Butler, 79 [Octavia Estelle Butler was an American science fiction author. A multiple recipient of both the Hugo and Nebula awards, she became in 1995 the first science-fiction writer to receive a MacArthur Fellowship. Born in Pasadena, California, Butler was raised by her widowed mother, “Positive Obsession”/ -ekh-]

Shyness is shit.

It isn’t cute or feminine or appealing. It’s torment, and it’s shit.

I spent a lot of my childhood and adolescence staring at the ground. It’s a wonder I didn’t become a geologist. I whispered. People were always saying, “Speak up! We can’t hear you.”

I memorized required reports and poems for school, then cried my way out of having to recite. Some teachers condemned me for not studying. Some forgave me for not being very bright. Only a few saw my shyness.

“She’s so backward,” some of my relatives said.

“She’s so nice and quiet,” tactful friends of my mother said. I believed I was ugly and stupid, clumsy, and socially hopeless. I also thought that everyone would notice these faults if I drew attention to myself. I wanted to disappear. Instead, I grew to be six feet tall. Boys in particular seemed to assume that I had done this growing deliberately and that I should be ridiculed for it as often as possible

I hid out in a big pink notebook—one that would hold a whole ream of paper. I made myself a universe in it. There I could be a magic horse, a Martian, a telepath. . . . There I could be anywhere but here, any time but now, with any people but these.

My mother did day work. She had a habit of bringing home any books her employers threw out. She had been permitted only three years of school. Then she had been put to work. Oldest daughter. She believed passionately in books and education. She wanted me to have what she had been denied. She wasn’t sure which books I might be able to use, so she brought whatever she found in the trash. I had books yellow with age, books without covers, books written in, crayoned in, spilled on, cut, torn, even partly burned. I stacked them in wooden crates and second-hand bookcases and read them when I was ready for them. Some were years too advanced for me when I got them, but I grew into them.

An obsession, according to my old Random House dictionary, is “the domination of one’s thoughts or feelings by a persistent idea, image, desire, etc.” Obsession can be a useful tool if it’s positive obsession. Using it is like aiming carefully in archery.

I took archery in high school because it wasn’t a team sport. I liked some of the team sports, but in archery you did well or badly according to your own efforts. No one else to blame. I wanted to see what I could do. I learned to aim high. Aim above the target. Aim just there! Relax. Let go. If you aimed right, you hit the bull’s-eye. I saw positive obsession as a way of aiming yourself, your life, at your chosen target. Decide what you want. Aim high. Go for it.

I wanted to sell a story. Before I knew how to type, I wanted to sell a story.

I pecked my stories out two fingered on the Remington portable typewriter my mother had bought me. I had begged for it when I was ten, and she had bought it

“You’ll spoil that child!” one of her friends told her. “What does she need with a typewriter at her age? It will soon be sitting in the closet with dust on it. All that money wasted!”

It will soon be sitting in the closet with dust on it. All that money wasted!” I asked my science teacher, Mr. Pfaff, to type one of my stories for me—type it the way it was supposed to be with no holes erased into the paper and no strike-overs. He did. He even corrected my terrible spelling and punctuation. To this day I’m amazed and grateful.

I had no idea how to submit a story for publication. I blundered through unhelpful library books on writing. Then I found a discarded copy of The Writer, a magazine I had never heard of. That copy sent me back to the library to look for more, and for other writers’ magazines to see what I could learn from them. In very little time I’d found out how to submit a story, and my story was in the mail. A few weeks later I got my first rejection slip.

When I was older, I decided that getting a rejection slip was like being told your child was ugly. You got mad and didn’t believe a word of it. Besides, look at all the really ugly literary children out there in the world being published and doing fine!

I spent my teens and much of my twenties collecting printed rejections. Early on, my mother lost $61.20—a reading fee charged by a so-called agent to look at one of my unpublishable stories. No one had told us that agents weren’t supposed to get any money up front, weren’t supposed to be paid until they sold your work. Then they were to take ten percent of whatever the work earned. Ignorance is expensive. That $61.20 was more money back then than my mother paid for a month’s rent.

I badgered friends and acquaintances into reading my work, and they seemed to like it. Teachers read it and said kindly, unhelpful things. But there were no creative writing classes at my high school, and no useful criticism. At college (in California at that time, junior college was almost free), I took classes taught by an elderly woman who wrote children’s stories. She was polite about the science fiction and fantasy that I kept handing in, but she finally asked in exasperation, “Can’t you write anything normal?”

A schoolwide contest was held. All submissions had to be made anonymously. My short story won first prize. I was an eighteen-year-old freshman, and I won in spite of competition from older, more experienced people. Beautiful. The $15.00 prize was the first money my writing earned me.

After college I did office work for a while, then factory and warehouse work. My size and strength were advantages in factories and warehouses. And no one expected me to smile and pretend I was having a good time.

I got up at two or three in the morning and wrote. Then I went to work. I hated it, and I have no gift for suffering in silence. I muttered and complained and quit jobs and found new ones and collected more rejection slips. One day in disgust I threw them all away. Why keep such useless, painful things?

#### Emerging technologies create disinformation campaigns, expanding state influence to justify its mistreatment of racialized and disabled subjects through the weaponization of cognitive dissonance in algorithmic fashion

Zach **Naqvi 21** [Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Madness, Migration and Media in the Modern Digital Age, April 14th 2021, pg.2-7, -ekh-]

Citizenship, migration and international relations informing how we conceptualize policy get inextricably tied to sovereign states that determine the fate of refugees. The framework that facilitates this process has followed a chaotic trajectory in recent years. Understanding the rise of populist rhetoric emerging in North America and Europe, among others, points to recent developments in international relations requiring greater scrutiny, with specific practices necessitating a closer look by communities at home and abroad. I argue that we have fallen short of our collective humanitarian promise of dignity and fundamental human rights for everyone, regardless of race, gender, religion, class, or country of origin. Unsurprisingly, the sovereignty of the state and a universal humanitarian aim have had difficulties getting reconciled. In theory and practice, pragmatism and utopia and things related to realist necessity versus a more utopian idealism – international relations are plagued with a disconnect between what ought to be and what is. The reason is that states, unlike individuals, families and communities are not concerned primarily with such lofty ideals as human dignity, fraternity, equality, and the like. Instead, they get inseparably linked with the fundamental objective of consolidating, maintaining, and executing powers that we as individuals upon the grounds of elections, citizenship and birth or connection have authorized the state to have. Furthermore, many view frameworks of citizenship and migration from a privileged standpoint, concerned with realist undertones of security, sovereignty, and the success of their state above all else. The dire question here is whether those immigrating, seeking asylum or even completely stateless can reasonably expect to be accommodated by sovereign states.

First, alternative facts or the designation by some that we are entering a post-truth world, amplified by improvements in technology moving us collectively towards increasingly interconnected existence, lay bare for all to see a new power dynamic playing out over the past decade. The aim of alternative facts is “to establish power: they are lying to flaunt power. They are saying to us: ‘we know that you know that this is a lie, and we don’t care, because there is absolutely nothing you can do about it’ … over years, ceaseless propaganda and spectacle, exacerbated by corrections and retractions, can destroy your sense of reality. Time spirals forward and lurches backwards.” (Kendzior, 2020, p.18) Take Franz Fanon, for example. Despite his death decades ago, his lived experience then provides critical insight now. Fanon was a doctor and the acclaimed author of Black Skin, White Masks. Despite his subjective personhood being complex and multifaceted, not constrained simply to role or race, when practicing medicine, it is a mistake made as a black doctor if he made a mistake. Similarly, refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers are broadly categorized as if the totality of their being constitutes race – and nothing more. Other times, we simply view things based on monetary or pragmatic conditionality. As Fanon notes, it is society, unlike biochemical processes, that do not escape human influence. Yet, it is us that brings society into being. (Fanon, 2008, p. XV) We saw this media makeover take place in society with the portrayal of Muslims, migrants and more recently with the Chinese during COVID-19, among a myriad of other examples through the ages. Kendzior notes how, “a media makeover is a peculiar wound. It is a terrible feeling to be in pain and ignored – as a place, as a person. It is worse to be given a mask and told it’s your face.” (Kendzior, 2020, p. 22) In other words, alongside ordinary people behaving rationally according to human psychology, some behave pathologically according to inhuman psychology. (Fanon, 2008, p. 15) We have forgotten sense from nonsense and implemented it ubiquitously as if it held any semblance of truth.

Take Wiener’s (1960) framing of the coming difficulties of technological advancement. It still proves influential because he generalized it beyond literal human–machine cooperation to any situation in which two systems work together at different temporal and perceptual scales. Because choices made today with limited information can have terrible long-term consequences that we cannot foresee, Wiener warns that “the purpose put into the machine — be it a literal machine like a Twitter algorithm, or a metaphorical one like the corporation that runs it — should be the purpose that we ‘really desire’ and not a colourful imitation.” (Wiener, 1960; Prier, 2017) That colourful imitation has become the norm with associations of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers based not on dignity but premised on race and identity politics masquerading as genuine discourse. In terms of how to meaningfully address this inversion, I believe it necessary to borrow from the very tactics we aim to illuminate. In a manner reminiscent of Darko Maver, where “the borders between reality and false, if they exist at all, are so thin that often the roles exchange and reality copies imitation,” Deseriis (2010) theorizes their method as a form of ‘media homeopathy.’ Where “the idea was to inject into the media bloodstream stories whose patent falsity would eventually induce the media immune system into a reaction of its own.” This example brings us to the most suggestive connection to the present. The QAnon conspiracy, from the beginning, fixated on the lurid idea of hidden child molestation rings. However, historically this is nothing new. The middle ages were plagued with conspiracies concerning Jewish cabals and children. (Spence, 2019) Recently, Swami (2012) noted a positive relationship between right wing authoritarianism and beliefs in anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, but a negative relationship with general beliefs in conspiracy theories. It points to how individuals may well pick and choose theories that fit with a particular political view or belief system. Moreover, the 90s saw Italy face its version of “Satanic Panic” around child sex abuse. Feeling that people were baselessly targeted, Luther Blissett activists responded in an unconventional way — with a multiyear campaign of interconnected, multi-city media pranks.” (Davis, 2018) As Q-Anon has gotten ‘unmasked’ recently in the HBO (2021) documentary Q, Into the Storm, and used to get hosted on a site whose slogan is ‘embrace infamy’, it would appear history has repeated itself through the injection of blatantly false narratives, except this time – it led to a clear and definitive mass mobilization. Furthermore, states profoundly benefit from this obfuscation, and I believe, as was the case with Trump in 2016, can have real success from dividing people into distinct categories and subsequently pitting these separate groups against each other. Rhetoric based on this divisive and obfuscated nature is the link I explore that differentiates arguments about justice, human rights, and dignity on the one hand and the actual telos of institutions on the other. Migration, immigration, and asylum frameworks have particularly gotten affected by this developing phenomenon detaching its purpose from actions. What I mean is instead of being concerned with the framework on which migration gets premised, we have forgotten that the framework’s telos or point in favour of the outcomes that result from it. As a means to an end, the frameworks are politicized in a Machiavellian manner, not ends in themselves. Likewise, social media is not free as one would like to believe. It follows a similar path as it is us who are the product, which is done by commodifying our data. Additionally, migratory narratives are often not concerned with promoting virtue but instead are concerned with outcomes. Kantian autonomy and human dignity help one to discern how this plays out; as is the case with varied frameworks, we treat people as a means to an end and not an end in themselves. The result: utilization of polarization for populist ends that often scapegoat’s foreigners, migrants, and refugees – among other fashionable outgroups, dependent on time, place, and circumstance. (Muslims after 9/11, Turkish with BREXIT, Chinese during COVID,)

Unfortunately, as much as we have never been more connected, we are also divided and polarized by the very tools that promote this connectivity. Similarly, the problem with Trump’s rhetoric, as with big tech, is that the purpose or telos gets obfuscated, and as a result, many lack the ability or context necessary to discern fundamental conceptions such as the difference between a migrant, internally displaced person, and refugee from broader conversations on what migratory regimes ought to look like. A clear example of this was illustrated during Hurricane Katrina, where many government representatives mistakenly referred to the displaced persons as refugees. Additionally, “the U.S. government did not adequately protect the rights of Gulf Coast residents during displacement, failing in many cases to prevent discrimination against the poor, immigrants, and people of colour, and allowing children, the elderly, disabled persons and other vulnerable populations to be put in life-threatening situations.” (Brookings, 2008, p. 5) If this occurred to those already in the US, it is unsurprising to see this outcome on a more pervasive scale for those with no citizenship or legal standing. On a more positive note, despite state powers, we also have the power to articulate concerns and voice expectations – albeit without a monopoly on violence like the state. (Weber, 1965) As Kendzior points out, “There is a difference between expecting autocracy and accepting autocracy. It is necessary to expect it so that you can plan how you will fight. But the battle lines change, and you often end up changing with them.” (Kendzior, 2020, p. 15) The sentiment as mentioned above is echoed in Nietzche’s quip how “he who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.” (Nietzsche & Zimmern, 1997, p. 52) Building on Nietzsche, I surmise the reason for our collective spiral into distrust, fueling anti-immigrant populist rhetoric, reflects how misinformation embodies the tale of the mythological hydra. What I mean is, when you cut one head off – three grow back to replace it. Similarly, when attempting to debunk blatantly false narratives, it only feeds further into conspiratorial rhetoric, reinforcing the person’s views that they are getting confronted because what they view is correct. Exchanges like this rob potential discourse of being constructive and cannot reasonably assess the credibility of varied points of view. Moreover, cognitive dissonance is a powerful influence on the mind causing hesitations regarding the credibility of contradictory information, especially pertaining to conspiracies. (Leman & Cinnirella, 2013) A typical interaction I have personally experienced many times manifests as such:

One person critical of conspiratorial narratives can say, “Not everything is intentional, and not everything has meaning,” referring to some real or imagined cabal, deep state, or conniving billionaire suiting their predispositions (Soros, Gates, Zuckerberg, Musk, Bezos, Trump, etc.) In response, the person defending their blatantly false views can say, “Well… that is just your opinion,” “You fell for the misinformation,” or “I did my research, you should do yours.”

The distrust is so pervasive that even asking for sources for the ‘research’ is met with hostility, contempt, or stonewalling. As a result, honest and credible debate cannot occur when the very foundation the conversation rests on is negated through open-ended Socratic style musings that talking heads like Tucker Carleson implore regularly. (Kaufman, 2021; AP, 2020) To clarify precisely how this presents itself, suppose I ask you, “are illegal aliens a burden to our country?” This is precisely the bad faith musings that presuppose a determined answer. By calling migrants, refugees, or asylum speakers’ illegal aliens,’ you are already denoting them in a negative light, grouping distinct cases into a bundle premised on the negation of the group’s humanity. Additionally, by using loaded words like ‘burden’ with negative connotations, the answer is built into the question. Unfortunately, despite various politicians, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and citizens’ repeated assurances that it is absurd to give this type of discourse credence, one must never forget – even the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Interestingly, Swami et al. (2012) demonstrated in a controlled study how belief in entirely fictitious conspiracy theory was significantly associated with stronger belief in other real‐world conspiracy theories, stronger paranormal beliefs, and lower crystallized intelligence. Nevertheless, we must remember these subtle influences that guide the narratives we tell ourselves and society collectively are not spirits, hydras, or demons but rather,

“bots and opaque algorithmic processes, which alternately and capriciously curse or bless us. One such force is, of course, Internet memes and online content generally. Amplified and circulated by complex proprietary information platforms hidden behind corporate obfuscation and often too complicated even for their own engineers to fully comprehend, these systems make their users vulnerable to external predation by harmful forms of social influence. The common factor in all the fears about rampaging memes is the belief that memes are like magic, with powers to cause real-world effects.” (Elkus, 2021)

#### What does literature do in the face of obsession?

Butler, 79 [Octavia Estelle Butler was an American science fiction author. A multiple recipient of both the Hugo and Nebula awards, she became in 1995 the first science-fiction writer to receive a MacArthur Fellowship. Born in Pasadena, California, Butler was raised by her widowed mother, “Positive Obsession”/ -ekh-]

There seems to be an unwritten rule, hurtful and at odds with the realities of American culture. It says you aren’t supposed to wonder whether as a Black person, a Black woman, you really might be inferior—not quite bright enough, not quite quick enough, not quite good enough to do the things you want to do. Though, of course, you do wonder. You’re supposed to know you’re as good as anyone. And if you don’t know, you aren’t supposed to admit it. If anyone near you admits it, you’re supposed to reassure them quickly so they’ll shut up. That sort of talk is embarrassing. Act tough and confident and don’t talk about your doubts. If you never deal with them, you may never get rid of them, but no matter. Fake everyone out. Even yourself.

I couldn’t fake myself out. I didn’t talk much about my doubts. I wasn’t fishing for hasty reassurances. But I did a lot of thinking—the same things over and over.

Who was I anyway? Why should anyone pay attention to what I had to say? Did I have anything to say? I was writing science fiction and fantasy, for God’s sake. At that time nearly all professional science-fiction writers were white men. As much as I loved science fiction and fantasy, what was I doing?

Well, whatever it was, I couldn’t stop. Positive obsession is about not being able to stop just because you’re afraid and full of doubts. Positive obsession is dangerous. It’s about not being able to stop at all

I was twenty-three when, finally, I sold my first two short stories. I sold both to writer-editors who were teaching at Clarion, a science-fiction writers’ workshop that I was attending. One story was eventually published. The other wasn’t. I didn’t sell another word for five years. Then, finally, I sold my first novel. Thank God no one told me selling would take so long —not that I would have believed it. I’ve sold eight novels since then. Last Christmas, I paid off the mortgage on my mother’s house.

So, then, I write science fiction and fantasy for a living. As far as I know I’m still the only Black woman who does this. When I began to do a little public speaking, one of the questions I heard most often was, “What good is science fiction to Black people?” I was usually asked this by a Black person. I gave bits and pieces of answers that didn’t satisfy me and that probably didn’t satisfy my questioners. I resented the question. Why should I have to justify my profession to anyone?

But the answer to that was obvious. There was exactly one other Black science-fiction writer working successfully when I sold my first novel: Samuel R. Delany, Jr. Now there are four of us. Delany, Steven Barnes, Charles R. Saunders, and me. So few. Why? Lack of interest? Lack of confidence? A young Black woman once said to me, “I always wanted to write science fiction, but I didn’t think there were any Black women doing it.” Doubts show themselves in all sorts of ways. But still I’m asked, what good is science fiction to Black people?

What good is any form of literature to Black people?

What good is science fiction’s thinking about the present, the future, and the past? What good is its tendency to warn or to consider alternative ways of thinking and doing? What good is its examination of the possible effects of science and technology, or social organization and political direction? At its best, science fiction stimulates imagination and creativity. It gets reader and writer off the beaten track, off the narrow, narrow footpath of what “everyone” is saying, doing, thinking —whoever “everyone” happens to be this year.

And what good is all this to Black people?

#### The embracement of Black speculative fiction through our 1AC creates agentive forms of intimacy and resistance within white spaces that crowd out discussions of black life. This intervention counters logics of whiteness that seek to desire but terminally destroy Black disabled persons.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 36-41, JMH]

Both frustrating and fascinating, Black speculative fiction writer and pioneer Octavia E. Butler renders intimate, personal relationships with an eye toward complexity and compromise.35 Her characters’ investment in each other does not necessarily equate to a divestment from the oppressive ideologies that buoy their power. Most important for this inquiry, Butler’s work foregrounds the spaces of discomfort and erasure that accompany Black madness. As noted in the preface and introduction, I view Butler as a theorist working in the medium of fiction. I analyze her archive and her final published novel Fledgling (2005), interpreting the intimate relationships she depicts. Here, I invest in the “politics of the possible” regarding modes of interpretation that function as alternatives to mutual constitution.36 **Elsewhere I have discussed the enemy relationships in Butler’s Fledgling, pinpointing that the protagonist’s enemies “[mobilize] racist rhetoric subsequent to failed ableist rhetoric.”37 Their motives and their ideas are easily understood as a threat to the protagonist’s life, a desire for her erasure, since their engagement with Blackness and disability relies on a denigration of both.** This discomfort and erasure flows from the protagonist’s lovers, friends, and family as well. Here, the discourses of madness and Blackness vie for importance, a competition of sorts in which neither can win, but where the decision to prioritize one over the other shifts the emotional and ideological terrain, particularly in the interracial, multiability encounter. Butler theorizes that Black madness creates a crisis of the self in which subjectivity and identity is destabilized and the conception of the future altered. Butler conceptualized Fledgling as a coming-of-age and chase narrative that follows the structure of a crime procedural. In a letter to her editor she writes, “This one is essentially Shori’s [the protagonist’s] struggle to rebuild her life in spite of her lost family and memory—and, of course, she can only rebuild if she finds those who are hunting her and her love ones and stop them. In Law and Order fashion, she does this first through physical action— looking for answers, finding them, getting surprised, fighting to stay alive. . . . Then there’s the trial—a less physically active part of the story, but one just as involved in its own conflict and drama.”38 The first third of the novel follows Shori as she awakes with amnesia, learns that she is a vampire (called Ina) from her father, Iosif, and finds human companions, including Wright, Celia, and Brooke (called symbionts, abbreviated as syms) to survive. During this time, she learns that what separates her from other Ina is genetic experimentation with human blood that grants her melanin and the capacity to remain awake during the day. The middle third of the novel depicts her adjustment to her new symbionts, including three same-gender loving relationships with syms Theodora, Celia, and Brooke, and her alliance with the male Ina family to whom she was/is betrothed (the Gordons). The final third delineates the trial, or Council of Judgment, which determines truth and consequences for those Ina who attempted to murder her, and successfully murdered her family (Silk family, Dahlman family). Butler’s notebooks and journals reveal that she conceptualized several sequels to Fledgling. She completed five chapters of a novel tentatively called Asylum or Flight. In it, she introduces a new symbiont, a newfound archive from Shori’s mothers, and the drama of being kidnapped by unmated male members of the Silk family. In the journal entries months before her death, Butler rethinks the story line of kidnapping and considers the story of a seduction, where Shori must build a family of symbionts and Ina sisters.39 Within Fledgling, several intimate relationships—the Gordon family, Daniel Gordon, Shori’s symbionts—clarify how Black madness disrupts the ideological field: their behavior clarifies that the reading strategy of mutual constitution elides the competition between Blackness and madness for narrative space, the impossibility of linear progressive understandings of history and time, and the fiction of Black mad resistance as always agentive. As a family, the Gordons remain in thrall to their able-bodied and race privilege, such that it governs their interpretations of Shori. They “deploy an evaluative gaze that assesses Shori’s ‘fitness’ based on their own criteria— shaped as it is by abled embodiment. The Gordons constitute fitness based on criteria that demonstrate their ignorance about the systemic effect whiteness and ability have had on their lives.”40 Since they do not distinguish between her amnesia as impairment and Ina cultural and traditional customs as fomenting disability, they exude a paternalism that becomes taxing for Shori to navigate. She must consistently remind them that her impairment has practical implications to which their cultural structures (such as the Council of Judgment or mating rituals) must adapt.41 She reminds them, “My memory goes back a few weeks and no further,” and the narration explicates her emotional response, “And because I was annoyed. I let my tone of voice say, You should all realize this. I’ve explained it before.”42 Further, **they neglect to think of her Blackness as more than just the genetic engineering experimentation that allows her to be awake during the day. They consider her melanin useful as part of her physiology but do not think through the implications of how it creates her outsider status.** The Gordons rank her identities: her Blackness as more beneficial, her amnesia as more pitiable, her Blackness as less important, her amnesia as less desirable. Their logic views the two identities as competitive in their narration of events: only one category requires their attention at any given time. Their priorities reveal how one identity, disability, is a problem for them that they can articulate. Her other identity, Blackness, is a problem to be sure, but one about which they cannot answer a word.43 Further, it stresses that their deliberate problematizing of one identity parses Blackness and madness for their own comfort. When Butler portrays Shori as frustrated in addition to misunderstood, she debunks the idea that all one must do is fuse the identities together. In other words, it is not necessarily a problem that the Gordons must strategize about Shori’s disability (especially since doing so will help save her life), but rather that they seek to strategize without fully understanding the disability itself (and how it is shaped by Blackness) and without her input. In this instance, Black madness cannot be agentive or radical or resistant all by itself. Shori’s mere presence cannot bear the weight of reorienting the narrative all on its own, nor can her behavior automatically shift the ideologies that govern her circumstances or change the people who helped create and sustain them (which, by default, includes the Gordon family). Instead, Butler’s work suggests that allies themselves must reconcile the competing tension between their own privileged positions and their desires for inclusivity. Though Shori can marshal her embodied knowledge to instruct others, she has limited success. The Gordons’ gaze functions similarly to that of Shori’s enemies. Their intimate interaction highlights that the difference between the two—that is, good intention—requires more labor on Shori’s part (which by itself curtails agency). She cannot dismiss the Gordons because they are not antagonists; instead, she must reframe the conversation to emphasize her position as potential daughter-in-law in need of assistance. When Shori reminds them, “So far [her] problem is ignorance, not dishonesty,”44 she splices impairment from disability and suggests listening as an integral facet of engagement. Yet her interactions with the older Gordons remain taxing and frustrating because their good intentions do not match the impact of their behavior. Their remarks—she is “somewhat arrogant” or she must “seem more Ina than [the antagonists],” or she is “both very attractive and very frightening”45—belie their weddedness to ableism, even as they attempt to help her navigate institutionalized barriers. It is up to them to shift their thinking, and it is not clear that ever occurs by the end of Fledgling. In Butler’s drafts of Fledgling, she toys with the way Shori’s Black madness structures her interactions with the Gordons and the text writ large. Each instantiation of the novel evinces Butler’s commitment to depicting Blackness and madness as destabilizing forces, which heighten and problematize privilege because they shift the contours of the multiability, interracial encounter. The two discourses work together and, in that sense, remain coextensive, but they also function at cross-purposes. For instance, Shori speculates that the Gordons test her when they allow her to question the human agents responsible for the arson that killed her family.

#### Everyone can do something, can’t they?

Butler, 79 [Octavia Estelle Butler was an American science fiction author. A multiple recipient of both the Hugo and Nebula awards, she became in 1995 the first science-fiction writer to receive a MacArthur Fellowship. Born in Pasadena, California, Butler was raised by her widowed mother, “Positive Obsession,” edited for racialized language / -ekh-]

MY MOTHER read me bedtime stories until I was six years old. It was a sneak attack on her part. As soon as I really got to like the stories, she said, “Here’s the book. Now you read.” She didn’t know what she was setting us both up for.

“I think,” my mother said to me one day when I was ten, “that everyone has something that they can do better than they can do anything else. It’s up to them to find out what that something is.” We were in the kitchen by the stove. She was pressing my hair while I sat bent over someone’s cast-off notebook, writing. I had decided to write down some of the stories I’d been telling myself over the years. When I didn’t have stories to read, I learned to make them up. Now I was learning to write them down.

I was shy, afraid of most people, most situations. I didn’t stop to ask myself how things could hurt me, or even whether they could hurt me. I was just afraid. I crept into my first bookstore full of vague fears. I had managed to save about five dollars, mostly in change. It was 1957. Five dollars was a lot of money for a ten-year-old. The public library had been my second home since I was six, and I owned a number of hand-me-down books. But now I wanted a new book—one I had chosen, one I could keep.

“Can kids come in here?” I asked the woman at the cash register once I was inside. I meant could Black kids come in. My mother, born in rural Louisiana and raised amid strict racial segregation, had warned me that I might not be welcome everywhere, even in California.

The cashier glanced at me. “Of course you can come in,” she said. Then, as though it were an afterthought, she smiled. I relaxed.

The first book I bought described the characteristics of different breeds of horses. The second described stars and planets, asteroids, moons and comets

My aunt and I were in her kitchen, talking. She was cooking something that smelled good, and I was sitting at her table, watching. Luxury. At home, my mother would have had me helping

“I want to be a writer when I grow up,” I said.

“Do you?” my aunt asked. “Well, that’s nice, but you’ll have to get a job, too.”

“Writing will be my job,” I said.

“You can write any time. It’s a nice hobby. But you’ll have to earn a living.”

“As a writer.”

“Don’t be silly.”

“I mean it.”

“Honey . . . ~~Negroes~~ Blacks can’t be writers.”

“Why not?”

“They just can’t.”

“Yes, they can, too!”

I was most adamant when I didn’t know what I was talking about. In all my thirteen years, I had never read a printed word that I knew to have been written by a Black person. My aunt was a grown woman. She knew more than I did. What if she were right?

#### Thus, we affirm the black cyborg – a project of imagination, memory, longing, aversion. A diplomatic strategy that is alive, insurgent. A human being that no longer is, at least temporarily

Joy **James 13** [“Concerning Violence”: Frantz Fanon’s Rebel Intellectual in Search of a Black Cyborg, Winter 2013, The South Atlantic Quarterly, doi 10.1215/00382876-1891233, accessed 7/13/22, -ekh-]

The essential duty of the one is to struggle for the realization or consciousness of the cyborg. The cyborg is born at that moment in which the convergence of interests among anyone and everyone seeking or dodging freedom is inescapable and inescapably recognized; the cyborg glimpses the possibilities of permanent revolution, as the veil descends. This convergence is cemented in more than blood and rational choice. It is shaped by imagination and memory, longing and aversion.

Fanon’s 1960s writings about the Algerian war of liberation from the French illuminate aspects of the 1980s Cold War’s détente. The first, like all of the post–World War II battles for freedom in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Middle East (and the “internal colonies” in the Americas and beyond), was asymmetrical warfare. The Cold War was not. Both forms of warfare, hot or cold, were in the postwar era largely fought on or against the bodies of the colonized.2

To inhibit nuclear proliferation between two waning empires, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), diplomats and activists crafted new vocabulary. Mutual assured destruction (MAD) was coined as the language of rational-minded Westerners seeking to preserve what they had accumulated or appropriated. In order to avoid an apocalypse— at least for the imperial crowd—sobering reality would dictate the demilitarization of East and West and the playing out of antagonisms on Third World terrain where the casualties against bodies already dehumanized by Europe would not create significant political collateral damages in either democracies or dictatorships of the people.3

“Concerning Violence” exhibits contempt for superpowers and their respective blocs or adherents for the native who has completed a revolutionary struggle against the colonizer and now enters the world arena as a leader. For Fanon, diplomacy is simply another war strategy or strategy of maneuver to safeguard the newly emerging nation that seeks to avoid becoming a neocolony or a “failed state.” Fanon offers the possibilities of a diplomacy that is dynamic, alive, and insurgent: a “strange contrast to the motionless, petrified world of colonization” (1963: 78). He cites several examples of “boorish” or inappropriate behavior on the part of those ostracized or distanced by the West: “[When] Mr. Khrushchev brandishes his shoe at the United Nations, or thumps the table with it, there’s not a single ex-native, nor any representative of an underdeveloped country, who laughs. For what Mr. Khrushchev shows the colonized countries which are looking on is that he, the moujik, who moreover is the possessor of space rockets, treats those miserable capitalists in the way that they deserve” (78).

Fanon finds the theatre of Soviets similar to that of the Cuban representatives, although only the latter fought a prolonged bloody war in the postwar period. Thus there is a profound difference in the ways in which Fanon describes the implications of Nikita Khrushchev’s pounding of footgear and Fidel Castro’s presentation of war as bloodshed, not mere theater:

In the same way, Castro sitting in military uniform in the United Nations Organization does not scandalize the underdeveloped countries. What Castro demonstrates is the consciousness he has of the continuing existence of the rule of violence. The astonishing thing is that he did not come into the UNO with a machine-gun; but if he had would anyone have minded? All the jacqueries and desperate deeds, all those bands armed with cutlasses or axes find their nationality in the implacable struggle which opposes socialism and capitalism. (78)

There is a violence reserved for the colonized both as receiver and as proponent that seems predictable and part of the biopolitical world he or she is reduced to living and being perceived as living. Khrushchev by some accounts actually seems to have enjoyed his visit to the United States (embracing at arm’s length, with considerable threat, his distant Euro cousins). The same cannot be said of Castro (who would be subject to multiple assassination attempts by the CIA), unless one counts perhaps his visit with Malcolm X in Harlem and his stay at the Theresa Hotel in Harlem when hotels in downtown Manhattan denied accommodations for the Cuban leader and his entourage.

“Concerning Violence” intimates that the Soviet/Eastern bloc would be an adventurer in Third World freedom and as opportunistic as the West in its own fashion. However, Fanon does not explicate, writing in the height of decolonization struggles against Western imperialism and before the Soviet collapse, how the specter of Western colonization and the benign face of Soviet domination, through weapons and currency to those seeking freedom from the West and United States, might in fact mutate into a shared body or host. One cohort in alliance against black freedom, one corporate-military state conglomerate that understood its feeding grounds to be the “wretched of the earth”—the black, brown, yellow bodies who had not morphed or blossomed into cyborgs capable of resisting colonization and slavery.

Understandably Fanon need not depict an adversary so grotesque in its abilities to consume black life. He can focus on the colonialist, the French settler as the enemy formation, although this colonialist or settler is actually just an errand boy for another, more formidable foe. Fanon, without confronting the increasing concentration of military power and finance witnessed in the twenty-first century, offers a redemptive possibility beyond enlightenment or rational self-interest or choice; he offers an apocalypse of sorts. For when the “one” solitary merges with others to become the revolutionary, he or she is no longer a conventional human. As cyborg, as one/mass unified against the divine, mechanical, and biological terror of the colonizer, as its own biological, mechanical, and divine formation, a human being as a conventional being no longer exists (at least momentarily).

Revolutions of course mark the end of time and space as conventionally understood and relied on. What happens when the human becomes part machine and part divine, the alternate manifestation to what the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, an amendment theoretically crafted for former enslaved blacks, created when it enabled corporations to become cyborgs by allowing them humanity or political personhood? What, then, is the predictability of time and space in a struggle between cyborgs? And would such a struggle of unequal equals be a form of MAD?

If the enslaved or colonized disappear as materiality and consciousness, then the consciousness of the enslaver and colonialist is left homeless, a roaming ghost, the zombie that Fanon mocks the native for fearing more than her oppressor or the secret police. The enslaver and the colonialist without the slave or native cannot haunt themselves. Thus the colonialist or enslaver would be insane or suicidal to usher in the henceforward moment in which every native is massacred. The disintegration of the multitude of individual natives is based on their common vulnerabilities to suffering as slaves or colonized folks. Their pain becomes a weapon against their oppressor (who, although decapitated, is still capable of a lethal strike).

#### The conceptualization of the black cyborg ruptures whiteness’s frame of technology as the tool of the colonial master. Theorizing through the black cyborg is a tool for the becoming resists the assumption that technology is the province of white ingenuity and that technological engagement is incompatible with Black culture.

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In her article, “New Genres of Being Human: World Making through Viral Blackness,” Ashleigh Greene Wade’s approach is similar to Puar’s with its shared roots in assemblage theory and commitment to thinking through new frameworks for being. From an explicitly Black feminist framework, she calls in Sylvia Wynter and Wehilye to a discussion of assemblage in order to power her central argument: we have shifted into a new way of experiencing our own humanness and subjectivity, and it is an experience that fundamentally weaves our physical selves with our digital experiences. Weaving together Black techno-social practices and Black feminist notions of the human, Greene Wade produces a significant development toward theorizing the virtual-physical assemblage. Central to Greene Wade’s analysis is the idea of virality and viral Blackness. She names virality as “an affective condition in which content spreads widely, changing both the form of the original content and the channels through which it passes.” She calls upon Puar and Patricia Clough as interlocutors in the conversation of virality, citing their introduction to the Women’s Studies Quarterly volume devoted to the concept of virality which notes the spread of “viral” as a descriptor for things happening in biological, physical, financial, linguistic, and cultural realms. Greene Wade notes the fear that the word “viral” can evoke; the dominant use of viral is in discussion of spreading disease. While she urges us to expand beyond this fear and critically engage with the viral as a generative concept, I like to linger on the fear component of Black virality. The fear is essential for understanding how the Black viral has been tracked, surveilled, and covered: the white gaze looks upon Black viral phenomena with equal parts intrigue, confusion, and fear. Its effects are visible: social movements spring up, hashtags trend, bodies show up, information is shared. The methods remain opaque, rendered as invisible as a virus. As Greene Wade notes, the most terrifying aspect of viral Blackness is its uncontrollable nature: “Within the carceral state, containment is extremely important for maintaining control, but the viral cannot be contained. While the source of viral content can be located, once it is released, control societies cannot dictate how or where it spreads.” This uncontrollable, mutable, spreading form of viral Blackness manages to blend the boundaries between the virtual and physical, to muddy binaries, and to resist legibility to whiteness. The subversion of control found in viral Blackness is part of what I will argue makes Black feminist cyborgs so effectively able to travel worlds. When mutability and shape-shifting themselves assist, viral Blackness becomes a powerful tool for achieving and maintaining a sense of cultural control. The most critical aspect of the functioning of viral Blackness is the political force we are able to exert in digital spaces and manifest offline. Greene Wade asks us to consider the emergence of viral Blackness through #BlackLivesMatter (among other associated hashtags) and place it in the context of Black technological activism. She cites the mobilization efforts in 2014 around Ferguson, particularly organizing buses of protestors and funds and resources for protestors on the ground. She points to pre-social media periods, referencing events as far back as 1997, when Black women honed early Internet resources to organize the Million Woman March. In this project, I place this work in the framework of Anna Everett’s “Black technophilia,” the basic concept that Black people’s love for and skill with technology is neither rare nor deficient but is part of the tradition of Black people’s innovation in finding and creating tools for survival. In Greene Wade’s analysis, hashtags, viral videos, and images from Black protests and demonstrations are not only tools, but also “material artifacts of viral Blackness.” Greene Wade concludes her article by making the case that weak, appropriative, derivative hashtags stemming from #BlackLivesMatter serve to highlight the ways viral Blackness disquiets and disrupts white supremacy. #AllLivesMatter and #BlueLivesMatter, for instance, rest on outmoded and fixed identity categories. She issues a call: “We have to release Blackness from essentialism so that it may be deployed toward liberation within a multiplicity of subjectivities.” Moving toward conceiving of a Blackness that operates as a virtual-physical assemblage is part of that vision. Though Greene Wade does not mention cyborgs, I place this essay and Puar’s essay in conversation to illuminate my vision of the makeup of the cyborg: the Black feminist cyborg is a virtual-physical becoming-intersectional assemblage, slinking and changing from one world to the next, armored on digital platforms and able to shapeshift beyond the rigid grids of identity politics on technosocial platforms. This theory demands that we re-think what a cyborg is. In the intellectual tradition of Puar, conceptualizing a cyborg as humanity and technology gracelessly mashed together leaves us with an indelicate and relatively worthless metaphor. If we think about a cyborg as a new genre of being, the way Sylvia Wynter via Greene Wade ask us to think about humans, it prepares us to imagine the cyborg as a virtual-physical assemblage equipped to both travel through and make worlds for Black feminists who seek refuge, feminist discourse, and methods for moving through online spaces. The part-time Black feminist cyborg is able to move as Black women so often do: as part of a side-hustle, as part of an informal, widespread Black aesthetic devoted to hustling in the margins, seeking and performing community support and maintenance, gaining insight from other places and people to be repurposed toward Black excellence. The Black feminist cyborg side-hustle is one which pays in security, heightened ability, heightened perception, and occasionally heightened suffering. Though the “side hustle” is a language of labor, it is labor performed for self and community. I take Joy James’ critique of Black cyborgs operating as super-human seriously, and argue that the part-time nature of this aesthetic allows for breaks, rest, and centering of the self rather than super-human strength and performance to please and serve whiteness and white people. The part-time hustle allows for anonymity: no one need know about your alternate cyborg mode of being. If we are all to embody a new genre of being human and become virtual-physical assemblages, the part-time Black feminist cyborg theory serves as a method, a tool for the becoming. This concept quickly falls apart if there is commitment to the tool of technology as it has been traditionally discussed, even among feminist thinkers, as dominance and conquest through mechanical and digital means. Black feminist speculative fiction authors can offer us an alternative way of thinking through definitions of technology, often advocating a reassessment of what technology is, can be, and has been in the hands of Black people. In the interviews I conducted, I asked each participant two main questions related to the nature of technology: how have you conceived of or grappled with themes of technology in your speculative fiction work? And what would you consider the most dominant messages about Black people, bodies and technology that come from popular culture or mainstream speculative fiction? In response to the first question, participants frequently mentioned cyborgs, the steampunk genre as a space to toy with our preconceived notions, and expansive definitions of technology. Tempest K. Bradford responded: I mean, technically, again, the novel I’m writing now, it’s steampunk, so there is a technology in it even though it’s in the past. The technology is what is driving the commentary about social change[,] my commentary on 71 inequality[,] because in this story, it’s set in ancient Egypt. The steampunk elements are copper scarab beetles that are really big. People ride around in them and they run on the power of steam generated by sunlight. adrienne maree brown noted that she had grappled with themes of technology in her speculative fiction work “sort of flailingly? Like, I mostly imagine futures where technology is invisible or inside of us, cyborgish, enhancements. I also think of technology as how we do everything.” Encapsulating both themes, Walidah Imarisha comments on the whitewashing of the definition of technology and steampunk as a site of reproducing racist and colonial narratives, and as a means of expanding and responding to definitions of technology for Black survival: I think having conversations about what technology is, is also really important from the beginning. I think that we think of technology in a very Western, European white-centered frame. And so, I think that it’s important to recognize that a lot of the ways we think about technology... I think that steampunk is a genre [that] actually is a really useful way to sort of externalize the implicit conversations that often happen about technology— the way... that technology is intimately linked to colonialism and the global spread of white supremacy [in] this sort of white racist utopian fantasy that white folks create when they create steampunk. So. You know, I think, again, if technology is not a useful term, then we just don’t use that term. I do think it’s useful to challenge that idea and saying, well, what is our definition of technology? Technology is actually much broader than just externalized robotic gadgets that often are what we think of when we think of technology. So I think that’s one thing. I think the other thing, I definitely feel like I think about technology a lot. [I have] a couple pieces that center around [technology] that I’m working on. I’m actually working on developing a workshop that takes current developments and technology that folks think of as science fiction, but that are here now, and then has folks kind of imagine how this might be used against us in the future as folks try to change the world, because it will. And then develop potential strategies to challenge that… I don’t think we can deny the digital technological advances that exist in this world. I think we do so at our own peril. 72 In line with their thinking about expanding both ideas of technology and “cyborgish” ways of being, I find something productive and playful about imagining taking on the label of a cyborg, which requires being built, shaped, taken apart, and re-imagined in the face of oppression. There are deep resonances between descriptions of the cyborg and the experiences of being a Black woman: feeling like a being both out of time and somehow advanced, forced to travel worlds the way Lugones describes, continually being drawn both into the past and the future, losing limbs and gaining playfulness along the way. The cyborg concept has been considered by many feminist theorists in the decades since Haraway’s introduction and is increasingly relevant in the face of continuing technological advances. In TechnoFeminism, Judy Wajcman calls our attention to this fascination with the cyborg when she notes, “The cyborg has fired the feminist imagination. It crystalizes our pleasure in, desire for, and anxiety about technological transcendence. Perhaps this, and the infinite flexibility of what has become the postmodern icon, explains its rhetorical force.” Cyborg metaphors about the Black body and Black experience are present in literature, art, popular culture, and academic theory; indeed, Haraway specifically mentions the Black speculative fiction endeavors of Samuel Delany and Octavia Butler in her manifesto, appreciating them among other prolific feminist science fiction writers as “storytellers exploring what it means to be embodied in 73 high tech worlds,” and that they operate as “theorists for cyborgs.” Women of color is the category of coalition that Lugones writes about, framing their unique ability for worldtraveling as a result of marginalized positionality. The cyborg in Haraway’s conception is also portrayed as an ideal creature for moving “between worlds,” as Lugones describes them, or, into and out of the margins. Fused with technology and flesh, the vulnerability and adaptability of the cyborg allows for the variety of shifts in perspective required for moving between worlds—perception, vulnerability, and adaptability being kinds of technologies of their own. Moving into Digital Worlds The Black feminist cyborg resists the assumption that technology is the province of white ingenuity and intelligence, and that technological engagement is incompatible with Black people and Black culture. Claiming space in discourses of social technologies can push back against the limited kinds of knowledge production that people of color can produce that is legible within white supremacy. A modern cyborg still lives in a humandominated world with a very narrow conception of humanity. As Haraway acknowledges science fiction writers as cyborg theorists, I also turn to the writers I interviewed for their reflections on Black bodies and technology. Their contributions offer vital insights into both the genre of science fiction and real-world digital landscapes. Black women 74 operating as part-time cyborgs must move through these digital worlds, which provide new conditions for loving perception. A Black feminist cyborg is continually adapting to digital worlds where physical safety is less likely to be threatened and our access to one another is unprecedented. A Black feminist cyborg practical aesthetic is ideal for traveling to these worlds mediated through social media platforms, where we extend our Blackness beyond our physical bodies and simultaneously become aware of the embodied ways technology mediates and fuses with our lived realities. Black Cyborgs Moving Forward I have positioned the Black feminist cyborg as an ontological approach and a creature of fiction, but I would be remiss if I did not mention the rapidly closing gap between the cyborg as fiction and the cyborg as reality. In my interview with speculative fiction author Walidah Imarisha, the subject of bio-hacking was discussed in relationship to some of her latest writing and activist work. For example, she is in the process of developing a workshop which has participants think about concepts like bio-hacking, the import of technological and mechanical tools into one’s body, often imagined as science fiction but already part of reality, and strategize ways to combat their inevitable use against Black bodies. Her upcoming fictional work incorporates bio-hacking themes to underscore both the anxiety about technological additions to bodies and Black resistance 75 to methods of white social control over Black bodies. Citing facial recognition software newly employed in airports and the recent trend of corporations bio-hacking willing employees with identifying chips, she tells an oppositional story of a dystopic world in which characters are guided by self-implanted chips that point them in the direction of the North Star. In the interview, she describes the research she conducted for background in her story. She says, with both the excitement and trepidation that the idea of fusion with technology, especially for Black people, can bring: “The piece I was reading about was folks, like, bio-hacking themselves and becoming cyborgs! And getting superhero powers, basically. I was like, **this shit is real**, y’all, people are cyborgs right now!” Imarisha calls our attention to the narrowing divide between the cyborg as a creature of fiction and a creature of reality and imagines the way Black people can use technology to combat white supremacy. This speculative work through a Black feminist lens is imperative, because it challenges the notion that Black people can only interact with technology to serve white supremacist aims, and it rejects the erasure of Black people’s long, rich relationship with science and technology. It is transgressive in that it rejects the notion that Black people’s bodies and minds operate as machines and tools, having technology used on and through them. As I demonstrate in chapter four, Black people 76 harness the technological tools available to them and created by them. As social media drives much of Trump-era political discourse, Black people use it to facilitate cultural conversations, strategize for livable and desirable futures, and center the experiences of marginalized people. The Black feminist part-time cyborg aesthetic is a way to visualize the experience of moving in between the digital and physical, with room for both worlds. In the following chapter, I assess examples of world-traveling Black part-time cyborgs from popular media. These examples from Star Trek: Deep Space Nine and the discography of Janelle Monáe illuminate the way loving perception partnered with cyborg theory can provide a method for fruitful Black feminist world traveling, selfexpression, and play

#### The role of the judge is to be an immediator not a mediator, mediation is undergirded by logistical whiteness that seeks out the destruction of the excessive share. Immediation is not a neutral process, rather a subjective force of thirdness that interjects between the two in the name of liberation from the logistical path of existence.

Manning 22 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty.“Out of the Clear” published in March 2022 by e-flux Journal <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/125/452291/out-of-the-clear/> accessed on July 12th, 2022 by AP]

We already know how the story ends. On May 29, 2021, the headline reads: “Canada mourns as remains of 215 children found at indigenous school.”8 It wasn’t an indigenous school, of course. It was a residential school, a Canadian school, in the clearing. The picture says it all: sparse trees growing in the background, empty yard, an architecture completely at odds with the environment, cleared of life, of all that immanently interconnects. The violence of logistics is inscribed in the ghost trees of its whitened surround. How we organize bodies, we who sidle whiteness, how we excise (from clear sight) the ravages of an earth desecrated, of a people brutally murdered—these are the workings of logistics. Logistics mediate existence by keeping it at arm’s length, soothing us into believing that we are not responsible. The deaths are newsworthy, and we’re sorry, but we must move on. It’s not really about us and in any case, there’s nothing we can do about it. Let’s get a mediator and sort this out! At arms length, we see these workings—the cleared forest, the dying planet, the dead children—as somehow disconnected. We do not acknowledge the felling of the trees as the wanton destruction of all that transversally connects. And yet logistics, in its power of mediation, is all about the forests. It’s all about the cotton planted in their wake. The ghostly outline of Proulx’s pine table haunts the residential school, its absence equal to the absence of education. Because what the residential school really does is unteach. Taking the place of pedagogy, what is practiced here is theft. Theft of thought, of imagination. This theft is a rape. A physical rape, a sexual aggression, but also a conceptual rape, a clearing—“to snatch, to grab, to carry off by force”—of all that lives in the abyss of what has been left behind.9 Rape, relation severed, cuts the fragile interwoven threads of existence, wresting life from life-living, from the more-than that gives it its spirited and spiritual contour. If body is land, if bodying is only ever worlding, what residential school does, in this most recent form of clearing, is sever this imbrication, leaving the body lifeless. All that remains is the clearing. And a mess. But this can be handled. This is how mediation does its work, in the name of and as logistics. From here on in, things will be managed. Managers will be appointed to organize, to administer, the now-reduced environment. This science of loss—“which is to say the science of whiteness, or logistics”—is predicated on the end of sharing, on the destruction of the excessive share, the annihilation of that which exceeds the one-two form whose dramaturgy relies of the intervention of the mediator.10 The mediator will take the form of the “yellow eyebrows” in Proulx’s account, but it also need not take a simple human form. Repetition of the same is the form it takes in a dramaturgy of extinction. Scene 3 Clearing produces property. Property produces dispossession. “All property is loss because all property is the loss of sharing.”11 The accursed share of all that exceeds interpersonality, mediation, whiteness, logistics, all that cannot be accounted for, sickens the field. And sometimes rejuvenates it. The force of the transindividual, of all that exceeds and precedes the individual, does rewild. But its vitality is weakened, and as perception is honed to single out the individual over the field, the human increasingly becomes the focal point, becoming synonymous with life. This is how the logistics of genocide—the genocide of relation—does its work. The genocide of relation can never be traced back, quite. Relation cannot be propertied. What is lost cannot be parsed. The yellow eyebrows have a role to play, of course, and we could call on the archbishop for that missing apology, but the truth is, it was never just one. He was never just the one. He is a logistical pattern, a commitment to the dramaturgy of (white) man as self-centered orchestrator of existence cleared. Logistics: the slave ship, but also the body-as-individual. “The first odious vessel produced by and for logistics is not the slave ship, but the body—flesh conceptualized—which bears the individual-in-subjection.”12 In the clearing, man is revealed as the loss of relation. Humanism is born here, in the empty space of the stolen land, in the vast expanse of the 1+1, the infinite regress of nothing-in-between. How to fill the emptiness? How to create an account for all that is lost and yet claimed? Mediation offers to fill the shape of the between. Mediation as the figure of what comes between, of what fills that “empty” space. The adjuster, the divorce lawyer, the priest, the government agent. A quick intervention to make sense of all that has become unclear, to fill in the lines, to provide context. And perhaps this does make things clearer, perhaps we understand each other a bit better now that we’ve mediated all we couldn’t make sense of in the vast emptiness of our difference. But the problem is: mediation never goes away. It sits there, inert but active, facilitating the ongoing impoverishment relation by adhering to all that takes the shape of the 1+1 of body-as-individual, of interpersonality. Because in advance of the gesture of inserting the mediating influence, he is already there. Long before the divorce, he hovers, betweener, judging, parsing, condoning, condemning. His take doesn’t really matter. What matters is that he remains in the offing, holding things apart. Mediation is the father of the control society. It is the way surveillance takes on a personality from the outside in. Whether formally or informally, mediation sets the tone for an interpersonality that, by definition, can only be lived at a distance. Playing at impartiality, mediation haunts the surround, reducing it to what is already known, what is already valued, what is already within the scope of the expressible. 2+1, always less than 3, mediation is passive aggressor, poised for judgment, always in the know (while it listens carefully). Because its role is to keep existence in its track, on its logistical path. It doesn’t really matter who is right. It matters that it needs mediation. Mediation knows best, trampling on any detail of middling, sewing interactivity into a twoness without excess. Hardening the between of interpersonality into the amplification of the self-same, mediation lodges at the interstice, cutting it into a hyphen, setting up its colony on the bridge. Settler, it speaks from a place it has never had to truly encounter because its role is only to order things apart. Harney and Moten might speak of mediation with the same disdain as they do of logistics, which they call the “science of whiteness.”13 Mediation is the logistic category par excellence of whiteness. It has no content, is not in itself an agent of transformation, does nothing but cannibalize the life it parses. Its intervention happens in the beat of enter and retreat, leaving the uneasy twoness of existence to sort itself out. In the name of property and propriety, mediation solves all uncertainties of zoning. That it never actually leaves is its dirty secret. But the logistics of mediation can only fail. The interface is shaky—we know this both from the endemic code 404, page not found, and from the impossibility of truly domesticating our surrounds. Ultimately, the squirrels, the black flies, the birds, the worms, the fungi, the weeds, the viruses, the hackers cannot be kept in their place. The disarray is handled, of course, with more mediation, with more logistics. The interface claims a distance, a secure between-two that repeats the refrain of nature colonized, of culture denatured. It promises a security of inhabitation, a zone that can be controlled, a slip through which we can safely enter, we who claim the place. Here, in the logistics of passage that beats at the cadence of the one-two, me-you, the outcome is always the same. Police to subjugate. Code to organize. Clear to colonize. Logistics aims to straighten us out, untangle us, and open us to its usufruct, its improving use; such access to us, in its turn, improves the flow line, the straight line. And what logistics takes to be the shortest distance between us requires emplotting us as bodies in space where interiority can be imposed even as the capacity for interiority can be denied, in the constant measure and regulation of flesh and earth.Scene 5 Deleuze and Guattari speak of man as the white wall of the black hole of existence.15 Think landscape painting, especially the kind that excises that very life that breathed it into existence. If you’re not familiar, search for “Canadian art.” And if you don’t know the history of the mansplaining of the Canadian landscape, search for the Group of Seven, the early twentieth-century Canadian landscape painters, and notice not only the ubiquity of the vast open, uninhabited space, notice the clearing. Very little has changed over the last hundred years. We still see Canada through the clear, in the emptiness of nature cultured. The denuded land, the empty north, is how we art ourselves still today, we who property the land. The Group of Seven, those painters of the land pristine, of the great white north, the painters of the land of the (single) pine and of the distant ridges, they are still with us, still managing the imagination, orchestrating the field, playing the dramaturgy of extinction. Logistics are also aesthetic (if not artful). The white man is a specter. That is to say, the white man is without content, without shape. He is the shift in form that allows all takings-place to be propertied inhabitations, which is to say, sites already claimed. This is whiteness: the pretense that the lines that demarcate the boundary between me and you protect you, protect me, from the wilderness of all that cannot be contained (and must be kept at bay). The truth is, the wilderness was cleared, but never quite colonized. And that is why whiteness is alive and well. To police a job half-done. Scene 6 Mediation makes many promises. It promises clarity: think, drop-down menu. It promises fairness: think, divorce court. It promises health: think, therapy. The gesture is cast as innocuous. A simple third, a neutral agent. A little bit of reason. A moment of distance. An interlude so that things can be tied up again and smooth functioning can resume. A representation of the useful.16 But what is it to insert distance into a field of relation if not violence of the highest degree? Whose distance? At what cost? To what ends? Guattari fights against this at every turn, refusing mediation either in politics or in psychiatry. Schizoanalysis is the proposition, a call for a transversal operation that breaks the pretense of neutrality in the encounter. A therapeutics of transversality. No more triangle. No more transference. Schizoanalysis is the event of the encounter itself, the practice of encountering. To be in the relation is to have been changed by it. What this looked like: a years-long institutional arrangement housed at a clinic called La Borde in the north of France whereby to be in the therapeutic encounter was to live with the effects of encounters in the everyday and to learn from them how to continue to live. Nothing very complicated, really. But infinitely complex in its transversality. Because to live in the encounter, to allow ourselves to be changed by it, is to be continuously undone, and to be sensitive to all that comes alive in that undoing. Who we are is a question that can only really be asked (and answered) by the mediator. The mediator, after all, looks in from outside to tell us how our actions are affecting the world. Without the mediator there is no steady external gaze, no calm interface for the mirroring. That’s why “who we are” is always a white question, a question of whiteness, of colonization. Blackness, write Harney and Moten, is not a thing, or a state (of being). It is the way the doing expresses. It is not a subject, not a person, not a property. It is a field. It is the excess on itself of a body claimed, blackened by hate. Blackness is the celebration of refusing to claim, to be claimed. “Meanwhile, Michael Brown is like another fall and rise through man—come and gone, as irruption and rupture, to remind us not that black lives matter but that black life matters; that the absolute and undeniable blackness of life matters; that this is not a judgment of value but a description of a field of activity that obliterates the worldly distinction between the organic and the inorganic.”17 Blackness is not the simple descriptor of what has been enfleshed. Blackness cannot be mediated into a form imposed (exposed). Blackness is the force of living that exceeds colonization, its accursed share. And in that sense, the wildness of the surround, it too is black. As is the earth. This is what Guattari means when he entreats us to move from schizoanalysis as a therapeutic-political dispositif, an agencement more than an apparatus, a moving-forth of encounterings afield, toward the transversality of what he calls the “three ecologies.”18 These three ecologies, the mental/conceptual, the environmental, and the social, are the overlap, as I see it, of a commitment to a blackening of the earth, out of the clear. (Necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that extracts and excepts himself from the earth in order to confirm his supposed dominion over it. And just as the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed, man must forcefully speciate himself in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement. The world is posed as the way to live on the earth as the individual is posed as the way to live in the world. To live in the world as an individual is therefore to be logistic, and to be logistic is to settle into a rhythm that kills, to beat out that rhythm over the undercommon track that keeps (giving away) its own measure.19 Scene 7 Guattari wrote The Three Ecologies in what have come to be known as his winter years. The winter years came after a sustained attempt at working with the Green Party in the aftermath of the terrible letdown of post-1968 politics in France. This attempt to connect to state politics left Guattari with a sour taste. He knew better, of course, than to trust state politics to be a site of transformation. Schizoanalysis had been the wager that there were other ways—that to work “in common,” “toward the common” is, ultimately, always to commit to the logic of mediation. In The Three Ecologies, he makes a plea to invent new ways of being committed to and involved in the urgent call to transversalize experience, ways that move beyond how the state lays claim to existence: In the domain of social ecology there will be times of struggle in which everyone will feel impelled to decide on common objectives and to act “like little soldiers,” by which I mean like good activists. But there will simultaneously be periods of resingularisation in which individual and collective subjectivities will take their marbles and go home without a thought for collective goals, and in which creative expression as such will take precedence. This new ecosophical logic—and I want to emphasize this point—resembles the manner in which an artist may be led to alter his work after the intrusion of some accidental detail, an event-incident that suddenly makes his initial project bifurcate, making it drift [dériver] far from its previous path, however certain it had once appeared to be.20 There is an echo in this ecosophic call to Moten and Harney: Rather than dissipate our preoccupation with how we live and breathe, we need to defend our ways in our persistent practice of them. It’s not about taking the streets; it’s about how, and about what, we take to the streets. What would it be and what would it mean for us jurisgeneratively to take to the streets, to live in the streets, to gather together another city right here, right now?21 Ecosophic logic is a refusal of the clearing, of the ways in which we seek to inhabit the space already colonized. It recognizes the lure, and understands the commitment to change that the gesture of taking the streets embodies. But ecosophic logic asks a different question: What if instead we practiced living by creating new conditions that didn’t center us, that didn’t inadvertently redeem that central and self-centering figure of man and its mediating logistics? What if we painted into the dérive of artfulness’s angle on experience? What if we moved at the pace of that accidental detail tangled with the weeds we have been wasting so much time clearing? Ecosophic logic is an urgent call to refuse the ongoing clearing that denies, decries, and violates the force of blackness in the ongoing genocide of all that resists the count. To refuse does not mean to face and challenge. Frontality, the neurotypical activity par excellence, only cements into place what is already there, what is already claiming the ground of existence. To refuse means to move into the accursed share of life-living twisting in the troubled interstice, to move with that anarchic share of existence that keeps giving life. For life-living to thrive, life has to be activated at those interstices that exceed man. Life’s expression as tangle has to be attuned to from the edges in. Conditions have to be crafted to honor what is not about us. This is what the First Nations in Barkskins of course already knew. And for this they were cleared. To see, to feel, what was always already there, to pulse with a force of life-living that cannot be claimed—owed or owned—this was always the crime. Scene 8 The many years Guattari spent practicing schizoanalysis, which is to say, living at La Borde and encountering, daily, the shape of an existence unmediated, an existence committed, always, to a refusal of normopathy—these are what he takes into the project of the three ecologies. And it is specifically the orientation of La Borde toward neurodiversity, I believe, that makes it necessary to underscore what he calls the mental, or conceptual, ecology as the inflecting force that must, and will, change the contours of the environmental and the social. La Borde taught him this: to skirt the question of the subject leaves the black hole wide open, filled to the brim with neurotypicality, whiteness. In the sickness that has befallen the earth—the ongoing genocide of all that eludes the count—subjectivity, too, has fallen ill. Replaced by the face of man, given the guise of whiteness in all its logistical powers of mediation, subjectivity has been swallowed, engulfed by the subject. “The main feature of the colonial-capitalistic unconscious is the reduction of subjectivity to its subject’s experience.”22 But subjectivity, as Guattari understands it, is nothing other than its ongoing production. It is not the subject. It is the transversal, the emergent unmediated middle, the collectivity that must never be reduced to the one. This is why, for a renewed project of the earth, or as Moten and Harney would have it, for the blackening of the earth—“we are the moving, blackened, blackening earth”23—“it will be a question of literally reconstructing the modalities of ‘group-being’ [l’être-en-groupe], not only through ‘communicational’ interventions but through existential mutations driven by the motor of subjectivity.”24 To construct modalities for group-being is a call for an aesthetics of sociality which exceeds the 1+1 of interpersonality. Group-being, or what Guattari refers to as the “group subject,” is not countable. The group subject is never the sum of its parts. As solitary as it is multiplicitous, the group subject makes felt how subjectivity is produced in the excess on itself of coming into relation. The group subject is how the more-than of the relational field finds expression. It is the emergent collectivity of an expression of life-living shared (in its accursed excess), expression irreducible to the one, always beyond consensus. Without mediation, the group subject is activated in the renunciation of summing up. To produce the modalities for this excess of existence requires a mutation on existence itself, a mutation that in every sense rethinks subjectivity as a position. The group subject reminds us that what we produce is never solely ours. We are not simply our-selves. We are fieldings of complex imbrication. Any other account of experience is subjected to mediation, organized by logistics. Anarchival to the core, the production of subjectivity is not an account of a life contained. It is not condensable to something like identity. It is not reducible to the form of the human. It is always more-than, always in movement, a motor or conduit of a worlding. The production of subjectivity bodies in the same gesture that it refuses to be a body, an “individual-in-subjection.”25 That is to say: in the production of subjectivity the bodying is always a being of relation. Always in movement, it does its living in the unlimited exposure that exceeds any body-world separation. Subjectivity is not inside. It is not in me. It is out of me. Rather than speak of the “subject,” we should perhaps speak of components of subjectification, each working more or less on its own. This would lead us, necessarily, to re-examine the relation between concepts of the individual and subjectivity, and, above all, to make a clear distinction between the two. Vectors of subjectification do not necessarily pass through the individual, which in reality appears to be something like a “terminal” for processes that involve human groups, socio-economic ensembles, data-processing machines, etc. Therefore, interiority establishes itself at the crossroads of multiple components, each relatively autonomous in relation to the other, and, if need be, in open conflict.26 “That abolition starts with the self.”27 In the drift, subjectivity’s dérive is irreducible to the human. Active in the interval of worlds making themselves, subjectivity is never reducible to a subject. The production of subjectivity is the activity of the interstice: vector, not form. Schizoanalysis works at this uneasy juncture. The task of schizoanalysis is not to get between body and world, between-two. Its task is to make way for all that already populates the between, and to agitate, from within the field of relation, orientations already in germ. Fostering the germination, tending the field, schizoanalysis vectors the inflection. The vectoring requires a subtraction from the open field of all that is still in potentia. Schizoanalysis culls from potential a shape, a way. This excision from process is a subtraction from infinitude to the finite. From the side of infinitude, in the field of immanence, Whitehead calls this activity that sparks a standing out of experience “importance.” From the side of finitude, in the field of activity, Whitehead calls it “expression”: Expression is founded on the finite occasion. It is the activity of finitude impressing itself on its environment. Thus it has its origin in the finite; and it represents the immanence of the finite in the multitude of its fellows beyond itself. The two together, namely importance and expression, are witnesses both to the monistic aspect of the universe and to its pluralistic character. Importance passes from the world as one to the world as many; whereas, expression is the gift from the world as many to the world as one.28 Importance and expression function as intensifiers of experience, bringing into activity the singularity of a life that nonetheless continues to carry its anarchic share. In this account, the human is not singled out. There is no externalizing voice, no mediator. Arrows of experience are their own force, importance not a question of what matters to me, but of what actually (but always also in potentia) makes a difference. Importance makes way for precision in experience. That is to say, importance is what fosters a certain specific angle of existence, allowing certain qualities of experience to take precedence over others. We have come to believe that mediation is necessary to parse experience. But as Whitehead emphasizes, the world is always in its own pursuit of amplification. Incessant clearing, colonialism without end, in the afterlife of slavery, results in systems out of kilter. Ecological destruction has finally begun to register, centuries too late. The question of how to bring things into a metastability that is conducive to life-living must involve a reckoning with the deadening force of mediation. We don’t need another apology. We need to get out of the way. The blackening of the earth requires the production of something entirely other than me, or you.The infraface29 of the three ecologies—“the world as one to the world as many … the world as many to the world as one”—is immediating.30 Immediation is not the opposite of mediation. Rather, it is the force of a thirdness irreducible to a between-two. Immediation is the more-than, the n+1 that is by necessity n-1, one as many, many as one, the qualitative force of an uncountability that diagonalizes to give rise to what else moves in the relation. The production of subjectivity is immediating to the degree that it is not produced by something outside itself. Immediating, always at once body and world, its own perspective. That is to say, its angle on existence is not ours, cannot be reduced to us. The production of subjectivity is a making-conceptual of existence. It is an attuning to the deadly violence of the body-world split produced in the wake of the clearing.31 There are not three ecologies. There is one ecology multiply intertwined. To get to the potential of what the three ecologies in their transversality offer, the production of subjectivity must be attended to. We have failed each other at the juncture of the production of subjectivity in particular, and nothing will be possible without that shift. In the words of The Invisible Committee, the exhaustion of natural resources is probably much less advanced than the exhaustion of subjective resources, of vital resources, that is afflicting our contemporaries. If so much satisfaction is derived from surveying the devastation of the environment it’s largely because this veils the frightening ruin of subjectivities. Every oil spill, every sterile plain, every species extinction is an image of our souls in rags, a reflection of our lack of world, of our intimate impotence to inhabit it.32 To become in excess of a person, to activate the conditions for a life-living that worlds in the bodying, is a social and environmental act. The emergent sociality of becoming-environmental never happens through the clearing. In happens in the midst, black flies and all. The production of subjectivity in the transversality of the three ecologies is the way the more-than of nature naturing crafts a sociality ecosophically. A sociality, as Harney and Moten might say, all incomplete. Guattari calls the ecology he associates with the production of subjectivity “mental.” I prefer conceptual, to produce a stronger sense of how the world itself is alive with the movement of thought. A turn to Whitehead brings the two together. For Whitehead, the conceptual share is that excess of experience that tunes the occasion to its potential. All activity in the world has a conceptual share, but it is true to say that some aspects of existence make use of it more emphatically. Whitehead calls this “mentality.” Mentality, as in Guattari, is not reducible to the mind. Mentality is the force of existence. It is the world’s capacity to exceed itself. All incomplete, the world continuously renews itself. Scene 10 We don’t need to look to some far off lands: it’s already here. Isn’t that what Tommy Orange means when he says, “Being Indian has never been about returning to the land. The land is everywhere or nowhere”?33 The work has already begun. The accursed share of life-living is too unwieldy, too uncountable, to be mediated. It cannot be governed. This is its potency, but also its fallacy. The work is not where we’ve been taught it is. And the tools we need are not the ones we own. a nascent subjectivity a constantly mutating socius an environment in the process of being reinvented34 The three ecologies are a proposition. They are not a place. To follow the artist-architects Arakawa and Madeline Gins, we might call them an architectural procedure.35 An architectural procedure is not an architecture. It is a fielding of potential that brings into constellation enabling constraints for the construction of a world. Procedurality is key. An architectural procedure must produce itself propositionally. This means that what emerges will never be a thing, a site. It will undercommon itself into existence, perhaps—as Arakawa and Gins once said—“only making an appearance indirectly.”36 Because to see-feel it is to have created the conditions for feeling, conditions that were never reducible to a subject as given in advance. The event of the three ecologies is here, in the productive looping of a field of experience that is at once constitutive of its expression and constituted by it. Because when importance and expression meet, it is never at our bidding.

#### **The role of the negative is to offer novel creative epistemologies that reorients modernity’s understanding of subjectivity**

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Neurodiverse qualities of attention can make getting going an issue; spaZe emerged as a technique for activating study. How we practice matters, and no change can occur without practice. This includes practicing value differently. What we most want to avoid with 3e is any return to the service economy and any kind of transactional economic politics. 3e is about asking how else we can value beyond the economy of credit that orients education today. What is the credit we exchange in the name of neurotypicality, of whiteness? What kind of sociality can be crafted that honors that debt, too immense to ever repay, turning it into the gift of Glissant’s poetics of relation, a living practice that reminds us at every turn that we must consent not to be a single being (1997, 5, 27)? We invite those of you who want to participate, who care to invent with us what else learning and living can be, to practice three modes of entry. We ask that you bring to the platform of exploratory learning one of these techniques: knot: a paradox or temporary impasse in one’s work, life, thinking, or creative practice that might become newly productive if staged in a way that opens it to a collaborative exploration, in language or between language and other modes of expression. juncture: a known conjunction reopened for further exploration through new techniques reconfiguring its potential; the juncture might be a theoretical perspective, a set of established techniques informing a particular practice, an already-operating collaboration or project, or an existing disciplinary, interdisciplinary, or intermedia platform, restaged with a new inflection. vector: a move out from known junctures into a wander line that is oriented by a proposition, and in that sense directionally constrained, but is at the same time open-ended in way that invites new takings-form on the fly. Platforms for relation are never set in stone. We only propose to begin here. Together we will see where the practice leads. What we know is this: platforms for relation are everywhere active in our everyday lives. We need to learn how to seed them across undercommoning environments. Through these platforms we need to germinate new practices, and to practice failing together. Content delivery is not what changes the conditions of experience. There is no production of desire there. What moves experience are practices that reorient the place of knowledge in experience, practices that ask how the being of relation produces the kind of transformative justice livingloving requires.

## Case

### 2AC --- Presumption

#### Reject presumption- it relies on the logics of productivity and goal-oriented approaches that prevent other modes of being within debate.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 57-59, JMH]

Considering Black cultural contexts where mental illness and cognitive disability occur, the two major Western modes of interpretation—ocularity and (drawing on our earlier conversation) linear time—no longer retain the exclusive right to interpret meaning. **The Black mad are, in some sense, no more. They becomce the mad Black.** I theorize mad Black and mad Blackness as a formulation that disrupts the ocular and linear legacies of the West’s conception of space and time, respectively. To theorize the concept of the mad Black or mad Blackness opens up critical space to consider how the discourses of madness and Blackness not only operate in intraracial spaces but also intensify and dismantle common understandings of each other. When mad becomes a modifier for Black it carries with it the charge of excess (i.e., more Black, really Black, unapologetically Black, Blackity Black), anger, and insanity as it simultaneously functions as an intensifier for Blackness itself. In some ways, madness amplifies Blackness in this conception, pushing it to excess, but it also has the potential to dismantle it. Said potential lies precisely in the disruption of Western space and time. Sight no longer acts as the dominant mode of sense making. Linear progressions of time no longer capture the movement of subjects and objects through narrative. Mad Blackness fills in the gaps heretofore created by reading strategies (i.e., mutual constitution) that rely on these two Western modalities of interpretation. For instance, Octavia E. Butler’s mad Black character cleaves time from space with her very existence, such that the linear progressive narrative plane is disrupted. She also foregrounds the lie in thinking of the impeachability of sight as the dominant mode of interpretation. Her allies cannot see her illness. Their understanding based on sight—no matter its superlative quality— is impoverished. The mad Black then is not solely disruptive because of its embodiment. But also, the mad Black figure and mad Blackness stage a narratological intervention in how we analyze and tell stories about race and disability writ large. **Mad Blackness describes the aesthetics of a text that refuses to adhere to ocularcentrism or linearity**. In these texts—including but not limited to the ones in these conversations—madness and Blackness pervade the structure of the text such that linear renderings of the narrative always do a disservice to the text and an emphasis on sight forecloses interpretive possibility. To be clear, it is not that ocularcentrism and linearity are wholly inappropriate, but rather that they are explicitly incomplete due to the influence of madness and Blackness in the structure and characters of the text. As a result, **mad Blackness necessarily critiques texts that de bnigrate madness or Blackness or both.** Despite, and perhaps owing to, this disruptive quality, I would not define mad Blackness as a revolutionary force, nor would I expect mad Black figures to offer solutions. **Their disruption—of interpretation, of narrative—does not require that they provide solutions, since that contrasts their suspicion of linearity and teleology, nor does it require that they be benevolent, since that often requires they be in service of those that create and maintain antiBlack ableist and sanist structures**. This book, Black Madness :: Mad Blackness, is one such example of a mad Black text. As I mentioned, the conversations herein reveal critical conversations to themselves, and seek to perturb some of the foundations upon which Black studies and disability studies rest all while yoking them irrevocably together Nalo Hopkinson’s work in Midnight Robber (2000) theorizes this concept through her two mad Black figures (one who experiences mental illness and another, cognitive impairment) and her aesthetic commentary on narrative structure. Midnight Robber is not her only novel that explores the mad Black. Hopkinson’s oeuvre includes a variety of characters and plotlines influenced by or experiencing some form of madness peculiar to the worlds they inhabit. In Sister Mine (2013), one of Hopkinson’s main characters has a congenital magic defect. In The Chaos (2012), the entire world randomly changes so that rules of physics, metaphysics, climate, thermodynamics, and electricity no longer apply. Brown Girl in the Ring (1998) features a cadre of characters who do not share the reality of the community. The New Moon’s Arms (2007) wades into the territory of madness within a subplot about the main character’s origins. Hopkinson’s short stories in Skin Folk (2001), particularly “Tawny Bitch,” which depicts a woman in an asylum, also feature (and I mean that in the vernacular sense) mad Black characters and aesthetics.13 **For the characters for whom this is an embodied reality, madness can be real or imagined. It tends to divide into the two categories described and parsed above: cognitive disability and mental illness.** Cognitive impairment within the world of Hopkinson’s novels carries with it a sense of responsibility to the person experiencing the impairment. Those who have been perceived as having mental illness tend to be sequestered or isolated from a larger community either physically or emotionally. Determining soundness of mind crystallizes in our logophilic obsession with the book and the insistence on the unimpeachability of sight. Here—in this break—is where Nalo Hopkinson’s work becomes instructive.

### 2AC --- Accountability Good

#### Intimacy requires accountability and inclusion- their move to discount the role of non-disabled debaters only locks in the status quo and prevents change.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 35-36, JMH]

So, the critical task before us is not to dismiss mutual constitution but rather to develop a more robust analytic that does not remain stagnated between recuperation and resistance. We must consider how recuperative projects assume a simultaneity and reciprocity of creation not always present within linear history and interracial encounter. We must be wary of projects that locate resistance on Black mad bodies solely in service of white bodies (regardless of ability status), avoiding the seduction of ascribing agency at the cost of ignoring material reality. The critical literature foments its analysis based on characters or people’s relationships to structures and institutions; yet, within each lurks the possibility of analyzing another set of relationships, the interpersonal. Without parsing structural violence and history from intimacy, Octavia E. Butler’s consideration of kinship and intimate relationships offers a space to consider the quotidian and erotic praxis that undergirds the relationships and analytical possibilities of Blackness and madness. **A move to the quotidian and the erotic prioritizes the import of “the discretionary acts and, yes, racist [and ableist] practices that each of us make in everyday decisions such as choosing someone to sit beside on the subway, selecting a mate or a sperm donor, or developing a list of subjects or an academic study.”32** Not only should we rethink the “autonomy usually attached to erotic choices” but also how “racism [and ableism] orders some of the most intimate practices of everyday life.”33 Obviously, proximity and intimacy offer no curative function for racism and ableism and can, in point of fact, exacerbate the wounds they create. Yet, the contours of how we discuss intimacy reverberate beyond the individuals it includes, revealing a limited threshold for complex interpretation.34 When we do not excuse the behavior of allies, friends, family, and sexual partners as representative of a culture, poor impact of good intention, or part of a learning curve, they offer another way to think through the constellation of relationships between Blackness and madness, circumventing the inclination toward limited readings of either resistance or recuperation.

### 2AC --- Progress

#### Neoliberal notions of progress reconstitute themselves as Black debility becomes the antagonist of white racial progress.

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In my original plan for this book, I had intended to say much more about the legacy of vitality politics in Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” antiobesity campaign, and to unpack its continued practice in Flint, Michigan’s lead-poisoned water crisis. While I was completing this book and meditating on the afterlife of these historical intersections of slow violence, Black debility, and fugitive justice, however, the 2016 presidential election occurred, and all seemed changed, changed utterly. I began to suspect that concluding with these stories of historical recurrence may not fully address the questions we need to ask about the long history of antiblackness and African American debility: what are the stories worth telling in our current twenty-first-century cultural moment and, as importantly, what are the questions we need to ask in telling these stories to intervene and to imagine alternative social, economic, and political possibilities? During and now after the 2016 election, as it has been frequently noted, the United States witnessed a resurgence of white nationalism (or at least its unabashed expression) and intensified antiblackness. But what interested me was how the material-semiotic sign of Black debility functioned as a key relationality within a less overt conservative white racism, which reconstituted white citizenship for a supposedly postrace multicultural America. However, this time questions of Black debility had a different valence. Although, as in an earlier post-Reconstruction period, Black debility was once again being invoked as part of a white backlash against racial progress, it had morphed. No longer was white America defining itself against a strategically constituted or permitted Black debility: it was both reappropriating this positionality as a sign of its own victimization while reauthenticating a decontextualized maiming of Black lives as a comparative sign of their inherent and implacable “noncompliant” debility. We can see this story of white America’s “rehabilitation” and the utility of Black debility most clearly in the current narratives about the opioid crisis that has caused political commentators on the right and the left to question white America’s decline and possible future, and also Black America’s intractability. In the remainder of this epilogue I will, therefore, offer a discursive reading of what I call “the gentrification of the drug crisis” narrative in public debates about white America’s needed rehabilitation in the face of the opioid crisis in order to trace out some final thoughts about Black America’s structurally necessary debility in U.S. citizenship-making stories. Then, as a way of demonstrating how this narrative has entrenched itself in Hollywood’s popular overcoming narratives, I will offer a brief analysis of the 2015 film Southpaw that, even though seemingly offering a typical sentimentalized story about cross-racial friendship in the boxing world, reveals the new logic of a white identity politics that, like the drug crisis itself, gentrifies a Black positionality and displaces its devaluation of Black life in order to circulate a dominant narrative about America’s “great (white) hope.” Specifically, in the 2015 film Southpaw, which stars Jake Gyllenhaal and is directed by the African American Antoine Fuqua, we see how the main character, Billy Hope, referred to as the boxing world’s “great white hope,” discloses how a liberal white antiracist narrative of America’s comeback story and contemporary prison reform still depend on the drug-addicted pain and suffering of an inherently different Black debility. During the 2016 presidential campaign there was a lot of talk about America’s—or at least white rural and suburban America’s—drug epidemic. As the candidates noted, citing the most recent available statistics, 37,000 Americans died of drug overdoses in 2013, but what captured headlines, as Vice News noted, was the fact that drug overdoses “killed white people more than anyone else,”14 or, as the New York Times reported on February, 2, 2016, “Addiction [Now] Has a White Face.”15 A study published in JAMA Psychiatry in July 2014 reported that nearly 90 percent of recent heroin users were white, and about 75 percent of these new users came from rural or suburban areas, many in states that are GOP strongholds.16 While campaigning in key primary states such as Iowa and New Hampshire, as a consequence, traditionally conservative law and order Republican candidates broke silences and confessed their own family histories with drug abuse. Jeb Bush shared his daughter’s struggle with addiction and the felony charges she had faced for “illegally possessing prescription drugs”;17 Carly Fiorina admitted her daughter’s struggle with alcohol and opiate addiction before her death from an overdose; and Ted Cruz disclosed his older half-sister Miriam’s similar overdose death, explaining, “[t]hese tragedies are happening in human lives all over this country—it’s the human journey” (emphasis added). Although not sharing personal family histories, Ohio governor John Kasich also addressed what he called (repeating the language of news stories in the New York Times as well as on NPR) the “gentrification of the drug crisis.” In 2014 Governor Kasich had passed in Ohio the first legislation to make naloxone available without a prescription because, at the time, the state had the second highest number of overdose deaths. I want for a moment to quote Governor Kasich’s comments before a Drug Addiction Forum in New Hampshire because they point out the troubling racialization, structuring antiblack debility and emergent white identity politics within various survivalist narratives about America’s drug epidemic and the push toward more humane responses, replacing incarceration with treatment. Speaking to a largely white audience in New Hampshire, a state still 96 percent white, according to the government census data, Kasich noted, “This disease knows no bounds, knows no income, knows no neighborhood; it’s everywhere. . . . And sometimes I wonder how African Americans must have felt when drugs were awash in their community and nobody watched. Now it’s in our communities, and now all of a sudden, we’ve got forums, and God bless us, but think about the struggles that other people had".19 As Kasich’s comments attest, drug addiction should be reframed as a colorblind disease, and five months later, in July 2016, Congress passed a landmark piece of legislation referred to as the Opioid Bill, or more officially as the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA), that shifted low-level drug violations from the criminal justice system to treatment programs. The promotion of such a public health response represented a significant reframing and overturning of the nation’s response to addiction during the Reagan era “war on drugs,” and we should not minimize the importance of this shift toward rehabilitation. But such a therapeutic rethinking of policy also depends on a new race transcending and seemingly more civilized disability (or addiction) narrative that taps into a structuring antiblackness to rehumanize innocent white users, just as Black debility had functioned to legitimate white labor privileges and enfranchisement during the post-Reconstruction period. This “gentrification of the drug crisis narrative,” as we might call it, discloses not just a racist disparity between an earlier zero tolerance of Black crack users in the 1980s and 90s and a contemporary public health response to sympathetic white heroin users. It also offers insights more generally into an emergent dynamic of a Black debility within an unmarked white identity politics that often comes to stand in for contemporary liberal antiracist multicultural discourse. To begin to unpack how antiblackness structures the white identity politics of this seemingly more civilized “gentrification of the drug crisis” narrative, we need only look at the legacy of a long history of antiblackness and health that I have tried to recover throughout the previous chapters. As I have argued throughout this book, drawing on the work of Black Studies scholars such as Jared Sexton, Frank Wilderson, and Alexander Weheliye, antiblackness encompasses more than racial bias, discrimination, white privilege, and even violence. Antiblackness refers to a foundational structuring differentiation that continues to govern Black lives in the afterlife of slavery. Not only, thus, have white supremacists invoked antiblackness as a self-identifying racial difference, but U.S. liberal notions of personhood, citizenship, and agency have also depended on figurations of antiblackness, or of Black disposability and worthlessness and indifference to Black suffering and pain as a structuring force. In his comments before the Drug Addiction Forum, Kasich, on one hand, calls for empathy, but he also invokes the larger shaping logic of a post–civil rights white liberal identity politics (one that goes unmarked as “color-blind” amid the alarm over a more clearly vocal white supremacism): this white identity politics depends on, to borrow the language of the drug epidemic narratives, a white gentrification and appropriation of a Black positionality in the call for a universalizing empathy.20 As Kasich’s comments before the drug forum’s white audience note, whites are the new Blacks, for whites now share the suffering and pain historically associated with an abstracted Black experience, and as a consequence, the United Stated can now move beyond identity politics to embrace, as Ted Cruz indicated, a universal “human story.” But this supposed postrace, postidentity politics is its own white identity politics, one that although seemingly antiracist (built as it is around a common pain of addiction), obscures the structuring position of a differential Black debility.

### 2AC --- Root Cause

#### We control root cause- ableism and antiblackness are foundational to the creation of gender hierarchies and capital accumulation. Their analytic can only explain one form of violence while our 1AC takes a more wholistic approach against anti-black and ableist histories.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 24-29, JMH]

The second critical impulse, retrieval projects that read against ableism to find agency, attempts to locate spaces of resistance where race and disability meet. Here again, I turn to the critical conversations to read where the distillate reveals the material to itself. An analysis of resistance surfaces as part of projects undertaking Bell’s “representational detective work” that “uncovers the misrepresentations of Black, disabled bodies and the missed opportunities to think about how those bodies transform(ed) systems and culture.”19 As such, it offers a way to think through the cultural and political contours of structural ableism as intersected with structural racism. So far, this scholarship concludes that Black disabled bodies loosen the grip of ableism by resisting cultural norms of both disabled and Black communities: scholars explore this dynamic within Blackness and madness from a wide variety of critical angles, including Black women and depression (Anna Mollow), melancholia and poverty (Éva Tettenborn, Anne Cheng, Paul Gilroy), cognitive disability and civil rights redress (Stacie McCormick), rehabilitation and Black queerness (Robert McRuer), and popular music (Nicole Fleetwood, La Marr Jurelle Bruce, Moya Bailey, Anna Hinton). Usefully, this body of scholarship opens up the critical space left closed when we aver that discourses of Blackness and madness compete. Each points out that the workings of structural racism and ableism do not complement each other. In fact, the cultural logics that mandate Blackness as abject can depose those that maintain disability as such. This strategy is not the only or primary way to read challenges to racism and ableism. The problem exists (pace Hortense Spillers) at the level of grammar. These projects tend to have one vector: they “transform(ed) systems and culture.”20 Note that transform operates as transitive where Black, disabled bodies perform the work of transformation rather than undergo the process of transformation. Yet Black, disabled bodies will not always behave as agents that transform or those who are transformed in equal measure or, as noted above, with a degree of reciprocity. Allowing for more than one vector between Black, disabled bodies and the systems in which they operate clarifies the following: it is inaccurate that the only critical relationship between Blackness and disability (specifically, madness) is one of liberation from ableism. At times, **Blackness exacerbates the presence of ableism, or cultural norms facilitate ableism.**21 In accounting for these moments, I trouble the corollary of the logic above: namely, that whiteness withal the privilege embedded in it lacks the tools for its own liberation and must rely on Blackness to acquire its release. Here, Blackness becomes a reduced space where whiteness enacts its privilege by instrumentalizing Blackness. In this paradigm, Blackness for all its cultural complexity becomes another reactionary space that exists to indict whiteness, rather than a culture and system of thought all its own.22 We must consider the spaces when mere exposure of oppression is not only not emancipatory but can also be detrimental, where demonstration and acknowledgement of one’s various intersecting socially marginalized positions does not equal political agency. **We must also consider what happens when Black cultural locations refuse whiteness as an interlocutor in favor of intraracial conversations. In short, when madness is “a Black thang” (with all that evokes in terms of exclusivity and ableist objectification).** I take up the question of intraracial context and conversation in the next discussion. For now, I turn to another foundational moment in the study of Blackness and disability to read in the breaks of the critical material. I continue the conversation about the critical impulse of mutual constitution that looks to retrieve agentive stories of Black disabled folks as instantiations of anti-ableist radicality. Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s Extraordinary Bodies (1997) includes a chapter on physical disability in Ann Petry’s The Street, Toni Morrison’s oeuvre, and Audre Lorde’s Zami. Though Thomson’s discussion does not explicitly discuss mental disability, cognitive impairment, or crazy-as-insult, I find it instructive for this conversation. Madness shadows each of the texts under scrutiny since the characters deviate from intracultural norms by being Black women who seek class ascension despite the odds (Petry) and wider American cultural norms by participating in and identifying with communities labeled deviant (and crazy) by the dsm IV (Lorde). Of course, Morrison’s characters are literally haunted by their actions and kinfolk, which always forces the question of whether Morrison’s characters could be labeled crazy. It becomes useful to think about Morrison’s, Petry’s, and Lorde’s work (especially as part of Garland Thomson’s project) from the perspective of Octavia E. Butler: namely, that sanity is communally defined and anyone who deviates from agreed upon norms is treated as mad. The characters’ desires for themselves (and the methods they use to achieve them) exceed the racialized and gendered boundaries drawn for them. Indeed, because they also have physical disabilities, their behavior trespasses the boundaries drawn based on ability as well. Madness cannot be cleaved from these conversations. Thomson’s claims about the representation of physical disability as agentive and liberatory have implications for whether madness has similar representational possibilities.23 Thomson offers that the collective project of these Black women’s writings provides an antidote to white racist depictions. These powerful bodies— extraordinary, in Thomson’s lexicon—participate in a “collective project of cultural revision [that] challenges the African-American woman writer to produce a narrative of self that authenticates Black women’s oppressive history yet offers a model for transcending that history’s limitations.”24 Moreover, the primacy given to disabled women figures “reveals the shift in African-American literary representation from a modernist to a postmodernist mode, a change that parallels the ideological move of minority groups from assimilation to affirmation of cultural and ethnic differences.”25 While I partly agree that these representations “render oppression without reinscribing it,”26 I hesitate to read in them the triumph that Thomson affirms. On the one hand, Thomson rightly points out that these characters do not completely represent physical deviance. On the other, they do not, as she says, “repudiate such cultural master narratives as normalcy, wholeness, and the feminine ideal.”27 I would attribute this aspect of their representation to the way that the social model of disability upon which Thomson relies does not fully account for the way madness shows up in these texts.28 The social model privileges a particular kind of mental agility and cognitive processing to combat the stigma and material consequences that arise as a result of ableism. In turn, the model dismisses madness as a viable subject position, ensuring that those counted as such—either by communal consensus or psydisciplines—remain excluded from conversations about disability because they cannot logically engage. For the characters in Thomson’s study, this has the pernicious effect of erasing some of the master cultural narratives they work against: those that acknowledge their physical disability and link it to mental disability as a way to further disenfranchise and disempower them. Thomson’s work reads these figures (based on their representation of physical disabilities) as liberatory for the larger narrative and theoretical spaces of ethnic modernism. I hazard that these characters’ relationship to disability suggests an investment in internalized ableism, particularly visà-vis sexuality. For example, Thomson reads Ann Petry’s Mrs. Hedges, a tall, dark-skinned Black woman with avoirdupois who works as a madam, as one who refuses victimization. Important for this conversation is the way Mrs. Hedges is not only physically disfigured by burns but also read as ex ceeding the gendered and racialized boundaries the text’s Black community (voiced through the protagonist) circumscribes for her. Her madness is not biomedically defined, but it carries psychosocial repercussions given how she is treated. Thomson bases her reading of Mrs. Hedges as liberatory on Hedges’s sexualized gaze on the main character and her profession as a madam. Yet, there is no room for Hedges to acquiesce to or enjoy the sexualized attention she receives from the rich white man who controls the street. The novel makes it clear that part of Hedges’s rejection of the man’s sexual advances is financial. She cannot be in bed with him literally and economically. However, **what the novel leaves open is that Hedges’s rejection of him is also about her own denigrated view of her sexuality.29 She is still limned as monstrous, grotesque, even if Hedges as a figure shifts the understanding of monstrosity.** Inasmuch as Hedges’s physical disability allows her to move from one position in the economy to another more powerful one, she must rely on a chosen life of celibacy and a masculinized, monstrous appearance to secure and maintain her new economic position. Her celibacy also shores up her power by keeping the madness of her disfigured, disabled, interracial sexuality in check. That is, though the disability is no longer in the background of the text, the cultural baggage of internalized ableism appears in the foreground replete with eschewing sexual desire and limiting the association with traditional forms of femininity. Even if Petry’s project does—according to Thomson—pave the way for Black authors to shift from assimilation to affirmation and provide a challenge to the static representations of disabled figures in modernist texts, Mrs. Hedges’s refusal to engage in her own sexuality complicates a reading of this figure as liberatory vis-à-vis physical disability and the charges of madness that accompany her character. Reading Mrs. Hedges as agentive certainly poses challenges given the internalized ableism within Petry’s text, especially since the novel focuses on intraracial encounter. First, physical disability only liberates Mrs. Hedges from the intraracial economy of the street by providing an avenue for power. Yet, within intraracial encounter, she remains circumscribed by the discourses of madness because community members consider her mad for transgressing boundaries of race and gender. Second, the interracial encounter does not allow for her agency within the critical literature. Thomson claims that Petry’s text, as well as the others, counters the limited representations of disability within modernist texts. Implicitly, the logic of such a critical move—regardless of its truism—mandates that Blackness become the vehicle for (mostly white) others’ liberation from ableism in their reading practice. In that way, **it is the presence of Blackness that shores up white liberalism by not only providing a representation of Blackness but also a complex rendering of white-centered notions of disability.**

### 2AC --- Humanism

#### Reject humanism- mad blackness overdetermines one’s ability to be a human in the first place.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 36-41, JMH]

In Butler’s drafts of Fledgling, she toys with the way Shori’s Black madness structures her interactions with the Gordons and the text writ large. Each instantiation of the novel evinces Butler’s commitment to depicting Blackness and madness as destabilizing forces, which heighten and problematize privilege because they shift the contours of the multiability, interracial encounter. The two discourses work together and, in that sense, remain coextensive, but they also function at cross-purposes. For instance, Shori speculates that the Gordons test her when they allow her to question the human agents responsible for the arson that killed her family.In Butler’s drafts, she experiments with how to split the questioning between Shori and the Gordons, and, in the final version, Butler settles on Shori’s silence. In the published version of Fledgling, Shori is only present to reassure the human agent and persuade him to tell the truth.46 The effect of these changes—displacing the Gordons as the primary interrogators—suggests that the difference is not merely about the space given to the Gordons but rather how Blackness and madness operate. In one draft, Shori interrogates the human agent. Here, her Blackness functions as a discomfiting presence for the human, a reminder and remainder of her difference that forces him to reveal the identity of the Ina agents. Making her the interrogator does not disappear her madness, but it does emphasize a soundness of mind that does not appear to be consonant with her understanding of being Ina, undermining her general authority over her amnesiac experience. In another draft, the Gordons serve as the primary interrogators. Here, her Blackness performs a similar discomfiting function. Her amnesia bolsters her authority over her own experience, even as it forms the basis for her being surveyed by the Gordons. Her madness, invisibilized though it may be, structures the interaction since the Gordons’ familiarity with other Ina allows them to ask leading questions of the human agent. By virtue of her amnesia, this s not an interrogation skill she can use. As a result, her silence in the face of her amnesia lingers as an answer to the Gordons’ skepticism about her, creating two interrogations. In these drafts, splitting the questions between Shori and the Gordons reorganizes how and why information about the attacks is given, clarifying that Shori’s Blackness and madness work on the interaction differently than the Gordons’ whiteness and presumed sanity. In the final version of Fledgling, since she is largely silent, Shori’s **Black madness functions as a sustained pressure for the interrogation, emphasizing the Gordons’ privilege in relation to her.** Whereas her Blackness shores up her utility during the questioning, her madness strips away her authority and autonomy because the Gordons take over the interrogation of the human agent and, without saying a word about her amnesia, create an interrogation of her. Though her race is recognized in both the draft and the final copy as a boon to helping them catch and coerce the human agents, the difference in interrogation technique allows for her madness to reveal the Gordons’ relationship to privilege. Recall that thinking about Blackness and madness as mutually constituted leads us toward reading the two identities as an avenue toward agency when they are located on the same body. I objected to this line of thought because it requires that Blackness operate as a stepping stone for imagining agency only available under certain material conditions and assumes that mere knowledge of one’s condition suffices as emancipatory. Butler’s novel and archive theorizes about this in contemplating the interplay of desire and madness. Butler writes several drafts of an interaction between Shori and Daniel Gordon where Daniel, lost in his own desire for Shori, invites her to bite him.47 In each draft, the invitation remains unspoken at first, functioning only as a matter of scent. He allows her to crawl all over him while they smell each other. The olfactory plays a large part in Ina attraction to either possible symbionts or other Ina. So, Daniel’s invitation to smell—especially since he has to keep himself from acting on sexual arousal caused by her scent—is dangerously coercive. It suggests sexual agency for Shori, but in fact it jeopardizes her life. Butler writes what appears in the final version: Daniel’s admission that he had hoped Shori’s memory was impaired enough to let her bite him. He says, “I half-hoped you would [bite], that maybe with your memory gone, you would simply give in to my scent, my nearness. If you had, well . . . If you had, no one could prevent our union. No one would even try.”48 What keeps her from such an action is her understanding that it might threaten her good standing at the Council of Judgment. In these scenes, Daniel remains silent at first and, later, forthcoming about his desires/intentions. His invitation is a test, one Shori must pass to prove her Ina-ness to other council members, a perception of her identity dependent on both her race and her impairment. **This is not merely about Daniel’s desire but rather how his desire manifests as a form of ability that takes advantage of Shori’s impairment and bears repercussions for the perception of her identity.** Operating along the axis of desire, Daniel’s craving of Shori microaggresses her by circumscribing her within parameters that facilitate her erasure. Microaggressions as a series of environmental, verbal, and nonverbal slights often fall into the category of unintended discrimination and often occur in intimate and/or interpersonal spaces. At times, this discrimination also comes from an affective space of benevolence, where one intends to be nice but instead reveals one’s own biases, ignorance, and desires. To read a microaggression, to understand it, is to analyze the break in the everyday since those moments prove revelatory about the microaggressor. Daniel intends to demonstrate desire and create intimacy, become Shori’s Ina lover, and concretize what he views as the eventual mating between their families. However, Shori is not old enough in Ina society or physiologically mature enough to mate, and her impairment renders her ignorant of social customs regarding interaction between Ina males and females. In addition, Daniel has made a decision about his desire to mate with Shori, whereas Shori’s ability to make such a decision must be—by virtue of her circumstances— delayed. Note the issue of time. Despite her enjoyment of Daniel’s scent, Shori does not control the marketplace of desire, making murky the possibility of consent. Daniel’s solicitation encourages her to break the rules and flirts with disaster given that they are on the cusp of a Council of Judgment meant to decide her fate.

### 2AC --- Fatness (Mollow)

#### The stigma that fatness inherently equals disability allows the media to perpetuate that fat, black people fall victim to the violence that they experience is due to a fault of their own and not the oppressive systems built against them

**Mollow 17** (Anna Mollow, Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley (2017). *Unvictimizable: Toward a Fat Black Disability Studies. African American Review, 50(2), 105–061.* doi:10.1353/afa.2017.0016)

Those who defended Garner’s killers added another source of blame to an already familiar mix: Garner was fat. According to the New York Republican congressman Peter King, the chokehold was necessary because Garner was a “350- pound person who was resisting arrest.” Furthermore, King asserted, if Garner “had not had asthma and a heart condition and was[n’t] so obese, almost definitely he would not have died” (qtd. In Henderson). Here, fatphobia and ableism function as weapons of antiblack violence, allowing Garner to be blamed for his own death at the hands of police. In this essay, I argue that fatphobia is routinely deployed in ways that exacerbate the problem of state-sanctioned violence against African Americans. As we shall see, antifat prejudice, racism, and ableism intersect to create a double bind in which black people are depicted as unvictimizable for two contradictory reasons: black people—of all sizes, but fat black people in particular—are figured as innately disabled but also as invulnerable to disability, injury, or suffering. For example, defenders of the officers who killed Garner reproduced stereotypes of black bodies as inherently disabled when they insisted that fatness-induced disabilities—rather than a deadly police chokehold—caused Garner’s death. At the same time, Garner was portrayed as almost superhumanly invulnerable when Congressman King described him as a “350-pound person who was resisting arrest,” the implication being that Garner’s size made him so dangerous that deadly force was necessary to defuse the threat that he presented. In this and other tragic incidents that I discuss in this essay, fatphobia and ableism work in conjunction with racism to construct an ideological double bind that rhetorically positions black bodies as incapable of being victimized. One side of this double bind renders violence against black people inconsequential by suggesting that fatness is the real cause of any injuries inflicted upon them, while its other side depicts violence as a necessary response to the excessive physical power that black people, especially those who are fat, are imagined to embody.

This racialized double bind is not a new invention. In the U.S., it dates back to the era of slavery, when slave owners and their supporters contended that black people were so prone to physical and mental disabilities that they could not survive without the “protection” of their white owners—while at the same time maintaining that people of African descent possessed such inordinate strength that they did not suffer from the abuses that their enslavers imposed upon them.2 Today, discussions about race are less likely to explicitly invoke biological theories equating blackness with disability. More common is a discursive formation that some scholars call the “new racism,” which blames the social disadvantages that black people experience 105 African American Review 50.2 (Summer 2017): 105-121 © 2017 Saint Louis University and Johns Hopkins University Press not on biological impairments but instead on alleged moral failings, such as “laziness” and lack of “personal responsibility” (Collins).3 What is important is that the new racism has not replaced the old racism; instead, it repackages longstanding racist stereotypes to make them more palatable in a neoliberal, ostensibly “postracial” era (Collins 32-33). Fatphobia functions efficiently as a weapon of the new racism by enabling the adaptation of old ideas about black people’s supposed inborn physical deficiencies to a modern context, attributing the putative bodily pathology of “obesity” to moral shortcomings that are coded in racialized terms. Tellingly, the behaviors to which fatness is commonly attributed replicate stereotypes of black people as undisciplined and unable to control their appetites (Williams-Forson).

A central justification for stigmatizing fat people rests on two unexamined assumptions: that fatness is a choice, and that it typically leads to disability. Because fatness and disability are inseparably linked in the cultural imagination, it is impossible to adequately theorize antifat oppression without simultaneously attending to ableism. Nor, I will argue, can antiblack violence be sufficiently analyzed without examining the ways in which ableism and fatphobia reinforce longstanding constructions of black bodies as unvictimizable. We therefore need a methodology that takes measure of deeply imbricated relationships among racism, ableism, and fatphobia. Because no such theoretical apparatus currently exists, this essay begins conceptualizing a new, transdisciplinary methodology, which I provisionally term “fat black disability studies.” Fat black disability studies brings together four principal bodies of work: critical race theory, fat studies, disability studies, and the Black Lives Matter movement. While the present essay focuses on racialized state violence, this by no means exhausts the topics that fat black disability studies could illuminate. As I articulate my argument about the roles of fatphobia and ableism in sustaining antiblack state violence, I also sketch the contours of fat black disability studies, highlighting key insights within the multiple disciplines that compose it: critical race theory’s concept of intersectionality, fat studies’ contestation of the medicalization of fatness, disability studies’ analyses of social constructions of “health,” and Black Lives Matter’s demonstration of the ways in which police brutality is fueled by other, often unrecognized, forms of antiblack violence.

#### Environmental racism that black neighborhoods enforces the idea that fat people are disabled and ignores the fact that the location the neighborhoods are in subjects the residents to toxins that create health issues

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Failures to punish perpetrators of antiblack violence send the disturbing message that black lives do not matter to the state. Much the same message is conveyed by the U.S. government’s long standing refusal to adequately address the lead poisoning crisis in African American neighborhoods. Although the use of lead paint was banned decades ago, the paint remains on the walls of many low-income black people’s homes, and laws stipulating that landlords inspect rental housing for lead paint are seldom enforced (Wheeler and Broadwater). In Gray’s home state of Maryland, almost five thousand children, the vast majority of whom are African American, have experienced lead poisoning in the past decade (Wheeler and Broadwater). Lead poisoning is only one of many examples of racialized environmental injustice. Historically and contemporarily, black neighborhoods have been used as dumping grounds for toxins that white people have the political and economic clout to keep out of their communities. People of color are far more likely than whites to have little choice but to live near landfills, hazardous waste facilities, coal-fired plants, and chemical factories; they also face disproportionate levels of water contamination and pollution (Bell; Covert). Here, Black Lives Matter’s reference to the ways in which black people “are intentionally left powerless at the hands of the state” is germane: despite the pervasiveness of racialized environmental injustice, the Environmental Protection Agency has never made a formal finding of a civil rights violation against people of color (“Did the EPA''; Covert). Since its effects on the bodies of people of color are damaging and sometimes deadly, environmental racism as a form of violence. Yet fatphobia masks this violence: while news about a supposed “obesity crisis” makes daily headlines, the press all but ignores environmental racism. This omission is particularly troubling when one considers that food activists who blame fast food restaurants and snack foods for illnesses and disabilities focus intense attention on the poorest African American neighborhoods, where the effect of environmental racism the most extreme. What if the public resources that are now being used to fight a “war on obesity” in communities of color were instead directed to the task of eliminating environmental racism? One of many toxins to which people of color are disproportionately exposed is nitrogen dioxide, a chemical that has been identified as a potential causative agent in asthma and heart disease (Swift). As previously noted, Eric Garner had both of these conditions, and defenders of the police who killed him blamed his death on these disabilities, alleging that they were the result of fatness. Their comments crystallized the ways in which antifat prejudice, racialized police brutality, and environmental racism interlock and reinforce each other. While fatness has not been shown to cause asthma, heart disease, or any other medical condition, the pollution that proliferates in African American neighborhoods likely does increase the risk of acquiring these disabilities. Thus, the inaccurate claims about body size and health that were circulated by those who blamed Garner for his own death had effect not only of legitimizing anti black state violence but also of obscuring the violence of environmental racism. Like police brutality, environmental racism is often justified through dehumanizing rhetoric that depicts black people as unvictimizable, suggesting that the injuries black people sustain are of their own doing. In the mid-twentieth century, when scientific evidence implicating lead paint in neurological and cognitive disabilities became overwhelming, the lead industry claimed that lead poisoning resulted from “uneducable Negro and Puerto Rican families” who could not stop their children from eating paint (Black).33 Note the striking similarities to contemporary discourses about body size: much as proponents of lead paint maintained that black people would not get sick if they would only stop putting the wrong things in their mouths, modern-day medical “experts” blame health problems in African American communities on “obesity” and portray black people as lacking the requisite “education” to make appropriate choices about what to eat.

#### Black, disabled people are forced into a double bind that, especially when they are fat, images them as unvictimizable. This ideology gives an excuse for the state to enact violence and disguise it as them protecting civilians from “dangerous people”

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Fatphobia reinforces these tropes of black bodies as inherently dangerous. Consider, for example, public remarks by Steve Loomis, the president of Cleveland’s police union, who defended Loehmann’s decision to shoot Tamir: Tamir Rice is in the wrong. He’s menacing. He’s 5-feet-7, 191 pounds. He wasn’t that little kid you’re seeing in pictures. He’s a 12-year-old in an adult body. Tamir looks to his left and sees a police car. He puts his gun in his waistband. Those people—ninety-nine percent of the time those people run away from us. (Schultz) In keeping with the new racism, Loomis never mentions that Tamir is black. Yet it would be difficult to miss the unspoken racism that saturates his words. The repetition of the phrase “those people,” the denial of Tamir’s vulnerability, and the description of an unarmed preteen boy as “menacing” call up longstanding images of black bodies as too dangerously powerful ever to be considered victims. Interestingly, although Loomis knows better than to speak directly about Tamir’s race, he does offer detailed information about his size. Immediately after describing Tamir as “menacing,” Loomis gives his exact height and weight. Why must the public know that Tamir was precisely “191 pounds”? Presumably, it was Tamir’s weight, not his height, that one was supposed to take as evidence that he was “wrong”; since five feet, seven inches is shorter than the average American man, Loomis’s mention of Tamir’s height serves no discernible purpose other than to make it clear that Tamir was fat. Functioning as a proxy for racism, fatphobia enables Loomis to reduce the child victim of a police killing to a set of dehumanizing antiblack stereotypes, yet without ever directly mentioning race. Antifat prejudice shores up cultural conceptions of black children as lacking innocence, authorizing Loehmann’s assertion that Tamir was a “12-year-old in an adult body.” A fat black child, it seems, cannot really be a child. Nor, it seems, can an African American person of any age be perceived as a genuine victim of state-sanctioned violence. In a culture that relentlessly depicts black bodies as unvictimizable, dominant cultural representations of blackness impede recognition of suffering, injury, and loss experienced by African Americans. As we have seen, this erasure is effected in part through an ideological double bind that contradictorily images black people as inherently disabled but also as invulnerable to pain, disability, and suffering. We have also seen that antifat prejudice augments this double bind: from depictions of Tamir Rice as “menacing” to insinuations that Barbara Dawson posed a threat to other patients in the hospital from which she was evicted, one side of this double bind represents black bodies as dangerous. The other side, which suggests that it is fatness and not violence that causes injuries and deaths of fat African Americans, relies on inaccurate assertions such as the claims that Eric Garner’s “diet killed him” and that Barbara Dawson died because she was “overweight.” As I have demonstrated, this double bind has lethal consequences in a wide range of institutional contexts, including the healthcare system, policing, and environmental policy.

### 2AC --- Scholarship Good

#### Challenging the current norms surrounding disability in modern literature allows for the stigma surrounding disability to be dissolved so it can be seen in a better light

**Schalk 18** (Sami Schalk,Associate Professor in the Department of Gender & Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin – Madison, (2018) *Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women's Speculative Fiction* 133-134 http://library.lol/main/2C8F7A1D8C5F5DC42089719EDD904C24)

The defamiliarization of race, gender, and sexuality in black women’s speculative fiction is important because it demonstrates that (dis)ability is not an exceptional category in these texts and is therefore not merely metaphoric or symbolic. Instead, (dis)ability represents an integral part of the collective defamiliarization of multiple social categories of privilege and oppression, which encourages readers to imagine each of them differently. The defamiliarization of (dis)ability, race, gender, and sexuality encourages us to question our assumptions about the definitions, meanings, and boundaries of these categories. Not all speculative fiction, however, works to explore and question social systems of privilege and oppression. As feminist and critical race scholars of speculative fiction have demonstrated, some texts reify social categories and their related stereotypes, even in nonhuman contexts. This is most apparent in representations of the racialized Other through the figure of the alien, robot, or cyborg.14 It is important then that these contemporary black women writers challenge readers to think about the social construction of (dis)ability, race, gender, and sexuality through defamiliarization. This creative destabilization and challenging of the norms and stereotypes of multiple social categories is influenced by black feminist theory, which insists on the intersectional and mutually constitutive nature of social categories and oppressions. Defamiliarization in these texts also demonstrate Barbara Christian’s argument that creative texts can be a form of theorizing about world. While authors do not need to identify their political positions or personal identities in order for critics to interpret the political implications of their texts, it is nonetheless useful to note that Hopkinson has explicitly identified as both feminist and queer, while Jemisin’s blog certainly suggests strong antiracist, feminist politics (Batty 189; N. Johnston 204). While politicized creative work is clearly not exclusive to black women, Madison’s, Jemisin’s, and Hopkinson’s defamiliarization of major social categories are examples of black feminist theorizing through speculative fiction. All three authors, in different ways, refuse certain expectations of (dis)ability, race, gender, and sexuality while still prioritizing those who are multiply marginalized. These texts therefore provide new and creative ways for readers to question such social categories, not only within these fantastical worlds, but also in their own realist contexts.

### 2AC --- Realism

#### Western rationality frames disability as incompatible with the “reality” of its logics, excusing the worst structural violences while focusing on the “opaque" image of the disabled

Elizabeth J White **Vidarte 21** [Disability, Dependency, and the Mind: Representations of Care-Giving and Receiving,. Temple University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2021. 28542354, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2572601236?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true>, -ekh-]

The AMA’s code of ethics did more than prescribe obedience for patients and tender deportment for doctors; it emphasized the intimately personal connection between a doctor and the ethics of his practice: “A Physician should not only be ever ready to obey the calls of the sick, but his mind ought also to be imbued with the greatness of his mission, and the responsibility he habitually incurs in its discharge. Those obligations are the more deep and enduring, because there is no tribunal other than his own conscience, to adjudge penalties for carelessness or neglect” (np, emphasis mine).

The weight of this ethical charge lies heavily on Dr. Trescott, the protagonist of Stephen Crane’s61 1892 novella, The Monster. The novella frames the medical conundrum at the heart of the story as a question of morality. Dr. Trescott has saved the life of his black servant, Henry, badly burned after having attempted to save Trescott’s own son from a fire. Yet Henry is left “without a face” and apparently with little mind; he has become “the monster.” In the eyes of the town, Henry has transformed into a gothic horror trope, terrorizing children and the infantilized black residents of the town; the second half of the novella shows “the monster” repeating scenes from the first half — asking the doctor about his horses, walking through town, and courting his fiancée at her mother’s house, though this time he is met with screams and stones instead of affectionate ridicule, in part because Henry “the monster” shows no awareness of his transformation. Eventually a mob forms to demand his removal from their collective sight, and when the doctor refuses to send him to the state hospital, he and his wife are socially ostracized. The town’s venerated judge had himself suggested, when Henry was in limbo between life and death, that the most ethical decision Trescott could make was to let Henry die.

Ultimately, the novella asks readers to decide whose way of knowing Henry hews closest to a true understanding of his condition — and therefore whose judgement is morally sound. In doing so, readers are prompted to ask where the limits of morality lie. Is the judge immoral for suggesting that Henry would be better off dead or are the townspeople immoral for their small-minded fear and disgust? Is the doctor immoral for centering the choice to save Henry on his personal feelings rather than his patient’s best interest? Is this a story about social prejudice or a story about a doctor’s hubris?

Susan Schweik has argued persuasively, in “Disability Politics and American Literary History: Some Suggestions,” that The Monster is a story of aftermath, of what happens in the wake of the unthinkable. The townspeople, no less than most critics, cannot seem to conceive of a world in which the Henry of the story’s after — that is, the monster — exists as part of the social fabric of the small town, no matter how picturesque its mischievous small boys and gay outdoor concerts, its barbershop and its tea parties, its volunteer fire companies and its kitchen gossip. If the intimacies of a small town cannot embrace Henry, the novella seemingly implies, there is no place for him anywhere in the universe of American realism. That there were real, historical Henry Johnsons in the America of the 1890s, Schweik argues — Civil War veterans, face cancer patients, factory accident victims, those with congenital harelips, etc. — changes little, for even in the realm of “history,” there existed institutions — overfilled state hospitals, traveling freak shows that specialized in medical oddities, and formal and informal urban “ugly laws” that jailed the disabled for begging in public — that all served a similar purpose: to remove from public view (unless contained appropriately in the cages and stages of the circus) and public consciousness, if not public imagination, those whose very existence was inconceivable in the context of life and community.

This is where reading with attention to the gothic can reveal the hybrid — even monstrous — generic structure of Crane’s novella; we can see the ways that Crane’s realist and gothic modes are inextricably imbricated such that “the real horrors of social relations are simultaneously exposed and concealed,” as Nick Lolordo insightfully argues in his essay, “Possessed by the Gothic” (36). Beyond this, we can attend to what the text works hard to disguise through the narrator’s exaggerated irony, along with Crane’s exuberant literary style, full of distractingly improbable similes and figurative expressions to describe even the most mundane of acts,62 and the cartoonish parodies of black minstrelsy, immigrant dialect, and the follies of womanly gossip and jilted spinsters (all of which are jarringly contrasted with the seriousness with which the novella takes Trescott’s dilemma). Through the medical gaze that constitutes Henry as a knowable monster, the narrator exteriorizes Henry both before and after the fire through the eyes of the town’s characters and, crucially, also through the narrative itself, such that we are presented with what Lolordo calls Henry’s “absolute opacity” (Lolordo 47). Attending to what the narrative paints as the irreducible knowability — emptied of all subjectivity and interiority — of Henry as a black minstrel figure and as “the monster,” we can also interrogate the comforting notion that such an objectifying view of disability is entirely of the past.

### 2AC --- State Engagement

#### **The 1AC is a prerequisite to engagement with progress narratives that ignores how mad blackness goes beyond their linear conception of time.**

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 112-113, JMH]

What of the linear progressive narrative that attempts to discipline Black madness and mad Blackness into being valuable but meaningless? At first blush, it appears to propose a more just world. It suggests that we are moving toward a historical moment that recognizes difference but does not attach abrogated meaning to it: at the end of time, we will shed the meanings of our bodies. Yet, the repercussions for such a world, even the desires for that world, require willful incursions into an ideological territory that demands anti-Blackness and ableism as its governing principles. Making meaning is not merely an intellectual exercise. It rightfully establishes Blackness and madness as integral parts of history, clarifying that their existence as abject has been crucial to creating and sustaining the violent fictions of whiteness and ability as normal. **And that their objection to abjection has been and remains disruptive.**

It is in the nature of a conclusion to wrap up or sum up a story already told, but in the story of madness and Blackness, we’ve already seen that Black madness :: mad Blackness exceeds the boundaries of a text. It then becomes impossible to create an apt conclusion for this kind of work. Consider this veritable lack of conclusion a mark of this project’s own mad Blackness. Each conversation in this volume unpacks the various meanings and critical interpretive strategies available when madness and Blackness intersect. As I mentioned before, the conversations here take for granted that critics and creatives speak to each other, complicate one another’s ideas. For that reason, I read the gaps each leaves open in their conversations with one another. I mine the tensions and deferrals, the mercurial and the transformative possibilities of the fold and the flesh. **What appears in this volume attends to how Black madness :: mad Blackness upends, destabilizes**. My wayward project demonstrates that an exploration of this sort often raises more questions than it answers, or, as was often the case in the previous discussions, does not allow a direct answer at all. How do we push the two fields together if mutual constitution is not altogether useful? What occurs when madness is a Black thang but eschews culturally nationalist leanings? Why might it be impossible to get outside the confines of the human? How does the venerable Black novel tradition offer a challenge to linear progressive temporal understanding? **What becomes clear is that one cannot get beyond either madness or Blackness but rather must find the spaces where excess, unknowability, and insanity do not account for them in all their complexity.** **The only way out is through.**

## Topicality

### 2AC --- C/I Schizz the Rezzzzz

#### Let’s schizz this shit up! The process of schizzing is a commitment to the quality of sociality toward alter-economic postcapitalist futures. We’ll term this schizoeconomics. The schizz cuts subjectivity as we know it liberating the neurodiverse from the grips of capitalism.

Manning 20 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty, “For a Pragmatics of the Useless” (pgs 289-297) published in November 2020 by [Duke University Press - For a Pragmatics of the Useless (dukeupress.edu)](https://www.dukeupress.edu/for-a-pragmatics-of-the-useless) accessed on July 13, 2022 by AP]

Schizoanalysis is an alter-economic practice: its work is to unmoor the financialization of the individual as metric of preexisting value. The schizz cuts through the middle, neurodiverse in its call for the more-than. “No more normopaths!” it howls. How-else-with-and? The schizz of the schizoanalytic practice must never be reindividualized by setting up the figure of the lone schizophrenic, or any figure, as its cipher. Contrary to some interpretations of Anti-Oedipus, nowhere do Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari idealize psychosis or schizophrenia. As everywhere in their philosophy, the aim is not to moralize but to couple the pragmatic with the speculative, asking how processes unfold and what immanent valuations run through them. The differentiation they make between schizophrenia as process and schizophrenia as entity is vital in this regard. The schizophrenic entity “can only be defined in relation to the arrests, the continuations in the void, or the finalist illusions that repression imposes on the process itself” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 379). The schizophrenic process, or what they call the schizoid pole, refers to the manner in which desire invests itself in sociality. At the schizoid pole, knowledge schizophrenizes, passing beyond its own axiomatics, creating new operations. “Figureschizzes” are produced “that are no longer either figurative or structured” (371). These two operations, the schizophrenic entity and the schizophrenic process, are in continuous co-composition, the schizoid pole always also in proximity with the threat of the pathological. Desire schizzes, uncoupling pathology Cephalopod Dreams Finance at the Limit 8 290 Chapter 8 from process. Desire, the impersonal force that activates socialities in germ, is the revolutionary activity through which new lifeways are produced, schizzing all the while. What distinguishes the schizophrenic from the neurotic is psychosis. What is of interest to Deleuze and Guattari is that psychosis cannot be oedipalized. The neurotic is the one on whom the Oedipal imprints take, whereas the psychotic is the one incapable of being oedipalized, even and especially by psychoanalysis. The first task of the revolutionary . . . is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs. Such apolitics dissolves the mystifications of power through the kindling, on all levels, of anti-oedipal forces—the schizzes-flows-forces that escape coding, scramble the codes, and flee in all directions: orphans (no daddymommy-me), atheists (no beliefs), and nomads (no habits, no territories). (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi) The schizz must always be considered in terms of what it can do, not in terms of what it defines. It is from this vantage point that the figure of the schizophrenic must be understood in the account of capitalism and schizophrenia, with Oedipus always as the overdetermining pull to the neurotic replaying, in all pathologies, of what holds them to the narration of a preexisting structure. Oedipus should not be considered an actual formation, however. The Oedipus complex is a tendency in potentia: “it must be actualized in a neurotic formation as a derived effect of the actual factor” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 129). Psychosis schizzes Oedipus. This is why Freud disliked schizophrenics: “For we must not delude ourselves: Freud doesn’t like schizophrenics. He doesn’t like their resistance to being oedipalized, and tends to treat them more or less as animals. They mistake words for things, he says. They are apathetic, narcissistic, cut off from reality, incapable of achieving transference; they resemble philosophers— ‘an undesirable resemblance’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 23).1 In schizzing the “neurotic territoriality of Oedipus,” psychosis produces new circuits (136). There is no promise attached to these circuits. They could just as well fold back on themselves, returning to all the forms of neuroticization that reduce psychotics to the apparently unmoored, disjointed paranoid figure psychiatric institutions lock up. “Perhaps there is only one illness, neurosis, the Oedipal decay against which all the pathogenic interruptions of the process should be measured” (319). In pushing up against what can be extracted from the schizophrenic experience that resists the neuroticization imposed on it, Deleuze and Guattari pursue the question that most troubled Jean Oury and was central to the work at Cephalopod Dreams 291 the La Borde clinic: “How does one avoid the institution’s re-forming an asylum structure, or constituting perverse and reformist artificial societies, or residual paternalistic or mothering pseudo families?” (319). What techniques can be put in place to schizz the institution’s penchant for all that retriangulates? Urgently necessary is the decoupling of experience from the pathological valuations of the deficit model. As in the wider field of neurodiversity, the aim is not cure but a commitment to the singular ways difference expresses itself and the qualities of desire, knowledge, and creation it produces. “A true politics of psychiatry, or antipsychiatry, would consist therefore in the following praxis: (1) undoing all the reterritorializations that transform madness into mental illness; (2) liberating the schizoid movement of deterritorialization in all the flows, in such a way that this characteristic can no longer qualify a particular residue as a flow of madness, but affects just as well the flows of labor and desire, of production, knowledge, and creation in their most profound tendency” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 321). Against normopathy, schizoanalysis never does its work from outside the event. Sensitive to the schizz, it moves with it, following its tendencies. “Foucault announced an age when madness would disappear, not because it would be lodged within the controlled space of mental illness (‘great tepid aquariums’), but on the contrary because the exterior limit designated by madness would be overcome by means of other flows escaping control on all sides, and carrying us along” (321). From this vantage point, schizophrenia shifts from entity to force, desiringproduction its motor. “Like love: there is no specifically schizophrenic phenomenon or entity; schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines” (5). There is no longer “a specific, identifiable schizophrenic entity” (6). What there is instead is a practice of the schizz that attunes to the multiplicity of “I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, my mother, and myself” (15). Multiplicity in differential, the schizoid pole explodes the great tepid aquariums of our pathological imaginations. Beyond pathology, there are no criteria. “It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way” (15). Is this madness? Or is the psychosis to be found in the imposed adherence of systems on worlds too differential, too multiple to tame? The schizophrenic is the limit case of existence that troubles our certainties as regards the stability of subjectivity. To repeat the mantra that drives chapter 5: “A schizoanalysis schizophrenizes in order to break the holds of power and 292 Chapter 8 institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind. For we are sick, so sick, of our selves!” (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi).2 Schizoanalysis is not a practice of the individual. It is not a practice of pathologization, of singling out the one whose neurology will invariably be considered a deficit. Schizoanalysis is a practice of the event where I, even schizo-I, is not yet. That the schizophrenic refutes the limited envelope of the individual is certainly part of the story. But the work of schizoanalysis is not done on the body (of the schizophrenic) per se. The work is done in the relation where the phonic leaves its resonant traces. The schizz, the effect of the schizophrenizing of experience, cuts subjectivity as we know it, subjectivity as the claim to the human (the category that excludes the neurodiverse, and all qualities and forces of life-yet-tobe-invented that threaten the I as white, colonial, neurotypical being. Capitalism breaks bodies, its devaluation of qualitative difference at the level of aesthetic sociality so complete that bodies barely hold up. Exhaustion, anxiety, depression, and all their offshoots are everywhere palpable. Capitalism breeds paranoia, the ground so uneven, our bearings so unsteady, that we fold into a selfpossession that leaves no room for what exceeds us. Limited by the hardening of our edges, we become more enclosed in our-selves, less turned to an outside that would revivify the more-than that courses through us. This is what Deleuze and Guattari are referring to when they talk about how capitalism produces the neurotic, and, at the extreme, the “sick schizo” (1983, 362). A schizoeconomics is committed to the schizzing of capitalism. Its challenge is to work in careful attunement to capital’s own infinite appetite for circulation and deviation.3 Flows, processes, detours are, after all, what capital is made of, its movements faster, more mad, and often more creative than we would like to admit. To compose with capital is to coincide with its movements to schizz the more-than that runs through them, connecting to the speculative share of its own decidedly more-than human process. The cutting edge of capitalism is in the financial markets, which have evolved forms of abstract capital so abstruse, contingent, and objectively undecidable that it is impossible to get an effective grip on them. They run according to their own process, and sometimes run away with themselves, periodically crashing and burning. The financialized economy is beyond the human pale: beyond full human comprehension and beyond effective Cephalopod Dreams 293 human control. It is a self-driving machine, operating more and more abstractly, with no one in particular at the steering wheel. It was created by the human, but not in its own image, emerging rather as a monstrous offspring that turns back to engulf its maker and drive away with it. (Massumi 2017c, 9) To schizz capitalism is to develop an account of quality that can discern the difference between cuts that breed the count of assets, and cuts that revalue value. In its infinite capacity for deviation, capital is a powerful adversary. The aim of finance at the limit is always alter-capitalist, but it in no way purports that there is an outside of capital as we know it. To schizz capital is to watch another limb begin to grow elsewhere. Alter-capitalist futures will be built of more than the schizzing of capital: they will be led by the development of practices that exert the force of other ways of living in a logic that refuses the tenets that undergird capitalism—the relentless drive to quantitative increase, inexorable growth and inequality, the capture of life intensities for profit. Practicing the schizz begins there, in the midst, asking what kinds of techniques can be crafted for those other logics, logics that sidle, in approximation of proximity, an aesthetic sociality of blackness, experimenting with the minor that runs through a sociality born in the being of relation. This is to say that the practice of the schizz is never structural, never aimed at a totality, as though something as stable as capital-as-structure existed and could directly be taken down. The practice is transversal, operating in the circulation of flows themselves. This modest aim may seem useless. Indeed, it is: an ethos of the pragmatics of the useless runs through it. It claims nothing as regards grand schemes of productivity. Its proposition: to practice the art of life-living at the differential of minor socialities in a livingloving that angles toward the instauration of new modes of (merest) existence. Schizoeconomies will not come into themselves once and for all. They will always need to be (re)invented, at every turn bringing with themselves new techniques for practice unlimited. Capital is crossed by lines of escape, and this is what finance at the limit exploits. “Capitalism is continually cutting off the circulation of flows, breaking them and deferring the break, but these same flows are continually overflowing, and intersecting one another according to schizzes that turn against capitalism and slash into it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 376). Cleaving capitalism from within, the schizz produces social fields that may operate only for an instant, but nonetheless provoke the seeding of a dif­ferent mode of investment, and with it dif­ferent operations of value. Paranoia will always be around the corner, counting its coins, but as Saidiya Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments 294 Chapter 8 demonstrates, minor practices of the art of life-living have always existed, even under the worst conditions: “The wild idea that animates this book is that young black women were radical thinkers who tirelessly imagined other ways to live and never failed to consider how the world might be otherwise” (2019, xv). “The revolutionary investment of desire” schizzes worlds into otherwise-living (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 378). Desiring-production is the force against which capitalism has no power: unquantifiable, in a logic of the relation of nonrelation, desire as force too impersonal to claim bends the pathways toward intensities for which no preexisting code, no count, exists. This is why the schizophrenic as conceptual persona is vital to the project of schizzing capital for Deleuze and Guattari: the schizoid pole is the pole of desiring-production and, as such, “is revolutionary, in the very sense that the paranoiac method is reactionary and fascist; and it is not these psychiatric categories, freed of all familialism, that will allow us to understand the politico-economic determinations, but exactly the opposite” (1983, 379–80). Revolutionary desire is a practice, not a tool. It does its work transversally, moving waywardly where we might least expect it. Writing of Mattie, a young laundress, Hartman culls from the anarchival force of the photographs that nourish her critical fabulation the force of what desire can do in the face of racial capital’s devaluations: Mattie has been credited with nothing, deemed unfit for every role except servility, condemned in advance of wrongdoing, and destined to be a minor figure even in her own verified history. To esteem her acts, to regard rather than vilify Mattie’s restive longing, is to embrace the anarchy—the complete program of disorder, the abiding desire to change the world, the tumult, upheaval, open rebellion—attributed to wayward girls. It is to attend to other forms of social life, which cannot be reduced to transgression or to nothing at all, and which emerge in the world marked by negation, but exceed it. (2019, 62) Mobilizing the schizz, inventing schizoanalytic techniques for practices of the event, requires diligence as regards capital’s (de)valuation of existence. Techniques must be invented to learn to attune to the difference between finance unlimited (neoliberal capital) and finance at the limit (schizoeconomy), to become sensitized to what sanctions the extreme deterritorialization of capital on one end of the spectrum and empowers the infrathin registering of the ineffable on the other. Deleuze and Guattari speak of capitalism’s process of production as unleashing “an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless contin- Cephalopod Dreams 295 ues to act as capitalism’s limit” (1983, 34). Capitalism is a movement that skirts the limit, continuously coming up against the dangers of crossing the threshold: “it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit” (34). This is even more clearly the case today than when Deleuze and Guattari underscored it in the late 1960s. Neoliberal capital is the flow of all flows. As Brian Massumi writes: “The ‘capitalist process’ is how the capitalist system dips into its own immanent outside to draw out new potentials for its becoming, or continuing self-constitution” (2018, 11). How to invent platforms for schizoeconomic finance at the limit that do not simply facilitate capital’s seemingly infinite capacity to capitalize on process for monetary gain? Precapitalist marginal economies may give us a clue. For their operations, unlike those of capital, are rich with emergent sociality. The notion of the penultimate is vital to understanding how limit and threshold are mobilized to engender the being of relation in these early economies. “Take two abstract groups, one of which (A) gives seeds and receives axes, while the other (B) does the opposite. What is the collective evaluation of the objects based on? It is based on the idea of the last objects received, or rather receivable, on each side” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 437). The receivability of the objects in the account above refers not to the last object received but to “the penultimate, the next to the last, in other words, the last one before the apparent exchange loses its appeal for the exchangers, or forces them to modify their respective assemblages, to enter another assemblage” (437). The seriality refers to the cycle the exchange produces. “The last as the object of a collective evaluation determines the value of the entire series. It marks the exact point at which the assemblage must reproduce itself, begin a new operation period or a new cycle, lodge itself on another territory, and beyond which the assemblage could not continue as such. This is indeed a next-to-the-last, a penultimate, since it comes before the ultimate” (438). The ultimate changes the assemblage and, with that change, produces a new series. The limit is here understood as “marking a necessary rebeginning,” while the threshold marks “an inevitable change” (438). “What counts is the existence of a spontaneous marginal criteria and marginalist evaluation determining the value of the entire series” (438). In the marginal economy, exchange creates the conditions for an encounter that, each time anew, establishes an emergent valuation. “There is neither exchange value nor use value but rather an evaluation of the last by both parties (a calculation of the risk involved in crossing the limit), an anticipation-evaluation that takes into account the ritual character as well as the utilitarian, the serial character as well as the exchangist” (439). The immanent limit sets the stage for “a collective feeling out” that cannot be done in advance of the event (439). Both sides are altered not 296 Chapter 8 only by the actual exchange but by their collective retuning to the limit. What has been “exchanged” is more than an object. A sociality has been invented that accompanies the object, supplementing it with the allure of the event through which it came to value. The economic cannot be reduced to the exchange itself. It is a platform for relation that facilitates a process of collective feeling-out that intuitively responds to the intensifying approach of the penultimate. Deviations in the process will cause punctual redirection, but an immanent choreography is in place to assist the process in not tipping into a new assemblage. The potency of the penultimate is the sociality it carries through the system. Consider an argument between a couple. No matter how angry they are, the couple will argue with a collective feeling-out of a limit, intuitively aware that to cross the limit might very well untether the bonds that hold the relationship together. The argument might sidle that limit, but the couple will be careful not to allow the threshold to be breached. They will do this by holding back certain thoughts, by attuning to the texture not only of what is said but how it is said, listening for what might crack their collective carapace, exposing them to what they cannot bear to hear. If they do cross that limit, everything will be up for renegotiation, and their relationship might end. The penultimate is of course never precisely knowable in advance—it is best known in retrospect from the perspective of the ultimate (after the assemblage has tipped into a new one). Attending to the penultimate means being sensitive to the field of relation in composition. Holding the process to the internal texture of its schizz is a way of attuning to the quality of a limit, collectively composing the relation in relation. When the schizz does the work of attending to the penultimate, what it does is value the pulse of duration’s serial rhythm as minor sociality. An exchange happens but it is not here that the value is located. The value is operative in the collective feeling-out that attends to the event’s composition. This can look like nothing. It can look like a simple exchange between seeds and axes. But it’s much more than that: it is the staying-with of the complexity of a seriality lived not as a transaction but as a proposition for life-living itself. Practicing the schizz toward alter-economic postcapitalist futures is a commitment to the quality of sociality highlighted in Deleuze and Guattari’s account of marginalist economies and sidelined by contemporary capitalism’s way of tending toward the limit. For capital too, as mentioned above, flirts with the limit, pulling back before it goes over the threshold. The difference is that capitalism remakes itself through quantification, in the generation of profit. What is being collectively affirmed in the marginalist economies is a mode of existence. When there is a pull back from the limit, it reflects a collective desire to remain within a field of relation. In capitalism at the limit, quantification runs wild. Cephalopod Dreams 297 When there is a push to the limit, the qualitative stakes are masked by the quantitative drive. This has devastating effects whose runoffs create a deviation of limit conditions that become capital’s new field of creative potential, the limits reset within the bounds of its own domain. This can be seen in the cyclic crises through which capitalism lurches, catching itself each time before it tips over (up to now). Schizoeconomics attunes to the quality of sociality in the collective feelingout of aneconomic fields of relation where finance at the limit revalues value.

### 2AC --- C/I Dis Crit

#### C/I – The resolution through Dis Crit Studies. Only the C/I is a necessary interrogation of a system that attempt to uphold normalcy.

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Disability Critical Race Theory (DisCrit) is a tool that, if implemented, can give voice to Black children with disabilities in a system that cares little about either. Its merger of disability studies (DS) and Critical Race Theory (CRT), if applied, would provide the necessary shock to the system to racist policymakers who would rather pity, at best, than support the empowerment of visible Black disabled bodies. DisCrit “calls for activism and resistance that ‘removes the policing and enforcement of normality’ rooted in ableism and racism[…] (Park et al., 2021, p. 59) DisCrit is a fight for ownership of the Black bodies, minds, and aspirations of an underserved population as partners rather than clients/beneficiaries of the kindness of a white-controlled system that has not interrogated its own bias and hatred of Blackness in all its forms. Through it, a holiday, passage of disability laws that lack enforcement, and other feel-good measures would no longer be the extent of meaningful change. DisCrit is the most effective tool to center the study of power in the hands of the oppressed. In particular, it offers a kinetic response to injustice within the sector, focusing on the education of Black students with special needs. Its interrogation of a system that devalues the very humanity of the subject provides arguably the most comprehensive reading of the oppressor, forcefully turning the gaze of whiteness on black back onto itself where its systems rather than the Black body become what must be analyzed and acted upon. To examine the utility of DisCrit in the American classroom, one must first define the critical barrier to realizing a truly inclusive experience in that space – white supremacy. In the popular American imagination, the term conjures images of villainous white men spewing hate and threatening or carrying out violence akin to the antagonists in Norman Jewison’s film In the Heat of the Night or Alan Parker’s Mississippi Burning. If only it were that simple. As celebrated as these two motion pictures are, the reality is far more complex and nuanced. White supremacy is less about a white individual’s raw hatred of people of color and their unshakeable belief in that group’s inferiority. It is systemic. It seeps into every crevice of the American project. White supremacy is at times easy to see, but it is invisible to the average American—it being so much a part of the country’s history and mission. A highly effective explanation/definition/navigation of white supremacy is offered by Vann R. Newkirk II who references critical race theorists while cutting to the heart of the term: The school of critical race theory, championed by scholars such as bell hooks, has been around in academic circles for at least 30 years, and its definition of white supremacy has long animated black activism. To quote scholar Frances Lee Ansley (taken here from a passage from David Gillborn, also, a critical-race-theory scholar): By “white supremacy” I do not mean to allude only to the self-conscious racism of white supremacist hate groups. I refer instead to a political, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings (Newkirk II, 2017). For most African-Americans, a white person not liking them has minimal impact on their lived experience. But being shut out of educational opportunities, the professions, healthcare, housing, freedom of movement, and all manner of fundamental rights is far more than a trivial vexation. It reduces their quality of life or may even result in their death. This all-encompassing aspect of white supremacy would require surgical excision to separate it from the history of the American project. It is so embedded in the mission and purpose of America that white people seldom realize that they benefit from it. Is there a difference between a well-meaning, progressive white teacher in an urban school system serving Black students and a card-carrying member of the Ku Klux Klan or activist in the alt-right movement? Sure, there is. But do they both exist in the same system that provides them privilege while reducing people of color to second-class status? There’s no doubt that this is also true. Not being conscious of the impact of white supremacy on themselves and those around them makes them both unhelpful at best and at worst equally dangerous to African-American youth’s life and life chances. This article will interrogate, in an admittedly modest fashion, the history of white supremacy that has led to a need for an intersectional tool, not just a theory, but a tool to counter the American education system’s desire to control Black, disabled children, no different than it has any other category of Blackness in America. It will focus on how DisCrit can function as an education and awareness tool for educators, parents, and children who view formal spaces of learning as necessary for the liberation of people of African descent rather than an institution to isolate and imprison both the minds and bodies of disabled children in service of white supremacy. It will engage a brief history, leaning more on recent events, current definitions, explore the limits of disability law without implementation, and the steps necessary to reform special education as applied to Black people in America. DisCrit Interrogates the American Desire to Control Black Bodies From the political violence that led to the murder of Crispus Attucks before the American revolution, the mutilation of Emmet Till, and the forced sterilization of Black women in the South, until this moment, the destruction of Black bodies has catalyzed opening democratic space in America. The filmed torture and murder of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis resulted in the most significant moment of collective reflection on the evils of white supremacy since the end of the American civil rights movement. Floyd was incapacitated, lost control of his bodily functions, cried for help, and was exterminated as the world watched. Americans observed in both fascination and disgust as the full power of systemic anti-Black racism was captured so visibly that even conservatives were temporarily aghast at its horror. What would usually go no further than a hashtag on social media became a moment for corporate philanthropy, study circles on race, and even a national holiday marking the end of America’s original sin—the enslavement and forced labor of African people in the formation of America itself. Shortly after this rare moment of handholding and togetherness, the political and social space transformed into yet another battle in America’s culture wars. Legislative attacks against Critical Race Theory (CRT) were launched only days after celebrating the nation’s supposed reckoning on race (Sawo & Banerjee, 2021). The quick pivot from compassion and a need to understand each other across racial lines turned to self-serving claims by numerous state and national legislative bodies that enough had been done to placate African-Americans. Nothing more was needed. The current legislative position in numerous American statehouses calls for progressive disability advocates and, more importantly, those with disabilities themselves to forcefully approach and engage struggle in an intersectional manner that challenges systems rather than individuals and institutions. America was built on the backs of Black bodies. The fierce pushback required for Black people to be seen and heard in America necessitates, as it always has, the inclusion of its children, including those with disabilities. Black children within special education classrooms are no less feared than George Floyd was by the police officer who murdered him. The resistance to subjugation that DisCrit offers is informed by the historical legislative, scholastic, and criminal justice-backed aims to control Black bodies.

#### The C/I usage of DisCrit is a necessary resistance strategy to modes of education that are unaware of racial bias.

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The Need for Systemic Overhaul Hancock et al. (2021) describe DisCrit resistance in childhood education as an exercise that transforms theory into praxis. It moves with an awareness of educator bias and racism, is an asset rather than deficit-focused, dismisses whiteness as a default entry point for learning, embraces resistance by parents and students as an opportunity to reflect on systemic white supremacy, rather than a marker for punitive action. Respect for the value of the student must be reflected in curriculum, pedagogy, and solidarity with the community of learners and parents that are purportedly the focus of special education efforts (p. 49). The above is not an exercise that is workshopped into an educator after they are hired. It is something that, at minimum, begins during teacher education. It assumes that what has been absorbed by the educator before this engagement is a product of white supremacy. It matters not whether the teacher is a woman of color or even a person with disabilities herself. One can be taught to hate themselves and, at times, are more kinetic in disciplinary measures against members of their self-identified group than someone from outside of it. In a system that identifies a Black student with disabilities as a liability or, worse, a threat, it takes a mighty indoctrination process to view anyone with a Black body as a decision maker rather than a body to be acted upon. American policy of all types sees Blackness as threatening—all forms of Blackness. Khalil Muhammad (2011) zeroes in on this reality by positing that the fear of Blackness defines the American cityscape itself. Urban America is defined not by greater access to education, commercial space, advancement in technology, employment, or any other factor. Instead, the presence of Black people and their association with crime frame the value of the American city. With rapid de-industrialization and re-segregation of many of these spaces on the one hand and equally aggressive gentrification on the other, the American city is on some level fighting against itself whether it is rising or falling, based almost exclusively on the number of Black people within it. Therefore, among the blackest, legitimate spaces where progress should occur, the American school system is deemed worthy only by how prevalent (or not) Blackness is within it. Community resistance to pity and fear is an essential aspect of DisCrit. Studies show that parental involvement in their children’s education is vital in a program for young people with special needs. DisCrit sees resistance to racism as capital rather than a deterrent to education. Monique Matute-Chavarria (2021) defines cultural community wealth as consisting of “six forms of capital: aspirational, linguistic, familial, social, navigational, and resistance” (2). An educator allied with white supremacy would have difficulty even speaking to a parent whose every move, inflection of voice, and lived experience is different from their own. One false move could result in punitive action towards the child, no different than a police officer who misinterprets African American cultural norms as something that must be countered with brute force. Remember that we are speaking of systems. White supremacy’s umbrella is large enough to cover both the criminal justice system and the education system – with the school to prison pipeline being in itself a journey of progressive discipline leading to the control of the Black body. DisCrit sees African-American ways of being as a strength through which the curriculum and pedagogy should be informed rather than something to be, at times, violently resisted by the education system. Labeling Black students with disabilities as “at-risk” has led to their isolation and opened the door for re-segregation of the American public school system in direct opposition to earlier hard-fought legal victories against the practice (Love & Baneke 2021, p.37). Underneath this desire to help Black disabled children is another reason for the labeling and othering of Blackness in white-controlled spaces – protection of white children through re-segregation (Love & Baneke 2021, p. 35). It is one thing for a white female educator to be exposed/subjected to the grotesquery of Black disabled bodies. It is another to put her children among them. DisCrit identifies individual bias and racism but sees the bigger picture in challenging white supremacist fueled rollbacks of civil rights policy that further disadvantage already marginalized and underserved communities. White supremacy is ever-shifting with the times. Policy and law in disability have led to confusion as to who is considered disabled. It is now widely accepted that special education is not isolated to the physical. It must also address the mind through new learning methods for those who do not process what is widely offered. What is considered normal? The fact that Blackness is not considered acceptable or malleable makes many different learning methods within the community special. Practitioners often do not understand cultural differences and the need for new teaching methods. They instead see their purpose as an opportunity to segregate Black students in special classrooms, ghettoizing special education and transforming it into an exclusively black space in some school districts. The dilemma here is that progressive white educators reject special education opportunities for Black students not to appear racist (Connor et al., 2019). While this may seem commendable, it then locks out students who might genuinely benefit from innovative new learning strategies. There is a better approach than obsessing about the over-representation of Black students in special education. A more comprehensive, truthful curriculum that acknowledges the existence of white supremacy would be a commendable starting point. DisCrit in Practice The section above navigates theory but less so practice. How would an educator apply DisCrit in the classroom and interactions with Black parents? An understanding that the school itself is not always a place filled with pleasant childhood memories might be of value as the teacher prepares to engage with Black families in that space. Accepting that what is (at times) difficult for the educator to see does not mean that it does not exist. This is an appropriate starting point, especially as it relates to issues of race. For a teacher of any race, to see all forms of resistance from parents and students as defiance, pushback, oppositional behavior, and overall unreasonable diversions from learning is an error. To expect lockstep compliance within a system that has often failed Black families means that there needs to be a more nuanced interpretation of what is being observed in the classroom or parent-teacher interactions. As noted by this DisCrit tenet, children of Color with dis/abilities and their families intentionally act in the face of marginalization, and such actions should be respected as necessary communication to support justice efforts rather than simply targets for intervention. For example, Collins (2011) described how a Black child with perceived challenging behaviors engaged in literacy moves to confront deficit positioning and capitalize on self-identified strengths. Acknowledging such behaviors as intentional forms of participation, rather than disruptions, encourages innovative practice and counters deficit assumptions that hinder inclusive education. Similarly, families of Color often resist deficit positioning of their children by engaging in behaviors that are not traditionally recognized as parent involvement, such as refusing disability labeling and enacting culturally meaningful parenting (Kaomea, 2005; Lalvani, 2014; Waters, 2016). Understanding such acts as necessary family advocacy and engagement creates new avenues for family–professional partnerships supporting young children (Love & Baneke 2021, p.40). The school should not in any way resemble a prison. Parents have a right to question what is being taught to their children, and the children themselves have to be their genuine selves to process what is being provided by the educator. DisCrit advocates are not asking for special treatment of Black students with disabilities, but that they are given the room to learn in an environment that values their existence and recognizes their humanity. It’s not too much for an educator to engage parents as equals and children as young people who explore possibilities and at times test boundaries. DisCrit advocates demand the above. None of which is too much to require of the education system.

### 2AC --- Resolved ::

#### Resolved :: as a model of black disruption unsettles contemporary academics, finding company in vast finitude

Therí Alyce **Pickens 19** [Black Madness :: Mad Blackness, https://doi.org/10.1215/9781478005506, 2019, author of New Body Politics: Narrating Arab and Black Identity in the Contemporary United States, and editor of Arab American Aesthetics: Literature, Material Culture, Film, and Theatre., accessed 7/11/22, -ekh-]

The third putative word of the title, the double colon, teases and disrupts. The title signals that there are differences between Black madness and mad Blackness but one is not an analogy for the other, nor does one explain the other, nor does one cause the other. A

lthough the double colon tends to stand for analogy, the use of it here does not affirm that the two are such, but rather questions the grammars and assumptions that lie dormant in thinking of them as analogous (a query I highlight by calling the double colon a word above). I toy with the double colon as a convention of the academic project specifically because what typically follows the colon is supposed to explicate or clarify. In this case, the so-called clarification is meant to unsettle. The double colon also nods to the tradition of Black speculative fiction on which this project focuses. In the introduction to Afro-Future Females: Black Writers Chart Science Fiction’s Newest New-Wave Trajectory (2008), Marleen Barr claims, “A period printed on a page resembles a planet backgrounded by white space vastness.”20 Whereas Barr usefully thinks of the period as a manifestation of Black/white encounter in science fiction authorship, I find the period-as-planet evocative for how it forces a more expansive understanding of that which we once thought of as finite. Again, the causal, analogic, and explicative relationships do not fully capture how Black and mad function together. Instead, the four period/planets of the double colon invite us to think of them as more vast in scope than heretofore imagined.21

### 2AC --- Cruel Optimism DA

#### Cruel optimism DA- There framework reproduces ideas of cruel optimism by ignoring most the role of critical disability studies.

Kolářová 14( Kolářová, Kateřina. “The Inarticulate Post-Socialist Crip: On the Cruel Optimism of Neoliberal Transformations in the Czech Republic.” Journal of Literary; Cultural Disability Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, September 1, 2014, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp. 257–74, doi:10.3828/jlcds.2014.22)// RB

Echoing Sara Ahmed’s understanding of the future as “a question [that] unfolds […] in the present” (Promise, 164), I want to come back to the questions that opened this article in order to ruminate on what it means to cruise a geopolitical time and place that apparently no longer exists. I want to ask what the vantage point crafted from the specific historical experience of socialism and the post-socialist transition offers to critiques of neoliberalism—more specifically, to critiques formulated from cripistemological perspectives and what we might perceive as reorientations toward crip futures. specifically, to critiques formulated from cripistemological perspectives and what we might perceive as reorientations toward crip futures. In engaging with these questions, I come back to Berlant’s concept of cruel optimism, which has been extremely helpful as I identify structural attachments to promises of better futures that created the ideological base of the project of transition. The engagement with post-socialist material also shows, however, that Berlant’s brilliant discussion of the toxicity of the neoliberal version of the promise of a good life needs, as I implied earlier, to be reformulated not only to correspond to the specificity of the particular experience of post-socialism, but also to reveal how such a confrontation brings forth more general challenges and lines of critique. There is a strange incongruity in and around Berlant’s book. Disability is literally on its cover, as the crip artist Riva Lehrer provided the cover image, If Body: Riva and Zora in Middle Age. It is embedded in the title of the book, as “cruel optimism” could in fact be a very appropriate name for the violent, recuperative, and compulsory optimism of the cultural logic of rehabilitation to which “the disabled” are permanently subjected. The book’s discussions are haunted by disability, and at times it is even evoked directly, yet only through the clinical and medicalized language of “disease,” “depression,” “obesity,” “spina bifida,” rather than through the transformative and politicized vocabulary of cripness. In this sense, Berlant’s book replicates the failing of the majority of critical work that exposes the neoliberal debasement of the values of solidarity, social justice, and equity. This lack of discussion is startling. Indeed, how is it possible that the bulk of critiques of neoliberalism and neoliberal governmentality provides such engaging and incisive insights into the politics of maximizing vitality, capitalizing on the very act of living, or exposing the morbid utilization of “slow death” and the necropolitical distribution of death, yet does so without including disability/cripness in its analytical instrumentarium? How can a discussion of “the politics of life” itself do without a category that is integral to modern definitions of life and vitality? Taking up the one crip lead from the book, I speak to the image of If Body (approaching it differently to Berlant herself in her closing “Note on the cover image” [265–67]) and ask what a critique of cruel optimism would look like if it thought of crip bodies, if it thought of crip bodies elsewhere from the Western context, and if it thought of crip existence in the context of post-socialist, neoliberal promises.6

In formulating the crip reading of cruel optimism, in cripping cruel optimism, we need to address the different affective structures of post-socialist promises. We also need to read those affective structures along with and perhaps against the relationality of cruel optimism Berlant first identified. Most importantly, the concept needs to be expanded so that its more capacious definition would account for the pressures of compulsory able-bodiedness and for the specific experiences of disabled people and crips. In other words, Berlant’s concept of toxic and hurtful promises and her repertoire of critical analysis of fantasies of the good life call for encounters with crip versions of “life” as well as for a cripping of the notion ofcr the “good life.” They need to be read more carefully and closely along with the realities of lives that were never promised (let alone lived through) by this liberal fantasy, lives that are appropriated and colonized by images of “life not worth living,” or lives that are at times not even granted the recognition of life itself. The transition into neoliberalism produced forms of affective citizenship based on what Berlant calls “aspirational normativity” (164). In the post-socialist context, the aspiration promising the utopia of the “good life” was not expressed in the imperative to keep going; the moral aspiration of the post-socialist transition was by definition that of rehabilitation, overcoming the failure and shame of the bad past. It was not the “nearly utopian” (163–64) desire for a prolonged present, but the “nearly utopian” desire for a recuperative future. The cruelty of the post-socialist moment lies—as I hope my analysis above unmasks—in conditioning forms of social belonging through an “affectivity of debt,” discourses of overcoming, and fantasies of cure. The cultural grammar of rehabilitation saturated the political and the social so fully that claims to social equity could be disavowed and turned into a chimera, the crip monstrous ghost haunting the post-socialist redefinition of sociality and community, where any form of social belonging for crips other than under the rubrics of paternalizingly charitable humanism was (and remains) virtually impossible (see also Kolářová). Registering the temporal coincidence of different structures of compulsory optimism also emphasizes their cruel irony. The project of rehabilitating the post-socialist crip virtually overlaps with the moment when, in the West, states started to retract their social welfare commitments. Even more specifically, the countries in “transition” served to uphold the fantasies of success, health, and the general “good life” made possible by capitalism. For instance, with the claims that it was living the “post-communist dream” (qtd. in Weiner 53), the Czech Republic was in the early 1990s (before the myth of smooth, straightforward, and successful transition was ruptured by the first crisis in 1994) put forth as the model for the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The “teleology of ‘transition’” (Hann 9) of the post-socialist countries along the same path the West followed decades earlier (see also Verdery) also served, however, as an important projection space for the “West,” where the apparent rehabilitative capacity of capitalism in the East was utilized to bolster the “secular faith” (Duggan xiii) in (neoliberal) capitalism as the only possibility for human history. This did not go completely unnoticed, as the key figure of the Czech transformation, Václav Klaus, himself notes: “It is nearly paradoxical that the speeches of some of us [sic] delivered in the West are perceived not only as signs of the vital renaissance of thought in the East, but are also sought after as a support in their own ideological skirmishes” (Klaus, “Síla,” 1). Yet, in his ego-centrism, Klaus did not draw the conclusions at hand: that the project of rehabilitation/transformation in the “East” and its shock method helped to sustain the “West”—and at the same time inhibited the development of a critical crip consciousness in both locations.

### 2AC --- Promise DA

#### Promise DA – Their model invests in the false promise of policymaking that sees its engagement as the conclusion of their project. Only DisCrit creates a place where white supremacy “can’t hide”.

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Definitions DisCrit builds upon the legal activism embedded within Critical Legal Studies (CLS), CRT, and DS. Its voice is as inclusive as CRT’s, with change agents approaching its strictly theoretical elements in an expansive and interdisciplinary manner. It interrogates and engages history, sexuality, gender, the whole person (body and mind), organizational development, conflict resolution, family studies, and personal and community agency. DisCrit places the disabled child in the center as a subject rather than an object of their liberation. The last element places it squarely within an African-centered approach to change that predates even CRT in the 1970s. One of CRTs founders, Kimberley Crenshaw, declares that it “is not a noun, but a verb. It cannot be confined to a static and narrow definition but is considered to be an evolving and malleable practice” (George, 2021). DisCrit is inspired and driven by the spirit of its theoretical predecessor. Raush et al. (2019) capture the definition of DisCrit as a theory and the possibilities of its application in practice: Consider the marginalization that Children of Color with dis/abilities and their families experience due to the intersection of power and privilege around race and dis/ability[…] the DisCrit framework can be used to understand how a difference in power (e.g., between administrators/teachers/schools and families) can lead to the exclusion of very young children with dis/abilities and other social identities and their families […] (Raush et al., 2019 p. 45). In America, it is dangerous to praise an unfinished project. The passage of a law, the change of a policy, and the adoption of an inclusive curriculum are often seen as the conclusion of engagement rather than its start. What DisCrit does is challenge/interrogate well-meaning law/theory/policy to agitate for action and function as a reminder of the centuries of broken promises America has made to its most vulnerable citizens and residents. With DisCrit, there is no sacred space for white supremacy to hide. Furthermore, there is no faith in a system that has proven repeatedly that it is willing to view the codification of best wishes as satisfactory for a population that should be grateful even to be acknowledged. Disability Law, Policy and Implementation Those resistant to further reform of special education in American classrooms point to the existence of disability law and well-meaning child-focused policy as positive proof that America has changed for the better in its treatment of all children with special needs. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), if applied equitably, would bring America closer to its stated aim of inclusion and protection for students with disabilities (ADA National Network, 2018). Further, the policy created by the Division for Early Childhood and the National Association for Education of Young Children, on the surface, acknowledge there are a multiplicity of innovative ways to educate children in the American classroom. However, applying the most positive standards will be limited without an interrogation of race and white supremacy. If the default from which all changes occur is whiteness, then what of those who are not white? If whiteness is the standard, then the beneficiary of these gifts would need to be white or white adjacent to be worthy of receiving anything meaningful from the system. With this in mind, education of special needs children of African descent would first be an exercise in diminishing their blackness to make them deserving of the assistance on offer. DisCrit is forced to involve itself in pushing against the othering of Black students and questioning the utility of an exercise in whitening black spaces through pacification and policing of Black bodies—students, parents, administrators, teachers—any Black body.

### 2AC --- Litigation DA

#### Litigation DA- the deployment of topicality operates as a litmus test in which debaters must prove they are productive enough for the white debate community.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 54-57, JMH]

Narratives about people of color with cognitive disabilities are difficult to come by, generally speaking.9 The largest stumbling block is the issue of representation: who represents whom, and where those representations occur. There have been some popular representations of Black people with cognitive disabilities, most recently celebrity mothers of autistic children. This cadre of mothers includes famed R&B chanteuse Toni Braxton, actress Holly Robinson Peete, and actress and singer Tisha Campbell-Martin. Their work largely focuses on advocacy for their children. On the occasions when their children do speak (usually within the context of reality television), they tend to voice overcoming narratives. Largely, these tellings rely on the idea that the cognitive disability is an invisible one, which poses trouble because it is not readily understood as disability. The resulting misunderstandings, bullying, or trauma stems from the unrecognizability of these illnesses. These narratives fall in line, culturally speaking, with the arguments of those of Nirmala Erevelles, Allison Carey, and Michael Bérubé, who all agree that the repercussion of announcing oneself or being identified as cognitively disabled is a loss of citizenship rights. Here, the rights are not merely material but can also include cultural capital. **Invisibility surfaces as a long-standing component of stories about Blacks with cognitive disabilities.** During the antebellum period, slaveholders could demand compensation for supposedly unfit slaves. Within the critical literature, the understanding of physical and mental fitness are combined not only because slaves were not thought to be particularly intelligent but also because mental fitness was a necessary component in some assessments of physical labor. So-called soundness of mind was determined by a confluence of physical and mental conditions such as “skin color, gender, character, vice, health, body, and emotional state.”10 One of the characteristics of fitness was a degree of mental acuity (which slavers were likely to miss upon initial inspection of the human property) and a characteristic for which slavers could demand compensation. **Successful litigation often depended on the slaver’s ability to prove that the human property was unable to perform the duties for which it was purchased. Most important for these discussions is that the litigation occurred after sales were made, indicating that slavers were expected to have recourse to legal action for impairments that were not visible at the time of purchase**. In this paradigm, **one’s worth as a Black person with a cognitive impairment**—no matter its imaginary quality—**is determined by one’s production.** Such possibilities for legal action created a link between the mental acuity of enslaved persons, invisibility, and profit. This connection appears in the discourse regarding rehabilitation in the early twentieth century as well. The historical record conflates physical ability and mental ability as a way to disenfranchise Blacks economically. Here, I mine the gaps in critical literature similarly to my earlier discussion of Rosemarie Garland Thomson. Black World War I veterans contended with rehabilitation policies that “devalued, deskilled, and institutionalized [them] and dismissed their claims to rehabilitation as spurious attempts to unjustly profit from their ‘natural inferiority.’”11 Rather than review their claims as disabilities acquired during military service, officials delegitimized Black veterans’ need for rehabilitation by ascribing their disabilities to venereal disease and tuberculosis, which were, again according to officials, endemic to the race. **This rhetoric built upon the idea of Blackness itself as a congenital, cognitive defect** (further conflating physical ailment with cognitive impairment). The result was the removal of some veterans from the communities to which they may have contributed and of which they were definitely a part. When these veterans were denied rehabilitation, they were also denied the opportunity to earn a living in the postwar labor economy. Here, the connection between mental acuity, invisibility, and profit arises again. This time, the putative defect of Blackness gives rise to an imagined and invisible cognitive impairment that circumscribes the availability of economic self-determination. Though cognitive impairment is not, strictly speaking, emblazoned on the flesh, it nevertheless subtends interaction as a structuring presence. The conception about worth, particularly related to capitalist profit and economic viability, becomes imbricated in the narratives about cognitive disability. Entangled here, enfolded here, are legibility, visibility, economic viability, and cognitive disability. On the one hand, cognitive disability and the rhetoric thereof are marshaled as a way to justify exclusion from resources. On the other hand, cognitive disability becomes visible when one cannot prove one’s worth or value to the labor economy. In either case, cognitive disability remains wedded to its legibility as an identity category, regardless of whether it is linked to other categories (Blackness itself). One reads cognitive disability based on interaction within a community regardless of whether that cognitive disability has a diagnosis attached. Such a reading may be complicated by the shifting terrain of legibility, determined as it is by cultural expectation, social convention, and medical narratives about cognition. Of interest to this conversation is how observation and visibility rests at the crux of these ideas: namely, one believes that one can judge, ascertain, and observe cognitive disability at work. The stare, despite its interrogative heft, is incomplete.12 The problem is that these understandings operate with ocularity as the central sensory praxis despite the fact that legibility is not determined by sight, neither singularly nor primarily. **Cognitive disability disrupts sight as having exclusive critical purchase over interpretation.**

### 2AC --- Debate is a game

#### Even if debate is a game, you should transform it into a mad game challenges projections of ableist violence into the space

Cecilia **Rodéhn 22** Aassociate professor and a senior lecturer at the Centre for Gender Research and Department of Game Design, Uppsala University, 2022, Introducing Mad Studies and Mad Reading to Game Studies, -ekh-]

A mad reading of games seeks to identify the workings of normative ableist discourses in texts and how sanism is conflated with other oppressive regimes. The purpose is to interrupt and resist sanism. Investigating representations of sanism is also a good starting point for the exploration of madness. The reason for this is that many representations of madness in games are sanist. This means that madness often appears through the lens of sanism, and sanism is seen through madness in games. However, there isn’t just one kind of sanism in games, which I shall now discuss.

In many games, mental illness is embodied by male characters (cf. Shapiro and Rotter, 2016, p. 1594). This is perhaps no surprise, seeing that men are overall overrepresented in games at large (cf. Taylor & Voorhees, 2018). Male characters with mental illness are often portrayed as violent, psychotic, and homicidal maniacs (Shapiro & Rotter, 2016, p. 1594; Ferrari et al., 2019, p. 6). Violent behaviour is often associated with masculinity in games, but games portray a kind of masculinity where violence is expressed as controlled by an often emotionally stoic character. Male characters with mental illness are often contrasted with this stoic masculinity. For instance, Scarecrow in the action-adventure game Batman: Arkham Knight (Rocksteady Studios, 2015) exhibits erratic, emotional, and unpredictable behaviour, and the patients in Mount Massive Asylum in the first-person survival horror game Outlast (Red Barrells, 2013) are represented as both catatonic and scared or as butchering the staff and raping corpses.

Women, on the other hand, are often represented as victims and/ or patients of psychiatric facilities in games (Shapiro & Rotter, 2016, pp. 1592-1594). These depictions can be connected to the tradition of objectifying women in games and portraying them as passive and/ or damsels in distress. A recent trend in games is to present girls as those dealing with mental illness, such as in platform-adventure game Gris (Nomada Studio, 2018), the platform role-playing video game Child of Light (Ubisoft Montreal, 2014) and the platform video game Celeste (Matt Makes Games, 2018). Representing mental illness using children as a metaphor offers possibilities to highlight the vulnerability of the person suffering from mental illness, but this is problematic due to a long tradition of portraying the relationship between doctors/nurses and mental patients as one of a parent to a child. In addition, China Mills and Brenda Lefrançois shows that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V), which is a manual that classifies and explains illnesses and behaviours and functions as a handbook for health care services, lists “childishness” and “childlike behaviour” in adults as a symptom of mental illness (Mills & Lefrançois, 2018, p. 512). Furthermore, psychiatric discourse marks people experiencing mental illness as underdeveloped or wrongly developed (Mills & Lefrançois, 2018, p. 504). Representing mental illness as a child or through a child’s perspective unfortunately works to reproduce discourses of mental patients as infantilized.

Sanism also needs to be positioned in relation to issues of race and ethnicity since stereotypes of mental illness are often conflated with stereotypes of race and ethnicity (Rodéhn, 2020). Research shows that there is a history of denoting Jewish and African American groups as predestined for madness, revealing that race, ethnicity, and madness are conflated in cultural representations (Gilman 1985, pp. 24-25, 162). For instance, Blackness has been considered as equal to madness, and blackness became a prerequisite for the social constructions of madness (Pickens, 2019, p. 4). I suggest that this construction of Blackness is the source for why Black men have been portrayed as irrational, unpredictable, and violent in games. An example of this is the pirate lord Vaas Montenegro in the first-person shooter game Far Cry 3 (Ubisoft Montreal, 2012), who is depicted as loud, erratic, sadistic, and violent.

Adrienne Shaw shows that Black and indigenous women are almost non-existent in games, and when portrayed, they are often depicted as abuse victims (Shaw 2014, p. 21). In popular culture, Black women are commonly portrayed as lazy, slow-minded or angry and/or seductive, which are also characteristics used to represent people diagnosed with mental illness (Mollow 2006). The way sanism is intertwined with colonization and racism needs special attention because when sanism is visited on racialized bodies it is especially devastating (Meerai, Abdillahi & Poole, 2016, p. 22). Characterizations of mental illness in video games, where the character is explained as having a diagnosis or illness, occurs more among characters that are white and male. This suggests that white people are represented as suffering from a condition, whereas Black people are merely represented as erratic and violent.

Furthermore, it is common that queer and transgender characters are represented as mentally unstable in games. One example of this is the character Reni Wassulmaier, introduced in action-adventure game Grand Theft Auto: Liberty City Stories (Rock Star Games, 2005) and reappearing in Grand Theft Auto: Vice City Stories (Rock Star Games, 2006). Reni Wassulmaier is portrayed as a prostitute and a porn star. Reni was assigned female at birth, but they go through four gender confirmation surgeries: female-to-male, male-to-female, female-tomale again, and then male-to-female again. This transphobic representation, parodying the process of gender confirmation surgery, works to portray Reni Wassulmaier as mad and as having erratic behaviour -- not being able to decide on a gender. The result of this is that queerness is represented as madness and madness as queerness. The connection between madness and queerness is not new; there is a history of pathologizing and diagnosing transgender people in, for instance, the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders. The conflation can also be seen in terms of sexuality. Reni Wassulmaier is characterized as a mad seductress, trying to seduce every man they meet in all different kinds of situations. Shapiro and Rotter show that the appropriation of the mad seductress trope is well-established in media and used as a way to connect feminine and female sexuality to madness (Shapiro & Rotter, 2016). In Grand Theft Auto, the trope is used to portray Reni’s madness and reveal the tendencies to pathologize femininity and feminine sexuality as performed outside the boundaries of heteronormativity.

I suggest that, to expose and resist sanism, the following questions can be useful guidelines to conduct a mad reading of games: (1) What normative discourses produce madness in the game that is being studied, and how are these representations connected to other oppressive ideologies? (2) What kind of madness does the intersection of sanism and other oppressive ideologies produce?

### 2AC --- TVA

#### Narratives of vitality and health create the preconditions necessary for the growth of bio-political governance and the intentional debilitation of Black flesh.

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In Booker T. Washington’s famous 1895 Atlanta Cotton States and International Exhibition Address, he identifies that a post-Reconstruction backlash depended on the biopolitical production of a lived experience of Black health precarity and tactical debilitation. In this “compromise” speech, Washington repeatedly asserts, as most commentators note, the important role that African Americans ought to play as the laboring race in the industrial development of a New South.48 But Washington’s selling of African Americans as the “most patient, faithful, law-abiding, and unresentful” workforce that mill owners and manufacturers might hire is accompanied by an appeal as well to postemancipation myths about a disabled African American race and, in turn, to the region’s fears about biosecurity.49 As part of his “pragmatism,” it is frequently noted, Washington targets—and appeases—white self-interest, but Washington also taps into white (as well as Black) fears and anxieties about African American productive vitality. After assuring white southerners that African Americans do not seek social equality—willing to remain separate as fingers, but work as one hand in “all things essential to mutual progress”— Washington adds a thinly veiled threat that most in the audience would have hardly failed to detect: the “nearly sixteen millions of hands will aid you in pulling your load upward,” Washington warns, or, switching suddenly from the synecdoche of “hands” to the first person, as if to call attention to his own embodied presence, “we shall prove a veritable body of death, stagnating, depressing, retarding every effort to advance the body politic” (222). In his language that African Americans excluded from participation in the New Southern economy will “[slow down]” and not advance the “body politic,” and indeed they will putrefy as a “veritable body of death,” Washington invokes a highly contentious and statistically driven public debate prompted by African America post–Civil War health inequalities: since emancipation, it was widely publicized, African Americans were a diseased, debilitated, and even, as Washington notes here, dying race in the absence of their masters’ care and protection (see chapters 1 and 2).50 But what does it mean, we need to ask, that Washington frames African American progress—the question of African American citizenship— around an opposition between Black capacity and debility? What does it mean that commentators have erased this line in their remembering of Washington’s speech and in the repeated criticism of his failure to demand immediate civil or political rights, or both? Washington’s compromise speech talks back, as we will see in chapter 1, to postemancipation debates over the contagious, disabled, and dying African American by reframing and placing these health disparities in the larger context of a post Reconstruction vitality politics. In his promotion of Black labor in the New Southern economy Washington pinpoints that postemancipation antiblackness revolved around not just the denial of rights—to work, to public access, to opportunity—but that antiblackness in the afterlife of slavery functions through the creating of cycles of debilitation and recovery that keep African Americans always on the edge of health and, thus, as the surplus laborers in racial capitalism. As Washington implies in his address, conserving the “wages of whiteness” (to borrow David Roediger’s famous phrase) means neglecting and debilitating black bodies and minds to naturalize their comparative inadequacy.51 In tracing out the diverse techniques grouped under the idea of biopower, or the way politics intervenes into the vital characteristics of biological and mental life, Michel Foucault distinguished between two general technologies: although much of Foucault’s early work focused on the production of individual discipline or the individual’s internalizing of the surveillance, control, and norms implemented in the factory, the schoolhouse, the asylum, and the prison, Foucault’s later work focused on a biopolitics that operated on the level of populations.52 As part of this biopolitics in mass, social scientists, public health officials, reformers, politicians, and race activists sought to track, survey, and regulate various demographics’ births, life expectancy, mortality, and general level of health. As Washington’s often redacted appeal to the debilitated Black body reveals, as part of the post-Reconstruction racial reordering, biopolitics broadened and shifted from tactics of direct exclusion to a dialectical regime of imposed Black debility followed by surveillance, recovery, and assistance toward optimized capacity, or what post-Reconstruction commentators called vitality, according to the demands of an industrial labor market.53 As part of U.S. national fantasies of liberal meritocracy, all citizens had to learn to monitor, assess, and “conserve” their vital resources for their personal success as well as the conservation of the race. However, a post Reconstruction politics of Black debility worked through an environmentally produced corporeal and mental enervation to render freedmen and women as a contrasting disposable population of decapacitated life incapable of achieving the aspirational promises of self-perfectibility, opportunity, economic productivity, material success, and mobility. As a result, “New [Blacks]” in racial uplift’s politics of respectability were not simply “policed” according to the norms of middle-class propriety.54 They were debilitated, and, as a result, the post-Reconstruction period saw a shift toward data gathering and actuarial assessments by insurance companies and public health officials that broke down the African American “citizen-patient” into an assemblage of risks, statistics, and biomedical predictions that created new networked forms of surveillance and control. Race leaders’ rehabilitative program and their invocation of a language of recovery and cure, however, sought to regulate particularly the behavior of Black women and the poor. I want to end this initial brief historical contextualization of early twentieth-century vitality politics by looking at National [Black] Health Week, and, especially, one health week bulletin from 1927.

## Fem

### 2AC --- Root Cause

#### Analysis of debility is key to understand the ways in which Black Women are coded as “angry, restless” and in need of “healing”.

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Most of the action in The Chinaberry Tree occurs in the past time of the novel and is over when the story opens as the characters struggle to move beyond its traumatic consequences. The novel’s recovery plot, thus, builds its suspense on the question of the “redemption,” or, in the medicalized terms of the novel, “healing” and rehabilitation, of the two main protagonists: Laurentine Strange and her cousin Melissa Paul. In the backstory of the novel Sal Strange, Laurentine’s mother, had a scandalous affair with a white man, Colonel Halloway, who moved her from Alabama to set her up in a beautiful house with a chinaberry tree in Red Brook, New Jersey. Although Sal and Colonel Halloway’s sexual union recalls the familiar story of the plantation master’s sexual exploitation of his kept slave mistress, Aunt Sal insists that her relation with the now deceased Colonel Halloway was a “love story” and “she to this day still loves him” (2). After the birth of Laurentine, “Aunt Sal,” as she is generally called, remains a “maladjusted,” overly sensitive, tragic mulatta, ostracized from both the white and Black communities of the town who condemn her as having “vicious” or “bad blood,” thus seeing her moral impropriety as resulting, as an earlier race psychology maintained, from hereditary character defects. When Laurentine was a young girl, however, her mother’s sister Judy came to stay in Red Brook and temporarily relieved the family’s isolation. During Judy’s visit to Red Brook, she has an affair with the husband of one of her friends, Sylvester Forten, which results in the birth of another “illegitimate” daughter, Melissa Paul, who later, in the present time of the novel, falls in love and plans to wed unwittingly her half brother Malory Forten. Like Maggie in There Is Confusion, Melissa is a class outsider who has a “morbid” and restless ambition to be part of “larger and more brilliant settings” within the exclusive circles of the town’s Black bourgeois elite (71), and, as a consequence, she initially declines marriage with the “essentially sound” southerner Asshur Lane because she insists on wedding a wealthy and socially prominent man, Malory Forten (337). In the novel’s denouement, the “secrets” of the past are finally revealed, including that Maggie and Malory are half brothers and sisters. But if such a tragic disclosure of possible incest might have permanently broken the “strange” women, both Laurentine and Melissa are “adjusted” to a “healthy wellbeing” (medical language that Fauset herself uses) by the men in their lives (120): first, Dr. Denleigh, a former head of the National Medical Association, who heals Laurentine of her “melancholy” (113), and, second, Asshur Lane, whose “fine, sweet sanity, a strength,” in the novel’s final tableau under the chinaberry tree ensures Melissa’s recovery from her own feverish “morbid” desires that nearly caused her to break unwittingly one of the most fundamental taboos (336). Although Fauset’s The Chinaberry Tree follows once again the medicalized recovery narrative of social psychology that we saw in There Is Confusion, in which the restless, angry Black woman (Melissa) must be cured by the good Black man’s “sweet sanity,” I want to focus on the rehabilitation storyline of the novel’s other main female protagonist, Laurentine Strange, for what it reveals about the complex biopolitics of Black women’s depression in the Jim Crow United States. Throughout the novel Laurentine is depicted variously as “melancholy” (113), as having an “irregular” life (69), as highly sensitive and “withdrawn to herself ” (19), as full of “restlessness” and “hopeless brooding” (98), and “sick” with “hopelessness.” Although the plot traces out how she learns to become “more normal” (98) once she is taken under the wing of Dr. and Mrs. Ismay (herself a trained nurse from Boston) and is courted by Dr. Denleigh, once again Fauset creates a contradictory novel in which there is more meaning in the “disorder” than in the cure, and indeed the novel blurs the boundaries between social psychology’s distinctions between maladjustment and integration, disorder and rehabilitation. Laurentine’s cure, Fauset implies, is forced, artificial, and silencing of the way that Black women like Laurentine speak and witness through their mental distress and pain. As Fauset demonstrates, Black women’s depression, whatever biochemical (or blood) roots may be behind it, is embedded within the unequal gendered and racial relations that Black women daily “weather” and which define their proper, “good” feminine identity. I want to look for a moment at Fauset’s description of Laurentine’s “bitter and futile life” before she is rescued by Dr. Denleigh for what it says about Laurentine’s “strange” character, and for what it says about Black women’s “strange” or “mad politics” of mental distress: But she [Laurentine] was sick. Sick not only with wounded pride and bewilderment, but with something far worse than that— hopelessness. For what could she expect? She would live like this always, seeing herself ripen, ripen—she was twenty-four, there were many years of cruel, burning, unsatisfied life still before her. Yes, she would ripen—some poet had said it—“ripen, fall and cease.” It would be exactly as though she had never been; like a leaf that had fallen too early; like a flower that someone had picked and deliberately thrown away,—no worse, had carelessly dropped to be trampled on, withered. So had her mother and Colonel Halloway dropped her and she was being trampled on, withered. (61–62) In the language describing Laurentine’s depression, Fauset indicates that her “pathology” is her body’s way of speaking, doubting, and trying to repress feelings and thoughts that are at odds with the “healthy” “sane” forms of respectable Black womanhood. Although Laurentine does not acknowledge the source of the poetic refrain that organizes her meditation, the line “ripen, fall, and cease” comes from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “The Lotus Eaters” and refers to the temptation of the sailors to renounce the hard life of the sea to remain in the seductive tranquility of the home of the “lotus.” The irony here is that Fauset/Laurentine correlates the futile “numbing” life to the domestic scene (not the sea) and to the respectability expected of “good” race women. In contrast to this “good” and “unsensational/unfelt” life, however, is the “unsatisfied burning” (willed, angry, sexual) that Laurentine cannot act on due to codes of gender, race, and class imposed on Black women. Instead, she feels as if she can only ripen unfulfilled and “cease.” Thus, Laurentine’s depression, social withdrawal, and fatigue are, Fauset implies, both a sign of mental distress and a complex expression of insight: an anxiety and hopelessness voicing her frustration and inability to act in the face of systematic oppressions (whether those oppression are the everyday nerve-wrecking psychological maimings imposed by white supremacism, or the codes of respectability placed on Black women). As a result, Laurentine turns her anger inward. In this scene, Fauset traces out a new language of Black women’s depression that identifies it not as emptiness within, but as a violence imposed from without on Black women’s vitality, or their flowering into themselves.

### 2AC --- Vulnerability

#### Their analysis of vulnerability ignores the disabling nature of racial-sexual violence, an ontologically unspeakable moment – their model trades off with collective falling apart and fracturing, moments of dissociation that are necessary to enact a radical care

Alyson K. **Spurgas 21** [Solidarity in Falling Apart: Toward a Crip, Collectivist, and Justice-Seeking Theory of Feminine Fracture, Cripistemologies of Crisis: Emergent Knowledges for the Present, Issue 10.1 (Spring 2021), <https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/>, -ekh-]

In 1992, psychiatrist Judith Herman published Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror. In this important intervention, Herman argued that the trauma that results from domestic violence and sexual assault, as part of patriarchal aggression, constitutes a type of political violence or even gendered terrorism. As it also tends to be quite commonplace yet simultaneously hidden from view (and thus complicated and insidious in its effects), Herman made the case that the traumatic symptomology that follows from domestic violence and sexual assault must be reconceptualized—thus heralding the shift from post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD (which had up to that point been reserved primarily for the “shell shock” experienced by soldiers in war), to complex post-traumatic stress disorder, or C-PTSD. C-PTSD was to be understood as distinct from PTSD in part because “the syndrome [or spectrum of conditions] that follows upon prolonged, repeated trauma needs its own name.”[1](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-1) The most important aspects to note about the shift to C-PTSD include the following: 1) sexual trauma is most often gendered and specifically feminized as it is disproportionately experienced by women, 2) one of the most notable and common symptoms of this feminized trauma is dissociation, or the splitting of consciousness as a protective mechanism (as it has been since early Freudian formulations of hysteria and other feminine neuroses), and 3) the symptoms of dissociation and other traumatic sequelae may be ordinary, ongoing, and quite literally complex. In explicating this shift, Herman brought gendered and sexualized violence into mainstream psychological and therapeutic conversations and illuminated their inherently structural nature. C-PTSD arguably brought thinking on trauma closer to the chronic, as well, as it attended to the effects of prolonged exposure to violence. Herman staunchly advocated that the conceptual groundwork of trauma must account for the minutiae of the everyday life of domestic violence victims, which subsequently illuminated how so many forms of gendered trauma are “not outside the range”[2](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-2) of normal human experience, and are not exceptional. For Herman, too much of what happens in the home, in the bedroom, and on the street might be seriously dangerous and traumatizing to women, in particular. The personal is political.

One of the most common symptoms of trauma, in Herman’s analysis as in others, is the dissociative silence that accompanies it. C-PTSD then still remains within the traditional psychoanalytic trauma theory framework, relegating trauma to that which cannot be narrated, categorically. So, although Herman placed trauma itself squarely within the sociopolitical, she did not question the ontological status of trauma’s unspeakability—understood to be the result of a temporal split and the subsequent need for psychic defense due to an experience that was quite literally unthinkable and thus also unsayable. In this essay, I question trauma’s fundamental inability to be spoken of or even adequately recounted by survivors. Is trauma unnarratable by nature, or are traumatized people instead just too often part of communities that are either ignored or actively silenced? To this end, I propose that trauma’s unnarratability is not fundamental nor ontological, but rather political and structural. And this may be particularly true for the feminized trauma that results from domestic violence, sexual assault, and other gendered—and, importantly here, racialized—aggressions.

As revolutionary as it was at the time, Herman’s reframing was also insufficient in attending to the full breadth of trauma responses across experiences of gender and femininity (i.e., cis, trans, nonbinary, agender, genderqueer, etc.), and experiences related to race, class, nation, and citizenship. Dissociation, still centered in Herman’s C-PTSD framework, has become the sine qua non of trauma and has been treated as necessary for trauma to register as legible and legitimate—but arguably not all trauma survivors experience dissociation, or experience it in the same way. This de facto requirement is also troublesome insofar as the very same folks whose credibility is regularly questioned as it is (i.e., women—especially trans women—of color, first and foremost) are viewed as non-credible if they do not exhibit this symptom. Further, even as dissociative and other traumatic symptomology are conceptualized as ongoing and everyday in Herman’s updated C-PTSD model, they are still framed as ills that can be overcome, rehabilitated, and even cured. And recovery here entails being able to reconnect the disconnected parts of the dissociated (and unspeakable) self, often through medicalized and individualized therapeutic modalities. It is because of the inadequacies of this continued framing of trauma as unspeakable, the centering of dissociation as the categorically legitimate response to gendered and sexualized violence (often evacuated of race, class, and nation), and an emphasis on individualized recovery under neoliberalism, that I argue we must reconsider and reformulate notions of feminized trauma. Attending to the range of ways in which violence is meted out and experienced will help us to listen to survivors without presuming their inability to communicate. And this can help promote a new and politicized understanding of trauma, and pave the way toward more just forms of collective and communal care.

My analysis moves between theoretical and conceptual registers and discussions of various types of data (i.e., historical and contemporary scientific discourse, tweets and other media-based accounts, and autoethnographic narrative) and illustrates the type of fracturing or falling apart that I describe as a legitimate trauma response. Not fully dissociative, but a little all over the place. Sometimes declarative, sometimes interrogative—at moments “feral.”[3](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-3) This fractured method suggests the difficulty (but not impossibility) of communicating everyday trauma. It is repetitive, fragmentary, and at times frustrated—a banal collage of dull anger and pain (including anger at the silencing of so many others). Asking questions, I argue, can help open up space for radical intervention and reframing. So when I ask questions, the intervention I propose is, in part, enacted in the asking. This method is not only a form of inquiry and interrogation but also of recognition—the recognition that some things, some very important parts of the story, have been missing and should be heard.

In the remainder of this essay, I argue that even as we have moved toward thinking of gendered and sexual violence and their traumatic aftermaths as political and structural (and as psychologists have gotten better at accounting for these types of violence and their effects), we still too often operate within a reductive logic regarding femininity that is ultimately unjust insofar as legitimate trauma becomes relegated to a certain demographic, and only that type of trauma experience is legible as suffering. Further problematic is that, under this prevailing logic, the type of feminine suffering that is most clearly legible is that which follows from violences framed as “exceptional” (as opposed to the suffering of those who are not victims of “stranger rape,” incest, or abuse “at home”). Most often, survivors (even under Herman’s improved formulation) are imagined to be white and wealthy or middle-class—and their treatment is targeted as such. Given all of this, I argue that we must responsibly ask: What symptoms might we observe if and when we recognize that many traumatized folks do not have recourse to diagnosis, to treatment, and, in some cases, do not even have the time or space to dissociate? (Let alone to recover?)

In response to the historical and contemporary whitewashing, cisheteronormativity, and class reductiveness of psychological frameworks of feminized trauma, I re-theorize the symptomology and sequelae of gendered and sexual violence alongside recent conceptualizations of insidious trauma,[4](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-4) crisis ordinariness,[5](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-5) debility,[6](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-6) chrononormativity,[7](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-7) slow violence,[8](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-8) and slow death.[9](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-9) With an eye toward the liberation of groups whose experiences are often minimized or blatantly ignored, I argue that traumatic symptomology such as dissociation ought to be re-read through the lenses of critical disability studies[10](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-10) and, more specifically, crip-of-color[11](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-11) and feminist-of-color disability studies[12](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-12)—which offer novel ways to consider the imbrication of minds, bodies, and the social. These frames are oriented toward structural critique, and move us beyond traditional formulations of the psychosomatic, bringing us closer to an understanding of the environmental, relational, and often traumatic constitution of bodyminds in the world.[13](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-13) Such an orientation is imperative in that it allows for deeper attention to how race, class, citizenship, and other intersecting statuses contour feminized trauma and symptoms across gendered populations.

An increased attention to multivalent structural inequities within recent work coming out of disability studies is exciting and noteworthy. However, disability studies has historically had its own problems with a reductive and bourgeois whiteness. Thus, Black feminist theory’s attention to productions of gender, femininity, and sexual difference, and to how these feel, necessarily helps reconceptualize feminized trauma. Black women (and particularly Black trans women) tend to have more frequent experiences of both macro traumas caused by clearly identifiable forms of violence and the more mundane, banal, and gnawing forms caused by everyday violations. I am informed by radical Black feminist scholarship that considers Black feminism and Black femininity as affective,[14](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-14) as felt, as lived—sometimes defensively (out of necessity and toward an [often obstructed] agency)[15](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-15)—in everyday environments that are traumatizing and debilitating insofar as they are saturated with racism, sexism, misogyny, and misogynoir,[16](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-16) and which condone and perpetuate Black unfreedom, violation, death, and harm (and/or threats thereof). Audre Lorde and, more recently, Treva Ellison, Amber Musser, Jennifer Nash, Sami Schalk, and C. Riley Snorton have theorized how structural racialized and gendered violence contributes to traumatic Black feminine subject formation. These scholars consider how (sometimes negative) affects associated with Black femininity inhere in subjects but are, in fact, produced within white supremacist, colonialist, misogynistic, transphobic, and otherwise toxic environments and relations wherein Black women are regularly injured—and then expected to heal themselves.

Historically through today, dominant psycho-logics have perpetuated racist, classist, and imperialist conceptualizations of femininity itself.[17](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-17) Simone Brown utilizes the concept white prototypicality to theorize the racialized normativity of biometrics (such as fingerprinting and other forms of surveillance).[18](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-18) Elsewhere, I have critiqued the ways that medical and scientific protocols both depend on and simultaneously disavow feminized trauma as they attempt to explain white feminine sexual “receptivity,” “responsiveness,” and “discordance” in depoliticized behaviorist and evolutionary terms.[19](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-19) Following Browne and other Black feminist scholars cited above, in this essay I consider how trauma frameworks are constituted within registers of racial normativity—a type of white prototypicality that dwells within the dominant psycho-logic for interpreting gendered and sexualized trauma. Given this white prototypicality, I seek new ways to understand feminized trauma experiences outside of both contemporary psychological frameworks and traditional psychoanalytic conventions. I foreground traumatic affects as they are lived at the level of raced, classed, and gendered populations, while simultaneously reconceptualizing how traumas are felt at the level of individual bodies and relationally among them. My intervention is threefold:

First, I suggest that, because sexual and gendered violence is directed disparately (both quantitatively and qualitatively) at groups of femmes which are internally diverse, trauma responses also necessarily look different across these populations. Feminized trauma must then be rethought, particularly when violence is slow, grating, cumulative, and disconcertingly ordinary and normalized to the point that it is expected—rather than posited as abnormal, exceptional, and something that can be healed from individually. Traditional psychological approaches to diagnosing and treating trauma are not only limited to race-, class-, nation-, and gender-specific subjects, but, in fact, produce and configure traumatized subjects as only intelligible when they fit within these boundaries.

Secondly, once trauma (as it is experienced by many feminized folk) is reconceived as banal, mundane, and chronic, I open up space for acknowledging, valuing, and centering a traumatic dissociative-adjacent standpoint (or sitpoint).[20](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-20) Absent in mainstream psychological frameworks for interpreting feminized trauma, this is an invaluable perspective on sexual and gendered violence from which much can be learned.

Finally, within a disability justice framework,[21](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-21) I advocate that this traumatized femme perspective, epistemology, and form of knowledge-production provides the ground upon which survivors who live with raced, classed, and gendered trauma can come together as they enact radical care in community with each other, fracturing and falling apart together. My analysis seeks to illuminate the full spectrum of feminized trauma experience and amplify accounts rather than assuming unnarratibility. To this end, the notion that trauma is ontologically unspeakable must be called out for what it is—a form of silencing that is undoubtedly structural and political. Women and femmes—and here they are grouped together insofar as I am describing feminizing processes rather than femme identities, per se[22](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-22)—have been silenced, including when they try to speak of their traumas (or feel and register them outwardly, publicly). Creating space—and a fleshy and affective language of sorts—to narrate endured violences is part of an abolitionist justice project and can help to end expectations of silence. I argue that this will offer a different type of healing, as well, one that is not tied to individual rehabilitation, but which instead allows fractured populations—both fractured from traumas (but not fully split) and fractured along raced, classed, and gendered lines—to stand in solidarity and feel differently (not “better” in the vein of neoliberal productivity) together. With such a goal in mind, I argue that even a C-PTSD-based therapy and analysis framework is inadequate for fully attending to the insidious nature of everyday traumas, and that instead, a crip theory of feminized fracture or falling apart will help us move beyond the limitations of both PTSD and C-PTSD and their treatment. This affect-attendant, justice-seeking, cripistemological orientation to the multiplicity of traumatic iterations counters previous myopic formulations of trauma and its symptoms, and empowers and gives voice to those who are traumatized.

#### Hyper alertness creates a threadbare life representative of an unfinished psychic split that questions of vulnerability never resolve – the framing of violence as “resolvable” ignores the ontological nature of sexual violence

Alyson K. **Spurgas 21** [Solidarity in Falling Apart: Toward a Crip, Collectivist, and Justice-Seeking Theory of Feminine Fracture, Cripistemologies of Crisis: Emergent Knowledges for the Present, Issue 10.1 (Spring 2021), <https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/>, -ekh-]

Insofar as dissociation was often comorbid with a diagnosis of hysteria for early psychoanalysts like Freud and Josef Breuer, there is a long history (or hystery) of dissociation as feminized, or as part of a sequelae of feminine neuroses. But if we take seriously that women are more likely to dissociate, we must also follow the earliest Freud and remember that this occurs so often in women (and here, I will add femmes more broadly to update Freud’s argument) due to their disproportionate experiences of sexual violence and abuse.[34](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-34) Today, women and femmes continue to be unduly violated, and trans women, particularly Black trans women and other femmes of color, are disproportionately likely to experience violence—including sexual violence—during their lives.[35](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-35) Further, current research suggests that while 6.8% of the general adult population in the United States report symptoms of PTSD, prevalence estimates of trauma among trans folks range from 18% to 61%—and according to recent studies, discrimination and assault associated purely with being trans (rather than with exogenous experiences such as sexual abuse) significantly amplify PTSD symptoms among transgender folks.[36](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-36) These symptoms are, of course, exacerbated when intersecting experiences of oppression are at play. Given these disparities in proximity to trauma, and because we are in an age of ever-present yet unspectacular harm, I argue that we are also in a moment in which it is imperative to rethink structures of gender, race, class, and nation as structures of feeling [37](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-37) which are ontologically shaped by closeness to supremacist state violence. It is time to reconceptualize sexual and gendered trauma, the logic of dissociation, and the affective structure of femininity itself.

If part of living as a femme-identified or femme-coded individual—and particularly as a Black woman or femme of color—involves living with apprehension, hyper-alertness, and the daily specter of anticipated violence, then how does this affect symptomology? What do symptoms look like when they are the result of banal, chronic, slow violence? If they follow from everyday, grey brutality and ordinary crises? What if there is a detachment, but it is not a full rupture, and instead . . . fragmentary? Always bubbling up, but never completely coming to the surface, an embodied-psychic stretching, to the point where the bodymind feels threadbare . . . never fully numb, but never fully (or hyper-) vigilant. Maybe the dissociative-adjacent symptom looks instead like anxiety, or it’s akin to brain fog[38](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-38)—pervasive, yet partial—or it’s the perpetual feeling that you’re about to fall apart, to come unglued. Maybe it’s having a constant lump in your throat, a racing heartbeat, and radiating tension while also feeling utterly empty and dazed when you read the news, when you are out on the street. Maybe the psychic split is never finished—a fracture, fleshed-over . . . semi-sutured . . . but never fully severed?

Not only might we ask what this shift to a new framework for trauma symptomology looks like, how it presents, but also: what knowledge does shifting from breaking / splitting to fracturing / falling apart make possible? And legible? Feminine fracture then is both symptom and standpoint/sitpoint. But if it is a standpoint/sitpoint, maybe it is also a rallying point . . . and even a rallying cry.[39](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-39)

To begin this project of fleshing feminine fracture, we might take the experience of dissociative-adjacency as a point from which to theorize. Returning again to early psychoanalysis, I propose that we do this in the vein of Freud’s and Breuer’s notion of hysteria as an altered state of consciousness, as, in fact, double consciousness.[40](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-40) This notion is particularly apt here as it shares many uncanny epistemological and phenomenological assumptions with double consciousness as it has been theorized by W. E. B. Du Bois[41](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-41) and later as bifurcation of consciousness by Dorothy Smith.[42](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-42) And most usefully, Black feminist scholars such as Patricia Hill Collins[43](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-43) and Kimberlé Crenshaw[44](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-44) have utilized intersectional analyses to bring these frameworks together. I follow the work of Jennifer Nash[45](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-45) and Jasbir Puar[46](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-46) who consider (in addition to the feeling of being multiply marginalized) how intersectionality might be experienced affectively, and what types of feelings “becoming-intersectional” and being forced into a defensive posture around intersectionality elicit.[47](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-47) This ontological orientation to intersectionality-as-event can help illuminate how a traumatic double consciousness as sequelae of gendered and sexual violence is inextricable from racism and white supremacy. How might we honor this feminized, racialized, and classed experience while simultaneously taking care not to essentialize or universalize it? How is a traumatic double consciousness kindred with fracturing and falling apart? In our contemporary climate of slow violence and crisis ordinariness, how do these ways of knowing, feeling, and living trauma manifest? And how are they contoured by difference—including the difference that race makes?

In April 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Latina trans activist Lorena Borjas fell ill with the virus and passed away, leaving a deep and painful void in her community. In a tribute to Borjas’s life, another NYC-based activist and writer, Cecilia Gentili, articulates a type of feminized traumatic experience that feels chronic, heavy, ossified, sedimented:

Many of us have been forsaken by our families, found ourselves homeless and deprived of support from teachers, co-workers, and employers. We’ve lived through extreme poverty—have made cohabitation with risk and danger part of our normal. Transgender women of color—like she was, like I am—know the uncertainty of taking each step as if it may be our last. We know the weariness of walking under the weight of transphobia, racism, and misogyny.[48](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-48)

The burden described here might not be easy to recover from; one might be more likely to feel as though she will fall apart beneath it. In order to get closer to feeling/understanding/recognizing falling apart—an experience akin to dissociation, derealization, and depersonalization but not quite the same thing—I propose that, in addition to embracing a traumatic or hysterical double consciousness, we work backward. Here, a cripistemology of feminine fracturing or falling apart has a kinship with both double consciousness and feeling backward, which might involve an “embracing of loss and risking of abjection”[49](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-49)—and deeply resonates with what Gentili describes above. This kinship is clear, in that a traumatic or hysterical double consciousness, feeling backward, and feminine fracturing and falling apart all fuck with time and space. They alter our perception, allow for altered perception, and provide new forms of affective knowledge through altered perception, and what it makes intelligible. This has direct import for reconceptualizing trauma and its sequelae. Fracturing and falling apart, alongside traumatic/hysterical double consciousness and feeling backward, all expand how we interpret feminized trauma, as they are standpoints/sitpoints which are explicitly anti-chrononormative.[50](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/solidarity-falling-apart-toward-crip-collectivist-justice-theory-feminine-fracture-spurgas/#fn-9311-50)

An imagined place of recovery can be a starting point from which to work in order to better understand the experience of feminized trauma—particularly insofar as the injury that is feminized trauma is, in part, constituted by the non-negotiable injunction to recover. Recovery and rehabilitation are normative processes, which involve taking individual action—but trauma, as it is traditionally framed, is “paralyzing,” even “crippling.” So, once again, we have a paradox. But if we conceive of paralysis and crippling outside of this individualizing logic of recovery, beyond the logic of unnarratability, and instead as possible to speak about or feel and even worth speaking about and feeling, and we do this alongside others who are injured, then we may be able to get past this seemingly insuperable foreclosure. Thus, feeling backward, along with embracing traumatic double consciousness, are central to understanding feminine fracturing as an alternative to dissociation, and as an alternative to the conceptualization of trauma as breach—as a break between a past and present self, or between a body and a mind. This alternative framing also exposes how normative formulations of gendered and sexualized trauma have been founded upon a specific vision of an innocent and whole (white) woman, who is then damaged and broken, but who is finally cured and can live normally (normatively) again. If we look at the ways that traumatized people have been and continue to be expected to recover, we can come closer to a cripistemology of feminized fracture, and also get outside of the white, bourgeois, cishet femininity built into formulations of gendered and sexualized trauma. Further, taking seriously how diverse feminized and traumatized populations have been expected to heal themselves allows us to consider more communal and radical ways of caring for each other.

### 2AC --- Fem IR

#### Only questions of disability in IR can draw the genealogies of war-spaces such as Afghanistan into the broader question of a racialized Fem IR

Alison **Howell 22** [Feb 25 2022, Imagining Afghanistan in Post-colonial IR: Feminism, Disability and Imperial Warfare, <https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/imagining-afghanistan-in-post-colonial-ir-feminism-disability-and-imperial-warfare>, Society and Space, -ekh]

One clear starting point in apprehending the contributions of Imagining Afghanistan is to heed Manchanda’s alertness to the “co-optation of discourse [analysis] as a depoliticized study of language, semantics, and rhetoric” (2020: 17) that is, the pacification and de-barbing of discourse analysis as a methodology of (feminist) critique. Imagining Afghanistan instead develops its arguments concerning the racial-sexual nature - and violent material consequences - of Anglophone imperial knowledge production about Afghanistan by gathering an extensive and divergent archive of source material: the book eschews a sole focus on the ‘easy targets’ of George W Bush-era or military proclamations, to instead trace not only the production but the circulation of discourse, and in particular to consider the racial logics of Anglophone constructions of Afghanistan across the political spectrum.

So, for instance, we find rich discussion of the production of imperial discourse by those strongly (even dynastically) associated with ‘the left’ and with (white) feminism, such as the longtime Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee (Manchanda 2020: 151). Yet the book also recognizes some potential limitations to an intellectual and political orientation of challenging Western/Anglophone constructions of Afghanistan, as it acknowledges the potential critique (via discussion of Zia 2017) that a “focus on Western constructions of Afghan women’s oppression” might “[make] it difficult for Afghan feminists to expose and arraign local forms of patriarchy and the curtailment of the rights and agency that these entail” (Manchanda 2020: 176; see also the Coda to the book).

Crucial here is that these kinds of engagements are illustrative of the need to resist any temptation to comfortably conceptualize feminist IR in terms of a binary reading of a homogenized ‘white’ versus a homogenized ‘other’ feminism, when some of the most exciting debates in feminist IR work through conversations and contentions between, for example, divergent schools of postcolonial feminist, transnational feminist, and anti-imperial and Third World feminist thought, with their different emphases and methodologies for understanding colonial matrices of power, imperial warfare, and resistance. In this sense, Imagining Afghanistan raises urgent questions (without claiming to ‘resolve’ them with finality) about whether challenging white-Western feminist canons of knowledge risk re-centering them as objects of knowledge, and whether there is room for multiple, sometimes contentious, avenues for imagining and enacting feminism as an anti-imperial project.

Another way in which feminists and others can read Imagining Afghanistan is to consider how it empirically illustrates that thinking about disability (studies) might enrich our accounts of war, empire and global politics. While the book makes scant reference to disability studies texts (containing some discussion of Puar’s 2017 The Right to Maim), there are two notable sections of the book that sit squarely in the realm of disability studies concerns: the first (Manchanda 2020: 44-49) examines the “leitmotif” of “illness and disease,” that is, the persistent articulation of Afghanistan as a festering, cancerous, pathological space in need of curative and surgical (read military) intervention; the second (Manchanda 2020: 188-190) is situated in the chapter on representations of Afghan masculinities, and unpicks the figure of the “Mentally Unstable Taliban.”

Such empirical concerns, and the book’s brief engagement with some recent literature located as interventions in disability studies opens productive space for thinking about imperial warfare from a decolonial disability studies perspective. Despite[the whiteness](https://asylummagazine.org/2013/12/mad-people-of-color-a-manifesto-by-rachel-gorman-annu-saini-louise-tam-onyinyechukwu-udegbe-onar-usar/) of, and historical focus on the Global North in, disability studies (cf. Bell 2006; Gorman et al. 2013; Miles, Nishida and Forber-Pratt 2017), like feminist IR, there are many worlds of disability scholarship and activism, including parallel genealogies of anti-imperial and anti-racist work that treat [ableism as integrally enmeshed with racism](https://www.talilalewis.com/blog/why-i-dont-use-anti-black-ableism) (cf. Meerai, Abdillahi, and Poole 2016; Pickens 2019). Established and growing research in this field has been shaped by an acknowledgement of the need to decolonize disability studies and firmly place disability in global and colonial contexts (cf. Erevelles 2011; Meekosha 2011; Grech 2015; Grech and Soldatic 2016), as the field has examined the imbrications of racism and ableism in a number of areas of empirical concern to global studies, including for example: migration and detention (cf. Joseph 2015; Tam 2017), development (cf. Cosgrove et al.), the arms trade (cf. Meekosha 2011), and war and militarism (cf. Wool 2015). Like Imagining Afghanistan, some of the work emerging from this field has entailed researching how colonial knowledge and imperial violence are produced through racist and ableist registers of madness and deviance, especially the pathologization of the figures of the terrorist or insurgent (cf. Howell 2007; Patel 2014; Rai 2006).

One of the highly productive tensions emerging out of these literatures concerns how to situate research focusing on the representational/discursive in relation to efforts to decolonize disability studies in ways that foreground how enslavement, land theft, and colonial warfare have been and continue to be productive of mass impairment and debility (cf. Meekosha 2011; Grech 2015; Puar 2017). This latter move may press on understandings of disability as a basis for political identity, community and collective action (sometimes organized through the concept of ‘Pride’). Put differently: how can the bodily devastation of colonialism and imperialism be captured as a disability issue, without casting racialized disabled people or disabled people in the Global South as pitiable victims lacking agency, or without reifying representations as a function of deconstructing them?

One answer has been to highlight shared collective political struggles, for example by recognizing attempts to disqualify colonized peoples from self-determination and sovereignty on the basis of the production of racial hierarchies of mental capacity, intelligence, maturity and (sexual) deviance (cf. Bruce 2017), or political activism and scholarship that highlights shared but divergent histories of incarceration (i.e. penal incarceration and disability incarceration in institutions or by ‘chemical incarceration’) and of abolitionist activism (cf. Ben-Moshe 2020; Carey Chapman and Ben-Moshe 2014; Fabris 2011).

To begin to think through how these literatures might come into conversation with Imagining Afghanistan, we might start by acknowledging that what’s at stake in taking this scholarship seriously is not, as Manchanda warns, to adopt a “mantra of race, class and gender” (Manchanda 2020: 183) to which ‘disability’ could be ‘added,’ but rather recognize that “[s]ocial difference is messy, uneven and ambivalent.” Put differently, this is not about cataloguing a more complete list of ‘isms’, but about fostering a more conceptually and empirically robust field of imperial war studies.

Bringing Imagining Afghanistan into conversation with these disability studies literatures pushes us to consider, for example, the relations between colonial tropes of the Taliban ‘warlord’ as mentally unstable and as sexually deviant, topics which are treated sequentially in the book (chapter 5). Such tropes of madness and deviance are not new, and can be situated amidst a long history of misogynist and racist psychiatric knowledge and practice in settler and other colonial spaces. It is noteworthy that precisely where Imagining Afghanistan shifts gears from the discursive or “metaphoric to the literal” (Manchanda 2020: 48) is in the discussion of representations of Afghanistan as a diseased and pathological space, where the direct relations between drone warfare, CIA activity and elevated polio rates are discussed. This suggests natural lines of affinity with the kinds of disability studies scholarship that view colonization through the lens of the production of impairment, while opening space to highlight agency and resistance to war and other forms of correction-through-violence.

Read through and against these political and scholarly contexts, Imagining Afghanistan points to exciting common touchstones across these fields of inquiry, suggestive of ways to significantly push forward the fields of critical and postcolonial war studies, and to better grapple with all of the complexities of imperial warfare.

## Queerness

### 2AC --- Perm

#### **Both queer and disabled communities have been forced to become “normal”, and this shared history makes the two intertwined in their suffering.**

Sandahl 03 (Carrie Sandahl an associate professor in the Department of Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois at Chicago, “QUEERING THE CRIP OR CRIPPING THE QUEER? Intersections of Queer and Crip Identities in Solo Autobiographical Performance” <https://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/intimidade/media/Queering%20the%20crip_sandahl.pdf> pg 26-27 04/10/03)

As academic corollaries of minority civil rights movements, queer theory and disability studies both have origins in and ongoing commitments to activism. Their primary constituencies, sexual minorities and people with disabilities, share a history of injustice: both have been pathologized by medicine; demonized by religion; discriminated against in housing, employment, and education; stereotyped in representation; victimized by hate groups; and isolated socially, often in their families of origin. Both constituencies are diverse in terms of race, class, gender, sexuality, religion, political affiliation, and other respects and therefore share many members (e.g., those who are disabled and gay), as well as allies. Both have self-consciously created their own enclaves and vibrant subcultural practices. Perhaps the most significant similarity between these disciplines, however, is their radical stance toward concepts of normalcy; both argue adamantly against the compulsion to observe norms of all kinds (corporeal, mental, sexual, social, cultural, subcultural, etc.). This stance may even be considered their raison d’être, since both emerged from critiques levied against the normalizing tendencies of their antecedents.4 Queer theorists critiqued feminist, gay and lesbian, and even gender studies for excluding various sexual constituents (transsexuals, bisexuals, transgendered people, S/M practitioners, nonheteronormative straights, etc.) and for advocating inclusion and representation in, rather than replacement of, existing social structures. Disability scholars critiqued the fact that disability had long been relegated to academic disciplines (primarily medicine, social sciences, and social services) that considered disabilities “problems” to be cured and the disabled “defectives” to be normalized, not a minority group with its own politics, culture, and history. Because of these similarities, it may seem that disability studies has little to add to queer theory, and vice versa; indeed, some may assume that disability studies is a subset of queer theory. Consider, for example, how the term queer has been defined by some of its proponents. In The Queer Renaissance Robert McRuer describes queer as a fluid designation for identities that “are shaped and reshaped across differences and that interrogate and disrupt dominant hierarchical understandings of not only sex, gender, and sexuality but also race and class.”5 I think that McRuer would agree to adding disability to that list. Michael Warner, in Fear of a Queer Planet, argues for an even broader definition: “The preference for ‘queer’ represents, among other things, an aggressive impulse of generalization; it rejects a minoritizing logic of toleration or simple political interest-representation in favor of a more thorough resistance to regimes of the normal.”6 Disability studies’ stance against “regimes of the normal” may appear to be more of the same; as Judith Butler argues in Bodies That Matter, the term queer, rather than describing a specific identity, can be considered “a site of collective contestation . . . the point of departure for a set of historical reflections and futural imaginings.” Thus it must “remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes.”7 Because disability civil rights could be considered just such an urgent political purpose, one might assume that queer could be redeployed in its service. Moreover, the term cripple, like queer, is fluid and ever-changing, claimed by those whom it did not originally define. As a pejorative, the term queer was originally targeted at gays and lesbians, yet its rearticulation as a term of pride is currently claimed by those who may not consider themselves homosexual, such as the transgendered, transsexuals, heterosexual sex radicals, and others. The term crip has expanded to include not only those with physical impairments but those with sensory or mental impairments as well. Though I have never heard a nondisabled person seriously claim to be crip (as heterosexuals have claimed to be queer), I would not be surprised by this practice. The fluidity of both terms makes it likely that their boundaries will dissolve.

### 2AC --- Link Turn

#### The terms “queer” and “crip” are inherently connected, due to their shared history of change and their past of being used for harm. Reclaiming the words can help move forward with deconstructing the systems of discrimination that have oppressed groups of people for centuries.

Sandahl 03 (Carrie Sandahl an associate professor in the Department of Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois at Chicago, “QUEERING THE CRIP OR CRIPPING THE QUEER? Intersections of Queer and Crip Identities in Solo Autobiographical Performance” <https://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/intimidade/media/Queering%20the%20crip_sandahl.pdf> pg 49-50 04/10/03)

The power of these performances lies in their ability to assert pride while drawing the audience’s attention to the political and social issues of being crip and queer. Along with asserting pride, Clare maintains, comes the responsibility of “bearing witness”: Both witness and pride strengthen identity, foster resistance, cultivate subversion. . . . Yet we also need to remember that witness and pride are not the same. Witness pairs grief and rage with remembrance. Pride pairs joy with a determination to be visible. Witness demands primary adherence to and respect for history. Pride uses history as one of its many tools. Sometimes witness and pride work in concert, other times not. We cannot afford to confuse, merge, blur the two.57 We must not forget that even as we appropriate the terms queer and cripple, they retain the taint of their power to injure. This taint provides the fuel for a rearticulation.58 As an act of witnessing, solo performance reminds audiences of the crucial social and political work that needs to be done. Queer crips also challenge audiences by raising questions about intragroup dynamics as well as the alliances between queers and cripples. Galloway points out that everyday disability performances are crafted not only for the nondisabled but also for insiders: QUEER AND CRIP IDENTITIES IN SOLO AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCE 49 At the end of the summer was award night [at the cripple camp]. . . . You had this steady stream of kids going up to the stage to get their awards. But I was the only kid who was mobile. . . . these were kids without legs, kids with artificial legs, kids on crutches, kids in braces, kids in wheelchairs, in wheeled beds, kids drawn there by pulleys. So when it came time for me to accept my award, I limped all the way up to the stage. As I limped back—on the other leg—I was thinking, even with all the paraphernalia making my handicaps visible—among those kids I’d just never be handicapped enough.59 With this story Galloway uses humor to critique the crip community’s often divisive, painful hierarchy of disability identities. Neither crip culture nor queer culture offers utopian spaces free from the need to perform stigma management.

## Pomo

### 2AC --- Perm do both

#### Perm do both - resolves the link using postmoderist body as a tool of disability studies, we know the creation of the body is not perfect but when combined with disability studies it goes beyond the incomplete theorizing of the body

Samuels 2002 (Ellen Samuels, NWSA Journal , Autumn, 2002, Vol. 14, No. 3, Feminist Disability Studies “Judith Butler's Body Theory and the Question of Disability (Autumn, 2002), pp. 58-76, Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4316924> , Transcribed via OCR) // RB

One reading of Butler would suggest that her sustained concern with the normative criteria that form legible, bounded, human bodies versus illegible, uncontrolled, inhuman bodies attempts to recuperate sexuality at the expense of disability. By exposing and explicating the cultural pro cesses at work, Butler aims to demonstrate the unfixed and constructed nature of sexuality/gender, thus destabilizing the hierarchy of normal. (hetero) vs. abnormal (homo) forms. However, in doing so she must necessarily acknowledge and discursively materialize a realm of abnormal bodies, only to rescue queer bodies from inside it. But what remains? Some clues are offered in Butler's discussion of Freudian hypochondria, in which the physically ill body emerges as the product of inappropriately abjected sexuality, forced into psychosomatic emergence through socio psychological prohibition (1993, 58-64). The ill body and the homosexual body emerge, in Butler's paradigm, as ontological opposites whose co existence is the product of oppressive social schemas. It naturally follows for Butler to oppose the "metaphorics of illness that pervade the description of sexuality," especially in the context of AIDS and the subsequent re-pathologization of homosexuality (64). To question Butler on this point is not to endorse the pathologization of gayness, or to imply that queer and ill/disabled bodies have any natural or presumed commonalties. It is, however, to point out that Butler's liberatory approach to sexuality takes as a matter of course that "metaphorics of illness" are always negative, and that somewhere, somehow, bodies do exist which deserve patholo gization based upon the very material, biological "realities" which she seeks to destabilize.

Mitchell and Snyder describe this problem as the "representational double bind of disability" in which, "while disabled populations are firmly entrenched on the outer margins of social power and cultural value, the disabled body also serves as the raw material out of which other socially disempowered communities make themselves visible" (1997, 6). Thus, "any attempt to distance disenfranchised communities from the fantasy of deformity further entrenches the disabled as the 'real' abnor mality from which all other nonnormative groups must be distanced" (6). This "double bind" also emerges in Thomson's critique, cited earlier, of feminist theories that attempt to de-pathologize the normative female body at the expense of the physically deviant or ill body. While Mitchell, Snyder, and Thomson focus their critique of postmodern body theory on the reliance of that theory upon the disabled body as a constitutive Other, Susan Wendell is concerned that postmodern theories focus too exclu sively upon the body-as-construction and thus elide the lived experience of "actual" bodies, particularly the "negative body," i.e., the body which is disabled, ill, or suffering (1996, 166-8).

We can see in Butler's work many examples of such apparently "dis embodied bodies." In particular, body parts separated from their original, intact bodies populate Butler's work in a strangely impersonal fashion that certainly seems divorced from any literally fragmented bodies, i.e., amputees, congenitally "deformed" persons, etc. To elucidate her idea of the imagined phallus vs. the physical penis, Butler extends Freudian theory on hypochondria to suggest that the "ambiguity between a real and conjured pain. . . is sustained in the analogy with eratogenecity, which seems defined as the very vacillation between real and imagined. body parts" (1993, 59). This idea is then extended to include the Lacanian "partitioned body," "the body 'in pieces' before the mirror" which comes to stand for the whole, thus creating a "phantasm of control" (80). These concepts form the basis for Butler's analysis of Willa Cather's fiction, in which, she claims, "body parts disengage from any common center, pull away from each other, lead separate lives, become sites of phantasmic investments that refuse to reduce to singular sexualities" (140). As in Cho's essay discussed above, the disabled body becomes a disinvested. symbolic medium for the display and mediation of sexuality, which then apparently constitutes the "real" and primary subjectivity. In addition, the fragmented body parts littering the landscape are so firmly located within the imaginary that it is not even necessary for Butler to clarify at any point that she is not talking about actual bodies, that no characters in Cather's fiction suffer the loss of limbs, etc. Yet, once versed in the rudiments of the social construction of disability, one cannot help but perceive the incompleteness of Butler's argument, as "the disabled body is a direct imago of the repressed fragmented body. The disabled body. causes a kind of hallucination of the mirror phase gone wrong" (Davis 1995, 139).

Not only disability studies scholars have challenged Butler for her eli sion of the lived experience of the physical body. Butler tells us that she wrote Bodies That Matter in part to respond to such critiques of Gender Trouble, which she parrots into her introduction in the form of the oft repeated question : "What about the materiality of the body, Judy?" (1993, ix). Her consistent response is that, of course, she is not arguing that bodies or gender are only constructions, but that construction is an inte gral part of their being, and thus must be elucidated :

For surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep; feel pain, pleasure; endure illness and violence; and these "facts" one might skeptically proclaim, cannot be dismissed as mere constructions. Surely there must be some kind of necessity that accompanies these primary and irrefutable experiences. And surely there is. But their irrefutability in no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through what discursive means. (xi)

Butler's point is well taken, but so are those of her critics. The concerns of disability studies scholars such as Wendell who worry about "approaches to cultural construction of 'the body' that ... deny or ignore bodily expe rience in favor of fascination with bodily representations" echo those of some transgender activists regarding pomo gender theory (1996, 44). In her book Read My Lips, Riki Ann Wilchins (1997), co-founder of the political action group Transexual Menace, robustly critiques the aca demic field of gender studies as a voyeuristic anthropology of transgen der experience. Gender studies in the academy, says Wilchins, too often "escalate[s] the politicization of our bodies, choices, and desires, so that, with each new book, while their audience enjoys the illusion of knowing more about us, we find ourselves more disempowered, disembodied, and exploited than before" (22). Wilchins cites the extremely high incidence of physical violence and abuse in transpeople's lives, as well as their pain ful struggles for self-determination, and then notes "you won't find any of this in the next trans or gender studies book because the real challenges of our lives aren't perceived as relevant. ... It is far easier to invest us as a topic of study than the depredations of the gender regime that marginal izes and preys upon us" (24).

This critique is powerful and necessary, yet it jibes oddly with Wil chins's citations of Butler and Foucault in her book, and her description of Butler's Gender Trouble as "the most far-reaching and penetrating critique of feminism, sexuality, and binary sex from a postmodern view point to date" (224). One can reasonably be left confused as to Wilchins's ultimate feelings about gender theory in general, and Butler in particu lar. Yet, perhaps her contradictory attitude can actually provide a useful model for disability theorists as we begin to formulate more nuanced and liberatory ways to integrate Butler and her fellow constructivists into our own scholarship. I find a very similar moment in Carrie Sandahl's wonderfully unresolved interrogation of her own attempt to deconstruct both disability and femininity while directing a production of Joan Schenkar's play Signs of Life. Like other critics of postmodern body theory, Sandahl observes that "Butler's theory of performativity... relies on a metaphori cal association between gender 'freakishness' and deformed bodies. In a sense, then, Butler uses disability (or the deformed, abject body) as a metaphor for gender and sex difference, and . . . ignores the identities and concerns of actual people with disabilities" (1999, 15). Yet on the very next page, Sandahl decides to use Butler anyway, because "Butler's theory... allows us to see the performative parallel between gender and disability" (16). It seems that Butler's work exerts a powerful influence, not only on our academic discourse, but perhaps also on our minds and hearts. Her insights have the potential to be so far-reaching and liberatory that even as we formulate critiques of her theories, we are also drawn in to the possibilities those theories offer.

Conclusion : Can't Think with Her, Can't Think Without Her

[W]riting the disabled body will mean that our most basic conceptions of the body will need to be rewritten.... Like the normative ideologies of the body to which they often stand opposed, theoretical discourses of the body already contain within themselves a series of unacknowledged and/or disavowed assumptions and theories about disability. Bringing these out for inspection is one way that body theory can begin to learn something from disability stud ies and can intervene in them in turn. -James I. Porter (1997, xiv)

Judith Butler's theories have already had a wide and far-reaching influ ence on contemporary critical work on the body, gender, sexuality, and identity. Disability studies scholars cannot, I think, afford to ignore or dismiss Butler's work-but neither should we adopt it uncritically. As I have suggested, merely inserting disability into the mix without thor oughly examining the meaning and implications of the new ideas we thus create is not only inaccurate, but falls short of pushing Butler's work the necessary next step to fully account for the not-always-able body. Such wholesale adoptions treat Butler's theories as more fixed and final than even she, with her emphasis on unfixed, ever-shifting, and irreduc ible meanings, would likely endorse. There is no ideal blueprint of how future work in disability studies should integrate Butler's theories, and I won't pretend to offer one. But ultimately the groundbreaking nature of Butler's work means that it represents the first steps of a new body of thought that will necessarily become more nuanced, comprehensive, and accountable as it grows with time, and I believe that disability studies must and should be an active participant in that growth-not only to enhance our own work, but to provide the necessary apparatus to evolve those theories beyond their original limitations. As postmodern body theory and disability theory continue to develop and expand, they are certain to pursue parallel, if not corresponding, tracks : I have already noted that, as our understanding of disability as visually constructed has begun to evolve toward a more complex analysis of the role of language in forming discursive bodily identities, Butler has also moved from focusing upon the performativity of the body to inquire more deeply into the ways in which "language sustains the body" (1997, 5). Critics such as Mairian Corker develop this parallel to its logical and fruitful next step by integrating Butler's insights with a disability framework (1999; 2001). But this integration will have limited success if it works in only one direction. So I would like to end on a note of challenge to all body-theorists working within Butler's framework (not to mention Butler herself) to include and account for the disabled body in your work, not as a metaphor or sign for gender, but in all its real complexity. Only then can we begin to cross our divide.

### 2AC --- Turn

#### Pomo theorizing of the body always paints illness and disability as the negative for the means of critique gender hierarchy, there lack of understanding of the disabled body in their theory reifies oppression.

Samuels 2002 (Ellen Samuels , NWSA Journal , Autumn, 2002, Vol. 14, No. 3, Feminist Disability Studies “Judith Butler's Body Theory and the Question of Disability (Autumn, 2002), pp. 58-76, Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4316924> , Transcribed via OCR)// RB

One reading of Butler would suggest that her sustained concern with the normative criteria that form legible, bounded, human bodies versus illegible, uncontrolled, inhuman bodies attempts to recuperate sexuality at the expense of disability. By exposing and explicating the cultural pro cesses at work, Butler aims to demonstrate the unfixed and constructed nature of sexuality/gender, thus destabilizing the hierarchy of normal. (hetero) vs. abnormal (homo) forms. However, in doing so she must necessarily acknowledge and discursively materialize a realm of abnormal bodies, only to rescue queer bodies from inside it. But what remains? Some clues are offered in Butler's discussion of Freudian hypochondria, in which the physically ill body emerges as the product of inappropriately abjected sexuality, forced into psychosomatic emergence through socio psychological prohibition (1993, 58-64). The ill body and the homosexual body emerge, in Butler's paradigm, as ontological opposites whose co existence is the product of oppressive social schemas. It naturally follows for Butler to oppose the "metaphorics of illness that pervade the description of sexuality," especially in the context of AIDS and the subsequent re-pathologization of homosexuality (64). To question Butler on this point is not to endorse the pathologization of gayness, or to imply that queer and ill/disabled bodies have any natural or presumed commonalties. It is, however, to point out that Butler's liberatory approach to sexuality takes as a matter of course that "metaphorics of illness" are always negative, and that somewhere, somehow, bodies do exist which deserve patholo gization based upon the very material, biological "realities" which she seeks to destabilize.

Mitchell and Snyder describe this problem as the "representational double bind of disability" in which, "while disabled populations are firmly entrenched on the outer margins of social power and cultural value, the disabled body also serves as the raw material out of which other socially disempowered communities make themselves visible" (1997, 6). Thus, "any attempt to distance disenfranchised communities from the fantasy of deformity further entrenches the disabled as the 'real' abnor mality from which all other nonnormative groups must be distanced" (6). This "double bind" also emerges in Thomson's critique, cited earlier, of feminist theories that attempt to de-pathologize the normative female body at the expense of the physically deviant or ill body. While Mitchell, Snyder, and Thomson focus their critique of postmodern body theory on the reliance of that theory upon the disabled body as a constitutive Other, Susan Wendell is concerned that postmodern theories focus too exclu sively upon the body-as-construction and thus elide the lived experience of "actual" bodies, particularly the "negative body," i.e., the body which is disabled, ill, or suffering (1996, 166-8).

We can see in Butler's work many examples of such apparently "dis embodied bodies." In particular, body parts separated from their original, intact bodies populate Butler's work in a strangely impersonal fashion that certainly seems divorced from any literally fragmented bodies, i.e., amputees, congenitally "deformed" persons, etc. To elucidate her idea of the imagined phallus vs. the physical penis, Butler extends Freudian theory on hypochondria to suggest that the "ambiguity between a real and conjured pain. . . is sustained in the analogy with eratogenecity, which seems defined as the very vacillation between real and imagined. body parts" (1993, 59). This idea is then extended to include the Lacanian "partitioned body," "the body 'in pieces' before the mirror" which comes to stand for the whole, thus creating a "phantasm of control" (80). These concepts form the basis for Butler's analysis of Willa Cather's fiction, in which, she claims, "body parts disengage from any common center, pull away from each other, lead separate lives, become sites of phantasmic investments that refuse to reduce to singular sexualities" (140). As in Cho's essay discussed above, the disabled body becomes a disinvested. symbolic medium for the display and mediation of sexuality, which then apparently constitutes the "real" and primary subjectivity. In addition, the fragmented body parts littering the landscape are so firmly located within the imaginary that it is not even necessary for Butler to clarify at any point that she is not talking about actual bodies, that no characters in Cather's fiction suffer the loss of limbs, etc. Yet, once versed in the rudiments of the social construction of disability, one cannot help but perceive the incompleteness of Butler's argument, as "the disabled body is a direct imago of the repressed fragmented body. The disabled body. causes a kind of hallucination of the mirror phase gone wrong" (Davis 1995, 139).

Not only disability studies scholars have challenged Butler for her eli sion of the lived experience of the physical body. Butler tells us that she wrote Bodies That Matter in part to respond to such critiques of Gender Trouble, which she parrots into her introduction in the form of the oft repeated question : "What about the materiality of the body, Judy?" (1993, ix). Her consistent response is that, of course, she is not arguing that bodies or gender are only constructions, but that construction is an inte gral part of their being, and thus must be elucidated :

For surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep; feel pain, pleasure; endure illness and violence; and these "facts" one might skeptically proclaim, cannot be dismissed as mere constructions. Surely there must be some kind of necessity that accompanies these primary and irrefutable experiences. And surely there is. But their irrefutability in no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through what discursive means. (xi)

Butler's point is well taken, but so are those of her critics. The concerns of disability studies scholars such as Wendell who worry about "approaches to cultural construction of 'the body' that ... deny or ignore bodily expe rience in favor of fascination with bodily representations" echo those of some transgender activists regarding pomo gender theory (1996, 44). In her book Read My Lips, Riki Ann Wilchins (1997), co-founder of the political action group Transexual Menace, robustly critiques the aca demic field of gender studies as a voyeuristic anthropology of transgen der experience. Gender studies in the academy, says Wilchins, too often "escalate[s] the politicization of our bodies, choices, and desires, so that, with each new book, while their audience enjoys the illusion of knowing more about us, we find ourselves more disempowered, disembodied, and exploited than before" (22). Wilchins cites the extremely high incidence of physical violence and abuse in transpeople's lives, as well as their pain ful struggles for self-determination, and then notes "you won't find any of this in the next trans or gender studies book because the real challenges of our lives aren't perceived as relevant. ... It is far easier to invest us as a topic of study than the depredations of the gender regime that marginal izes and preys upon us" (24).

This critique is powerful and necessary, yet it jibes oddly with Wil chins's citations of Butler and Foucault in her book, and her description of Butler's Gender Trouble as "the most far-reaching and penetrating critique of feminism, sexuality, and binary sex from a postmodern view point to date" (224). One can reasonably be left confused as to Wilchins's ultimate feelings about gender theory in general, and Butler in particu lar. Yet, perhaps her contradictory attitude can actually provide a useful model for disability theorists as we begin to formulate more nuanced and liberatory ways to integrate Butler and her fellow constructivists into our own scholarship. I find a very similar moment in Carrie Sandahl's wonderfully unresolved interrogation of her own attempt to deconstruct both disability and femininity while directing a production of Joan Schenkar's play Signs of Life. Like other critics of postmodern body theory, Sandahl observes that "Butler's theory of performativity... relies on a metaphori cal association between gender 'freakishness' and deformed bodies. In a sense, then, Butler uses disability (or the deformed, abject body) as a metaphor for gender and sex difference, and . . . ignores the identities and concerns of actual people with disabilities" (1999, 15). Yet on the very next page, Sandahl decides to use Butler anyway, because "Butler's theory... allows us to see the performative parallel between gender and disability" (16). It seems that Butler's work exerts a powerful influence, not only on our academic discourse, but perhaps also on our minds and hearts. Her insights have the potential to be so far-reaching and liberatory that even as we formulate critiques of her theories, we are also drawn in to the possibilities those theories offer.

## Crip Pess

### 2AC --- Afrofuturism turn

#### Disability is key to understanding what makes black people non-human under white supremacy. Retheorizing Afrofuturism through the lens of the black disabled cyborg can tell the story of how blackness overcame antiblack violence, accounting for its multifaceted presence in the future.

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Last year, my queer platonic partner gifted me the graphic novel version of Octavia Butler’s Kindred. For us, this gift served as the meeting place of our passions—a book that bridges her love of comics and graphic novels with my love of gut-wrenching, meaty speculative fiction. Upon receipt, I made an effort to read the novel before reading the graphic novel to see the translation of prose to imagery. PhD life took over though, and instead of finishing the novel first, I found myself curled up one evening carefully making my way through Damian Duffy and John Jennings’s graphic novel adaptation. Reading the graphic novel adaptation of Kindred was nothing short of difficult for me. Watching Dana’s evolution from subject to circumstance to active abolitionist reminded me of watching Cicely Tyson’s tour de force performance in “A Woman Called Moses” as a child. “A Woman Called Moses” is a biographical TV movie chronicling Harriet Tubman’s journey to founding the Underground Railroad. In both Kindred and “A Woman Called Moses,” the disablement of black women’s bodies is central to the plotline as Dana and Harriet endure acts of physical violence at the hands of their slave masters. Experiencing the disabling effects of bondage are the catalysts that propel both Harriet and Dana to seek liberation—for themselves and others. Through Dana and Harriet’s perspectives, both narratives reimagine life during antebellum slavery, particularly the possibilities and difficulties associated with liberation from bondage. Reimagining presents a language of fugitivity—freedom from antiblack violence and the spectre of white supremacy that looms over both plantations Dana and Moses are entrenched in. Yet for all the speculative possibilities these stories present, I realized a language about disability is largely absent from what it means to seek liberation from bondage, despite its centrality to both stories. By and large, Kindred and “A Woman Called Moses” are not discussed as slave narratives whose protagonists are explicitly named as disabled black women. Subsequently, the disablement Dana and Harriet endure is often belted under the frame of antiblack violence as an explanation as to why they sought freedom from bondage, but not what it means for disabled black women to be architects of fugitivity. When disability is named, it is usually done by black disabled folks who are trying to assert disability as integral to the terrain of black struggle. Such a reluctance to explicitly name Dana, Harriet, and other figures of slave narratives as disabled not only highlights the absence of a language around disability and afrofuturism, but the implications of such silences in terms of how the future is envisioned as a space of black liberation. So much of afrofuturism’s liberatory potency and radical imagination comes from the ability of black people to be the architects of their own futurity. Florence Oyeke says as much when she suggests that, “afrofuturism dares to suggest that not only will black people exist in the future, but that we will be makers and shapers of it, too.” One way black futures are crafted is through declaration: the act of naming the existence of black people in the future, the roadmap to which is charted in afrofuturist works. An example of this is Alisha B. Wormsley’s billboard declaration, “there are black people in the future.” This declaration was born out of frustration not only from noticing the absence of nonwhite faces in science fiction films and television shows, but also the rapid demise of the black American neighborhood. Both Oyeke and Wormsley demonstrate the power of naming within the afrofuturist imagination, its significance in shaping the terrain of possibility. Naming a future that’s free from different manifestations of antiblack violence means determining a different relationship with time. Temporal difference not only shapes the creation of narratives, but also the body-minds at the center of those narratives—what body-minds exist in the future and the stories told about their becoming. Representations of afrofuturist body-minds are very much a function of what people desire to make visible, absent, or marginal within the schema of narrative construction. It’s often when I encounter body-minds in afrofuturist works that I’m left wondering about the shaky existence of black disabled body-minds in afrofuturism and the general absence of language around disability. Too often I look at what constitutes a body-mind in the afrofuturist imaginary and am left wondering, “which black people are in the future?” Take, for example, the prevalence of the posthuman in afrofuturism. On the one hand, there is the posthuman cyborg, most famously Janelle Monae’s alter ego Cindi Mayweather. Monae’s android persona is an example of how cyborgs in afrofuturism aren’t automatically understood as disabled subjects the way they might be for crip futurists, crip cyborgs, or Donna Harroway’s cyborg manifesto. Monae doesn’t use any language around disability to describe her conception of androids in relation to Cindi Mayweather. Instead, Monae understands Cindi as the mediator between flesh and hand, “the oppressed and the oppressor.”¹ Similarly, Kristen Lillvis notes the dual symbolism of Cindi’s “Digital Auction Code” (DAC) featured on the Electric Lady album cover artwork. The DAC represents the branding of enslaved Africans at the same time it marks her liberation from bondage—Cindi is not for sale.² The lack of language naming Cindi as a disabled cyborg suggests that while it’s possible to interpret her as such, cyborg and disability are not inherently synonymous in afrofuturism. Similarly, there’s the afrofuturist posthuman with supernatural abilities. In Parable of the Sower, Laura Olemina’s hyperempathy distinguishes her from other characters. As Sami Schalk notes, hyperempathy is understood as a condition as a result of a birth defect.³ In an interview with Juan Williams on NPR’s Talk of the Nation, Butler explains that Laura’s mother was addicted to the small pills. As a result, Laura is born with hyperempathy.4 The question in interpretation becomes whether hyperempathy is understood as a disability and based off what criteria. Schaulk uses the example of Williams assertion that Laura isn’t disabled. In response to an ableist remark William’s makes, Butler asserts that she never said Laura wasn’t smart, to which Williams concludes that intelligence cancels out hyperempathy as a form of disability.5 When considering existing conceptions of afrofuturist body-minds, I wonder about the seduction of the posthuman. The trend of afrofuturist posthumanism points to a particular consciousness around the possibilities of black bodies in the future. Lillvis understands afrofuturist posthumanism as a form of consciousness that responds to the conceptual construction of blackness that occurs because of the Middle Passage.6 Thus, afrofuturist posthumanism provides a space to think about black identity independent of white supremacy.7 Building on this, I understand the prevalence of the non-disabled afrofuturist posthuman as a way of envisioning black bodies outside the spectacle of antiblack violence as opposed to “facilitating its objectifying qualities.”8 Afrofuturist posthumanism is a way black people have explored the effects of the Middle Passage on flesh, consciousness, and time.9 It names how the enduring legacy of antiblack violence is enshrine through the marking of black body-minds through enslavement. It names the process of how violence marks the black body-mind as non-human, and how non-human status justifies the continued subjugation. As Zoe Samudzi and William Anderson note, the marking of the flesh is about personhood as much as it is about the social status of the enslaved African.10 At the same time, afrofuturist posthumanism names how the afterlife of slavery perpetuates black suffering, it also provides a view of black futures free from white supremacy. As Ytasha Womack notes, afrofuturism flips conventional thinking about blackness on its head by rejecting stereotypes, dystopian fatalism, and hopelessness often associated with black characters. Instead, afrofuturism demonstrates that within the terrain of the speculative, fatalism is not synonymous with blackness.11 Black suffering is visible, but it is not an entranchant condition. If afrofuturism is about envisioning black futures free from violence and suffering, then to paraphrase Lillvis, new types of consciousness around the black body-mind must emerge.12 The black body-mind undergoes a conceptual shift—from enslaved to liberated subject. It is no longer a site of fatalism, but a site of possibility for the future. In this way, if blackness is ascribed the status of non-human under white supremacy, then the afrofuturist posthuman is an attempt to envision the black body-mind as one that is “fully human.” Afrofuturist posthumans are creative visions of the body-minds to come, the body-mind that is free from violence that is no longer the spectacle of suffering on the world’s stage. The body-mind to come is the afrofuturist posthuman that enjoys the humanity of the black human that doesn’t currently exist. But like any attempt at worldbuilding or futurism, omitting disability from schemas of afrofuturist posthumans has consequences. If alternative worldbuilding means imagining better futures, then the afrofuturist posthuman as predominately non-disabled demonstrates the complexity of mapping an emerging conception of humanity onto the black body. In linking disablement primarily with enslavement or past history, disability is symbolized as a vestige from an oppressive past to be done away with. Disability gets understood as part of what makes black people non-human under white supremacy. In making these links, it fails to interrogate why an emerging consciousness around afrofuturist posthumanism assumes that excluding disability inherently facilitates the transition from non-human to post-human in black futures. It fails to interrogate how a future without black disabled body-minds is symbolic of black liberation from white supremacy. Subsequently, it fails to ask why the black disabled body-mind isn’t already considered post-human. What are the underlying assumptions about the relationship between black liberation and posthumanism that would justify the exclusion of black disabled body-minds? What about black disabled body-minds provokes anxieties about the overarching status of “non-human” assigned to black people under white supremacy? In many respects, linking disability to past oppression is ironic given that afrofuturism attempts to move away from conceiving of black body-minds as sites of fatalism. For all its liberatory aspirations, afrofuturist posthumanism has yet to envision disability as part of an emergent consciousness of black body-minds conceptualized independent of white supremacy. It has yet to engage a vision of the future where the presence of black disabled folk signals to a vision of liberation from violence exists in multiple manifestations. The presence of black disability in afrofuturist posthumanism doesn’t have to connote to the sort of fatalism afrofuturism seeks to avoid. It can represent the liberation of the black body-mind, a radical shift in existence where one doesn’t have to be able-bodied to have a chance at surviving into the future. The black disabled body-mind can explore the abundant possibilities for the world to come, in our body-minds to come. The black cyborg, as an explicitly disabled cyborg, can signal the onset of a new world where advanced adaptive technology isn’t cost prohibitive and thus financially inaccessible. The black disabled cyborg can also signal to a world where adaptive technology is given to black disabled people as part of reparations for histories of violent, non-consensual medical experimentation. The presence of the black disabled cyborg can usher in a world where black disabled folks finally reap what white supremacy in medicine has sown at the expense of our ancestors’ pain and exploitation. Similarly, the inclusion of black disabled body-minds in the future can be represented in the physical restructuring of society. The predominantly black neighborhood Wormsley’s billboard highlights the disappearance of can be redesigned to fuse accessibility with the tenants of self-sufficiency, environmental, and economic sustainability that have become cornerstones of black liberation movements. Black neighborhoods can re-emerge, victorious in the fight against gentrification; replete with accessible and sustainably designed infrastructures and community resources. In essence, the presence of black disabled body-minds in afrofuturism can tell the story of how our people overcame antiblack violence, accounting for our multifaceted presence in the future, our thriving, as opposed to our extinction. “A Woman Called Moses” and Kindred are examples of this, the power of the black disabled imagination in carving out pathways to liberation. The disablement both Dana and Moses experience plays a role in their choice to seek freedom from antiblack violence. It not only gave them an idea of the world they didn’t want to live in, but the world they did want to live in. It plays a role in how they seek to change the present to affect the future, and how they sought to accomplish liberation. The existence of their narratives show how black disabled body-minds are powerful architects of black futures, one that can truly be understood through an evolving language of afrofuturism that accounts for disability it all its complexity.

## Capitalism

### 2AC --- Perm

#### Perm – **Cripistemologies** create spaces to critique neoliberal governance while ignoring the coercion of state politics the alt alone doesn’t resolve

Jess **Whatcott 21** [Crip Collectivity Beyond Neoliberalism in Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower, Cripistemologies of Crisis: Emergent Knowledges for the Present, Issue 10.1 (Spring 2021), <https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/>, -ekh-]

In the 2013 special issue of the Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, Merri Lisa Johnson and Robert McRuer identify cripistemologies as forms of “prohibited knowledge” that emerge out of the experience of disability.[10](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-10) Johnson and McRuer’s essay contributed to ushering in a critical form of disability studies, joining other work such as earlier issues of Lateral that featured Julie Avril Minich, Jina B. Kim, and Sami Schalk.[11](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-11) Johnson and McRuer’s contribution to this conversation was to coin “cripistemology,” as a way of dismantling the expectation of knowledge from disability “experts,” and prioritizing instead the knowledges of those whose bodyminds cannot or will not be cured into normativity. Johnson and McRuer are insistent on taking a capacious view of what experiencing disability means, and consequently who is capable of producing knowledge through cripistemological methods; Johnson and McRuer include, importantly, the knowledge gained from being in relation with another who has been disabled.

Decentering the disability expert explodes the conventional disability studies canon. In a section called “Sensational Crips,” Johnson and McRuer ground their theory in women of color feminisms and queer theory.[12](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-12) What distinguishes expertise on disability (conventional disability studies) from their conceptualization of cripistemology (critical disability studies), is this specific genealogy that insists on reading disability in and through imbrications with gender, sexuality, class, and race. For example, Jina B. Kim imagines a “crip-of-color critique” that links together women of color feminist texts that explore themes of chronic illness (Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldúa), with recent disability scholarship that foregrounds race (Jasbir Puar, Therí Pickens), through a coalitional framework of queer of color critique (Cathy Cohen, Rodrick Ferguson).[13](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-13) In the present study, I pick up on the radical political economy thread within critical disability studies that also marks it as a distinct formation. Just as feminist of color and queer of color theory is grounded in Marxist political economy, Johnson and McRuer’s conceptualization indicates that critical disability studies offer a unique critique of formations of capitalism, and specifically the disabling conditions of precarity under neoliberalism.[14](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-14)

Crips and mad people offer knowledge that emanates from their position as a “surplus” class whose presence threatens the political and economic order.[15](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-15) As other scholars have elaborated, society has developed the ideology, since at least the end of the nineteenth century, that bodyminds that carry disease, illness, and impairment are a “menace.”[16](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-16) This ideology, that I would label as eugenics, promises a future of human perfection through scientifically guided interventions that dispose of diseased, ill, and impaired bodyminds. During the so-called eugenics era of the 1890s to 1940s, state and federal policies were implemented in the name of saving the human race and western civilization from rapid degeneration caused by the reproduction of those from so-called defective bloodlines.[17](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-17) Eugenics policies, including institutionalization, sterilization, restrictive immigration, and deportation, articulated disabled and mad bodyminds as crises that threatened the imagined future of human perfection.[18](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-18) However, these policies fluctuated between contradictory impulses. On the one side, the crisis of tainted bloodlines called for the state-sanctioned neglect and premature death of those inside eugenics institutions, those whose bodyminds could not be made to conform to normative standards of health. On the other side, paradoxically, the state also promised to create perfect human health through experimental treatments, rehabilitation programs, and cures, including reproductive sterilization on the very same bodies that were neglected and exposed to death.[19](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-19)

The surplus class of disabled and mad bodyminds constructed in the eugenics era programs was gendered and racialized.[20](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-20) The sociotechnical imaginary of eugenics conjured a specifically “female” threat, relying for justification on fears of unruly people with uteruses  whose reproductive capacity required containment. Eugenics programs had specific effects on people with uteruses  including longer recovery from sterilization surgeries like the salpingectomy. The threat of unfit reproduction was grounded in white supremacist fears of race suicide, and eugenics programs capitalized on long-standing legal regimes (including slavery and colonialism) that deny racialized gendered people bodily autonomy.[21](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-21)

When outright eugenics became outmoded following World War II and the stalling of the Great Society in the United States, new modes of governance were introduced that continued to draw on the eugenicist imaginary. These new modes of governance, including policies of privatization, deregulation, and market liberalization, exploded into what Mia Mingus, Eli Clare, and others call “the medical industrial complex.”[22](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-22) In the medical industrial complex, billions of dollars are funneled into the discovery of new diseases and impairments, while pharmaceutical and technological innovations are promised that can rid society of disease and impairment “once and for all.” As an outcome of neoliberalism, the medical industrial complex continued the eugenicist project of locating crisis within disabled and mad bodyminds, and again promised social health could be achieved by curing disease and disability. This theorization of the medical industrial complex maps onto what political theorist Giorgio Agamben names the “state of exception” as a mode of liberal governance.[23](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-23) According to Agamben, the temporality of neoliberalism justifies the permanently temporary suspension of civil liberties. Similarly, the medical industrial complex’s rhetoric of crisis and recovery justifies the curtailment of bodily autonomy and reproductive freedom for populations including mad and disabled people, poor and racialized women, and bodyminds with diverse genders.

However, despite the rehabilitative promise, neoliberal policies of deregulation, privatization, and market liberalization are implicated in creating the very conditions of precarity that exacerbate illness, impairment, and mental insecurity. Over the last three decades of the twentieth century, organized government divestment from urban and rural communities that were segregated by race and class from white suburbs left communities of color and poor communities to rely on themselves for access to education, food, and security. The already flimsy social safety net was systematically dismantled through the end of the twentieth century through privatization and disinvestment. At the same time, growing wealth inequality ground down the middle class by pushing all but the super-rich into competition for scarce resources. It was in this context that Butler wrote Parable of the Sower, fictionalizing her portrayal of a multiracial neighborhood forced into extreme self-reliance. The situation has only worsened in the twenty-first century, as the economy rapidly concentrates jobs in low-paying service and gig industries.

These neoliberal governance policies have a particular impact on disabled and mad people, particularly those who are also racialized and gendered. The process of closing or reducing the size of state psychiatric hospitals and institutions for people classified as intellectually/developmentally disabled beginning the 1960s—known as deinstitutionalization—was one of the first acts of privatization in the neoliberal model in the US. Subsequently, the US has created a bifurcated neoliberal system where the minority, typically white and wealthy, disabled people receive care only through private medical insurance or family members, while many more disabled and mad people of color have been criminalized and warehoused in jails and prisons. Even when public funds are invested in care, the neoliberal state has repeatedly refused to invest in treatments and services that would keep people alive, well, and out of institutions, funneling public money into private industries like nursing homes and to the carceral system rather than directly to sick, disabled, and mad people, or to the programs we want, such as in home support.[24](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-24) Preventable deaths of high-profile disability activists, such as Carrie Ann Lucas, attest to the tragic consequences of neoliberal governance, which is focused more on cutting costs than supporting life.[25](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-25) How many other lives have been cut short due to the combination of conjured crisis, emphasis on cure, organized neglect, and the displacement of blame onto disabled and mad bodyminds?

In addition to what has now become almost routine, systematic, premature death, neoliberalism has increased vulnerability to disaster, especially in the face of capitalism-induced rapid climate change. From supercharged hurricanes to wildfires entering urban spaces, mass death and injury are the consequence, and disabled and mad bodyminds are at increased risk.[26](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-26) As these disasters show, government aid for communities made vulnerable to disasters through neoliberal economic policy is not a realistic expectation. The rolling power shut-offs orchestrated by Pacific Gas & Electric company in northern California in the name of preventing wildfires illustrate that neither local or state governments, nor the private companies granted authority over critical infrastructure, take any responsibility for ensuring the safety of disabled and chronically ill people.[27](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-27) Further, neoliberal governance absolves the state from blame, pointing the finger on disabled bodyminds ourselves for any suffering and premature death that results from conditions of precarity.

As “situated knowledge” growing out of the experience of precarity, cripistemologies expose how neoliberal governance simultaneously creates and deflects responsibility for disabling conditions.[28](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-28) The perspectives of racialized and gendered disabled bodyminds surviving precarity offers distinctive analysis of how the twin violences of cure and neglect operate under neoliberal governance. When cripistemological texts shift attention from the “broken” bodymind to the disabling structure of neoliberalism, they are capable of undermining the urgency within which it is claimed that crises can be solved by state-led, scientifically driven efforts of cure. Resisting the temptation to counter premature death with calls for increased and expanded state interventions, cripistemologies are positioned to theorize the routes to survival and flourishing within and against neoliberalism. Cripistemologies are forms of what Chela Sandoval names as “oppositional knowledges” that can counter the eugenicist sociotechnical imaginaries of the neoliberal state.[29](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-29)

### 2AC --- Turn

#### We create models of crip-collectives, anti-neoliberal spaces that reject eugenicist impulses their movements inevitably collapse into

Jess **Whatcott 21** [Crip Collectivity Beyond Neoliberalism in Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower, Cripistemologies of Crisis: Emergent Knowledges for the Present, Issue 10.1 (Spring 2021), <https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/>, -ekh-]

Octavia Butler’s novel Parable of the Sower exemplifies a cripistemological critique of neoliberal governance. Butler has a created a Black femme protagonist with a disabling impairment. Devalued under the terms of neoliberalism due to her impairment, racial status, and gender assignment, this protagonist gains specific knowledge about how to survive disabling precarity. Further, the character critiques the solutions for crisis proffered by neoliberal governance—namely, privatization and deregulation that facilitates medical industrial cure. In Parable, the Black feminist cripistemologist protagonist orchestrates the emergence of a collective that offers a powerful alternative to reliance on the eugenicist solutions of the neoliberal state.

Parable follows Lauren Oya Olamina, a teenager living with her family in a walled-off community near Los Angeles in the year 2024. Outside of the neighborhood walls awaits starvation, rape, sexual exploitation, addiction, and murder. Olamina (as she was called by Butler) lives in a neighborhood that has banded together to survive by rigging up security systems, growing food, collecting water, schooling children, and worshipping together at a makeshift church. When Olamina’s family is murdered and the neighborhood burned down, she forges a new destiny. She creates a multiracial chosen family that she encourages to walk from Los Angeles to the far northern part of California, with the promise of building a more intentional community on more secluded land.

Olamina has a fictional impairment known as hyperempathy syndrome, which causes her to physically feel the pain or pleasure of any person she can see. Throughout the novel, she experiences the gunshot wounds, sexual violence, and starvation of others she encounters. Layered on top of Olamina’s hyperempathy syndrome are symptoms of what might be diagnosed as post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD), including symptoms of hypervigilance and insomnia. However, in her context, some of these PTSD symptoms are practical assets. Entering debates about whether Olamina’s hyperempathy is a gift or an impairment, Sami Schalk reframes the syndrome as a disability given the specific social, political, and economic context of Olamina’s life.[30](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-30) As Schalk points out, even the ability to share pleasure becomes twisted in the dystopic future that Butler created for Olamina. Olamina suffers from—and, in several terrifying instances, is completely debilitated by—her nervous system’s response to witnessing both pain and pleasure.

One reading of the novel might argue that it is a story about crisis, and consequently, that it inhabits the same temporality as neoliberal governance. Indeed, Butler intended for the novel to depict the interlocking crises of the neoliberal present. Butler sought to imagine where “our current behaviors and unintended problems might take us,” honing in on patterns in the United States of extreme wealth inequality, the abjection of low-wage and surplus workers, carceral expansion, disinvestment in social resources, and the effects of human-caused climate change.[31](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-31) Of interest to the present essay are Butler’s additional concerns about pharmaceutical drug abuse and declining access to life-saving medical treatments. Both trends are effects of the neoliberal medical industrial complex that prioritizes profit over life and health—and the latter trend is a specific crisis for Black women.

Olamina’s impairment, for example, is caused by her mother’s abuse during pregnancy of a fictional drug called Paracetco, so-called “Einstein powder.”[32](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-32) Mirroring current real-life conditions facing pregnant Black people, in the novel such pharmaceuticals are apparently the only form of medical care readily accessible, while other needs suffer, including maternal health. This racialized and gendered neoliberal contradiction plays out in the text when, after apparently causing hyperempathy syndrome in her child due to drug use, Olamina’s mother dies during childbirth. In 1993, when Parable was published, the number of pregnancy-related deaths had already jumped to 11.1 per 100,000 live births from a low of 7.2 in 1987; the number steadily climbed to 17.3 in 2017.[33](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-33) Olamina’s mother’s death represents the specifically racialized dimension of this problem, as non-Hispanic Black women experienced a pregnancy-related mortality rate that was almost three times that of non-Hispanic white women between the years of 2014 and 2017. A participatory research justice study of Black women’s maternal health concluded that numerous barriers have been erected that prevent Black women from accessing prenatal care, including “inadequate health insurance coverage,” “distrust of and poor treatment by prenatal care providers,” “structural inequities” that produce stress that contribute to poor health outcomes, and “institutional budget constraints” that prevent providers from offering adequate care.[34](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-34) Each of these trends, I argue, can be directly attributed to the ramped up neoliberalization of medical care in the United States over the past thirty years.

Common responses to these disabling conditions are either to cling to the neoliberal promise of recovery through more privatization and deregulation leading to market solutions, or to demand a return of government investment in the social safety net. Parable rejects both the neoliberal and liberal impulses, enacting a cripistemologically grounded critique that emphatically resists the assumption that recovery will come through either more advanced capitalism or state interventions. In the case of market solutions, Butler imagines the return of an indentured servitude in a kind of company town, where able-bodied individuals forfeit their freedom to the corporation in exchange for shelter, food, and protection from outside violence. In this extreme version of privatization, it is as if the state does not exist. Consequently, all human value is reduced to the ability to work, a status that Olamina recognizes as excluding disabled bodyminds like hers.

Butler also reminds us that under neoliberalism, the state is incentivized and disciplined into accelerating its collusion with capital, producing racialized, gendered, and disabled life as “surplus” through routine forms of governance.[35](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-35) Early in the novel, Butler depicts the election of Charles Morpeth Donner as President of the United States. Exemplifying neoliberal logic by insisting on operating the government like a business, Donner’s proposal for restoring the economy and “putting people back to work” is to dismantle labor protections and environmental regulations.[36](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-36) Olamina wonders, “And what about those suspended laws? Will it be legal to poison, mutilate, or infect people—as long as you provide them with food, water, and space to die?”[37](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-37) Identifying how the disablement of citizens occurs in the name of economic profit, Olamina exposes the fantasy of recovery to something called normal, organized through the mode of neoliberal governance, as a farce and a form of what Lauren Berlant calls “cruel optimism.”[38](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-38)

Yet, exceeding mere critique of the interlocking crises of the neoliberal present, the novel also presents alternative possible futures for those who manage to survive neoliberal catastrophe. One other possible future emerges through collective, community-based emergency planning spearheaded by the visionary foresight of Olamina. Butler’s protagonist anticipates the need to prepare materially, psychically, and spiritually for the coming disaster, challenging her parents and other adults who cling to a restoration of normality. Olamina’s differences from her family and community, differences which include but are not limited to her impairment and her unorthodox spiritual vision, force her to grapple with the inadequacy of the status quo for her survival.

Olamina’s impairment has lent her a pessimistic pragmatism forged through the need to make difficult decisions in order to survive through the bouts of sudden and debilitating pain that her impairment brings. Perhaps it is due to these attributes, gained through impairment, that young Olamina has the ability to push past the fantasy of normalcy in order to forge an alternative plan for survival. While her father and other adults in the community worked to shore up the fences that surround the neighborhood in a desperate bid to maintain the status quo, Olamina secretly assembled an emergency kit, saved cash, and studied edible wild foods. Olamina’s preparations ultimately save her life after the neighborhood is attacked, and she is forced to flee alone on foot. Olamina’s anticipation of the failure of the status quo is cripistemological and serves as a vital model of emergency preparedness for crip collectivities facing neoliberal disasters. This is a form of planning based on the crip of color knowledge that, especially in times of crisis, there may not be any government aid to call upon. Olamina’s example is an invitation to pack emergency kits and make collective disaster evacuation plans; to vision with our communities about mutual aid and self-sufficiency; to learn to grow food, harvest wild food, and make medicine; and to craft ethics and principles that can guide our collective decision-making outside and beyond the state. Although categorized under the genre of speculative fiction or science fiction, the text provides an urgent example for developing practical plans to survive the precarious conditions of the neoliberal present.

Powerfully, the novel moves beyond strategizing for crip survival to imagining what Alison Kafer calls “feminist, queer, crip” futures; futures that have until now largely been absent from eugenicist and neoliberal sociotechnical imaginaries.[39](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-39) Similarly, the Sins Invalid performing arts collective of queer and trans disabled people of color articulates “disability justice” as a demand for more than the mere survival of disabled and mad people.[40](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-40) While critique offers the barest minimum necessary for the survival of those devalued under neoliberalism, disability justice also demands a practice of imagining possible futures where queer and trans disabled and mad people of color can “flourish,” in Sins Invalid collective member’s Patty Berne’s terms.[41](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-41)

Parable imagines possible futures for those who have been disabled and made mad by the precarious conditions of neoliberalism. The novel depicts more than mere crip survival, the story imagines crip flourishing through the emergence of the collective. Once Olamina is forced from her domestic space and left with virtually nothing, she cultivates alternative public arrangements of care and intimacy, building a chosen family and community. Butler provides the following description of this collective emergence:

When Olamina’s birth community is destroyed, she begins to build another. She doesn’t know at first that that’s what she’s doing, and she’s afraid—terrified—of potentially dangerous strangers. But she learns to reach out in spite of her fear, to choose the best people she can find and bring them together. With her acceptance of Earthseed, she relinquishes hope for supernatural help . . . She believes that our only dependable help must come from ourselves and from one another.[42](https://csalateral.org/section/cripistemologies-of-crisis/crip-collectivity-beyond-neoliberalism-octavia-butler-parable-of-the-sower-whatcott/#fn-9253-42)

Family and community are brought together through Olamina’s visionary creation of an unorthodox spiritual tradition that she calls Earthseed. Earthseed grows into a multiracial and multigenerational community of people who have been impaired, traumatized, and dispossessed by the catastrophe of neoliberal capitalism and abandoned by the neoliberal state. Together Earthseed as an intentional community defies relegation to tragedy, creating possible futures for themselves through interdependence and mutual aid.

The Earthseed imaginary and the possible futures they create challenge eugenicist strands within neoliberal narratives. As I have discussed, neoliberalism structurally creates disabling conditions through privatization and deregulation, and then continues the eugenicist tradition of displacing responsibility for structural precarity onto surplus disabled and mad bodyminds. The Earthseed community resists this process of disablement, by collectively preparing for changing conditions, building capacity to adapt to changing conditions, and indeed, learning how to “shape” inevitable change. Through her depiction of Earthseed, Butler depicts how building collective crip resilience offers a path for surviving within neoliberalist precarity and creating flourishing futures for those that would otherwise be devalued under the neoliberal status quo.

### 2AC --- Individualism Link

#### The aff is not just discourse- our challenging of ableism spills up against material structures.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 34-35, JMH]

Elsewhere, I have argued similarly—that we ought to attend to the way that Blackness and whiteness function in the interracial multiability encounter. In my article on television’s Monk, I proposed that Blackness and madness cannot take up the same space within one interaction. I read the protagonist’s unnamed obsessive-compulsive disorder as a disability that “misfits” with other (usually minor) characters’ Blacknesses.30 At times, one is used for comedic fodder or erased in favor of representing the other or eclipsed as a way to demonstrate white liberalism. My article describes the relationship between these two identities as mutually constituted, but it evinces some slippage when attempting to discern why the protagonist’s disability erases the other characters’ Blackness. **Since Blackness and madness do not reside in the same body, the various drama-comedy scripts tergiversate about what difference among difference can mean, often mobilizing white liberalism to police disability and Blackness.** Rereading my own work with an eye toward the breaks, I find that we not only lack a critical vocabulary for describing Blackness and madness simultaneously, but it is also assumed that one must take priority over the other. The end result is that in this interracial encounter—whether fictionalized, theorized, or criticized—either Blackness or madness must be erased. Important for this conversation is that the multiracial, multiability encounter shifts depending on the social position of the characters. Blackness cannot and should not be marshaled as the radical space for white liberalism to mount its critique of ableism or racism. When Blackness and madness exist in the same space, multiple ways of reading should become possible, some of which eschew the possibility of radicality and others that might usher it in. The multiability interracial encounter also allows for Blackness and madness to be erased when improperly thought of as agentive. Because both discourses are often conceptualized as unspeakable or illegible, their presence can facilitate and consolidate the power that creates abject material conditions. Nirmala Erevelles makes this point most forcefully: “The analytic category of disability is useful in destabilizing static notions of identity, exploring intersectionality, and investigating embodiment, [yet] I argue that the effectiveness of much of feminist disability studies remains limited because of its overreliance on metaphor at the expense of materiality.”31 In other words, Blackness and disability have the potential to destabilize the rhetoric of normalcy that holds them as abject, but they are curtailed in doing so when mislabeled as agentive. In Erevelles’s exploration of the lived conditions of war, she argues that when disability (both physical and mental) intersects with Black and brown bodies in the developing world or in disenfranchised communities within the developed world, their confluence indicts unchecked multinational corporate greed because it reveals the politicized nature of impairment. With this in mind, there can be no ableist or racist narrative available that prioritizes individualized achievement (read: overcoming) or bemoans bad luck (read: pity) because the root cause implicates specific governments, companies, the people who run them, and those who are complicit in them. In addition, Erevelles resists ascribing agency to the disabled people of color she discusses, perhaps because, in this version of David and Goliath, Goliath is winning. More to the point, the material conditions for celebration and agency require material resources not available to everyone, and mere knowledge of one’s situation cannot be proxy for freedom from it, nor does awareness equal agency

### 2AC --- Materiality

#### Not all revolutions bring freedom – only the 1AC’s weaponization of violence against violence turns the colonized world disorderly, rendering one divinebiomechanical, thus, a cyborg

Joy **James 13** [“Concerning Violence”: Frantz Fanon’s Rebel Intellectual in Search of a Black Cyborg, Winter 2013, The South Atlantic Quarterly, doi 10.1215/00382876-1891233, accessed 7/13/22, -ekh-]

In “Concerning Violence,” Fanon offers a definition of revolutionaries in search of freedom predicated on truth not deception: “the fellah, the unemployed man, the starving native do not lay a claim to the truth; they do not say that they represent the truth for they are the truth” (1963: 49).4

For Fanon, “Truth is the property of the national cause. . . . Truth is that which hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime; it is that which promotes the emergence of the nation; it is all that protects the natives, and ruins the foreigners” (1963: 50). He sounds apocalyptic, but his commitment here is for the nation-state, not for “humanity” in general. Fanon preserves the native in human form and recognizes that truth is about change. Change is inevitable. Progress is not. Revolutions bring about change, true, but not all revolutions bring freedom. For Fanon, the native can challenge imposed immobility if and when he or she “decides to put an end to the history of colonization—the history of pillage—and to bring into existence the history of the nation—the history of decolonization” (51).

What we recognize now, from the vantage point of the early twentyfirst century, half a century after Fanon’s Les damnés de la terre was published in English, is that transforming the colony into the independent nation was not the endpoint of revolutionary struggle or even its midmark. The nation is as passé or anachronistic today as the colony was in the mid-twentieth century. The entity to be transformed and liberated today is both individual and collective. The revolutionary objective is to be freed from a humanity which under centuries of capitalism and imperialism has become another commodity in the marketplace. One sold with the accessories of Western democracy, consumer culture, mass advertising, and excess juxtaposed with increasing deforestation of lands and devastation of seas, and the extinction of species or their patenting by biotechnology firms.

Fanon as the observer and chronicler is not the fellah. So he is not the “truth”; he relays it through analyses and words, always one step or level removed from total intimacy with and surrender to it. The truth may be that not only what hurries on the demise of the settler but the demise of the fellah as well is truth. And what better, quicker break from the fellah, former captive, wannabe administrator, than to allow him or her to be reborn as cyborg?

Decolonization “sets out to change the order of the world,” making it for Fanon a “program of complete disorder” (36). (One hears this echoed in prison theorist, Black Panther Party field marshal George L. Jackson’s call for “perfect disorder” in Blood in My Eye [1996].) Faced with two “species”— the colonized native and the colonizing settler—Fanon envisions violence as the historical and futuristic trajectory resulting from first contact. And it is this violence that must be resolved in revolutionary struggle. If the New Testament philosophical/metaphysical injunction is read by Fanon as a Manichaean material struggle that realizes that “the last shall be first and the first last” (37), then there is nothing but the physicality of violence to resolve the contest and to realize the divine law.5 Divine law seems to be attended often by sacrifice and suffering and by violence. Evil seems never easily to succumb to good, nor does good succumb to evil, even when racialization is not part of the pattern. Yet, when is it not? Fanon describes how the Manichaean logic of racism represents the native in zoological terms. The colonizer “speaks of the yellow man’s reptilian motions, of the stink of the native quarter, of breeding swarms, of foulness, of spawn, of gesticulations. When the settler seeks to describe the native fully in exact terms he constantly refers to the bestiary” (1963: 42).6

White supremacy is part of the religion of finance and acquisition; thus Fanon describes how colonizers constructed Manichaeanism, the struggle of good versus evil, as a racial and political mandate:

The colonial world is a Manichean world. It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and the police force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. . . . The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values. He is, let us dare to admit, the enemy of values, and in this sense he is the absolute evil. (1963: 41)

With such proclamations, both explicit and subtle, the settler state or colonizing culture is able to declare total war against the native as not only the enemy of the state but also the enemy of the present and future civilization. Thus for Fanon, “The native who decides to put the program into practice, and to become its moving force is ready for violence at all times. From birth it is clear to him that this narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can only be called in question by absolute violence” (37).

The violence introduced not by the native but by the settler is the necessary requirement to enslave, control, exploit, and manipulate. If the natives have been transformed into the perfect or complete victims—acquiescent, passive, obedient, conformist, and mimetic—then to undo their slavery requires a violent transformation they must undergo by their own hands. This self-making requires that the slave become rebel or revolutionary. The willingness to meet violence with violence at all levels is what renders her or him mechanical, and thus divine, above moral law or the laws of man.

### 2AC --- Root cause

#### They are wrong about capital. The “able / disabled” distinction over codes capitalism’s analysis of productive value.

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That is to say, the process and apparatus of making abled and disabled emerges not simply out of capitalism, but out of the racial subsidies upon which it is based, producing the twin needs to humanize those who control the means of production and dehumanize those who do not and do so at varying levels of stratification depending upon context, locale, political exigency, extant social mores, etc. As Ryan Fics puts this matter, “disability and ability aren’t necessarily the product of capital, but, rather, they are co-originary with that which informs and arranges capital, especially the white supremacy that undergirds” its historical formation and emergence.25 Yet another component of this co-originary logic is that of extermination. The extreme and systematic acts of violence and murder by white Americans against Black Americans has been a historical mainstay.26 Making Black bodies disabled and making Black bodies dead is at the center of the structural intertwining of ableism and anti-Black racism upon which this country is founded. Along with the racial subsidies upon which the power of capture, influence, and polarization is afforded to those who are racialized as white comes also the production of social identity. When James Baldwin claims that whiteness must be seen in terms of the “protection of . . . identity,” I take him to be pointing to the way that whiteness becomes constitutive of the very sense of self of white Americans, of those who live in its possibilities of violence and capital gains without limits—as well as living with limits to their own exposure to certain types of living and labor conditions.27 But a central feature of capitalism, like any economic system, turns on the distribution, accumulation, and transferal of abilities. The ability to build, to buy, to negotiate, to insure, to sell, and to move capital (both social and financial) just is, among other things, a particular economy of this way of distributing ability. And insofar as the birth of the (modern) racial subject is linked to the history of capitalism, then this is at the same time to claim that the birth of the (modern) disabled subject is linked to the history of capitalism. One of the intellectual tasks at hand, I think, is to better see how the social value of any given “human” ability has become refracted through whiteness, which is to say, how whiteness inflects (and, certainly, infects) what any individual or group is taken to be able to do and whether that ability is held to carry any value, any capital. Sylvia Wynter explicitly links disability (both physical and cognitive) with the meaning of Blackness and the legacy of anti-black racism and settler colonialism in the United States more generally. “The bottommost role of Black Americans in the United States is systemically produced . . . a parallel and interlinked role is also played by the category of the Poor, the jobless, the homeless, the ‘underdeveloped,’ all of whom, interned in their systemically produced poverty and expendability, are now made to function in the reoccupied place of the Leper of the medieval order and of the Mad of the monarchical, so as to actualize at the economic level the same dysgenic or dysselected-by-Evolution conception.”28 On my reading, Wynter is here claiming that white supremacy in the United States has relegated Black Americans to disabled outcasts. This means, among other things, that being disabled cannot somehow offer protection for those who are black, as Curry’s analysis assumes in principle, whether through increased pity, consideration, social supports, or what have you.

## Afropess

### 2AC --- Ruse of Analogy

#### Ruse of analogy leads to the erasure of the black disabled body- not only are coalitions possible, but blackness and madness have collective histories that are intrinsically tied to one another.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 2-4, JMH]

Quite frankly, Kriegel’s essay is painful to read. The outdated language, the faulty analogy, the internalized ableism, the profound lack of community— all of these depict experiences of disability and Blackness detached from social and/or political context. In Kriegel’s essay, Blackness and Black social movements provide a loose social mooring. To write at the tail end of the 1960s in New York requires an engagement with Blackness as a matter of accuracy and rigor. So, Kriegel’s essay considers—as it should—the import of social positioning vis-à-vis Blackness. Thinking of the essay as an artifact, it clarifies how the Black power movements and civil rights gains of the 1950s and 1960s paved the way for disability activism around the Rehabilitation Act (1973), and, by extension, the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), among others. Frantz Fanon provides the essay’s central theoretical interlocutor, which could potentially position the “like race” idea less as analogy, shifting the discursive terrain such that the essay centralizes the projected experiences of Blackness. It doesn’t. Fanon’s theories do prove useful, however, in thinking about the social situations that difference creates and abets. Even though the essay references the world, it is not grounded in it. As a result, the analysis fails on a few registers. The “like race” analogies for disability function as missed opportunities for nuance. There are only certain well-worn paths that logic can follow. First, the comparative element leaves Kriegel little choice but to think through the relationship in hierarchical terms where one identity is more or less disenfranchised than the other. Indeed, this vacillates for Kriegel depending on the situation (i.e., the disabled have less social options, but Blacks have been victimized more), which demonstrates a kind of sophistication in understanding that each identity category operates differently depending on social context. Yet, the analogy still facilitates racist erasure: despite the fact that Kriegel’s rehabilitation facility is in Harlem, he does not think through the life of the Black disabled person, nor does he speculate about the interiority of those around him. They are merely sullen. **The “as” of the simile and, by extension, the “like” of the larger analogy elide the differences between these identities because rhetorically one replaces the other**. **Erasure then allows for a collapse of important distinctions in experience** (i.e., difference between Kriegel’s European immigrant mother and the Blacks in Harlem), **and the depiction of Blackness as an abject monolith incapable of providing its own analogy and method.** Placing Fanon in this context only allows him to expose and explain Blackness as a pathology of the West, rather than allow Fanon to function as a theoretician that dialogues with and about Blackness and disability (albeit one who makes certain problematic “like race” analogies himself). In its failure, Kriegel’s essay foregrounds why the “like race” analogies are missed opportunities: They potentially promise a useful engagement with Blackness and disability because they grant that the two share social similarities. However, **without addressing collective histories, theoretical impulses, and subjectivities with nuance, the analogy reinscribes the erasure it originally promises to rectify.** Although Kriegel’s essay was published in 1969, the theoretical and methodological residues of his project remain. To think through the relationship between race and disability requires answering several questions: How might we read race and disability outside the confines of the scripts heretofore provided? In what ways do we need to shift or challenge existing analytical paradigms? To what aesthetic practices and thinkers do we need to turn to expand our imaginations vis-à-vis these two discourses and material realities? What sacred cows or shibboleths do we need to leave behind methodologically, theoretically, aesthetically? This project, **Black Madness :: Mad Blackness, turns to madness and Blackness to answer these questions about race and disability more broadly. Critical discourses about madness and Blackness tend to implicate but not include each other.4** As a consequence, the criticism recapitulates several pervasive but incomplete ideas. One of those is the loose rendering of Blackness and madness as analogous to each other. More often, the two discourses are examined as extensions of one another, too slippery to parse, yet so inseparable that one can elide or replace the other. In contrast, I theorize that madness (broadly defined) and Blackness have a complex constellation of relationships. **These relationships between Blackness and madness (and race and disability more generally) are constituted within the fissures, breaks, and gaps in critical and literary texts.** Black madness and mad Blackness then are not interchangeable or reciprocal. Rather, they foreground the multiple and, at times, conflicting epistemological and ontological positions at stake when reading the two alongside each other. In exploring these critical possibilities, I explicate how this set of relationships has, makes, and acquires meaning in the various spaces they occupy without necessarily guaranteeing emancipation or radicality. **I turn to what may be an unlikely site to explore: Black speculative fiction.** These artists-theorists disrupt Western epistemology such that their work becomes a locus for thinking through putatively strange Black minds.5 Allow me to explain the title as an inroad to describing our current critical moment.6 Black Madness :: Mad Blackness rests on the idea that ability and race are intertwined, as Michelle Jarman notes, “two dynamic discursive processes that inform one another.”7 Suturing madness and Blackness together, I debunk the perception that the title is redundant, oxymoronic, or excessive. **In an ideological construct of white supremacy, Blackness is considered synonymous with madness or the prerequisite for creating madness.** To push them together syntactically runs the risk of appearing repetitive, but it also prompts the possibility that the two must be parsed.

### 2AC --- Perm do Both

#### Perm do both- black cyborg rebels, a divine, biological, and mechanical inverting of power relations for a praxis of blackness-as-resistance

Joy **James 13** [“Concerning Violence”: Frantz Fanon’s Rebel Intellectual in Search of a Black Cyborg, Winter 2013, The South Atlantic Quarterly, doi 10.1215/00382876-1891233, accessed 7/13/22, -ekh-]

Fanon’s “Concerning Violence” rebellion against colonization and slavery offers dreams of freedom but little vision of a posthuman or posthumanist world. His redemption appears in the same world, one now with black “sinners” leading the white “saints.” Essentially, this is the same driven world but with different persona at the helm. Power relations are inverted, not transcended, for the world remains a domain for humans trying to prove or disprove humanity and thus their right to rule. One is left to wonder about a world in which the native, fellah, and sistah relinquish the fight to be considered “human,” and subsequently folded into the national or international communities, and seek instead to become black cyborg rebels—biologicalmechanical-divine entities in service to freedom. (Some might argue that the “true” cyborg rebel comes from slavery, not from colonization; only slavery destroyed the full humanity of both the master and the enslaved as well as the terrain that gives meaning to one’s past.)

The ability to refuse blackness-as-victimization and reconstitute blackness-as-resistance may be the black cyborg rebel’s only real possession. Blackness no longer as the negation or target of white supremacy maneuvers as something no longer human, or subhuman or deficient in humanity. Human and black have been constructed as oxymoronic for at least half a millennium in the West (and longer elsewhere). The Underground Railroad, as an escape path away from the gravitational pull of whiteness-as-mastery, would entail a flight from the “human” as well.

The cyborg rebel’s three-in-one trinity—divine, biological, mechanical— offers an unlikely road toward freedom for Fanon. The scientist who reduces the divine to superstition or colonialist propaganda, the biological to the colonizer’s war against nature embodied in the native, and the mechanical to technologies of warfare and finance that enabled the colonialist to triumph, would not pursue this line of inquiry. Yet, Fanon writes that if the morality of the colonizer is to break the native’s spirit, then the morality of the native is to rekindle that spirit by breaking the settler’s “flaunting violence” and by putting him “out of the picture” (1963: 44).

It is only one step more in imagination to put the human out of the picture, to banish the unending genocidal squabbles over who is “human.” Costly struggles to possess or refashion the prize, the social construct “human,” may not in fact be revolutionary battles but skirmishes. Given that the gravity of and triumph in warfare are not determined by body counts, perhaps rethinking the “thinking body” as something different but not necessarily superior to human might be one of the few rewards for centuries of rebellions against violence. The cyborg embrace might be one strategy toward freedom that distinguishes the dreamers from the visionaries, the henceforward moment that puts another game into play.

### 2AC --- Social Death

#### Disabled, racial bodies have been derealized, an ontological limbo manifested in an infinite paranoia unexplainable with their broader ontological claims

Omar **Zahzah 20** [A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature, Undercover and Hyper-Visible: Security Poetics and Pacification Prosaics in African American and Arab American Literature, UCLA, 2020, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2404384586?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=trueM>, -ekh-]

Judith Butler’s notion of derealization may very well have become one of the premier analytics for considering the epistemological ravages performed by the so-called “War on ‘Terror’” upon countless racialized bodies and collectives (this is, of course, contemporaneous to the physical ravages of bombs, bullets, metal cages and attendant tortures). Butler qualifies the status afforded the Muslim “Other,” the enemy of the interminable “War on ‘Terror,” as a kind of ontological limbo, one fully admitted neither to life nor death:

If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated. But they have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never “were,” and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness… The derealization of the “Other” means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral. (Precarious Life 33-4)

Michael Malek Najjar’s gloss of Butler’s concept cleanly emphasizes how the notion of “spectrality” ensures the endlessness of both the paranoia of and against the Arab subject as well as the interminability of the so-called “war” waged against the “terror” with which they are both suddenly and transcendentally coupled (152). In fact, this “war” is not only interminable; Najjar’s resuscitation of Butler’s 2004 framework also implies that, in a very real sense, the beginning of this “war” in earnest is inevitably deferred, for: “the derealization of the Other’ means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral” (Butler 33-4), an insight of Butler’s that Najjar expands to surmise that “Interminable spectrality is a state where subjects are forced into a liminal position where they are not allowed to live freely and instead become victims of an infinite paranoia… they are left in a state where they cannot be freed until the socalled “war on terror” is realized” (ibid, emphasis mine).

This understanding of the “war on ‘terror’” as a state offensive that is simultaneously endless and also only ever about to begin couples a framework for racial and epistemological precarity with paradoxical temporal inflections. That this split temporality is rife with strategic benefit is patently obvious via the similarly contradictory ensemble of legal neologisms its perpetuation has generated (e.g., enemy combatant, a construct endemic to the timeless time of the “war on ‘terror’” that simultaneously marshals the full, exceptional weight of the Law against an implicated subject that is inoculated against any of its typical precautions). With no fixed end—or beginning—locatable, the “war on ‘terror’s’” pacification prosaics enact their violence through a chronological assault that exceeds the presumed finality of notions such as Fukuyama’s “end of history”75 and Jameson’s cultural “schizophrenia.”76

The players in this killing farce, then, are not only geopolitics, nor racial politics, and not even these combined with epistemological politics alone. For the stage is also haunted by a politics of time, a chronopolitics that constellates the workings of each of these components with fatal precision and nimble contingency.77 I argue that, just as the pacification prosaics endemic to the “war on ‘terror’” are effectuated via a politics of time, so too do security poetics likewise utilize their own textual politics of time as a means of staging their dissent. But there is a crucial distinction: while the “war on ‘terror’s” pacification prosaics are assembled around tropes of a single Time, a mono-Time, resistant security poetics upend this para-Time via a temporal pluralization that is irreducible in its complexity. What follows will therefore be an attempt to illuminate the nature and significance of the chronopolitics found within three particular texts: two plays by Ismail Khalidi—Truth Serum Blues (2005) and Dead Are My People (2018, and still in process) and a novel by Mohja Kahf, The Girl in the Tangerine Scarf (2006). I find it important to note that the choice of texts is simultaneously intentional and arbitrary, by which I mean that any number of texts with similar topical concerns might have worked for the purposes of this analysis. And yet, analytical intentionality is cohered through the texts’ temporal orientations (by which I refer to the date of publication for Kahf’s novel and Khalidi’s earlier play, and the historical setting of Khalidi’s most recent theatrical work). On this point, I find it both conceptually humorous and intellectually perfect that Khalidi slightly attempted to dissuade me from using Truth Serum Blues, his first play, within my dissertation because, as he wrote in an email, “it is nearly fifteen years old.” After all, what is a decade or more when hegemonic registers continue to police and restrict collective access to time and history?

Here (or now, if you will), it is necessary to sketch out some important distinctions between time and history, though the two are certainly interrelated. Along with “events,” time is conventionally understood as a unit of history, with the latter accommodating various strategies of explicit reflexivity regarding the passage of time and the transpiring—and subsequent schematization—of variously significant occurrences. Hayden White grasped as much when he argued that historiography is perceived as approaching the quality of “reality” the more it reveals the trait of “narrativity,”78 that history is considered history proper only insofar as it reveals the sequential ordering of events over a given period into the form of a story. The implications of this argument are, of course, a blow to the “objective” character of history. If history is a story, or series of stories in form rather than in essence, other stories—or “Other” stories—can be told over, above, in between, and in place of hegemonic (hi)stories.

Of course, history entails more of a sense of entanglement than time. It is for this reason, as Eagleton notes, that it is by no means incidental that Heidegger titled his study Being and Time rather than Being and History:

My own personal history is authentically meaningful when I accept responsibility for my own existence, seize my own future possibilities and live in enduring awareness of my own future death. This may or may not be true, but it does not seem to have any immediate relevance to how I live ‘historically’ in the sense of being bound up with particular individuals, actual social relations and concrete institutions… ‘True’ history for Heidegger is an inward, ‘authentic’ or ‘existential’ history—a mastering of dread and nothingness, a resoluteness towards death, a ‘gathering in’ of my powers—which operates in effect as a substitute for history in its more common and practical senses. As… Georg Lukács put it, Heidegger’s famous ‘historicity’ is not really distinguishable from ahistoricity. (57)

Yet even as history implies more of a sense of interrelatedness and complicity to others, its narrativation can retain a hegemonic, exclusionary function. C. Riley Snorton describes the implications that race and racialization have for these conversations in building upon the insights of Tavia Nyong’o:

[O]ne might also consider that race is a history of theory that functions to express what is un/thinkable across complex temporalities… history becomes less a program for examining change over time and more an examination in disruptions in linear time. Race, then, becomes a way of thinking history doubly, or of thinking about the history of historicity. (Black on Both Sides 8)

The security poetics employed by writers under analysis in this chapter, then, are under a double-bind: on the one hand, they must challenge the presentist exceptionalism of the “war on ‘terror’s’” pacification prosaics. But in doing so, they must also be careful not to reinscribe hegemonic historical narritivations that evade “disruptions in linear time.” Rather, their challenges must simultaneously dismantle artificial temporal exceptions and overly-exclusive conceptions of temporality and history.

The preceding comments suggest how the “war on ‘terror’” insinuates a perpetual present vis-à-vis derealization. Perhaps naturally enough, if a perpetual present is what is at issue, the solution might seem to be a historicization of this perpetual present. Yet a few further comments on the chronopolitics of both the “war on ‘terror’” as well as dissenting literatures will help clarify why this would be an ultimately misguided endeavor, according to the terms of this analysis.

The “war on ‘terror’” edifies its perpetual present via several temporal technologies, the first of which I am presently terming “terrorist exceptionalization.” Simply put, this refers to the phenomenon by which the currently racialized figure of the “terrorist” is imbued with a transhistorical omniscience, conscripted as an “enemy combatant” of fearsome existential proportions and the subsequent ability to upend not only individual (white, “freedom loving”/“dutiful citizen”) life, but also to rend the very fabric of hegemonic Western democratic “enlightened” civilization beyond repair. A symptomatic reading of the current terms of presentist racial-imperial anxiety make these dimensions evident enough. But equally as important as the current adumbrations of terrorist exceptionalization is a consideration of the forms it has taken in the past. For example, though the so-called “Islamic fundamentalist” is inextricable from the category of “terrorist” today, 19th century American racial anxieties told a far different story, one of Eastern Europeans with dynamite ever-ready to obliterate key sites of capitalist production. For this reason, Jeffory Clymer argues, racialized anxieties about “terrorism” are indissociable from paranoid vigilance surrounding the integrity of the capitalist system (America’s Culture of Terrorism 13). Furthermore, even following intense government scrutiny of Arab- and Arab American activism and uprising during the Cold War era, Sarah Gualtieri importantly reminds us that Arab American activists such as the members of the Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG) were accused of being “godless communists” for their championing of the Palestinian freedom struggle, while today they would be far more likely to be condemned as “Muslim terrorists” (Between Arab and White 173). The “terrorist,” then, is not and never has been transhistorically coherent, but rather contingently overdetermined by capitalist, geopolitical and racial fixations and anxieties.

Related to terrorist exceptionalization is another cultural technology of the “war on ‘terror’” that I refer to as “Muslim Exceptionalization.” Here I refer to the “war on ‘terror’s’” current occlusion of Muslim identity that historically preceded post WWII Arab immigration, spanning all the way back to Antebellum Muslim slave identity as well as the activism of organizations such as the Nation of Islam during the Black Power movement. The negative idealization of the “terrorist” as ultimately Arab, even while it does not exculpate Black bodies from ongoing interpellation into the framework of “terrorism,”79 nevertheless symbolically levels important histories of resistance, thereby fracturing the capacity for dissenting collectivities to more naturally gravitate towards mutual uplift and joint struggle.80

The final cultural technology of relevance for this investigation is what I am terming “securitization’s disciplinary tautology.” This concept is intended to capture the more individualized leveling of past and present that occurs when the charge of “terrorism” is deployed against a suspect. By way of a strategic, syntactical inversion, the objectified subject of such a charge is suddenly deprived of any narrational or temporal recourse for exculpation. Any and all responses to the charge merely confirm its elastic accuracy. For, according to this disciplinary tautology: one already always-was a “terrorist” because one is accused. One is accused because one already always-was a “terrorist.”

I opt for the term disfiguring in place of historicizing to refer to these text’s resistance to the “war on ‘terror’s” chronopolitics because to claim these texts “historicize” would be to imply one single, coherent notion of time and history, a construct these texts in fact elude and destabilize as part of their imaginative insurgency. Disfiguring simultaneously both the possibility of “disfigurement”—of scarring the illusionary veneer of the perpetual present to reveal glimpses of the time-worlds surging beneath—as well as “figuring,” meaning a textual representation of the “war on ‘terror’s” temporal assaults.

### 2AC --- Paraontology

#### **Failing to recognize the relationship between race and disability forms a contradictory disconnect with academia and movements outside of this space. Vote aff/neg to to build a bridge back to reality**

Pitts 22 [Andrea Pitts, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and they are affiliate faculty of the university’s Department of Africana Studies, Center for Holocaust, Genocide, and Human Rights Studies, Latin American Studies Program, School of Data Science, Social Aspects of Health Initiative, and Women’s and Gender Studies Program “[The Disability Bioethics Reader](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003289487/disability-bioethics-reader?refId=c78d238a-58bd-4085-a094-ad0b405d6999&context=ubx)” published in 2022 by Routledge (pages 237-239) <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003289487-30/disability-bioethics-race-andrea-pitts> accessed on July 13th, 2022 by AP]

In the context of The Cancer Journals, she intimates that writing about her experiences with breast cancer, including the patterned harms that she underwent within the clinical setting, is vital to her own survival and to the survival of other Black women. Additionally, “know[ing] without understanding” appears to refer to the inchoate existential awareness of one’s own sensations, emotions, and other embodied experiences, experiences that are not fully transparent to oneself or others. According to Lorde, the act of bringing such pre- or non-discursive forms of awareness, including experiences of pain and illness, into expression becomes a method to reshape personal and collective possibilities. On this point, Therí A. Pickens (2014) notes that Lorde “wrestles with the appropriate ethical response to her pain” and configures her writings as a means “to move toward awareness, discussion, and activism” (130–131). The importance of highlighting such a relationship between pain and expression is that Lorde is able to demonstrate the many ways in which Black lesbian women struggle through cancer and amputation. Among the themes that emerge in Lorde’s work is the dominance of the medical establishment over patients’ own narrative descriptions. Thus, describing her pain through evocations of joy and sensuality, including phantom pains, becomes a resistant act against the power of clinical medicine’s force relations. For example, after her mastectomy, Lorde writes that “the pain returned home bringing all of its kinfolk” (Lorde 2014, 31–32). Through drawing on familiar vernacular, Lorde’s description serves as a response to the insufficiency of medical discourses to describe the experiences of Black American women in pain (Pickens 2014, 132). The Cancer Journals also underscores Lorde’s decision not to wear a prosthesis following her mastectomy. Specifically, nurses and volunteer staff encourage her to wear a pink prosthetic breast following her surgery, and the reasons offered are that such a prosthesis will make Lorde and others around her feel more comfortable (1980, 42). The artificiality of the pink prosthetic contrasts with Lorde’s descriptions of her own “soft brown skin” after surgery, and her remarks critique the white aesthetic norms that exist within biomedical technologies of the flesh (44). Pickens also notes the heteronormative encounters Lorde describes while being encouraged to wear the prosthesis, including the suggestions by medical staff that wearing the prosthesis would allow her to remain attractive to men (2014, 135). In these ways, Lorde’s writings refuse these tendencies to foreclose her own appreciation of her body and desires, and her descriptions reopen a discursive space for a distinctively Black lesbian response to 238 Andrea J. Pitts the misunderstandings and erasures that stem from the medical world around her. As such, Lorde’s writings offer a counternarrative to the whiteness of clinical medicine, and provide a descriptive opening for the existential conditions of illness, pain, and pathologization experienced by queer women of color. Alongside the pivotal work by Black, Indigenous, and other women of color in the 1970s and 1980s, more recent scholarly and activist work operating through framings of disability justice has focused on the specific existential and conceptual tools necessary for disabled, queer and trans people of color. For example, although authors like Lorde and Gloria Anzaldúa wrote extensively of experiences of illness, medical intervention, pain, and blindness, these authors were often reluctant to interpret themselves in terms of “disability” or as “disabled.” Along these lines, Moya Bailey and Izetta Autumn Mobley (2019) and Aurora Levins Morales (2013) have respectively explored the relationships between race and disability, examining the reasons why people of color may choose not to politically organize around disability rights or through identification as “disabled.” Namely, Bailey and Mobley note that tropes of the “crazy Black woman” are weaponized against Black women leading to high rates of violence committed against them, and that such violence occurs while simultaneously failing to address the needs of Black people with psychiatric or physical disabilities (2019, 31). Additionally, they point out that: Black women and other women of color do most of the labor in the service of disability despite the impact on their ability to care for themselves or their families. Caregivers are often engaged in debilitating work for disabled people and become disabled themselves. (32) These concerns, along with others, may thus complicate political and personal mobilization through a framing of disability for people of color. Bailey and Mobley also note, however, that growing work is currently being done among Black authors and activists to explore the terms of a disability within Black communities, including as their work attests, developing a Black feminist disability framework from which to theorize and mobilize. Along similar lines, Morales notes that for Gloria Anzaldúa, as a “dark-skinned working class Tejana lesbian,” to have affirmed disability as an identity would likely have required “a strong, vocal, politically sophisticated, disability justice movement led by queer working class women and trans people of color who understood [her] life” (2013, 5). From this insight, Bailey and Mobley, as well as disability justice activists have resisted individualist rights- and autonomy-based models of justice to focus on collective resistance to ableism in its many instantiations. Instead, disability justice activists and scholars demand a recognition of the interdependence of shared struggles against systemic oppressions and how disability functions across all forms of oppression—all of this while foregrounding the desires, joys, and networks of care among disabled people who are fighting against those systemic oppressions. For example, disability justice organizers Talila A. Lewis and Dustin P. Gibson, through their social media, workshops, and collective public actions, offer powerful critiques of the forms of systemic ableism that undergird US prison systems and policing, while also dedicating time and energy to curate Black disability solidarity music, art, film, and history (Lewis 2020; Gibson 2020). Additionally, Sins Invalid, founded in 2005 by disability justice activists Patty Berne and LeRoy F. Moore, is a performance-based artist collective composed of artists of Disability Bioethics and Race 239 color and LGBTQ/gender-variant artists that explores themes of sexuality, the non-normative body, and social and economic justice through their performances and workshops (Sins Invalid 2020). These examples of disability justice activism thus illustrate the important point made by Bailey and Mobley that there are creative aesthetic, embodied, and political contributions founded in the experiences of disabled people of color, and that organizing work done within a disability justice framework celebrates both the lives and experiences of disabled people of color while also critiquing the very systematic patterns of harm that would seek to erase, reduce, or eliminate their very existence. Lastly, regarding the relationship between disability and race, Nirmala Erevelles (2011) explores the “racialization of disability” and the “dis-abilization of race,” a process that Erevelles offers to bring both categories into material relation. Specifically, she argues that whiteness, defended as a form of property right, is “the ideological discourse that has been used to justify the racial superiority of white people over people of color by using the logic of dis-ability (e.g., inferior genes, low IQ) to decide who has the rights to citizenship” (166). By this, Erevelles suggests that the racialization of disability is the process by which white, able-bodied heterosexual cisgender men become centered as the most productive (and thereby valuable) citizens within capitalist societies. In this, the productive possibilities of such white citizens are protected through institutions such as the law, education, and health care. Regarding education, for example, the criminalization and pathologization of Black children in k-12 settings, as well as the segregation of educational institutions by “cognitive ability” seeks to shore up protected educational resources for those deemed more deserving or more capable of making “positive” contributions to society. Regarding the dis-abilization of race, Erevelles notes that people considered outside the productive metrics of advanced capitalism are often relegated to the welfare state, and thereby stigmatized as burdensome on the civic body. The responses to such so-called “dependency” on social welfare programs, however, is also a lucrative business, she argues. Testing companies, metrics and measurements for success, juvenile detention facilities, and other programs designed to manage or “uplift” children of color effectively foreground a life marked by pathologization and deviance for many people. Moreover, Erevelles proposes that the debilitating conditions of labor for many people of color in the USA also lead to increased marginalization, vulnerability, and medical precarity for such populations within advanced capitalism.

#### Blackness and disability exist in a state of becoming; through the transatlantic slave trade, ability has intrinsically been tied to whiteness and disability to blackness. We should treat these as aligned instead of antagonistic to one another.

Erevelles 2011 (Erevelles, N.. Disability and Difference in Global Contexts : Enabling a Transformative Body Politic, Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, pg 38- pg 42 “Disability as “Becoming”: Notes on the political Economy of the flesh” <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=832212>. )// RB

In Hortense Spillers’s (1987) essay, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” the social context in which the embodied subject becomes-in-the-world is one suffused with an ineffaceable horror. Spillers, in this essay, locates the “origins” of African American subjectivity in the (trans)Atlantic slave trade, which starts with the unimaginable violence during the Middle Passage; continues through the dehumanization of slavery; and finally concludes by exposing dominant conceptualizations of the contemporary “Black Family” as a tangle of pathology. Her analysis pierces the body to expose “the hieroglyphics of the flesh” whose “undecipherable markings” become the cornerstone of an American Grammar that continues to this day to deny the African American his/her subjectivity, such that his/her body “becomes both the physical and biological expression of otherness . . . becoming both physically and generally powerless” (p. 67). In this section, I argue that Spillers’s essay is as much about disability as it is about race, even though the word “disability” is not mentioned even once in her essay. I find this startling because the “scene[s] of actual mutilation, dismemberment, and exile” (p. 67) that Spillers describes in her essay produce disabled bodies—black disabled bodies—who in an ironic turn are transformed into commodities that are exchanged in the market or profit. I call this ironic because the dominant paradigm has conceived of disabled bodies as having little economic value except in very limited contexts where their extra-ordinariness was made hypervisible, as for example, in the freak shows—another profitable venture (Adams, 2001; Bogdan, 1988). In Spillers’s essay, on the other hand, it is in becoming disabled that the black body is at the height of its profitability, and it is the historical, social, and economic context of this becoming that I will now foreground in this section.

Before I undertake this analysis, however, I want to distinguish my position from other positions that have theorized the relationship between race and disability. For the most part, race for disability scholars and disability for race scholars are conceived of as “prosthetic metaphor[s]” (Barker & Murray, 2010, p. 219). In race studies scholarship, Ewart (2010) calls this practice “dis appropriation,” where the language of disability is used “to affirm (an often-subordinate) voice to elucidate agency and figurative empathy for other oppressed and exploited populations” (p. 152). In disability studies scholarship, disability oppression/struggle is equated with racial oppression/struggle (James & Wu, 2006). In each of these cases, both disability and race are conceived of as tropes that can be used interchangeably to foreground the ubiquity of oppression, but that fail to explore the complex ways in which “the categories of race/ethnicity and disability are used to constitute one another or the ways that those social, political, and cultural practices have kept seemingly different groups of people in strikingly similar marginalized positions” (James & Wu, 2006, p. 4). Conscious of this critique, in this section, I will show how race and disability are imbricated in their collective formation of the black disabled body that now becomes a commodity that has economic, social, cultural, and linguistic implications for transnational subjectivities.

As mentioned earlier, Spillers’s essay does not follow normative ways of engaging both disability and race because disability is never actually mentioned in her essay. Instead, Spillers focuses on the deliberate and violent process by which the black body is transformed into a commodity— without gender, without genitalia, without subjectivity—a commodity so abject that it exists even outside kinship relations (the most fundamental of social units), such that, in another ironic twist, its very aimlessness constitutes it as “an effective social and economic agent” (p. 74). I underscore both the historical and economic contexts here that are instrumental in the body becoming both racialized and disabled. I want to stress here that my argument is not that disability is like race or that race is like disability. Rather, I am arguing that within the specific transnational conditions of colonialism/neocolonialism, the becoming of black disabled bodies is indeed an intercorporeal phenomenon that foregrounds a violent hierarchical context that contemporary theorists of difference have been reluctant to address or even acknowledge.

Spillers’s essay begins (and I use this verb very tentatively) in the fifteenth century, in the initial encounters between European adventurers and West Africans, as culled from the 1789 narrative of the Nigerian Olaudau Equiano or Gustavus Vassa and the Portuguese Gomes Eannes de Azurara’s chronicle of the discovery and conquest of Guinea, 1441–1448. In both narratives, written from entirely different perspectives, the initial encounter between the Self and its Other produced the shocked recognition of radical difference. In these initial encounters, “white men with horrible looks, red faces, and long hair” (Equiano as quoted in Spillers, 1987, p. 67) came face to face with men and women “black as Ethiops, and so ugly, both in features and in body, as almost to appear (to those who saw them) the images of a lower hemisphere” (1: 28; De Azurara as quoted in Spillers, 1987, p. 70)

The sociocultural and psychic horror expressed by the Self when brought face to face with the monstrous Other mimics Julia Kristeva’s (1982) argument that the abject inspires an irrational fear of engulfment and/or contamination. And, at face value, it would appear that both parties are guilty of this horror. However, as Spillers is quick to point out, this notion of simultaneous/mutual horror is a solipsism that conceals a more brutal reality—the intention of the One to subjugate the Other on the basis of difference perceived in skin color. To the ship crew of mostly European men, those bodies, “black as Ethiops and so ugly, both in features and in body,” were nothing more than cargo to be transported to the New World by sea, and to be traded for unimaginable profit because of their obvious “physical” impairments.” It is at this moment that the conceptualization of black subjectivity as impaired subjectivity is neither accidental nor should it be conceived of as merely metaphorical. Rather, it is precisely at the historical moment when one class of human beings was transformed into cargo to be transported to the New World that black bodies become disabled and disabled bodies become black. Further, it is also important to note that blackness itself does not stand in for skin color. After all, in his chronicle, de Azurara recognizes that “in the field of captives, some of the observed are ‘white enough, fair to look upon, and well-proportioned’ [while] Others are less ‘white like mulattoes’” (Spillers, 1987, p. 70). In other words, black and disabled are not just linguistic tropes used to delineate difference, but are, instead, materialist constructs produced for the appropriation of profit in a historical context where black disabled bodies were subjected to the most brutal violence.

The other factor to recognize in these flesh-and-blood encounters of intercorporeality, which Shildrick celebrates in her own work, is that both blackness and disability are mutually constitutive on account of this social violence. Here, disability is again not just a linguistic trope, but the actual bloodied markings on the black body. Spillers cites William Goodell’s account of North American slave codes that expose this brutal violation of black flesh: “The smack of the whip is all day long in the ears of those who are on the plantation, or in the vicinity; and it is used with such dexterity and severity as not only to lacerate the skin, but to tear out small portions of the flesh at almost every stake.” The anatomical specifications of rupture, of altered human tissue, take on the objective description of laboratory prose—eyes beaten out, arms, backs, skulls branded, a left jaw, a right ankle, punctured; teeth missing, as the calculated work of iron, whips, chains, knives, the canine patrol, the bullet. (p. 67)

While Spillers describes these markings on the flesh as “the concentration of ethnicity” in a culture “whose state apparatus, including judges, attorneys, ‘owners,’ ‘soul drivers,’ ‘overseers,’ and ‘men of God,’ apparently colludes with a protocol of ‘search and destroy’” (p. 67), I argue that these same markings on the flesh, quite simply, also produce impairment. Here, impairment is not just biological/natural, it is also produced in a historical, social, and economic context, where the very embodiment of blackness and disability “bears in person the marks of a cultural text whose inside has been turned outside” (p. 67). Here too, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s (2002) depiction of disability as the set of practices that produce disabled/nondisabled bodies via a system of interpreting and disciplining bodily variation takes a brutally violent turn.

When the imbrication of blackness and disability produce violent markings on enslaved bodies, the assault on enslaved subjectivities is profound. Take, for example, one historical account cited by Spillers, which describes the detailed specifications provided as instruction to the crew of one of the most famous ships associated with the Middle Passage ( The Brookes ) on how to most profitably cram its human cargo on board: “Let it now be supposed . . . further, that every man slave is to be allowed six feet by one foot four inches for room, every woman five feet ten by one foot four, every boy five feet by one foot two, and every girl four feet six by one foot . . . “ The owner of The Brookes , James Jones, had recommended that “five females be reckoned as four males, and three boys or girls as equal to two grown persons.” (p. 72)

Instructed with much mathematical precision, bodily boundaries collapse and collide, stretch and shrink. The categorical permeability of boundaries has scant regard for the sovereign subject, because complex computations of equivalency are not bound by bodily limits. And yet, it is difficult to celebrate the fragility, malleability, and instability of these bodily boundaries borne out of so much violence as either transgressive or transformative. Rather, more profoundly, the intercorporeal permeability between these un-gendered, un-named, and un-remarkable bodies (except for their economic value as cargo) only serve to further erode any form of subjectivity that these bodies could claim for themselves. Here, the historical conditions of a nascent colonialist transnational expansion of capitalism are responsible for the violent reconfiguration of the flesh, such that it becomes almost impossible to claim the sovereign subject, now mutually constituted via race, disability, and gender as a dehumanized commodity. And yet, even though the deconstruction of the sovereign subject is cause for celebration, how does one celebrate in the face of so much violated and wounded flesh?

#### **There is clear connection between the social death and its relation to blackness and disability- particularly in places like debate seek to pathologize these experiences.**

Erevelles & Minear 2011 (Erevelles, N. and Andrea Minear Disability and Difference in Global Contexts : Enabling a Transformative Body Politic, Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, ““Unspeakable Offenses: Disability Studies at the Intersections of Multiple Differences with Andrea Minear 1” <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=832212>. )// RB

“Spirit Murder” and the “New” Eugenics: Critical Race Theory meets Disability Studies

The three stories of Eleanor Bumpurs, Junius Wilson, and Cassie and Aliya Smith, however poignant they may appear to be, are not unique. Police brutality, false imprisonment, and educational negligence are commonplace in the lives of people of color— especially those who are located at the margins of multiple- identity categories. So common are these practices that CRF scholar Patricia Williams (1997) has argued that these kinds of assaults should not be dismissed as the “odd mistake.” On the other hand, Williams has argued that that these “mistakes” be given a name that associates them with criminality. Her term for such assaults on an individual’s personhood is “spirit murder,” which she describes as follows: I see spirit murder as no less than the equivalent of body murder . . . One of the reasons I fear what I call spirit murder or disregard for others whose lives qualitatively depend on our regard, is that its product is a system of formalized distortions of thought. It produces social structures centered around fear and hate, it provides a timorous outlet for feelings elsewhere unexpressed . . . We need to see it as a cultural cancer; we need to open our eyes to the spiritual genocide it is wreaking on blacks, whites, and the abandoned and abused of all races and ages. We need to eradicate its numbing pathology before it wipes out what precious little humanity we have left. (p. 234)

Clearly, in our educational institutions, there are millions of students of color, mostly economically disadvantaged and disabled, for whom “spirit murder” is the most significant experience in their educational lives. In fact, it is this recognition of “spirit murder” in the everyday lives of disabled students of color that forges a critical link between disability studies and CRT/F through the intercategorical analysis of intersectionality. In other words, utilizing an intercategorical analysis from the critical standpoint of disability studies will foreground the structural forces in place in schools that disregard students who are perceived as disruptive to the dominant ideologies that shore up the mythical norm. That most of the students are poor, disabled, and of color is critical to recognize from within a CRT/F perspective, because the implications these exclusions have on the community of color as a whole are disastrous. By failing to undertake such an analysis, we could miss several political opportunities for transformative action. For example, Connor and Ferri (2005) raise some critical questions regarding one of education’s most famous court cases, Brown v. Board of Education:

Why did supporters of Brown not recognize how the assigned status of “disability” could serve as a mechanism for resegregating students of color in otherwise desegregated schools? And why did special education fail to take into account the intersection of race and disability and, thus undermine the goals of the Brown decision? (p. 121)

Now that we have the benefit of hindsight, we need to move forward. Connor and Ferri’s questions require that we pay close attention to reading race and disability not through an additive/comparative lens, but by deploying an intersectional analysis that seeks to understand and transform the structures where power coheres in complex yet dangerous ways. It requires that critical educators plant themselves firmly at the intersections of multiple differences to submit our educational institutions to a ruthless critique of the status quo.

In the context of our argument, these are some of the questions that should be raised by all critical educators: What role do disability labels play in public school settings? Why should parents and educators of color be active participants in advocating special education reform in public schools? Why should parents active in the disability rights movement also foreground the racial dimensions of special education reform? Why should parents of color, parents of students with disabilities, and parents from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, and parents who live at all these intersections work together to radically transform schools?

One of the largest problems in the special education movement is that parent advocates usually deploy the individualist model when fighting for their children. Both CRT/F and disability studies scholarship point to the social/political context in which families are situated in relationship to educational institutions. It is these contexts that have real effects on the families and those individuals caught at these intersections. The history of the civil rights movement was successful because of community advocacy. At the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality, and disability, we will find that collective resistance is more fruitful than individualized forms of resistance.

The need for change has never been more pressing than now. Even as we write this chapter, there may be yet another Eleanor Bumpurs, Junius Wilson, or Cassie Smith, whose life is quite literally on the line. If we allow eugenic- like ideologies to continue to plague our institutions (legal, rehabilitational, and educational), we will be required to face the consequences. In the Nobel Prize winner Toni Morrison’s famous book Beloved , she evocatively describes how we can never escape history because it will continue to speak to us in haunting tones until we listen, atone, and transform ourselves. Rather than viewing it as a threat, we argue that there is hope in this assertion. Patricia Williams (1997) herself also echoes Morrison’s call to all of us educators to heed the voices of those who are innocently sacrificed at the altar of educational expediency. She writes:

The legacy of killing finds its way into cultural expectations, archetypes, and “isms.” The echoes of both the dead and deadly others acquire a hallucinatory quality; their voices speak of an unwanted past, but also reflect for us images of the future. Today’s world condemns those voices as superstitious and paranoid. Neglected they speak from the shadows of such inattention, in garbles and growls, in the tongues of the damned and the insane . . . So- called unenlightened others who fail to listen to the voices of demonic selves, made invisibly uncivilized, simply make them larger, more barbarously enraged, until the nearsightedness of looking glass existence is smashed in upon by the terrible dispossession of dreams too long deferred. (Williams, 1997, p. 235).

## Semiocap/Psychoanalysis/Academy

### 2AC --- No link (Slave Narratives)

#### Only our neo-slave narrative blur fact and fiction, weaponizing against historical modes of knowing blackness to understanding disability as a lived experience

Sami **Schalk 18** [Associate Professor in the Department of Gender & Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin - Madison. She was previously an Assistant Professor in the English Department at the University at Albany, SUNY, March 15, 2018, Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women's Speculative Fiction., p.36 – 39, accessed 7/13/22, -ekh-]

I use the term neo–slave narrative to refer to a broad range of post Emancipation fictionalized representations of slavery. Unlike traditional slave narratives, which sought to use consciously constructed personal narratives to promote the abolitionist cause, neo–slave narratives are often viewed as attempts to recover or rediscover aspects of slaves’ experiences that were not included in traditional slave narratives. Neo–slave narratives, therefore, use history to (re)construct experiences of slavery and affectively (re)connect contemporary individuals to slavery in ways that the less literary, nongraphic, and highly pragmatic traditional slave narratives often cannot. Despite this recovery element, neo–slave narratives also recognize that due to the marginalized position of slaves and lack of access to independent publishing and education, traditional historical methods of archival research do not necessarily produce new information. As Madhu Dubey argues, neo–slave narratives “situate themselves against history, suggesting that we can best comprehend the truth of slavery by abandoning historical modes of knowing” (“Speculative Fictions of Slavery” 784). In fact, many neo–slave narratives blur fact and fiction in order to comment on and challenge our ability to read any history of slavery—including slave narratives— as unadulterated truth, encouraging us instead to consider history, especially histories of marginalized people, as inherently partial, flawed, and filtered through human interpretation. The use of metaphor and nonrealism are both essential to this counter- (rather than anti-) historical task of the neo–slave narrative genre.

Since the publication of Kindred in 1979, which “set the tone for much subsequent fiction about slavery,” this reconstructive task of reading against the historical grain is often performed through a variety of nonrealist devices, including the disruption of traditional linear narrative, ghost stories, and time travel (Ryan 18).5 The change to nonrealist representations of slavery is an important difference between neo–slave narratives and traditional slave narratives because the traditional narratives relied on realism to underscore the authenticity, truthfulness, and trustworthiness of the narrative and narrator.6 Hayden White writes that both history and fiction depend on the distinction between the real and the imaginary. She contends that in order for a text, like a traditional slave narrative, to be understood as true and real in modern discourse, it must “possess the character of narrativity” (H. White 10). As a result of this connection between traditional forms of narrative and truth, our notions of the real, both in historical and fictional texts, depend on concepts of continuity, chronology, and causality. Neo–slave narratives, however, use speculative fictional devices to refuse traditional narrative modes and thus also reject traditional notions of what constitutes the real. These literary devices that disrupt temporality and narrativity “are designed to convey certain truths about slavery that are inaccessible through the discipline of history” (Dubey, “Speculative Fictions of Slavery” 791). Speculative fictional neo–slave narratives therefore work to reclaim lost voices, to critique traditional historical methods associated with white, nondisabled men, and to use fiction and nonrealism to expose many of the untruths and absences of the historical record and cultural memory of slavery

In addition to being nonrealist, contemporary neo–slave narratives also have a different relationship to (dis)ability than traditional slave narratives. Sherryl Vint writes that traditional “slave narratives aimed to show their black protagonists’ humanity, they required the demonstration of bodily suffering to guarantee authenticity and to spur the reader into sympathy, yet they also needed to avoid reducing the narrating subject to his or her suffering body” (“‘Only by Experience’” 244). The desire to demonstrate suffering without being reduced to such suffering in a traditional slave narrative depends on keeping the possibility of recovery, healing, and redemption (through the ending of slavery) open and viable.7 This distinction between the suffering, but recoverable black subject versus the suffering black subject reduced to a suffering (and thus irrecoverable) bodymind can be read as a distinction between nondisabled and disabled black people. Here, only a nondisabled slave narrator presents the possibility of recouping black subjects by ending slavery because the suffering and otherwise disabling circumstances are represented as solely resulting from the slave system. A disabled narrator could easily be interpreted by readers as evidence of the permanent damage done to black people by slavery (or their inherent inabilities regardless of enslavement or not) and the impossibility of incorporating black people into full citizenship, a concept that is traditionally imbued with assumptions of ability.8 A traditional slave narrative could not, therefore, fully detail the violence of slavery, which disabled so many people without jeopardizing its pragmatic purpose.

In the antebellum period, a slave narrator could not, within the discursive limits of that sociopolitical context, make a claim to rationality, morality, and citizenship while also claiming disability. Since disability and intellectual and moral capacity were viewed in opposition, even if an author had a disability it would not be represented in a traditional slave narrative as central to their personhood or experience. The two major exceptions to this representational absence are, one, when disability is represented as an effect of slavery on another person who is not the author and is then used as an example of the evils of the slave system, and, two, when disability is represented with the narrator, but cured, erased, or overcome in freedom.9 Even then, however, such representations had to be limited since emphasizing the disablement of black people at large could, once again, limit collective group claims to the rationality, morality, and citizenship denied black subjects during this period. Contemporary neo–slave narratives do not have the same pragmatic, discursive, or editorial limits and are therefore able to represent disability both as part of the reality of slavery and as a central aspect of an individual’s lived bodymind experience. In addition to Kindred, other neo–slave narratives that represent disability include Alex Haley’s Roots, Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Phyllis Alesia Perry’s Stigmata, Margaret Walker’s Jubilee, Edward P. Jones’s The Known World, James McBride’s Song Yet Sung, and Marie-Elena John’s Unburnable. Despite the fact that disability in neo–slave narratives could be read as evidence of the violence against black people in the antebellum period, representations of disabled bodyminds in neo–slave narratives are primarily interpreted as metaphors for the impact of racism, whether historically, contemporarily, or both.

### 2AC --- No link (ballot/meaning)

#### We don’t seek to put meaning behind narratives or the performance of 1AC, rather you should understand that the world is messy and the project of the 1AC is not complete but part of an ongoing process.

**Pickens 19** [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 95-96, JMH]

As an inroad to an ending, I turn to the issue of whether Black madness and mad Blackness must have meaning and what that meaning must be. I disambiguate meaning and value. The former is how a concept makes sense in or has an impact on public or private space. The latter concerns an affective and sociocultural conception of relative merit or perceived worth in public or private space. In the introduction to this volume, I called this line of inquiry an act of literary theorist blasphemy because it upturns one of the basic assumptions of literary criticism: namely, that certain concepts must continue to be impactful or that those concepts must make sense in a text, that they are available to be read and understood. Yet, this kind of inquiry has a long history in Black studies and disability studies. Scholarly interventions regarding Blackness and madness call into question the utility of both meaning and value. That is, disability studies and critical race studies attend to the ways that devaluation of Blackness and madness—legally, socially, culturally, historically—contribute to the thinking of these identities as abject. This is not simply about whether these subjects remain in a position of abjection but rather about sorting through the conditions that make that meaning shift. The political impetus is that one cannot have a different meaning unless the value ascribed changes. The lives of mad people matter. Black lives matter. **According to a linear progressive view of history, as the value of Blackness and madness increase, the abjection ascribed to them will dissipate or go away altogether.** Indeed, the fiction of postracial discourse is that we are/ were currently in this/that cultural moment. (The operative word here is fiction.) The conversations before this moment reveal that the artists-theorists discussed in this volume provide useful disruptions to linear time and progressive narratives. In drawing an intellectual cartography, **this project lays bare how these artists-theorists trouble the stativity of those ideas and, in their dynamic theorizing, intervene in the commonly held discourses about Blackness and madness.** As I warned, this map would uncover, recover, and discover, at times, contradictory relationships in the folds, lingering in the cut. A small bit of redistricting: Octavia E. Butler’s work wonders whether mutual constitution functions as an adroit reading strategy. Nalo Hopkinson suggests the intraracial space may offer some disruptive aesthetic and narrative potential, which challenges Butler without dismissing the possibility for new interpretative strategy. Tananarive Due’s heuristic queries how either of the worlds Butler and Hopkinson craft became possible given the ideological concept of the human. **Each conversation intertwines with the other to examine the fissures in our analyses of Blackness and madness. As a result, they raise questions about the sought after goals of understanding these narratives.** In what follows, I endeavor to do what is perhaps impolite at the end of a conversation: crawl under the discussion to retrace a thread that subtends but possibly upends the entire enterprise. I ask, if the value of Black madness and mad Blackness increases, do Black madness and/or mad Blackness retain the same meanings?

## DA

### 2AC --- Generic

#### The relation of blackness and disability is international, the institutionalization is not only in the US, to say that the slave trade only affects the US is naïve.

Stefanie Kennedy and Melanie J. Newton 16 (November 8, 2016, “Chapter 24 The Hauntings of Slavery: Colonialism and the Disabled Body in the Caribbean” , Disability in the Global South by Disability in the Global South The Critical Handbook, Editors: Shaun Grech, Karen Soldatic , https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-42488-0 )// RB

Disability and the Enslaved Body The relationship between disability, race and slavery in the colonial period was not just one of representation; rather, disfi gurement and impairment were routine results of enslavement in the British Caribbean. From the very moment of seizure in subSaharan Africa, enslaved bodies were methodically marked with slavery’s violence. The process of capture, forced march, imprisonment and forced migration that characterised the slave trade, and the physical effects of forced labour in sugar production, malnutrition, disease and legally sanctioned punishments which characterised British Caribbean plantations, often resulted in long-term emotional and physical damage. For captives who survived the passage and years of ‘seasoning’, disfi gurement, disease and impairment came to characterise their lives—they were ‘kept alive but in a state of injury , in a phantom like world of horrors and intense cruelty and profanity’ (Mbembé 2003 : 21). In British Caribbean slave societies, the space between fi tness and death constituted the majority of one’s life in enslavement. Legally sanctioned punishments were the most distinctive form of impairment and disfi gurement endured by the enslaved. Throughout the colonial period, the laws that governed the enslaved were written by the white planter elite and thus refl ected an‘immediate reaction of what the slave-owner conceived to be the necessities of the slave system’ (Goveia 1970 : 19).

The 1661 Barbados slave code was the fi rst comprehensive slave law of the Americas and greatly infl uenced the establishment of other English colonial laws, including Jamaica’s 1664 An Act for the better ordering and Governing of Negro Slaves. These early laws granted slave owners almost unlimited power to punish the enslaved privately and at their own discretion. Although subsequent laws did not explicitly delegate such sovereignty, these founding laws established a mentality that it was the owner’s right to govern and punish his or her property, however he or she saw fi t (Paton 2001 : 927). In 1717 it was made illegal for masters to dismember captives on their own property, yet, ‘such provisions were by no means ubiquitous’, and very little measure was taken to limit the power of owners to damage their human property (Goveia 1970 : 29). The enslaved were frequently sentenced by the courts to have their ears cut off close to their heads, to have a foot removed and to have their nostrils slit for crimes such as theft and running away (Paton 2001 : 937–941). In addition to brutal punishments, the enslaved also experienced impairment caused by labour accidents, disease and malnutrition. Unsanitary water and extremely tight living quarters caused and helped spread a variety of illnesses and diseases including scabies, leprosy, yaws, parasites and worms, smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough, measles, mumps and infl uenza. One 18th-century plantation management guide cautioned planters to the kinds of illness to which the enslaved were prone. The author described the yaws as : great ulcers that break out in various parts of the body, but chiefl y on the arms, and hips; the wounds yield very little matter, nor are they very painfull [sic]; but if not cured in time will spread in hard knots all over the body, and infect the whole mass of blood; the mussels will be contracted and the features deformed; the face swell’d with large blotches, and death the consequence—unless skillfull application be had. When any negroe is soon to have this disorder, he must be taken from amongst your other slaves, or he will infect the whole . (Dovaston 1774 : 253) Other illnesses included worms, which caused an individual to appear ‘as tho he was mad, and run about with desperate and ghastly looks, at other times the slaves will be taken with shakes and fi tts like those of an ague, and the blood be quite chill’d to their thinking’ (Dovaston 1774 : 256).

These diseases of unfreedom were an everyday reality for enslaved individuals and constituted a silent but powerful and highly visible debilitation of the body. Sugar production was an extremely dangerous enterprise that caused frequent dismemberment among sugar boilers and, for fi eld labourers, a gradual deterioration of the body. Due to their status as chattel, planters utilized enslaved bodies to their utmost benefi t regardless of impairments. In the Newton plantation accounts of Christ Church Barbados, Sampson Wood, manager of the plantation, in 1796 proudly asserted that ‘all who can be of any service in the plantation are put to some occupation or other’ (Newton Papers MS523/288). According to Wood, the mere presence of severely ill or impaired captives on the plantation, however, was a problem. Wood commented that on the Newton plantation : All have something to do, except diseased people and cripples, or those who have a kind of right to be idle, as it were, by prescription & long (I must say bad) habit, for it is an ill example to the other people on the estate & indeed a hardship for whilst they are labouring, those are at their … leisure, & have the same daily food, cloathing, and allowed them & more than the labourers. I wish they would take themselves off to a distance, as Becky did, I am sure I should not hinder them. Wood’s complaint that the presence of impaired and diseased captives on plantation grounds caused contempt among the able-bodied can be interpreted as a projection of his own aversion to impaired bondspeople. Due to the limitations of the archival record, it is diffi cult to ascertain how captives themselves understood impairment among the enslaved population. The History of Mary Prince ([1831], in Salih 2000 ) provides an indication, albeit limited, of how free whites and enslaved blacks responded to the impaired bodies in their midst. Prince described an enslaved man named Daniel, who was ‘lame in the hip, and could not keep up with the rest of the slaves’ and, thus, subjected to his master’s sadistic punishments, which further incapacitated him. ‘He was an object of pity and terror to the whole gang of slaves’, Prince wrote, ‘and in his wretched case we saw, each of us, our own lot, if we should live to be so old’ (Salih 2000 : 21). Prince suggested that the enslaved viewed such physical conditions as a direct result of enslavement, not as a personal tragedy but, rather, a condition to which they were all susceptible as forced labourers. She later testifi ed that individuals whose bodies had no value for the industrial work regime of plantation labour suffered greater violence at the hands of overseers and owners than their able-bodied counterparts. Sarah, an enslaved woman ‘nearly past work … who was subject to several bodily infirmities, and was not quite right in the head’, endured sadistic punishments from her overseer, Master Dickey, because she ‘did not wheel the barrow fast enough to please him’ (Salih 2000 : 22). Sarah died a few days after she received her punishment. Prince’s narrative demonstrates the unremitting violence the enslaved endured and suggests that individuals whose bodies had become antithetical to the industrial work regime of plantation labour suffered greater violence at the hands of overseers and owners than able-bodied labourers .

Evidence of Things Unseen: Following Slavery’s Ghost According to Gordon, ‘The presence of the ghost informs us that the over and done with “extremity” of a domestic and international slavery has not entirely gone away, even if it seems to have passed into the register of history and symbol’ ( 2008 : 168). Disability is key to how slavery and the unfi nished work of emancipation continue to haunt former slave societies. The prevalence of disability caused by poor nutrition and inadequate access to health care is one key manifestation of slavery’s ghost. The rate of diabetes in the Caribbean islands is consistently high and imposes a very high economic burden on Caribbean citizens. Many people with diabetes have limited access to health care, which can lead to temporary and permanent impairments (Barceló et al. 2003 : 19; International Diabetes Federation 2013 ). Rates of incarceration among people of African descent and people with disabilities are another sign that slavery’s unquiet ghost haunts the African diaspora. Although the majority of research on incarceration, race and disability focuses on the USA, such research has relevance to and across the African diaspora, including the Caribbean. The institutionalisation of black impaired bodies in the Caribbean is inextricably bound to histories of slavery. By the late 18th century, laws were put in force in Barbados and Jamaica to ensure that owners, and not the state, had the responsibility to provide for their disabled labourers and keep them from ‘wandering’ the island ( The Acts of assembly of the island of Jamaica 1788 : 5). Prisons and workhouses in the Caribbean were a relatively new phenomenon in the late 18th century and refl ected the modern continuum between state penal power and slave- owner sovereignty. The lodging of disabled captives in workhouses testifi es to the growing problem of public displays of impaired bodies in the islands. Today capitalism has found alternative ways to generate profi t from bodies perceived as disabled by incarcerating them in total institutions such as nursing homes and prisons. Liat Ben-Moshe explains that ‘disablement has become big business … [f]rom the point of view of the institution-industrial complex, disabled people are worth more to the gross domestic product when occupying institutional “beds” than they are in their own homes’ ( 2011 : 393). Race also plays a key role in rates of institutionalisation in former slave societies. Research on the USA has shown that in 2006, Latinos and African-Americans were incarcerated at a rate of 1038 per 100,000 residents and 2468 per 100,000 residents, respectively, compared to whites, who were imprisoned at a rate of 409 per 100,000 residents. What is more, nearly a quarter of prison and jail inmates who had a mental health problem had served three or more prior incarcerations (Ben-Moshe 2011 : 387). ‘The black body’, argues Hershini Bhana Young ( 2005 : 389), ‘continues to be the site onto which the state displaces its own violent crimes, externalizing its culpability and binding the black body’. Thus, the development of modern notions of disability and race that Atlantic slavery and the slave trade set in motion can be seen today in the widespread institutionalisation of black and disabled bod ies. People of African descent and people with disabilities are still being constrained by the prejudiced and racist societal forces of capitalism today. In prisons across the Americas, a racialised and disabled workforce labours for capitalistic means yet under different structural forms of violence. Individuals labelled as ‘mad’, ‘foolish’ or ‘idiots’ as well as people of African descent have long been associated with notions of social danger and perceived as being prone to violent crimes (Hahn- Rafter 1997 ; Young 2005 ). Like the structures of slavery, the incarceration and institutionalisation of black and disabled peoples today demonstrates that such individuals are always seen as criminal and in need of punishment by way of constraint.

### 2AC --- AI Good

#### Disability can’t be resisted through “legal measures”, instead we must reshape the normative assumption behind algorithms of fairness.

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Abstraction and fairness Despite our formal knowledge of the sources of algorithmic bias, it can be difficult to identify or take legal measures to combat it since the ways that machine learning AI analyze inputs are hidden in a black box[Footnote4](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#Fn4) (Sánchez-Monedero et al., [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR84)). The black box often frustrates efforts to correct inaccurate models, as it can be unclear if an AI system granted undue weight to non-causal factors or correctly identified a pattern we have yet to grasp. While seeking explanations may illuminate broad strokes of their processing, these algorithms’ inferences might simply be too complex for humans to make sense of (Selbst & Barocas, [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR88)). This inscrutability raises the broader question of whether we should turn to AI for inferences about deeply normative, difficult-to-quantify issues such as built inaccessibility and disability status. In the face of concerns about differing notions of bias, legal uncertainty, and the black box, vendors operationalized demands that AI delivers fair outcomes for protected classes. These fair-ML methods seek to translate bias into easily quantifiable terms that algorithms can understand such as error rates (Agrawal, [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR1)). For instance, by defining fairness as a mathematical constraint and optimizing for it or modifying training data until outputs conform to fairness standards, fair-ML can help mitigate disparities stemming from technical errors such as flawed input–output relations or training data. While fairness is operationalized in countless ways, most fall into one of three approaches (Corbett-Davies & Goel, [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR25)).[Footnote5](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#Fn5) First, anti-classification, also called fairness through unawareness, omits data about membership in protected classes as well as any traits associated with them (Zafar et al., [2017](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR106)). For instance, one might design an AI that explicitly cannot access information about applicants’ disability status. Second, calibration holds that people who an AI scores similarly ought to end up having similar outcomes (Dieterich et al., [2016](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR30)). For example, imagine an AI that equalizes false omission rates and negative predictive values so applicants with similar scores are equally likely to become poor employees, whether they are disabled or not. Third, classification parity defines fairness as a matter of equalizing a predictive measure across groups (Chouldechova et al., [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR22)). For example, an AI might equalize error rates such that applicants who end up succeeding are equally likely to be selected, independent of disability status. Fair-ML’s understanding of fairness reflects neither procedural nor normative concepts of the term but instead is a formal, mathematical criteria that AI outputs should not stray from (Ochigame, [2019a](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR72)). On this view, algorithms are biased if they violate a certain standard, the satisfaction of which is taken to indicate fairness (Mulligan et al., [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR67)). While conforming to these standards often is valuable, doing so ought not be taken as sufficient for securing fairness in the normative sense. Instead, fair-ML methods are best understood as pragmatic ways to render bias tractable despite the black box by replacing messy legal and normative issues with formal rules (Bennett et al., [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR9); Green & Viljoen, [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR43)). As such, these methods can be effective at addressing mathematical errors, such as inaccurate training datasets and input–output relations. Yet, while fair-ML can reduce certain outcome disparities, it lacks a principled way of detecting bias. The gap between formal and normative concepts of fairness was brought to light when researchers at ProPublica reported that COMPAS, an algorithm which predicted recidivism risk, discriminated against black defendants (Angwin et al., [2016](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR5)). Specifically, it had lower false negative and higher false positive rates for black defendants than for white ones, which violated classification parity. COMPAS’ developers, Northpointe (now Equivant), replied by arguing that error rates are flawed measures of fairness and noting that COMPAS exhibited equal predictive values for black and white defendants, thus ensuring calibration (Dieterich et al., [2016](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR30)). In this dispute, whether COMPAS was racially biased seemingly hinged neither on legal procedure nor normative principle but on various fair-ML criteria. While anti-classification, calibration, and classification parity all aim to operationalize distinct notions of fairness, it is mathematically impossible to satisfy each of these definitions simultaneously in the real world (Jacobs & Wallach, [2021](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR52)). Research has found that these standards could be reconciled only if the recidivism rate were uniform across groups, the AI was entirely accurate, or some groups never faced negative outcomes (Barocas et al., [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR6); Chouldechova, [2017](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR21)). Similarly, in the context of hiring, if disabled people performed worse than average on a given pre-employment assessment, calibrating employability predictions would shoulder them with higher false negative and lower false positive rates. This suggests that algorithms inevitably are unfair in that they will violate at least one fair-ML approach and reflects the conceptual tensions between the normative notions of fairness that underpin each of these approaches.[Footnote6](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#Fn6) Although fair-ML treats bias as the product of inaccurate input–output relations and training data, decisions about how to reduce bias are normative issues, not technical ones. Choices about which kind of algorithmic fairness to implement—anti-classification, calibration, classification parity, and so on—are intrinsically value-laden because they shape what AI designers consider to be a biased outcome. As such, it is unclear how to assess competing fair-ML strategies without appealing to normative reasons. For instance, since letting some criminals go is preferable to punishing innocents, data scientists predicting recidivism risk should be more concerned with false positives than false negatives. Yet, equalizing false negatives seems more important for AI hiring because approved candidates still face additional interviews while those screened out have little redress. At the same time, post-hoc measures for uncovering false negatives in hiring tests, such as approving a random set of lower-ranked applicants, would be much more difficult to justify in the context of recidivism. Narrow focus on abstract proxies for equality denies one the information required to evaluate the merits of different fairness standards. To define fairness as a formal constraint divorced from normative commitments and social context is to commit a category error. The difficulty of using solely technical means to secure normative ends points to broader issues with fair-ML, raising questions about how we should understand disability and fairness in light of structural ableism.

#### The impact is Algorithmic Ablism – AI will always be indebted to the structures of ablism which influence ethical considerations behind AI development.

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Algorithmic ableism To optimize for fairness and make data portable despite the black box, disability status often is modelled as a one-dimensional variable. This tendency to abstract away environmental and social context artificially limits categories of disability and obscures the process of measuring it. In doing so, AI design unintentionally can reinforce both the form and content of the medical model of disability. By omitting the value-laden decisions involved in operationalizing disability, fair-ML flattens variations in the intensities and kinds of people’s disabilities and further marginalizes those at the intersections. Analyzing the normative commitments of this approach highlights the importance of considering a wider array of ethical concerns beyond training data and input–output relations. When data scientists tackle open-ended goals such as diversity in hiring, they must translate contested models of disability into a single target that can be measured and adjusted in the black box (Selbst et al., [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR87)). As such, bias mitigation requires rendering concepts like protected class status amenable to quantification so discrete weights can be ascribed to them. For example, Pymetrics adjusts its AI to satisfy the 4/5ths rule by assessing if scores differ based on neatly defined categories of gender, race, and age (Yoo, [2017](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR105)). HireVue, which uses natural language processing to analyze the content of applicants’ speech during automated interviews and gamified tasks, makes similar claims (Zuloaga, [2021](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR107)). As part of this process, HireVue explicitly designs their questions in order to elicit readily quantifiable responses (Larsen, [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR58)). AI vendors often idealize abstraction since removing context-specific data can help algorithms function more accurately across a variety of settings (Selbst et al., [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR87)). However, accuracy is hampered by the fact that most data about disabled people are not comprehensive, without comparability, and low quality (Altman & Rasch, [2016](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR2); Maritz et al., [2017](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR63)). As a result, gathering more disability data and designing a shared system for classifying it plays an important role in bias reduction. Since optimizing for fairness can reduce accuracy, collecting high-quality disability data could help mitigate bias stemming from unrepresentative datasets (Chen et al., [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR20)). While better representation in training data is necessary to secure just outcomes, disclosing one’s disability status can lead to data misuse and expose one to further discrimination.[Footnote7](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#Fn7) However, even if people could provide information about their disabilities without fear of repercussion, what it means to identify as disabled is not always straightforward. It is not simply that some disabled people are understandably reluctant to disclose, but that if and how they identify depends on the model of disability and type of measurement at hand. Researchers have found that how people define their disabilities—if they identify as disabled at all—is predicted by a wide array of factors, such as the type of inquiry (Brown & Broido, [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR15)), intensity and stigma (Bogart et al., [2017](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR12)), and environmental context (Santuzzi & Waltz, [2016](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR85)). A host of other factors, such access to an official diagnosis, internalized self-doubt, and whether one’s disability is (in)visible also plausibly affect self-identification. Other studies suggest that whether and how one identifies impacts the types of bias encountered (Nario-Redmond et al., [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR68)), methods used to navigate them (Nario-Redmond et al., [2013](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR69)), and levels of self-esteem (Bogart, [2014](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR11)). These different understandings of disability not only call for distinct types of measurement but also are correlated with distinct outcomes. For example, official medical diagnoses seem to be good predictors of access to health care while self-identification likely is a better proxy for group and political affiliation. Data scientists cannot operationalize disability status as a single, binary variable because the category’s nature and boundaries are not self-evident even among people who seem to fit within it. While definitions of disability are fiercely contested, the ways in which disability data are collected and become legible to AI lend disproportionate weight to the medical model of disability. Given that disclosing disability status can open one up to further discrimination, disability is often quantified only when the situation demands proof of it, e.g., to make an insurance claim, secure a diagnosis, or receive treatment. Aspects of other models of disability, such as social attitudes and built environment, are difficult to measure and, when people have a chance to self-report, they typically are limited to the binary categories of census and actuarial forms. As a result, data scientists seeking to make use of what little disability data exists often turn to information gathered and stored in a narrow range of contexts and formats. In turn, the processes of selecting proxies, generating labels, and curating datasets tend to translate disability into concepts amenable to the medical model. That is, algorithms end up assessing disabled people through a lens that defines disability as a biological dysfunction isolated from structural ableism. Abstraction deprives AI designers of the information required to operationalize disability status as anything but a biomedical dysfunction. One need not deny disability’s material aspects to recognize that adopting an entirely medical understanding of disability crowds out analysis of the socio-political processes that inform it. After all, that disability becomes legible to AI in terms of measurable diagnoses does not entail that AI is objective but highlights its alignment with the medical model. For example, if disabled people score lower on a given pre-employment test, to operationalize disability without accounting for the ableist structures at the root of that performance gap cannot help but attribute that gap to bodily failures. Similarly, once social context is omitted, one can no longer appeal to hiring bias to explain why irregular eye contact adversely impacts employability, shouldering disabled applicants with that responsibility instead. Because disability cannot be reduced to biological facts, abstracting away information about one’s built environment and social context is inaccurate and renders structural ableism benign. However, efforts to remove context from or quantify aspects of disability sheds light on the value-laden nature of ostensibly objective AI design. After all, the notion that one’s competence can be understood apart from the setting it occurs in is hardly a neutral one. For instance, some researchers studying performance assessments argue competence can only be assessed in situ since it is intrinsically contextual and shifts in response to dynamic, complex workplace environments (Cate & Regehr, [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR18); Govaerts & van der Vleuten, [2013](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR41)). To focus solely on quantitative aspects of performance risks omitting information regarding, e.g., interactions between chronic fatigue and irregular work schedules, or moldy buildings and asthma flare ups. That such factors are often removed from AI models while more quantifiable traits are treated as legitimate markers of ‘fit’ is not objective but shaped by ableist norms.[Footnote8](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#Fn8) For example, while studies show that disabled people perform similarly on many aspects of employability (Houtenville & Kalargyrou, [2015](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR49); Lindsay et al., [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR60)), automated interviews often place great stock in easily measured factors such as a measured tone and eye contact (Whittaker et al., [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR104)). As such, assessing applicants primarily in terms of abstract, quantitative factors does not preserve objectivity so much as obscure the underlying assumptions of AI designers. By evaluating hiring outcomes for disabled people based on factors that do not resist quantification, fair-ML omits more nebulous aspects of disability and makes it difficult to identify the ways in which structural ableism shapes data. Consider that while sentencing decisions hinge on many factors, recidivism risk has been measured disproportionately. Researchers have noted that this focus disposes algorithms such as COMPAS to assess sentences in ways that prioritize incapacitation over, e.g., retribution and rehabilitation (Green, [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR42); Selbst et al., [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR87)). Similarly, imagine a hiring algorithm that predicts employability based entirely on quantifiable traits, like employment gaps, requests for medical leave, or expected cost of reasonable accommodations. Even if designers omitted explicit references to disability, such an AI would subtly emphasize correlations to disability status without providing important context or explanation. By prioritizing quantifiable aspects of disability over those not so easily measured, fair-ML configures and restricts our understanding of and responses to algorithmic bias. While inclusive data collection practices might better capture the contexts disabled people navigate, they would struggle to assign static values to them due to disability’s dynamic and shifting nature. Given that AI designers assign and modify discrete weights to features in their models, algorithms evaluate populations in terms of several snapshots taken at certain times instead of gradually emerging outcomes, they can end up entrenching injustice. For example, hiring AI that select applicants based on similarity to previous employees may not adapt to increases in workplace diversity, thus perpetuating bias. Moreover, since disabilities such as chronic pain, asthma, depression, and so on tend to wax and wane day-by-day or over one’s life, modelling people’s capacities in terms of a single binary dimension imposes artificial fixity.[Footnote9](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#Fn9) One’s performance on a pre-employment assessment cannot be understood in isolation from whether, to give an example, their chronic pain is flaring up that week. It is not just that experiences of disability are inseparable from their contexts, but that disabilities are embodied in shifting ways that cannot be captured by one variable. Although two people might receive diagnoses for the same disability, how they experience that disability and the degree to which it impacts their lives might vary immensely. By removing context and assigning discrete values to disability status, algorithms flatten differences between and within disabled people. The difficulty of operationalizing disability in AI raises similar concerns about membership in other protected classes, many of which also are modelled as binary variables to facilitate de-biasing. Although the sheer multitude of disabilities and historical shifts in their boundaries shed light on the category’s instability, disability is deeply entangled with other aspects of identity. Race, gender, class, and so on intersect and overlap with disability in ways that generate distinct forms of structural discrimination that cannot be reduced to their component parts (Crenshaw, [1991](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR27)). Crucially, intersectionality does not entail that disability is neatly analogous with other identities but that the institutions, structures, and norms shaping them are co-constitutive and mutually reinforcing (Erevelles, [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR32)). Given that fair-ML optimizes for fairness with respect to protected attributes in isolation, it artificially separates intertwined aspects of identity, which disproportionately impacts those at their intersections. For example, research has found that facial recognition algorithms exhibit higher error rates when classifying the faces of darker-skinned women than could be explained by either race or gender alone (Buolamwini & Gebru, [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR16)). Initiatives promoting more inclusive datasets and fair outcomes must reckon with the fact that classifications and the authority to shape them are mediated by discriminatory structures. Indeed, whether one receives legal recognition as disabled is impacted by intersections with these structures, as multiply marginalized disabled people may struggle to secure access to the category itself. For example, given the price of healthcare, the ability to obtain a diagnosis from the medical institutions that AI researchers often collect data from is unevenly distributed. Similarly, certification of disability status is mediated by other biases, such as many physicians’ undue skepticism about women’s experiences of chronic pain (Mingus, [2017](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR64)) and the false belief that black people have an unusually high pain tolerance (Erevelles, [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR32)). Given that intersecting axes of oppression impact one’s ability to claim disability status, the few disabled people officially recognized as such in training datasets seem likely to be disproportionately wealthy, white, and male. Data scientists cannot merely tack disability on to a list of isolated protected classes since their intersections affect who ‘counts’ as disabled. Instead, they should attend to the ways in which subjective decisions and structural hierarchies impact AI design, situating experiences of disability in their context.

### 2AC --- Tech Good

#### Modern technology is unpredictable; we cannot rely on it to “solve” disability

**Schalk 18** (Sami Schalk,Associate Professor in the Department of Gender & Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin – Madison, (2018) *Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women's Speculative Fiction* 105-108 http://library.lol/main/2C8F7A1D8C5F5DC42089719EDD904C24)

Through the origins of hyperempathy, Butler demonstrates how modern technology can have unpredictable effects, particularly technologies applied to human bodyminds. Such a speculative fictional representation is not far from impossible given the incredible rate of prescription drug consumption in contemporary American culture and our increasing interest in genetic testing, selection, and manipulation of embryos. The representation of hyperempathy suggests, in its critical dystopian form, that we cannot know in advance what our widespread cultural use of pharmaceutical treatments, genetic alterations, and other disability-preventing/curing technologies might have on our bodyminds in the long run, let alone on the bodyminds of future generations. Butler’s papers reveal that she planned to extend this theme in the unfinished third book in the series, often referred to as Parable of the Trickster. Drafts, notes, and outlines for this text show Butler was exploring the idea of having an Earthseed community travel to start a new colony on a planet in another solar system. When the community members arrive, people begin to experience different forms of disablement, which vary from draft to draft, including blindness, epilepsy, paralysis, and hallucinations. The idea that she continued to experiment with, based on these 106 Chapter Three drafts, outlines, and notes, was that either the technology used to keep the Earthseed community members alive on the trip, or the toxins in the air of the new habitable planet, caused these changes, and the community must learn to live with their altered bodyminds.12 Butler’s engagement with the effects of technology in the future is not simply limited to (dis)ability, but also has important material intersections with issues of race, gender, and class. When imagining a disability-free future perpetuated by technological advances that will supposedly prevent congenital disability and “fix” or “cure” all acquired disabilities, it is important to ask, who will have access to these advanced medical technologies and who will not? On whose bodyminds will new and experimental drugs and devices be tested? Who will perform the labor to extract raw materials for and construct these new technologies? Who will benefit the most and who will be barred from participation? If the history of medical experimentation such as the Tuskegee experiments or the work of Dr. Marion Sims tells us anything, people of color, women, working-class people, and people in poverty will benefit the least from technological advances and will be most at risk for harm in the development, production, and consumption of new technologies.13 In the Parable series, Butler emphasizes that technology is neither inherently liberatory nor destructive. In a journal entry dated April 23, 1999, Butler writes about this directly, stating, “Technology isn’t good or bad. It’s part of who we are, part of what we do. It’s how we us[e] it is [w]hat matters, of course” (Octavia E. Butler Papers, “oeb 1069”). Technology does not have inherent value; rather, it is how we as a culture use, misuse, and make available technologies that produces technological enhancements and/or harm. Further, the line between enhancement and harm is not always clear—nor are the two mutually exclusive. Enhancement for whom and harm to whom? What kind of enhancement and how much? What kind of harm and how much? As Butler writes, “Consequences may be beneficial or harmful. They may be too slight to matter or they may be worth the risk because the potential benefits are great, but the consequences are always there” (“A Few Rules for Predicting the Future” 166). Technology, the Parable series asserts in the face of the ideal of a technologically created, disability-free future, is an ambivalent cultural tool which is subject to both use and abuse, availability and unavailability, and a variety of unintended consequences. Hyperempathy is used as a primary example of this position on technology. As a result, Butler encourages readers to un- Bodyminds of the Future 107 derstand that one’s critical position in relation to technology need not be either purely celebratory or, in Melzer’s words, “paranoid rejection” (“And How Many Souls Do You Have?’” 177). Instead, we can evaluate particular technologies within specific contexts of creation and use. We can do so in solidarity with people with disabilities, people of color, the working class, the poor, and others who are more likely to participate in the creation and testing of such technologies while being less likely to be the beneficiaries of the results of such developments. Butler’s published and unpublished writings argue that technology guarantees neither a disability-free future nor any other supposedly desired outcome since we cannot predict its longterm effects, especially when it comes to biomedical technology. In particular, the Parable series demonstrates how marginalized groups, especially people of color and the poor, are less likely to have access to healing/curing technologies and are much more likely to be the targets of destructive technologies of violence and war. The suggestion that we cannot know in advance what our impulse toward a technologically created, disability-free future might lead to may seem problematically foreboding because it potentially suggests that the problem of disability-prevention technologies is that they might simply create more disability. However, the second way that the representation of hyperempathy resists our cultural idealization of a technologically created, disabilityfree future is through the representation of disability-related pleasure. Butler’s creation of hyperempathy insists on pleasure as an inherent aspect of the experience of this disability, a type of pleasure that nonsharers can never experience. For example, Lauren states that when having sex, “I get the guy’s good feeling and my own” (Parable of the Sower 12). During her early travels with her friends Harry and Zahra, Lauren also shares their pleasure when they have sex near her during their watch, writing, “I got caught up in their lovemaking. I couldn’t escape their sensation” (200). Later, when she meets Bankole, Lauren again discusses sharing pleasure in sex, explaining, “Best of all, he took a lot of uncomplicated pleasure in my body, and I got to share it with him. It isn’t often that I can enjoy the good side of my hyperempathy. I let the sensation take over, intense and wild” (266). While these moments of Lauren’s shared pleasure are few in comparison to the many representations of shared pain, they are incredibly important to Butler’s representation of disability in the future. The representation of disability-related pleasure in the Parable series shifts the ableist ways in which our culture typically understands disabled bodyminds as both nonsexual and as always more difficult and limiting than nondisabled bodyminds. Importantly, Butler does this without making Lauren come across as magical or as the perpetually overcoming, superpowered supercrip.14

# Neg

## Case

### 1NC --- Presumption

**Alt can’t change society’s worldview and only marginalizes material experiences**

**Vehmas & Watson 13** (Simo Vehmas & Nick Watson, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, p. 648-649)

Further, deconstructing differences will not in and of itself produce respect and equality between all people with various characteristics. Neither will it result in a social order free from a sense of difference. It is simply unrealistic to assume that a society could exist were people would not see some other people as different, and their lives or characteristics as representing a deviation from some norm considered important regarding good human life. This is because some of the individual characteristics that define disabled people are, sometimes with good reason, undesirable, even in a utopia where all differences would have been queered. **Disability is not the same** as many other group identities and we need to explore both morally and socially disability and difference rather than simply use difference as a concept through which to critique the disability identity. There are no rational reasons to consider homosexuality or gender undesirable characteristics whatever the social context, but there are many impairments that can reasonably be seen as undesirable (Shakespeare 2006). Motor neuron disease, depression or spinal cord injury are the kinds of conditions that we would prefer not to have, and this is not merely because of the cultural representations attached to them but because **these conditions are the kinds of predicaments that cause suffering irrespective of one’s cultural environment.** In acknowledging that impairments can include an undesirable dimension **does not imply devaluing people with impairments** nor their positive group identity (Shakespeare and Watson 2010). As long as people are genuinely free to decide for themselves and feel about themselves however they wish to feel, we are pretty close to relational justice, free from hierarchical evils. Imposing on people ableist or disablist assumptions is certainly wrong, but so would be the denial of the personal experiences of fearing the loss of one’s physical and mental capacities, or the fear of dying (Carel 2008). To explain the psychological anguish related to conditions such as motor neurone disease or depression merely in terms of internalized oppression and ableism would be insensitive, disrespectful and simply nonsensical.

### 1NC --- Cyborg Bad

#### Cyborg theorizing is rooted in ableist and Anti-Black logics that ensure it’s failure.

**Knadler 19 -**  ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac<http://library.lol/main/D8D265377A8F7623EB4F5A75223D22AB>) Dōgen

What I am also unwilling to take with the theory of assemblage is the freighted territory of the cyborg: the feminist materialist theory of becoming developed by Donna Haraway that combines human, animal, and machine as a radical political enterprise that ushers in the future both theoretically and practically. I have found it useful as a thought exercise that complicates the relationship of the body to itself and to others and deals with our very real reliance on machines and kinship with animals. Since the cyborg opens up the conversation about futurity—which usually elides madness and Blackness—it also becomes a useful space to consider who we are becoming.60 Certainly, to think through our kinship with machines is apropos for discussions of disability given the medicalization of certain bodies, and remains so given my emphasis on speculative fiction. But the cyborg is an incomplete, politically fraught, and ethically suspicious answer to a series of questions about raced and disabled futurity. Material reality must reckon with what others have pointed out are the lived experiences of the Black and disabled body, what amount to (in this project, at least) the gaps and folds within Black speculative fiction. Read in alignment with Tobin Siebers’s theory of complex embodiment and Alison Kafer’s questioning of spatial, cultural, and temporal logics, the emphasis on the cyborg and the desire to supersede the body has an antagonistic relationship with concerns at the heart of disability studies: pain, fiscal access, and the validity of embodied experience, to name a few.61 What happens when one does not desire cyborgian intervention as cure? What of those for whom material cyborgian realities are more painful than useful or pleasurable? As much as cyborgian futures promise a radical set of possibilities for considering disability, we ought to be wary of them because they are also reliant on a set of middleclass (or rich) realities. I have elsewhere pointed out the way the cyborg’s promise of radical potential hinges on an original white Western subject.62 Leaning on Donna Haraway’s original definition, João Costa Vargas and Joy A. James understand the Black cyborg as a postbellum construction that requires Black degradation: “A Black cyborg: a modified, improved human whose increased ethical, spiritual, and physical capabilities generate unusual strength, omniscience, and boundless love.”63 They invoke Haraway’s understanding of the cyborg as both real and fictive to pinpoint how the Black cyborg relies on a set of interracial dynamics that extend from a history steeped in anti-Blackness. The Black cyborg is required to participate in its own self abnegation since it is built on top of the foundations of American democratic and imperial projects reliant on phobic understandings of Blackness. The Black cyborg, then, in Vargas and James’s formulation, echoes that of the disabled cyborg: neither can escape the desire for normalcy that erases Blackness and madness both. Alison Kafer reads in the gaps of Haraway’s work and its intellectual genealogy to reinsert the oft-overlooked contributions of women of color—among them Octavia E. Butler and Chela Sandoval—to the definition of the cyborg. She pinpoints that the cyborg as transgressive figure has limited potential precisely because of how it has been developed and mobilized in ways that erase women of color and reify the virgule between disabled and able-bodied. Though the cyborg asks for blasphemous interpretation—a promise and proposition Kafer, Vargas, and James readily champion—as part of its political transgression, I question how much the cyborg can map a future of any kind when it relies on a past and path of erasure. What the cyborg ushers in—that I’d prefer to leave aside for this discussion—is an assemblage yoked to anti-Blackness and ableism, a method of becoming that requires theoretical overcoming since the theories rely on but refuse disabled and Black embodiment.

#### The Aff is an ableist cyborg hoax

Ellcessor 16 (Elizabeth Ellcessor is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia, “Cyborg hoaxes: Disability, deception, and critical studies of digital media”, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1461444816642754>, 4/19/16, Buck)

Cyborg hoaxes, deceptive forms of identity presentation that articulate gender, disability, and technology, have been persistent but unremarked upon elements of online culture. By identifying, contextualizing, and deconstructing them, this article has highlighted the persistence of an ideology of ability in online culture and in cyberculture and Internet studies. An ideology of ability is at work in the pitiable presentation of a digital sweet innocent and in the excuses offered by cancer. Identifying these themes reveals that online cultures remain closely connected to larger ideologies and norms. Far from offering a “liberation technology” (Coombs, 1991), online spaces may reproduce and amplify the prejudices and normative assumptions of a broader cultural context. These deceptive assemblages deploy disability strategically for an able-bodied audience, taking advantage of existing hierarchies. Yet, they may also challenge the very ideologies upon which they depend. For instance, the prominence of romance and sexuality in these hoaxes counters very real tendencies to desexualize people with disabilities. Such contradictions, and the blurring of identity and technology, are indicative of the “cyborg” component of these hoaxes. While I retained this language in order to highlight the possibility of such provocations, it is in the experiences of people with disabilities using online media that a richer form of cyborg can be found. These experiences reflect a variety of possible linkages of gender and sexuality, disability, and technology. In these formations, people with disabilities can be understood “as cyborgs not because of [their] bodies (e.g. our use of prosthetics, ventilators, or attendants), but because of [their] political practices” (Kafer, 2013: 120). In claiming disability identity and engaging in community formation, by reconfiguring default settings of computer hardware and software, and by speaking back to dominant narratives of disability and gender, these individuals and communities are producing disability technocultures that are seditious and, too often, invisible. Disability is a necessary and theoretically rich addition to the forms of identity, community, and material technology that have dominated critical and cultural studies of digital media. Present since the earliest cyberculture work, but rendered invisible or metaphorical, disability offers important critical resources for the nuanced and complex study of the digital networked media that increasingly permeate daily life. Not a metaphor, and not invisible, but ever-present and meaningful, disability offers a lens through which to examine theoretical assumptions and exclusions and with which to critically interrogate normative forms of digital media and the ideological structures that maintain and challenge them.

### 1NC --- Liberalism

**Even if political liberalism currently excludes the disabled, discussing questions of implementation can revise it**

**Badano 13** (Gabriele – PhD candidate at the Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health at University College London – “Political liberalism and the justice claims of the disabled: a reconciliation,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, April 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/tHKkbrxhGYIWAxTcJrAW/full#.UxyV-PldX-4)

I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net beneﬁt to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple carers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a beneﬁt to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, **should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities?** An afﬁrmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else. In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial **revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with** our intuitions concerning **what is due to the disabled.** 5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: **why should we uphold** the project of **political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model** that more neatly ﬁts with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled**?** First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism. Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, **political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities.** This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive beneﬁts that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to ﬁt a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights.

### 1NC --- State Good

#### The bidirectionality of this topic allows for state action for info sharing which resolves the securitization of collective trauma that caused the War on drugs, terror, and poverty

Jonathon P. **Whooley 21** [San Francisco State University, International Relations, Ontological (In)visibility and Cyber Conflict: The Problem of Sight and Vision in Establishing Threat, Global, Local, Political 2021, Vol. 46(2) 47–51, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/03043754211024583?journalCode=alta>, -ekh-]

International Relations (IR) is a field of vision. Elements traditional to IR like nuclear deterrence, armed conflict, terrorism, or great power balancing, all require states to interpret the behavior and posture of other actors to define the menu of options that are available to them. Ontological security theorists in general agree with this position, arguing that feelings and interpretations of their security are required for states to understand their position in relation to others in the international system. Thus, a state’s identity is defined as much by its relationship and feeling of threat toward and among other states. But what happens if the linchpin of defining a state’s security is covert, what if the mechanisms by which a state understands its security standing is accomplished not in the light, but rather in the shadows, around computer networks, non-state actors, disinformation campaigns, hacking, and at least for democratic states like the US through electoral manipulation?

At a recent conference panel with intelligent scholars of various stripe I was asked ‘when was the last cyber attack?’ They noted the presence of Stuxnet (a US-Israeli produced computer virus targeting the Iranian nuclear refining infrastructure at the Natanz plant) but hinted in confusion that there had not been much since. And my colleague was not alone, polling on the threat of cyber-attack routinely finds that these actions among the lowest of concerns for most Americans,1 The problem inherent in the disconnect between the assumptions of my informed colleagues and the reality of the cyber landscape is vision and sight. Cyberthreats often fall in between and within the context of our blindspots, hackers and non-state actors use the fact that much of what they do, be it malware or ransomware toward a hospital, misinformation or disinformation online, or direct attacks on networks or individuals, all too often are relegated to page A7 instead of the front page and largely away from public vision. However, if say, a series of bombs were exploded paralyzing the financial sector of a major American city the focus would immediately be apprehended and the eyeballs of many Americans would be glued to said attack.

This approach is both normative and theoretical in that it is directed at a central question: why do people misconstrue or fail to take seriously cyber threats? We argue that for democracies to thrive with well-informed voters making decisions in their elections and transmit their policy preferences to their elected leaders. But this requires the referential Self to effectively understand and develop their own identities relative to the national or effective assessments of threat must be possible. Placing OST in the conversation helps us to organize how publics conceive of their security and organize it into preferential voting behaviors. This folds in notions of threat and visibility, as well as the presumption that to properly ascertain how threatening an action may be is entirely relative to the perception that the problem is something tractable enough to apprehend, and cognizable enough to properly fold into an existing structuration of concern. Voters in an overwhelming information environment may fail to properly aggregate potential threats to their governments or persons, but this does not mean those threats do not exists. It only means we (as the public) may fail to properly tabulate and understand how those threats relate to our lived experience.

Ontological security theory as a set of practical and empirical assumptions about state and individual behavior is an important tool for heuristically constructing how preferences are sorted in an atmosphere of threat and contestation. Huysmans’s (1998) study is particularly important for this work because it situates how states come to view internal/external others as threats to the self/identity both in terms of space and vision. Because, as Huysmans argues, OST is founded upon relational security practices and the ability to perceive which are and are not manifest security threats is hotly in contention and is driven “by ‘securitizing’ the unknown into an identifiable threat” (Steele, 2017). The unknown in this case can be typified, though not flippantly, by the “half a billion cyber security breaches in first semester of 2014” (Oltramari et al., 2014) or the “16,555 vulnerabilities between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018” (Syed, 2020). This picture of the cyber horizon is made even more chaotic when one recognizes that “65% of the victims of intrusion and information theft in the private sector are notified by third parties and that the detection process usually takes up to 13 months” (quoted in Syed, 2020).

To effectively evaluate threat in the realm of cyber security means being able to effectively adjudicate how and where threats occur. For Huysmans (1998) in the practical realm of OST, this means identifying the other or securitizing the problematic party. For those in the cyber security community (computer scientists, data systems managers, and cyber security analysts) this means creating a common language to describe threats and to properly allocate culpability. They describe the problem as “cognizance” or the ability to create a “reliable perception of the elements of the environment and…the explicit representation of their semantics” (Syed, 2020, p. 54). The promotion of a shared conceptualization of chaotic and often covert threat attempts to, “shape that chaos into a framework of meaningful chunks of knowledge, turning the operational disarray into a systematic model” that gives practitioners and theorists purchase on dealing with cyber threats. To understand cyber is to adapt or adopt a common language to create a landscape of cyberthreats. Thus, the realm of threat is not hard to understand as even those closest to the problem are aware that lacking a basic knowledge of common elements has created chaos. How then are normal people meant to understand the cyber realm as a position of threat?

In this regard Kinvall’s work is helpful because it organizes the terminology and language of threat around a common source of loss. For example, the election hacking and disinformation around the 2020 election. Kinvall employed the use of ‘chosen traumas’ from (Volkan 1998) which are folded into broader group identities. Defined from here as the “collective memory of a calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors” (Volkan 1998). Securitizing the Self, here it seems’ requires a collective trauma, which in the realm of terrorism is easily understood. The terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, as well as the tragedy of Flight 93, on September 11, 2001 for example provided a necessary site for collective trauma and the torture (Steele, 2017) and then the Global War on Terror emerged as a result (Updegraff et al., 2008). The role of this trauma in creating the permission structure for conflict and bloodletting is manifest in the recent history of American Foreign Policy (Resende and Budryte, 2013). This, as opposed to say election hacking, or the sheer volume of cyber threats and conflicts as noted above, defies the mind to create known or unknown enemies precisely because vision is deterred and the necessary creation around anxiety is upended. Political life and the establishment of norms and routines around threat is dynamic and shifting, even as the human drive for certainty remains (Onuf, 1998). Societies are driven by a sense that a coherent picture of personal security is possible and preferable even if the notion of how that world outside is created is problematic and fractured. As researchers we desire things as well, including, a “coherent Self” (Steele, 2017) but paradoxically these may be those that are most capable and likely to commit acts of violence (Steele, 2017). Again, though, this requires a construction of the Self relative to a manifest threat and a creation of a sphere of safety around a perceived possible security or insecurity. Krahmann argues that just such a security sphere exists in the marketing of cyber-security to European Union (EU) communities. The promotion by the state of anxieties around threat first appears in notion of terrorism and migration in the EU. But migrates, one might feel, inevitably, to the realm of cyber security. Krahmann argues that while “Fear can be addressed by eliminating a threat, anxiety cannot” (2018: 358).

This is precisely the problem: anxiety without vision is lost on voters and policymakers not directly focused on the issue of cybersecurity. Because the cyber realm is largely opaque to the outside world and because individuals, corporations, public utilities, hospitals, or governments who suffer from cyber attacks often hide these attacks out of shame, embarrassment, or for security concerns no trauma is effectively transmitted and thus no concerted popular response is generated. This piece is not opining for another global war on terror, nor is it seeking some sight of popular trauma to serve as a benchmark for the dangers of cyber warfare, what it is fundamentally concerned about is the dramatic uptick in cyberattacks (the Russian attack on the Ukrainian2 and Georgian3 power grids, the ongoing Solar Winds hacks4 , the Russian theft of State Department emails5 , or the constant barrage of Chinese attempts to obtain intellectual property6 ) and the failure of the public to cognize that there are no redlines in cyber.

Other than the ICANN framework7 which is at this point not codified into international law or recognized by the UN, there are no established rules of the road, proportionate responses in terms of Just War Theory, or mitigative efforts short of backroom diplomacy. What a just response to an attack on a power grid or to the targeting of nuclear enrichment is often made on the fly among a close network of parties in the know, without the overview of policy makers or voters. This is a highly combustible situation, and it is made all the more dangerous by the potential for miscalculations, made broadly out of the view of the voting public, to result in magnified or outsized results.

### 2NC --- State Good

#### State action can be good for people with disabilities – ADA proves

Mckeever 20 (Amy Mckeever, JULY 30, 2020, "How the Americans with Disabilities Act transformed a country," History, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/americans-disabilities-act-transformed-united-states> ) //RB

More than 2,000 disability rights advocates gathered on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C., on a hot summer day. It was July 26, 1990, and they’d come together to witness one of the most momentous civil rights victories in decades: President George H.W. Bush signing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) into law.

During the signing ceremony—days after the Fourth of July—Bush admitted that the United States hadn’t always lived up to its founding principles of freedom and equality. “[T]ragically, for too many Americans, the blessings of liberty have been limited or even denied,” he said. “Today’s legislation brings us closer to that day when no Americans will ever again be deprived of their basic guarantee of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

The ADA not only provided comprehensive civil rights protections for people with disabilities for the first time in the nation’s history, but it also marked a sea change in the nation’s attitudes toward disability rights. Here’s how the landmark statute came to be, and how it transformed the country.

The disability rights movement gains steam

Throughout history, people with disabilities were feared and ridiculed for their perceived defects and pushed to the margins of society. By the 1960s, that discrimination had been codified. People with disabilities were excluded from public schools, involuntarily sterilized, sent to live in state-run institutions, and even denied the right to vote. Some U.S. municipalities even had so-called “ugly laws” prohibiting people with “unsightly or disgusting” deformities in public places. It was a world designed not to include people with disabilities. Government buildings and private businesses alike lacked ramps and elevators, while public transportation rarely provided accommodations for people with mobility or visual impairments. Having a disability was considered a medical problem to be solved rather than an identity to be protected under non-discrimination laws. But things began to change in the 1970s. Inspired by the civil rights movement of the 1960s, disability rights advocates became more vocal in their demands that their rights ought to be guaranteed as well. Disability had also become more noticeable as wars in Vietnam and Korea returned thousands of soldiers with lasting injuries. In 1973, advocates won the passage of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibited programs receiving federal funding from discriminating against people with disabilities. It was the first piece of legislation to use the term “discrimination” to describe the limitations that these Americans face.

For the law to go into effect, the government would have to issue regulations defining who qualifies as a person with a disability and what constitutes discrimination in the disability context. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare put off issuing those regulations for four years as they wrestled over the terms. Impatient with the delay—and worried it meant the regulations would be weakened—advocates organized protests around the country. In April 1977 they launched a sit-in at a federal building in San Francisco that would last for 28 days—the longest peaceful occupation of a federal building in U.S. history—and result in victory.

The need for a comprehensive civil rights law

With Section 504, the American public began to understand that making accommodations for people with disabilities was a civil right rather than a welfare benefit. It also galvanized a growing disability rights movement that won several other important victories in the 1970s and 1980s—including legislation that guaranteed a free public education to children with impairments and prohibited housing discrimination on the basis of disabilities. Yet discrimination persisted. In 1979, the Supreme Court ruled that the nursing school at Southeastern Community College in Whiteville, North Carolina, was not required by Section 504 to accommodate a hearing-impaired applicant. In other circumstances, regulations were simply not well enforced. For example, transit authorities were left to decide for themselves how accessible they needed to be. (A skull discovered in Spain suggests that early humans cared for disabled children.) In the mid-1980s, advocates came to the conclusion that the critical next step was to push for comprehensive civil rights legislation for people with disabilities. The National Council on Disability commissioned a report on the need for such a law, while its vice chair Justin Dart—who would later become known as the “Godfather of the ADA”—embarked on a national tour to discuss disability policy with local officials and gather stories of the discrimination people with disabilities faced. These advocacy efforts made an impression on both sides of the political aisle. Disability rights had become a bipartisan issue thanks to years of changing public perceptions. In 1988, Senators Lowell Weicker, a Republican from Connecticut, and Tom Harkin, a Democrat from Iowa, introduced the Americans with Disabilities Act. After years of revisions, amendments, and negotiations, the bill was passed, and on that July day Bush—who had made civil rights legislation for people with disabilities a campaign promise in 1988—signed it into law with Dart by his side.

Why the ADA matters

The Americans with Disabilities Act was a sweeping piece of legislation that banned discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunication. It finally afforded people with disabilities the same protections that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had provided on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.

"It is the world’s first declaration of equality for people with disabilities," Dart wrote after the ADA was passed. "It will proclaim to America and to the world that people with disabilities are fully human; that paternalistic, discriminatory, segregationist attitudes are no longer acceptable; and that henceforth people with disabilities must be accorded the same personal respect and the same social and economic opportunities as other people."

The ADA launched the process of building a more accessible world by ensuring that buildings, schools, and public spaces were equipped with ramps, elevators, and curb cuts. It made travel easier by requiring operators to make accommodations, such as offering wheelchair lifts, airport shuttle service, and rental cars with hand controls. It also led to the rise of interpreters and closed captioning in public communications. (These five coastal areas have made accessibility a priority.)

After a tragic accident ended her dance career, Kitty Lunn taught herself how to dance again in her wheelchair. Today, Lunn empowers her students to "dance in the body you have" in this film by Qingzi Fan. The Short Film Showcase spotlights exceptional short videos create...Read More

Crucially, this legislation has also become a model for lawmakers and activists around the world seeking to end discrimination against people with disabilities in their countries. Since 2000, more than 180 countries have passed legislation inspired by the ADA. The law is limited, however. The ADA has been criticized for failing to increase employment among people with disabilities—only 19 percent are in the workforce today compared with 66 percent of those without disabilities. People with disabilities are still disenfranchised. Accommodations at polling places across the nation are inadequate; in 2016, a government report found that 60 percent of the polling places it examined had one or more potential impediments, such as ramps that were dangerously steep or paths in poor condition. Meanwhile, 39 states and Washington, D.C., have incompetence laws that allow judges to strip the vote from people they deem incapable of participating in the democratic process, such as people with mental impairments. Stigma and discrimination persist throughout society too. The ADA may not be perfect, but as Dart wrote in 1990, it “is only the beginning. It is not a solution. Rather, it is an essential foundation on which solutions will be constructed.”

### 1NC --- Progress

#### The aff’s theory is contingent on institutions and their engagement with language in debate can’t achive any success. Only political engagement can solve.

**Brock 22** – Brian Brock holds a personal Chair in Moral and Practical Theology. He joined the University of Aberdeen in 2004, following postdoctoral studies at the Friedrich Alexander University Erlangen-Nurnberg and a doctorate in Christian ethics at King's College London. (Brian Brock, “On the limits of justice as eradicating ‘isms’”, Taylor and Francis Online, 23 Feb 2022, Vol. 22, Issue: 1, pgs. 75-85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2022.2038017>) || PZ

\*\*Edited for language\*\*

Are all biases equal? What is more idolatrous than ableism? Just as racism is a set of cultural attitudes and sociopolitical structures that privilege the dominant race over ethnic minorities, and just as sexism is a similar set of cultural presuppositions and sociopolitical structures that perpetuate male domination over women, so ableism names the discriminatory attitudes, negative stereotypes, and sociopolitical and economic structures and institutions that together function to exclude people with disabilities from full participation in society. Ableism thus identifies the normate bigotry, evaluative chauvinism, and structural injustice that people with disabilities have to endure at the hands of the dominant (read: nondisabled) culture.[1](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1474225X.2022.2038017) With this articulation of the injustices suffered by people with disabilities, the Pentecostal disability theologian Amos Yong channels the zeitgeist, a widely shared sensibility about how equality is to be achieved. The contemporary version of this Enlightenment quest to achieve justice – understood as universal equality – takes the form of a hunt to root out all pernicious -isms: not only racism, ableism, evaluative chauvinism but also patriarchalism, heterosexism and gender essentialism. Put in the terms of this special issue, it is almost universally assumed in the modern democratic liberal space that when we (late-modern westerners) ask whether disability is a ‘driving force for change,’ we understand change as a process progressive of eliminating injustices. This paper probes the limits and blind spots of moral change so defined in order to raise one theological note of caution. Understanding moral change in progressivist terms carries a momentum – psychological and linguistically embedded – that that can carry the moral drive for justice into a superficial and so problematic policing of language that can become unmoored from the more concrete work of investigating the mechanics of specific forms of lived justice. It is important to ask whether it is possible that well-meaning quests for justice can take forms that are idolatrous because they in fact excuse people from making real and costly concrete ventures to serve lived, actual justice. When Yong highlights ableism as idolatrous, he rightly draws attention to an important set of injustices, and in a way that makes common cause with people of all faiths and none who find ableism morally repugnant. The question I want to ask is whether saying something is idolatry (a theological description) is wholly equivalent to saying that it is a pernicious ‘ism’ (a linguistic and moral description). This distinction matters because one fights idolatry primarily by confession and repentance, whereas the common liberal understanding is that one fights bias and prejudice by education and institutional reform. Yong holds these two sorts of response together by marrying idolatry and ableism, but it may be that the list of aspects of ableism that he lists (‘discriminatory attitudes, negative stereotypes, and sociopolitical and economic structures and institutions’) are very differently understood if taken to be signs of worship of a false power rather than as institutional structures and mental attitudes which make life harder for some people than others. There may well be forms of being educated about discrimination which exacerbate the spiritual pride that assumes people do not really need to change. If so, it is important to ask what is lost if we simply equate the very different descriptive registers of idolatry and discrimination. These questions matter if the final aim of justice is effective social change. It is dangerous to assume that linguistic change alone can do this, a claim Yong would certainly reject. No one should doubt that we often find our way to real injustices by querying the behaviour of people who speak disparagingly of others, in this case, those with disabilities. Yet it is crucial not to lose the question of how successful or unsuccessful the work of rooting out discriminatory linguistic expressions has been in achieving changes to unjust practices on the ground. There are very practical differences in what it takes to combat ‘discriminatory attitudes and negative stereotypes’ in contrast to changing ‘sociopolitical and economic structures and institutions.’ If we call both sorts of work ‘combatting ableism’ we are lumping together very different sorts of activity, from the crafting of policy, to the analysis of cultural tropes to the revising of formulaic public speech to the investigation of people’s own identity structures. Distinguishing idolatry and discrimination Distinguishing between idolatry and discrimination matters because real change demands self-examination and repentance. It also demands personal investment in a very different sort of work, sociological research, policy formulation, legal clarification, engagement in the political process, forging alliances between different power blocks, and so on. It will always be tempting to reduce one’s investment in fighting injustice to the easiest of all these activities, the policing of language. What is dangerous about this narrowing of the quest for change to linguistic policing alone is that it can push some forms of injustice underground and so entrench them. It is fair to call the drift into linguistic policing alone intellectually ~~lazy~~ because it foregoes the hard and necessarily constant work of asking what is actually happening on the ground, what is the real injustice people are suffering right now, and what we might concretely do about it if we are serious about bringing about a genuinely more just society? The modern liberal quest to root out -isms can sometimes proceed in ways that make it difficult to see if these investigative questions are being seriously asked. Language policing undermines its own moral authority if this more concrete and fine-grained analysis is not obviously being pursued. For example, since the police killing of George Floyd in 2020 there has been an exponential rise in interest in rooting out racial bias among American white liberals. Yet despite this increase in intellectual comprehension of the implications of white privilege, those who think of themselves as white might still buy houses in places where they know racism gives them an unfair economic advantage, not challenge racism among family members and find reasons to resist sharing schools. Given the structural inequalities involved in racism and the personal costs of remaking these infrastructural barriers, crafting a ‘woke’ online profile and voting for progressive causes may seem like a reasonable and low-cost way of being an ally of victims of racial injustice while in fact being one of the more stable ways that racism is perpetuated.[2](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1474225X.2022.2038017) As early as 1965 Martin Luther King himself had highlighted this dynamic in the American populace. The ‘silence of friends’ he pointed out, is a longstanding feature of American racism, and is held in place as the majority of enlightened liberals denounce racism elsewhere but explain it away in their own back yards, where admitting it would demand costly change. As he put it in 1967: ‘most whites in America, including many of goodwill, proceed from the premise that equality is a loose expression for improvement. White America is not even psychologically organized to close the gap – essentially, it seeks only to make it less painful and less obvious but in most respects retain it.’[3](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1474225X.2022.2038017) Stated philosophically: the danger of calling a concrete injustice, against disabled people, for instance, an ‘ism’ – in this case, ableism, is to insinuate that the basic motor of justice is our work of classifying new sets of language and thought as pernicious -isms. The illusion is that moral change in society is essentially driven by the reclassification of specific acts from being morally neutral, to being morally problematic. Once something has been labelled a problematic -ism it is then subsumed within a general class of illiberal -isms that those who want to achieve a just society must now fight to eradicate or defend themselves from accusations of being morally suspect. But as the case of racism makes clear, this linguistic reclassification can blind us to our own culpability if we are not able to name concrete ways in which we are participants in ableism. Those who have become content to denounce unjust -isms can often be spotted by the ease with which they compare and implicitly equate injustices. People who have developed the habit of verbally denouncing unjust -isms often find it hard to explain the details of concrete injustices. There is a symmetry between the equation of injustices and the superficiality of one’s emotional and intellectual engagement with them. For instance: are the indubitable injustices associated with the labels racism and ableism in fact morally or phenomenologically equivalent? There are a wide range of questions that would need to be asked here to even begin to answer the question of what it would mean to stamp out these two -isms. Is the racism of one society equivalent to that of all others? In a society that had chattel slavery in living memory, should we prioritise the fight to eradicate racism, or should we acknowledge that disabled people have been disparaged and mocked for most of human history, and so deserve to receive priority in formulating our campaigns for justice and our calls for better social policies? Should we even ask whether some injustices are more severe than others? If we cannot ask this question, how will we focus our efforts in fighting injustice? I am not taking a position on any of these questions, but raise them in order to highlight how the classing of all injustices under labels that appear to set injustices in a single conceptual cluster may produce false equivalences that make it difficult to investigate and admit morally important differences between disparaging language and actually enacted injustices.

### 1NC --- Reform

**Abstract critique keeps us from forefronting political reform**

**Ruckelshaus 17** (Jay, Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, "The Non-Politics of Disability”, 1/18/17, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)

Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, **rather than politically structured injustices**. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. **We must politicize disability** — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? **How do we even define “disability”?** Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics. But politics need not be repulsive. That’s the beauty of Mouffe’s agonism: By legitimating clashing arguments and welcoming them into the political fold, unproductive antagonism becomes constructive, and compromises emerge.

### 2NC --- Reform

##### **Disability must be politicized---this is the only way to secure collective rights---the retreat from politics reifies ableist tropes of charity politics and naively tries to wish problems away**

Ruckelshaus 17, (Jay Ruckelshaus is a Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, The Non-Politics of Disability, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)

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### 2NC --- A2: Mollow

#### **The aff cannot solve – violence against the disabled is inevitable and attempting to reconcile creates more violence**

Mollow, 15 [Anna Mollow, University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D. in English, Tufts University; B.A. in English & French, Minor in Women’s Studies, has written countless books in disability studies, Spring 2015, Berkeley, “The Disability Drive” -ekh- + jmk]

Afterword: Done with the Drive?

Four years into writing about the disability drive, and three days before this dissertation is due, I have a thought: maybe it’s time to be done with the drive. That thought, of course, contradicts everything I have written in this thesis: one does not get done with the drive, check it off a to-do list, and go on to do other things. The disability drive is unmasterable; it is a force that cannot be overcome. Much as one might want to be done with the drive, the drive, it seems, is never done undoing us. Worse (or perhaps better), although we may say that we want the disability drive to stop its self-rupturings, the very notion of “wanting” is fundamentally destabilized by the drive, a compulsion that pushes us beyond pleasure and beyond desire, forcing us to wonder exactly what those concepts mean. The drive goes, does, and undoes. Recall the words of Jacques Alain Miller: “The drive…always has its keys in hand.” This line stays with me; whenever I drop something (for example, my keys), it repeats in my mind.

Always with its keys in hand, the drive pushes this project to go further. Among the most pressing questions now driving my inquiry are Jewish ones. In the previous chapter, I critiqued the ways in which Freud‟s developmental model of sexuality, reliant upon the theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, reinforces racialized social hierarchies. Yet we can’t label Freud as racist—or even dub him a “dead white European man”—and leave it at that. For in the context of the early twentieth century, Freud was not exactly European, and he was not exactly white. In the preface to the Hebrew translation of Totem and Taboo, Freud‟s anthropological analysis of people to whom he refers as “savages,” Freud distances himself from his Jewishness (noting his ignorance of “the language of holy writ” and his estrangement from “the religion of his fathers”) but nevertheless emphasizes that he “has yet never repudiated his people” (4, xxxi). Avowing that he “feels that he is in his essential nature a Jew,” Freud writes that he “has no desire to alter that nature” (xxxi). What is this essential nature? Freud cannot express the essence of Jewishness “clearly in words; but some day, no doubt, it will become accessible to the scientific mind” (xxxi).

Freud made these remarks in December of 1930, an era in which so-called scientific minds were attempting to pin down, and to eradicate, whatever that essence of being a Jew might be. Before the end of that decade, the Nazi invasion of Austria forced Freud to flee Vienna; he spent the final year of his life in London. Although Freud could not have known about the genocide to come, the threat of anti-Semitic violence forms a crucial part of the historical context in which he developed his concept of the death drive. “A Jew awaiting a pogrom”: that haunting line in Civilization and Its Discontents, a text published in 1933, is offered by Freud as an example of the impossibility of imagining what it is like to endure extreme suffering (62). The image is quickly left behind (“It seems to me unprofitable to pursue this aspect of the problem any further,” Freud writes), but it invokes questions that keep coming. Most saliently: why? “The Disability Drive” has perhaps taken us in the direction of this impossible question. My project’s central claim is that repressing the drive leads to violence. Hostility toward disabled people, women, fat people, racialized others, poor and working-class people, and queers has been the focus of my analysis. My future work will take these inquiries further, asking about the drive’s relation to systemic racial violence.

In doing so, I will ask: when the drive, as repressed, keeps returning, what does this do? As we saw in Chapter 1, Freud raised this question at the beginning of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Why, he wondered, did traumatized soldiers repeatedly return to the scenes of violence that had made them ill? Building on Freud’s theorization of the drive as an aspect of the psyche that may help the organism sustain trauma, I will ask whether theorizing the disability drive as a way of living through, or with, trauma might lead to deeper understandings of lived experiences of, and social reactions to, mental and physical disabilities that are brought on by trauma.

What connections exist between trauma and tragedy? In Chapter 2, I argued that disability scholars might productively reclaim the trope of “the tragedy of disability.” This phrase, I suggested, calls up not only the colloquial signification of tragedy (as devastating loss or pointless suffering) but also the term‟s generic denotation. Further exploring the relation between the disability drive and the genre of tragedy will open up questions about the status of literature in cultural analyses of the disability drive. I have performed literary readings in this dissertation because the drive, an unrepresentable force, can come to us only by means of the figural. For this reason, literary texts provide particularly rich sources for theorizing the complexities and the obliquities of the drive. But at the same time, I have sought to destabilize binaries between literary and nonliterary texts. By highlighting Freud‟s linguistic choices in his medical case history Dora; by analyzing Charles Dickens‟s and Lee Edelman‟s respective portrayals of the character of Tiny Tim as both literary and political productions; and by juxtaposing Freud‟s model of sexual development, Jane Austen‟s depictions of fatness and eating, and contemporary US American culture‟s citations of the figure of the compulsive eater, I have drawn attention to the ways in which the literary and the ideological structure, and are structured by, each other. In doing so, my intention has not been to use the political to master the literary, or to employ the literary to exert control over the political; instead, I have hoped to provoke and sustain potentially jarring confrontations between the two.

Such confrontations can produce experiences of epistemological disablement, rendering readers of cultural texts uncertain as to what counts as literature, what counts as politics, and to what extent such divides can be upheld. As we discussed in Chapter 1, epistemological disablement can be an effect of coming into contact with the disability drive. Stimulating uncertainties and doubts, the disability drive may disable us all; yet this ubiquitous psychic disablement also specifically evokes particular aspects of many disabled people‟s lived experiences. Disabled people live ongoing contradictions between our embodied realities and the structure of overcoming narratives, stories that are presented to us not as fictions but as normative prescriptions. We feel the effects of the drive when we suffer the breakages and breakdowns that occur when bodymind and overcoming narrative (the weight loss diet, the getting better with exercise and meditation, or even the claiming of a proud disability consciousness) clash and contradict—and when, for worse or for better, some parts of our selves like these crashes. In Chapter 2, I said that sometimes, despite our selves, we do like the disability toward which we are driven. But when it comes to the drive, perhaps it does not matter much whether we do, or don‟t, think that we like it. Either way, the drive is not done undoing us.

It undoes us through pity, we saw in Chapter 3. That affect that self-respecting crips are supposed to shun, I argued, could instead be conceived as a feeling that we might wish to solicit. If pity is regarded as a feminizing emotion, and if the abjection of pity has been effected through the culture‟s use of Tiny Tim as a trope not only for disability‟s pitiability but also, obliquely, for the clitoris as sign for an intrinsic feminine disability, then perhaps we should reconsider the impetus to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text. We could take our analysis of pity further by asking whether primary pity—which I defined as a concept that lies on the threshold between, on the one hand, the complete erasure of the concepts of “self” and “other” that characterizes primary narcissism and, on the other hand, the solidification of the self in which secondary narcissism is grounded—could be conceived as a quintessentially queercrip concept. My concept of primary pity is construable as “queer” because its unsettling of the categories of self and other poses a threat to identity formations. At the same time, the concept is readable as “crip” because, insofar as it maintains an attachment to the construction of the self, it is indebted to the disability rights movement‟s claiming of “crip” as a politically subversive identity. My queer cripping (or crip queering) of primary pity will thus draw on the interventions in queer theory and disability studies that I made in Chapter 1: it will depart from queer theory‟s strategy of claiming postidentitarianism as a transcendent solution to the disabling effects of claiming, and being claimed by, culturally minoritized identities; and it will simultaneously challenge disability studies‟ positing of proud, nonsuffering crip identities as foundational to political activism.

Questions about activism press us further, too. In using the lenses of psychoanalysis and literary theory to delineate aspects of the cultural politics of disability, I have not laid out a guideline or program for resisting ableist social structures. I have sought instead to show how developing an understanding of the disability drive—and, in particular, attending to the violences that result from individuals‟ and cultures‟ misrecognitions of the drive—may facilitate transformations in how we conceive of our subjectivities. Such transformations, deeply indebted to the feminist maxim that the personal is political, are not individual solutions akin to the overcoming narrative. Rather, by changing how we understand our “insides,” we may contribute to changing the ways that, “outside,” on the level of the social, we relate to each other. As we saw in Chapter 4, something as seemingly personal as an individual‟s “relationship to food” can raise vexing questions that, when we deny that within ourselves that drives these questions, become the basis of damaging social structures of fatphobia, racism, classism, misogyny, and anti-queer prejudice.

If the drive won’t stop doing us, is it possible that we can allow it to do us differently? In the last paragraph of this dissertation, on the day that it is due, I feel as if I should leave you with a message to take home: perhaps a user‟s guide to the drive, a method for learning to love this thing that won‟t leave us. If I were a queer antisocial theorist, I might propose that we shout out, loud and proud, something like this: “We‟re here! We‟re queer! We are the drive! And you‟ll never get used to us!” But such a call, we saw in Chapter 1, performs a fantasy of overcoming the drive by identifying with it (if you can‟t beat it, join it); and the drive is not a force that can be overcome. Were I to articulate my own version of a saying evoking the feeling of the drive, it would go more like this: “Come on; we‟re late; let‟s go—oh no, where are my keys!?” To be clear, I am the last person who should offer advice about handling the loss of one‟s keys. I know the recommendations—stay calm; breathe; retrace your steps—but rarely do I heed them. For me, it‟s closer to: Panic! Berate self! Look for someone to blame! I have no guide for getting over this set of reactions, but I do want to say this: “The Disability Drive” has been an invitation to think collectively about the ways that, when we feel we cannot bear the psychic or social equivalents of losing our keys (keys potentially serving as metaphors for other objects, the loss of which might be more devastating), the impetus to blame someone else can harden into a fixed idea, a truth that one refuses to relinquish. We have analyzed multiple examples of this process: fat people stigmatized as “compulsive eaters,” feminists caricatured as anti-sex identitarians, and chronically ill people dismissed as “hysterical.” If this dissertation has a moral, it is this: the intolerable feeling that arises when we lose keys, control, or other objects that we think we need in order to believe in our selves, originates not from outside us but from within. This is the drive: it always has its keys in hand. We are not done with the drive.

## Afropess

### 1NC --- Link

#### Their attempt to refuse ableism within the structures of civil society is only the upending of a conflict that mystifies the fundamental antagonism that structures civil society and the world writ large: The non-being of blackness – Anti-blackness provides coherence to the “human” subject.

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For instance, what at first glance seems merely naïve―that is the observation that in the U.S. “[b]eing disabled is just like being black”―actually does index how disability cannot be synonymous with Whiteness**.** For what is suggested through the forced parity between the construction of blackness and disability is that the disabled body or mind cannot properly embody Whiteness in toto. And that is what Anna Stubblefield demonstrates in “‘Beyond the Pale’: Tainted Whiteness, Cognitive Disability and Eugenic Sterilization,” which iterates how disabled white persons have historically been categorized as embodying a tainted form of whiteness. She convincingly argues that beginning from the 1800s in the U.S. those who were considered feebleminded, a form of cognitive disability, lost the full privileges attendant with white citizenship. As she writes, “… to grasp feeblemindedness fully as a signifier of tainted whiteness, it is important to understand that the state-sponsored, involuntary sterilization of tainted whites meant that they had, in effect, lost the full protection that whiteness conferred in a white supremacist society” (178; emphasis added). Not only did the so-called feebleminded whites come to embody a compromised form of whiteness but also the “ … white men [and women] labeled as criminal, sexually deviate, homosexual, … or insane … ” (Stubblefield 178). What Stubblefield emphasizes is that disability as a social construct cannot easily be detached from its imbricated positioning within a network of material forces that include not only race but sexuality, class, and gender**.** Her study foregrounds the need for Disability studies to attend to racialization as not a tangential focus but central to its overall theoretical and political project**.** Interestingly Stubblefield’s study of how disability can dispossess whites of their “full personhood” under U.S. law seemingly lends support to what “Dismodernism” authorizes, which is the idea that the suffering of blacks can be made equivalent to not only what disabled whites come to embody but also to all those other Others represented under the category of “people of color.” In short, disability has the potential to democratize civil society by recalling how all citizens are common in their humanity―that is, equally exposed to disability. Yet, if we read between the lines of Stubblefield’s summary of how “feebleminded whites” can become “tainted,” the singularity of “blackness’s grammar of suffering” emerges. For what distinguishes “blackness grammar of suffering” is how it does not operate according to the assumptive logic of capability. In other words, to approach “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” Wilderson insists that one must be able to imagine “an ethicality … so terrifying that, as a space to be inhabited and terror to be embraced” (41), it resists language. It is a “grammar of suffering” based not upon the logic of a “lost” capacity but that of a deontologized property, the Slave that is not “exploited and alienated” but rather “accumulated and fungible.” The effect of this singular grammar on Asian American and Disability studies is significant, but the impact of Wilderson’s critique on the “scholarly and aesthetic production” of the “Black theorist” is radical by comparison**.** As he writes: This [“blackness’s grammar suffering”] makes the labor of disavowal in Black scholarly and aesthetic production doubly burdensome, for it is triggered by a dread of both being ‘discovered,’ and of discovering oneself, as ontological incapacity. Thus, through borrowed institutionality―the feigned capacity to be essentially exploited and alienated (rather than accumulated and fungible) in the first ontological instance (in other words, a fantasy to be just like everyone else, which is a fantasy to be)―the work of Black film theory [and by extension Black studies] operates through a myriad of compensatory gestures in which the Black theorists assumes subjective capacity to be universal and thus ‘finds’ it everywhere. (42) Placed within the frame of “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” I want to examine the consequences of Davis’s attempt to render disability cosmopolitan. While the move has the virtual effect of equalizing all bodies around human capacity to suffer―such an ethical cum political strategy requires the disavowal of how concepts such as “human” and “civil society” in the U.S. have structurally depended on the production of social death, i.e. the Black (and the Red). As it should be obvious by now, what is therefore unthinkable in Davis’s attempt to make civil society cohere around the universality of human suffering is the contingent nature of the term human itself. This in fact is what Bells intuits but cannot name in his influential essay entitled “Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal.” Bell’s hesitation is partly attributable to how pain or suffering is both social (that is communicable, sharable by all humans in equal measure) and incommunicable within Disability studies. That is, Disability studies’ uneven attention to the incommunicability of suffering is seemingly capable of accommodating the unrepresentability that is constituent of “blackness’s grammar of suffering.” As Siebers insists, “[i]ndividuality derived from the incommunicability of pain easily enforces a myth of hyperindividuality, a sense that each individual is locked in solitary confinement where suffering is the only object of contemplation. People with disabilities are already too politically isolated for this myth to be attractive” (176). Yet in an attempt to intervene in the poststructuralist tendency to idealize “physical pain” as site of either transcendent power or pleasure, Siebers also adds, “… [p]hysical pain is [at once] highly individualistic, unpredictable, and raw as reality. Pain is not a resource of political change. It is not a well of delight for the individual” (178). What is directly pertinent to the present essay is how the universal figure of the “individual”- human marks the critical horizon of Disability theory. Or, to put a finer point to it via Widerson’s reading of Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Mask, “… the Negro … ‘is comparison,’ nothing more and certainly nothing less, for what is less than comparison? … [And as such] ‘No one knows yet who [the Negro] is, but he knows that fear will fill the world when the world finds out’” (42). We find in the most sophisticated Asian Americanist deployment of poststructuralist strategies of reading―such as the one advanced in the influential work by Kandice Chuh―a similar call to abandon politics based on social identity.6 While I am in agreement with both Davis’s and Chuh’s overarching critique of uniform identity, I find troubling their wholesale critique of all identity formation as a priori essentialist. For such framing of social identity as necessarily restrictive can only lead to the return of the repressed in our present era of colorblindness―the ideal of abstract citizenship. As she writes: “**‘Asian American’ … connotes the violence**, exclusion, dislocation, and disenfranchisement that has **attended the codification of certain bodies** as variously, Oriental, yellow, sometimes brown, inscrutable, devious, always alien. It speaks to the active denial of personhood to the individuals inhabiting those bodies” (Chuh 27). In this, **Chuh**―along with Davis and Siebers―unwittingly **announces the displacement and the erasure of “blackness’s grammar of suffering,”** as their strategies of reading the presence or absence of justice within U.S. civil society is predicated upon exploitation and alienation of the a priori human subject. Nevertheless, by embodying the self―Disability studies helps to shift (though only slightly) critical theory toward an alternative ethicality that does not programmatically endorse the idea and ideals of abstract citizenship. For contrary to the liberal model of the political subject that achieves “hyperindividuality” through social and material detachment, the alternative model of subjectivity that is afforded through the disabled body is a self that is always already in the process of negotiating complex relations to the materiality of the social. Thus, the embodied model of subjectivity helps to re-imagine “personhood” as relation itself, leading not to the reification or essentialization of self, this relational model of subjectivity demands that any identity whatsoever be thought not as autonomous substance but rather as a site, comprising of unfinished, mobile, heterogeneously constituted relations across an embodied hermeneutic horizon. It bears mentioning here that it is this interconnected and radically open vision of “personhood” as relation that is foreclosed in the liberal model of abstract citizenship. For in the liberal model of the self, the ideal is to attain singular indeterminacy through the negation of such social relations, without which no self can hope to attain intelligibility. As Alcoff’s important work suggests: Social identities … are more properly understood as sites from which we perceive, act, and engage with others. These sites are not simply locations or positions, but also hermeneutic horizons comprised of experiences, basic beliefs, and communal values […] . We are not boxed in by them, constrained, restricted, or held captive―unless … it makes sense to say that we are boxed in by the fact that we have bodies . … (287) Interestingly itis by attending to how the self is embodied and embedded in social reality that clarifies the radical singularity of the Black’s structural non-relationality, which in turn helps to bring into focus not only what Wilderson calls the “structural antagonisms” that contour U.S. civil society but also unexplored ethico-political limits and possibilities of sub-fields such as Disability and Asian American studies. For according to Wilderson’s Red, White & Black what gives internal coherence to such terms as “human” and “civil society” in the U.S. is the disavowal of the structural (historical) relation blacks have with what is essentially non-human, a form of social death known as slavery. As he summarizes: During the emergence of new ontological relations in the modern world, from the late Middle Ages through the 1500s, many different kinds of people experienced slavery. … But African, or more precisely Blackness, refers to an individual who is by definition always already void of relationality. Thus modernity marks the emergence of a new ontology because it is an era in which an entire race appears, people who, a priori, that is prior to the contingency of the ‘transgressive act’ (such as losing a war or being convicted of a crime), stand as socially dead in relation to the rest of the world. (17-8) Wilderson’s intervention therefore hinges on isolating and exposing this dual operation by which civil society makes sense of itself to itself―the simultaneous disavowal of and parasitic dependency on the Black. In other words, the desire to make blackness an analogue of disability amounts to denying the structural relevancy of slavery to the formation of U.S. civil society. Wilderson’s reading of Fanon helps to articulate the radical singularity of “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” as it emphasizes how “… the gratuitous violence of the Black’s first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, ‘wiped out [his or her] metaphysics … his [or her] customs and sources on which they are based.’ Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks” (38). What Wilderson calls the “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” consequently, has no analogue in either the assumptive figure of the “individual” that subtends Disability studies and those other Others within U.S. civil society that have become included within the frame known as “people of color.” In this, “blackness’s grammar of suffering” gestures toward what is unnamable, a form of suffering that is in excess of any ethical language which is based upon the universal figure of the human. This is how Wilderson radically undermines the desire to transpose “blackness’s grammar of suffering” into the ethico-political language upon which civil society’s depends to make suffering (physical, psychic or otherwise) intelligible**.** As he writes: The ruse of analogy erroneously locates Blacks in the world―a place where they have not been since the dawn of Blackness. This attempt to position the Black in the world by way of analogy is not only a mystification, and often erasure, of Blackness’s grammar of suffering (accumulation and fungibility or the status of being non-Human) but simultaneously also a provision for civil society, promising an enabling modality for Human ethical dilemmas. It is a mystification and an erasure because … their grammars of suffering are irreconcilable. (37) Such is the logic that animates Bell’s critique of Disability studies but it does not, cannot obtain the force of Wilderson’s intervention because Bell cannot or dare not disarticulate the Black from the world. Nevertheless both Wilderson and Bell help foreground the important fact that even suffering obtains a “grammar,” that is, has a way of indexing―whether positively in the form of identification or negatively through dis- or even through non-identification, the presence or absence of a world. What Bell’s and especially Wilderson’s critique bring into sharp relief is that anti-blackness is part and parcel of the episteme that gives internal coherence to U.S. civil society. To approach “blackness’s grammar suffering” is therefore to contemplate, albeit always indirectly, not the paradigm of disability which is always already predicated on agency but a radical non-capacity. Wilderson’s illumination of how the **“**antagonism” that obtains around blackness is structural to the formation of U.S. civil society has the effect of clarifying the positioning of sub-fields such as Disability and Asian American studies, especially when their protocols aim toward establishing some form of political justice based upon “exploitation and alienation,” which is at odds with “blackness’s grammar of suffering.” As previously mentioned, Wilderson draws a sharp distinction between “conflict” and “antagonism.” And this is key, as it is only when anti-blackness is positioned as an “antagonism” that the residual and structural effects of the Slave (the non-human) can be allowed to erupt into the living present of U.S. civil society. As such, though by comparison far more optimistic than Wilderson’s study, Alexander’s The New Jim Crow (2010) gives powerful evidence to Wilderson’s theory of the “structural antagonisms” that contour U.S. civil society. This is how a critical theory based upon advancing a colorblind world or an ethicality based upon the universal human effectively silences the suffering of the Black. As Alexander argues: Far from being a worthy goal … colorblindness has proved catastrophic for African Americans. It is not an overstatement to say that the systematic mass incarceration of people of color in the United States would not have been possible in the post-civil rights era if the nation had not fallen under the spell of a callous colorblindness. … Saying that one does not care about race is offered as an exculpatory virtue, when in fact it can be a form of cruelty. … Our blindness also prevents us from seeing the racial and structural divisions that persist in society: the segregated, unequal schools, the segregated, jobless ghettos, and the segregated public discourse―a public conversation that excludes the current pariah of caste [the incarcerated black males in U.S. civil society]. (228) In this, Wilderson’s Red, White, & Black and Alexander’s The New Jim Crow bring into sharp focus why the framing of blackness within U.S. civil society cannot do without the ruse of analogy which effectively puts under erasure a “… violence which turns a body into flesh, ripped apart literally and imaginatively, destroy[ing] the possibility of ontology because it positions the Black in an infinite and indeterminately horrifying and open vulnerability, an object made available (which is to say fungible) for any subject” (Wilderson, 38). Put otherwise, this “violence” which is in excess of that ideologically saturated term called Humanity demands the infinitely difficult yet necessary encountering with what gives U.S. civil society the simulacrum of ethical and political decency.

### 2NC --- Root Cause

#### The white body becomes the center of disability, creating a savage degeneracy at the heart of disabled blackness

Tommy **Curry 17** [JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 48 No. 3, Fall 2017, 321–343., “This Nigger’s Broken: Hyper-Masculinity, the Buck, and the Role of Physical Disability in White Anxiety Toward the Black Male Body,” African American scholar, author and professor of philosophy. As of 2019, he holds a Personal Chair in Africana philosophy and Black male studies at the University of Edinburgh. In 2018, he won an American Book Award for The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood, -ekh-]

On September 23, 2015, Mr. Jeremy McDole was executed by Wilmington, Delaware police officers. Mr. McDole was allegedly a threat to himself and suicidal. The police were responding to a “911 call reporting that [Mr. McDole] had shot himself.”1 The 911 caller can be heard yelling: “A man just shot himself in the AutoZone parking lot ... he’s fallen out of a wheelchair.”2 Mr. McDole was reported to the police as a victim, not a criminal. He was described as a disabled man with injury. A man who was suicidal; in need of help. His need, his victimhood, was not seen. He was not recognized by the police as a vulnerable person. He was seen as a Black man; a threat—a body marked for death by the danger he posed to others. This stereotype applied to his body, despite him being confined to a wheelchair. Like the deaths of hundreds of other Black males in America, his execution was recorded and subsequently released to the American public for summary judgment—just or unjust killing of a Black man. Unlike the hundreds of Black men killed every year in America, however, Mr. McDole was paralyzed from the waist down from an injury he sustained after being shot at the age of 18. What threat did this disabled Black man pose to anyone? Was he armed? Did he have a gun? These are the questions that define Black male death in this country, and despite Mr. McDole’s disability, they now define him. Why is it so easy to frame the lives of Black men and boys by one act, that same moment all the public sees where it is almost willed in unison that these Black males are in fact yearning for death? What was it about him being Black-male-disabled that resists consideration—did not diffuse the presumed danger—and convey that he was not a threat?

Like many academic fields, disability studies has been confronted with its raced, classed, and gendered assumptions about the body which lies at the center of conceptualizations of disability. Over a decade ago, Phil Smith argued in “Whiteness, Normal Theory, and Disability Studies,” that “whiteness is a normative, dominating, unexamined power that underlies the rationality of Eurocentric culture and thought. It serves to push to the margins not only those defined as not-white, but also those defined as not-Able.”3 Similarly, Chris Bell’s “Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal,” argues that disability studies functions to commodify Blackness as synonymous with disability. Reflecting on the Queer disability conference held in 2002, he writes many disabled non-whites “could not understand the overarching mentality of many of the attendees, perhaps best expressed by a remark made in a breakout session: ‘Being disabled is just like being black, so society should stop hating us and give us our rights.’ ”4 Bell clarifies in a footnote that disability studies normalizes disability such that the white disabled body is the conceptual/anthropological origin of disabledness. Far from excluding people of color, “White Disability Studies treats people of color as if they were white people; as if there are no critical exigencies involved in being people of color that might necessitate these individuals understanding and negotiating disability in a different way from their white counterparts.”5

The white body, being the ideal type, is then the basis of distortion or disfiguration which defines the disabled other. The racial designation of whiteness exceeds the borders of what is often meant by identity; who identifies or can be identified as a white person. In actuality, whiteness speaks to something more fundamental in the West that has come to define what it is to be human or nonhuman. To be non-white is to be abnormal—evolutionarily behind—in the phylogenetic order of human development. Those who are raced have historically been constructed as the degenerate/inferior/nonhuman opposite to the rational prototype of the human/superior/(Western) (abled) human.6 An outgrowth of nineteenth-century eugenics, “degeneration became a compelling racial metaphor such that the colonized races were assumed to be intrinsically degenerate, and as a result could never be improved.”7 Degeneracy suggested biological weakness and disease, often translating “into an attribution of diminished cognitive and rational capacities of nonwhite populations.”8

In the West, these colonial accounts of abnormality became dichotomizing anthropological designations separating those who are human from those who are not human. Those bodies whose origin are thought to share a phylogenic distance from European man have been thought to be the embodiment of pathology, degeneracy, and racial inferiority. As a kind of abnormality, disability was considered to be unnatural and detestable, while normality became synonymous with that which was natural and a means “of establishing the universal, unquestionable good and right.”9 The moral constitution of the self, the interior character one possesses, became associated with the physical and mental formation of the body. Oye`ronke Oyewumı argues that under Western epistemology, “The body is given a logic all its own. It is believed that just by looking at it one can tell a person’s beliefs and social position or lack thereof.”10 Because “the body is the bedrock on which social order is founded, the body is always in view and on view,”11 so the somatological becomes intuitive; that which is obvious when gazed upon. In the West, sight analyzes the body, and becomes the instrument used to identify biological deficiency which is thought to indicate degeneracy and inferiority. In this circuitous epistemology, the deformity of the body is a reflection upon the supposed distortion of the mind, just as the distortion of the mind suggests the savage degeneracy of the body.

In “Pathology to Power: Rethinking Race, Poverty and Disability,” Pamela Block, Fabricio Balcazar, and Christopher Keys explain that, even in the twenty-first century, “the concept of disability, when applied as a medical or psychological diagnosis, can subsume the culturally, socially, and historically derived identity of an individual beneath a label of pathology.”12 Despite the supposedly progressive social conscience of the American public, and the seemingly infinite theoretical nuances in identity theory, there is an anthropological, and dare I say, ontological problem, which continues to re-emerge as the basis of engaging those bodies perceived as disabled. This risk of being reduced to the perception and anxieties of others is only amplified by the vulnerabilities racial groups have in mainstream society. Whereas “white individuals with disabilities can recognize that their disability is the main reason why they are discriminated against, segregated, and oppressed, [disabled minority groups] have a harder time separating or consolidating their multiple identities.”13 Non-whites experience “segregation and discrimination independent of their disability. If we also consider the fact that poverty is a major source of marginalization and that most individuals of color with disabilities are poor, then the experience of disability is only one more factor in an already oppressed existence.”14

But what of Black males? Despite over a decade of work identifying the whiteness and bourgeois assumptions in disability theory, there has not been any attempt to create specific theories of Black male disability which engages the vulnerabilities his body has to death, hyper-sexualization, and super-humanism in America. Even Nirmala Erevelles’s work, which does an excellent job articulating the link between colonial concepts of inferiority, be they racial or cultural, misses the opportunity to fully articulate the vulnerabilities racialized maleness has within her transnational feminist disability studies perspective.15 This is not to suggest Erevelles does not engage the disabled Black male body. The concern she conveys for her husband Robert who was suffering with a grade IV brain tumor is a startling reminder of how the Black male body is perceived as a danger regardless of its actual physical state. As a Black male, I understand her relief when she tells the reader how lucky they both felt that most of Robert’s seizures occurred in the privacy of their own home.16 I know her fear, the repetitive terror she experienced imagining her husband being shot or killed because the public did not know how to react to a Black male body seizing. Erevelles is correct: “The Black male body ... is a source of terror in white patriarchal society, and when transformed during a grand mal seizure—with rolled back eyes, harsh grunting sounds, mouth drooling bloody foam, and the occasional loss of control of bodily function with its associated putrid smell—could become an even more terrifying spectacle as a result of the now lethal triple combination of race, gender, and disability.”17 But what conditions the maleness of this Black disabled body? What is the role Black man plays in Erevelles’s knowledge that “to be perceived as a dangerous black man in the wrong place at the wrong time ... could result in death,”18 and the public’s fear that even a disabled Black man is Black and male enough to pose a threat?

There is an asserted claim in gender theory holding that maleness need not have a separate theoretical account as an attribute of the racial body, as it represents privilege, domination, and hegemony in its relation to femaleness.19 For many, acknowledging the horror the Black male body conveys is enough, but the lack of an explanatory account as to why the Black male body is peculiarly dehumanized within patriarchal racial logics leaves the multiple levels of vulnerability Black males experience unexplored and untheorized. While it is obvious to many that Black males are seen as dangerous, it is often unacknowledged that Black men and boys have a long history of being victims of rape, sexual violence, and cannibalism.20 Black maleness is easily acknowledged as being the cause of white aggression and violence, but these ignored violence(s), which exist in the sexual register, are thought to be of no consequence to how Black men and boys are perceived, desired, and feared.21 This essay attempts to remedy this deficit in theory how the Black male body generally, and the disabled Black male body more specifically, is engaged as a phobia-inspiring entity. Because the Black male body is confined to the realm of terror—a living corporeal horror—I argue the recognition of physical or mental disability by white onlookers is subsumed by white fear. In other words, disability in the Black male is unrecognizable by whites because of a very real racial anxiety.

## Capitalism

### 2NC --- Cap Links

#### Only our critical analysis of capital at the level of labor functions can explain lived, material realities of disabled bodies as the surplus population.

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Capitalism, Disability, and the relative surplus population I would like to start by establishing the grounds on which I shall build my reflections. My first and final argument is that disability in capitalism is a social product of the contradictions produced by the clash between forces of exploitation and forces of labour. It is rather important to clarify, perhaps to the despair of postmodern perspectives (Eagleton 1998; 2016; Harvey 1990), that I shall focus my considerations on what we could call a materialist universalising view of the body and the mind, a body and mind that are expected by capitalism, the labour body/mind. The body/mind that is able to work and to sell its labour force in the market, so that it may extract surplus value from this abled-to-work body/mind. The contrast of the abled labour body/mind is the disabled body/mind, which is a term “used to classify persons deemed less exploitable or not exploitable by the owning class who control the means of production in a capitalist economy” (Russel 2019, p. 42). Those “deemed less exploitable or not exploitable”, deviant from the ideal labour body/mind, may be considered part of what Karl Marx calls a Stagnant Surplus Population (Figure 1), or the third category of the Relative Surplus Population (floating, latent, and stagnant) or Industrial Reserve Army (Marx 1990) – discussed in chapter 25 “The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation” of the first volume of the Capital. Although a famous quotation amongst Marxists is commonly used to summarise the author’s arguments3 , I would like to linger a little longer on his discussion of the Relative Surplus Population in order to establish a theoretical connection between a stagnant surplus population and the materiality of the lives of people labelled disabled in the capitalist society of the 21st century. Marx (1990, p. 794) argues that The relative surplus population exists in all kinds of forms. Every worker belongs to it during the time when he is only partially employed or wholly employed. Leaving aside the large-scale and periodically recovering forms that the changing phases of the industrial cycle impress on it, so that it sometimes appears acute, in times of crisis, and sometimes chronic, in times when business is slack, we can identify three forms which it always possesses: the floating, the latent, and the stagnant. David Harvey (2010, p. 145) clarifies that the surplus population is what “permits capitalists to super-exploit their workers without regard for their health or wellbeing”. Marx understands that there is a relation between the growth and accumulation of capital and the demand for a labour force, as capital expands so does the need for more workers - “[a]ccumulation of capital is therefore multiplication of the proletariat” (Marx 1990, p. 764). However, if the number of workers employed increases, so does the price of labour - an increase on wages - which means “a reduction in the unpaid labour the worker has to supply” (Marx 1990, p. 770). Despite its apparent simplicity, this movement is nevertheless more complex than it appears to be4 , but it can be summarised as follows: it is capitalistic accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces in the direct ratio of its own energy and extent, a relativity redundant population of labourers, i.e., a population of greater extent than suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus-population. (Marx 1990, p. 782, my highlights). For starters, we should not forget that the sole aim of the capitalist is to produce profit5 . Capitalists are ruled by what Harvey calls “the coercive laws of competition” (2010, p. 146), in Marx’s words: “a coercive force external to him” (1990, p. 381). When wages rise, they become an obstacle between capitalists and the maximum amount of profit that can be extracted. More elements will then come into place, among others, the intensification of the exploitation of the work force and the use of technology to increase productivity and profitability (Harvey 2010; 2011; Marx 1990). One example that may be useful to illustrate such an abstract relation is that of bank workers in Brazil in the last 30 years. In the 1990s, bank employees in Brazil created influential labour unions to exert pressure on banks, therefore demanding higher quality jobs - higher salaries, less working hours, more job places, amongst others. When going on strikes, until the early 2000s, those unions would still have some influence in the decision-making process in the organisation of banks. In 2020, the widespread use of the new technology, which allows users to solve most of their needs using their smartphones, has caused demands for higher productivity, wage drops, more working hours, and an increase in unemployment in the sector - industrial reserve army. While strikes of the sector in the 1990s were catastrophic (crowds of employees on the streets, freezing of banks, very little or no money available, the support of the population), a strike in 2020 gathers a few dozen with signs in the streets that are usually ignored by most passerby, looking down at their smartphones. Leading us then to an important hallmark of capitalist labour exploitation practices: The Industrial Reserve Army as a regulator of the tensions between the exploiters and the exploited. As capital multiplies and grows, it also tends to follow two internal movements, namely concentration and centralisation. Respectively, the augmentation of capital and control of this capital in the hands of fewer people. At the other pole, it also produces what Marx called in the previous quote “a relatively redundant working population”, that is, the surplus population (Marx 1990, p. 782). This surplus population forms an army of workers who may at times be absorbed or rejected by the capital, according to the capital’s own needs (variation in the number of workers in a certain area), requirements (level of education, expertise, and/or experience), rules (wages/salaries, working hours, holidays, health insurance). In other words, “the working population therefore produces both the accumulation of capital and the means by which it is itself made relatively superfluous; and it does this to an extent to which is always increasing” (Marx 1990, p. 783). In the case of Brazilian bank clerks, the introduction of new technological machinery, as Marx calls it, allowed banks to dispose of thousands of employees and change the rules of the game, it developed new needs and new requirements. The first category of the relative surplus population characterises workers that are “sometimes repelled, sometimes attracted again in greater masses” by the job markets (Marx 1990, p. 794). A modern example may be the situation of engineering workers in Brazil - when the economy is growing, they are the first ones to be absorbed and to get higher salaries and better conditions of work. However, as the economy slows, they are repelled by the companies, made redundant, and will be unemployed again. The latent category represents those with potential to be part of the capitalist labour force but are in agricultural areas still struggling to survive with their own practices against massive capitalist companies; it is the representation of the death of a rural lifestyle. As cities and companies grow, they swallow small family farms and ranches, leaving those families with no other option but to sell their properties to the big companies, move to the cities, and sell their labour force. It is a situation portrayed in literature by Theodore Dreiser in The Lost Phoebe (1918) and by Graciliano Ramos in Vidas Secas (1938), and more recently in the American sitcom The Ranch (2016-2020), and vastly discussed in the works of Raymond Williams. The last category, the stagnant, is formed by those who must subject themselves to the lowest conditions of work, to the most irregular forms of employment, and to “a maximum of working time and a minimum of wages” (Marx 1990, p. 796) - a sediment of the working class that lives in the poorest conditions of life. Now that we have reached the stagnant category, we should remember that when Marx is discussing the three forms of relative surplus population, he is categorising workers, in other words, those who are forced to sell their workforce because they do not own any means of production – der Arbeitsmensch. They are those who are able to sell their workforce; those who are at their full capacity in body and mind to create surplus value at the lowest cost, with the lowest adaptation possible, as it is remarked by Marx (1990) and by Engels (1987). In contrast, when dealing with disability, we are considering those who have been labelled by capitalist practices, symbols, and meanings as disabled, unproductive, and as a burden to the rest of the working class. A burden to the rest of the working class because “what becomes of the operative…, in case he cannot work, is no concern of the employer” (Engels 1987, p. 543). Engels here sheds light on an important element of our discussion: the class condition is a fundamental aspect of analysis when we are discussing disability. Marx (1990, p.797, my highlights) enumerates three categories of those who dwell in pauperism – the lowest sediment of the relative surplus population’, (1) those who are able to work but who are not working; (2) orphans and pauper children; and, finally, (3) ‘the demoralized (sic), the ragged, and those unable to work, chiefly people who succumb to their incapacity for adaptation, an incapacity which results from the division of labour… Note that here he is dealing with the incapacity of adaptation. And he goes on to identify these workers as those “who have lived beyond the worker’s average lifespan; and the victims of industry… the mutilated, the sick…” (1990, p. 797, my highlights). Marx approaches both the issues of ageism and ableism in the same category to indicate that those who are deemed useless by capitalist practices and excluded from the labour market will dwell in pauperism. To clarify, pauperism is The hospital of the active labour-army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army. Its production is included in that of the relative surplus population, its necessity is implied by their necessity; along with the surplus population, pauperism forms a condition of capitalist production, and of the capitalist development of wealth. It forms part of the faux frais of capitalist production: but capital usually knows how to transfer these from its own shoulders to those of the working-class and the petty bourgeoisie. (Marx 1990, p. 797). It seems to be implied that he differentiates the surplus population and pauperism. They are both conditioned to the ontological structure of the capitalist system and its ongoing wealth-making process. When Marx brings them together, he binds them, stating that one will be responsible for the other (the dead weight of the industrial reserve army), he is providing arguments against the traditional categorisation of disability as a personal and individual problem. Once again, disability is approached as a social, cultural, historical, and class-related issue. In a recent study, Santos (2020) scrutinised data on the living conditions of the Brazilian population comparing and contrasting the categories of race, gender, and disability with class condition. The author identifies how these elements come together to derail people’s access to a flourishing life in a racist, sexist/ patriarchal ableism, neoliberal Brazilian society. According to her, 30,06% of the population with a disability live with within the range of 0-1 minimum wage (R$ 1,100 reais) – in Brazil this means deprivation from a wide variety of essential goods and services, i.e., living in pauperism or close to pauperism. From another geographical perspective, in the United States, according to Erevelles (2011, p. 56), “[…] “one out of every four disabled people lives below the poverty line, and more than 75 percent have an individual income of less than $20,000.” In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx discusses the existence (Dasein) of the Arbeitsmensch in the labour-capital relationship. He points out that “[p]olitical economy… does not recognise the unoccupied worker, den Arbeitsmenschen, in so far as he happens to be outside [the] labourrelationship” (1988, p. 86), that is, it does not recognise their Dasein, their existence. According to Marx, “they are figures (Gestalten)…, specters(sic) (Gespenster) outside the domain of political economy” (1988, p. 86). Those deemed less exploitable or not exploitable are ghosts to a system that values profit over anything else. As I pointed out, when we consider the “class-disability” relationship in the working class, we are dealing with the sphere of pauperism – those on the lowest, poorest, most degrading conditions of life. These are either those who refuse to follow the system of discipline imposed by the capital or those who deviate from the ideal labour body/mind. Harvey (2010, p.149) points out that: there is the problem of what to do with people who don't conform and are therefore dubbed odd or even deviant. And this is Foucault's as well as Marx's point: they are called mad or antisocial and incarcerated in insane asylums or prisons; or as Marx notes, they get put in the stocks, mocked and punished. To be a "normal" person, therefore, is to accept a certain kind of spatiotemporal discipline convenient to a capitalist mode of production. What Marx demonstrates is that this isn't normal at all - it's a social construct that arose during this historical period in this particular way and for these particular reasons. According to Harvey, to be normal is to conform. Those who deviate will be labelled as abnormal, irrelevant, will be deemed useless, and set aside. So, normality does exist for capitalism – and it is very specific. On the one hand, it does not mean that we should simply accept it as a universal truth. On the other hand, we should not deny normality either but address it and question it. Theoretical and methodological perspectives that aim to refuse the existence of these antagonistic forces – normality and abnormality – in capitalist practices, symbols, and meanings, in an attempt to promote equality and the so-called inclusion, contribute to the ontological reproduction of the system that created the antagonism in the first place. Labelled as irrelevant and disposable to the political and economic structure, disabled people may be allocated in the Stagnant category of the Relative Surplus Population. In fact, even when they are absorbed by the system in times of need or when the system is forced to absorb them by affirmative action policies, those in the stagnant category “can be rendered superfluous at the slightest downturn of the business cycle” (Russel 2019, p. 76). Barnes (1992, p. 55) defines disability as “a diverse system of social constraints imposed on people with impairments by a highly discriminatory society — to be a disabled person means to be discriminated against”. A social approach to disability, therefore, does not deny the impairment, but understands that there is a socio-historical difference between impairment, disability, and disabled: the impairment is biological, the disability is social, and disabled is the end result of disabling a person with an impairment6 . Vygotsky (1993, p. 36) argues that “[i]n the final analysis, what decides the fate of a personality is not the defect [impairment in today’s terminology] itself, but its social consequences”. And it is this socio-psychological realisation that may or may not be a disabling one. In their development, disabled children will only require processes that will stimulate them in other ways rather than those traditionally applied at home, school, and any other social situation. As deviants of the patterns of normality, however, disabled people are many times completely or partially deprived of social participation. Deviant bodies and minds are expected to either follow the stabilised rules of society or not be part of it at all. Let us take a scene in Jack Nicholson’s One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest as an example. His character, Randle P. McMurphy, is in the swimming pool of a total institution for those considered mentally ill and/or intellectually disabled and tells one of guards that within six days he is going to leave the institution. To his surprise, according to the guard, he will only leave the institution when allowed to, when the doctors and nurses consider that he is able to adjust to social order. Randle is only pretending to have a disability to dodge prison, but to many of his companions it means never leaving the institution, because according to the rules, requirements, and needs of the capital they have already been deemed deviant and disposable or, as Harvey put it, they are “incarcerated in insane asylums or prisons […] they get put in the stocks, mocked and punished” (2010, p. 149).

### 2NC --- Root Cause

#### The political economy is the best analytic to explain forms of ableist violence that lead to material impacts that disabled populations must face. Only understanding “competence” as indebted to the structures of productivity and labor relations can reshape WHAT society values.

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Disability and the Ideology of Competence As stated, I am not going to analyse the disabling phenomena beyond the sphere of capitalism, but rather to understand them as part of the complex system of ontological maintenance of the capital (Mészáros 2011). One way (not the only way) to do that is to approach, from a materialist perspective, the ideological discourse of competence. It unveils not only what is expected from the working class but also what is to be discarded. Competence is a concept that is in dialectical relation with the concepts of class, exploitation, and individual. Social class, one’s position in the economic and political structure of capitalism, will have a direct impact on the limits imposed on and possibilities opened up to individuals. That is, humans make their history, but they are determined by sociohistorical forces beyond their control (Marx & Engels 1968). Therefore, a materialist reading of disability may largely contribute to deepen and expand the scientific knowledge around the disabling phenomena. Social class, albeit a commonly forgotten category in the analyses of disability, is an essential aspect of it. There are complex divergencies between facing an impairment in the higher classes, in the middle-classes, or in the lower-classes7 (See Erevelles 2011; Cabral 2021; Russel 2019; Santos 2020). Wright (1998) argues that exploitation is a grounding concept when it comes to class analysis because it creates a fissure between the higher classes (the owners of the capital, land, and means of production), who exploit, and the rest who are exploited. The development of capitalist relations, however, engendered new classes, a class that originates from the social and technical divisions of labour (Wayne 2020; Wright 1998). The middle-classes are constituted by those in the working class who perform jobs that require more complex skills in contrast to those who are working in manual jobs - and thus tendentiously share contrasting interests with them. These are also called in sociological works primary and secondary sector jobs, which respectively represent “those with high wages, high skill levels, good working conditions, job security, and ample opportunities for promotion” in contrast to “low wages, low skill levels, poor working conditions, little job security, and few if any possibilities for advancement.” (Barnes 1992b, p. 57). Wayne (2020, p. 5) keenly highlights that The social division of labour is linked to class formation because across the various branches of productive activity designed to meet variable social needs, the same social types in control of those branches have more in common with each other than they do with their immediate workers, who have the least control, least power and lowest remuneration in the production process. The maintenance of class structure and the inducement of competition and individualism in the working-classes is a fundamental trait to the ontological continuation of capitalism. The social division of labour focuses on the formation of an un-critical, individualist, and indebted working-middle class with no sense of unity or class consciousness (Marx & Engels 2008; Mészáros 2008; 2011). The spread of meritocratic values amongst the professional and managerial strata of the working-class gives them a glamorous look and the false impression that they are closer to the top than to the bottom, that they share more with those in power than with those in classes below them (Wayne & Cabral 2021). The relevance of the discussion of class lies in the fact that when we talk about inclusion without questioning capitalism, we are usually referring to the right to enter the labour force and be exploited. Disability in the working-class demands the absence of one of the non-disabled members of the family from the labour market to provide care for the disabled member. This care may also be relegated to a philanthropic special institution - in the latter, allowing all working members of the families to be absorbed by the capital (Russel 2019). It may be argued, however, that the concepts and definitions of what it means “to be able to work” are variable (Stone 1984). Indeed they are, but those are regulated by the State and by the capitalists themselves, and they vary not only influenced directly by pressures of society, but by the demands of the capital (Russel 2019). In other words, it means to say that their jobs and the place they occupy are both part of a regulatory system of the capital, as Russel (2019) argues, and a special kind of charity - in either case their workforce is easily disposable. If we consider here Robert Young’s (2009) analyses of Marx’s concept of use of value, we may indicate that: in the Capital’s commodity structure when those deemed disabled are exchanged, they are exchanged for less. Erevelles (2011, p. 252) argues that “[…] “becoming disabled is also a historical event where disability also has a use value that is deployed simultaneously with race to justify the creation of the enslaved un-gendered body. ” and that the “[…] actual act of impairment that is used both to create and at the same time to justify this construction.” Proof of that have also been the recent changes in the Brazilian legislation regarding the regulations for the mandatory employment of disabled people. Advancements in laws and legal regulations are indeed an important part of the struggles of the working class, but they “are ‘solutions’ which promote conflict between groups of disadvantaged workers, rather than making it a right of every citizen to have a living-wage job and health care” (Russel 2019, p. 77). They are part of what Mészáros (2008; 2011) regards as corrections in the structure of the capital. They play a fundamental role in the ontological conservation of capital when softening the tensions between the owners of the capital and the working class. Barnes (1992) advocated in favour of anti-discrimination legislation as a solution to improve the participation of disabled workers in the labour market, as we all should. No one would deny that even within the limits of the capital one should always fight against discrimination, prejudice, and deprivation of access to better living conditions. Notwithstanding, the market finds its ways to ‘dodge’ the legislation. When it comes to disabled workers that usually happens through what Samuels (2014) calls biocertification. Biocertification is the process companies and industries use to certify that a new employee will follow their not-so-secret internal rules, using medical reports, exams, and tests. By means of biocertification processes individuals are reduced to their biological characteristics and are erased as social subjects, “[b]iocertification materializes the modern belief that only science can reliably determine the truths of identity and generally claims to offer a simple, verifiable, and concrete solution to questions of identity” (Samuels 2014, p. 122). The structure of capital and its relations of material and cultural production, distribution, and exchange convey ideological models of individuals, social relations, and patterns of social behaviour that must be assimilated to guarantee the right to actively participate in everyday life, from the most trivial activities to the most complex forms of social participation. These representations will revolve around the notions of gender, race, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and, in the case of the working classes, labour skills. They carry labels of non-deviant and deviant. The archetype of an ideal individual is linked to the project of society: Hence, the oppression that disabled people face is rooted in the economic and social structures of capitalism. And this oppression is structured by racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism, and disablism, which is endemic to all capitalist societies and cannot be explained away as a universal cognitive process. (Oliver 1990, p. 165). Oliver is arguing that the foundations of prejudice are in fact part of the ideological structure of capitalism. It a structure founded on an ideological and hegemonic set of “ideas, values, belief systems, habits and practices that defend and legitimise the interests of groups at the expense of other groups in relationships of inequality” (Wayne 2020, p. 136, author’s highlights). Hence, it is important here to clarify my understanding of five concepts that are usually present in discussions of inequality, prejudice, and disability: oppression, segregation, exploitation, and inclusion/exclusion. It is my understanding that, from a materialist perspective, they are all class-related issues. Oppression derives from the idea that due to one or more deviant characteristics one is deprived from access to some or all material, cultural, and social conditions that would allow them to carry on a fulfilling life or, as Wright (2019) calls it, a flourishing life. Oppression represents an image of someone being crushed, smashed, held (socially) against their own will and despite their own efforts to change. Oppression is a product of ideologies embedded in the social structure of capitalism and it is related to inequality. Segregation revolves around marginalisation. The social process in which those who are unable to follow one or more social expectations are centrifuged, sent to the borders of society. They are not welcomed to participate in everyday life. Segregation comes as an alternative to the idea of social exclusion, as we shall see below. Exploitation, in turn, is the essential concept that sustains capital every day. The act of extracting surplus value out of those who own nothing else but their labour power (Marx 2012). Stripped of all properties and material conditions, workers have no way to sustain life other than by selling their labour power to those who own those material conditions. Modern capitalism, however, has become even more complex than it used to be when Marx’s wrote Das Kapital (Wright 2019). In order to guarantee its own survival, the structure of class conditions was reshaped based on the social and technical divisions of labour. Different class interests will clash between those who own the capital, those in positions that require higher qualification and more sophisticated skills (the modern middle-classes), and the ones performing jobs that are socially characterised as lower jobs (Wayne 2020). A material approach to these concepts understands that the condition of class will determine - imposing starting points, limits, and ends, as Williams (1988) and Wright (2019) define it - their extensions and impacts on an individual’s life. It means to say that one may be segregated but not so much oppressed. So, the extent of the processes of oppression, segregation, and exploitation is class-determined. Going back to Wayne’s definition of ideology, he understands that: there is capitalism itself which has a built-in cultural tendency to decontextualise social phenomena, individualise social phenomena and de-historicise social phenomena. We may also add that capitalism prematurely or falsely universalises capitalist culture and value systems (e.g., the only way to live) (Wayne 2020, p. 137). Therefore, there is a paramount comprehension of capitalist practices when it comes to the analysis of the disabling phenomena. When we look at Marx’s exposition of the sphere of pauperism, we were in fact targeting how this process of decontextualisation, individualisation, and de-historicisation affect those who are considered unable to adapt. Historically and traditionally, capitalist ideologies have treated disability as a personal, individual tragedy, which is brought out of context and history, in an attempt to exempt society from any obligations it might have. Against this, Russel (2019, p. 51) argues that: Our institutions (particularly medical and social welfare institutions) have historically held disablement to be an individual problem, not the result of economic or social forces. They have equated disability with physiological, anatomical, or mental “defects” and hegemonically held these conditions responsible for the disabled person’s lack of full participation in the economic life of our society. This approach presumed a biological inferiority of disabled persons. Their deviation from social models of adaptation to everyday life and productivity in the cycle of the capital, established by social standards of normality, promotes processes of social marginalisation, from institutionalising policies of discrimination to deprivation of social participation (Barnes 2012; Bueno 2001; Ferreira 1994; Vygotski 2004). It is in and from everyday life that the concepts, values, and norms that represent, regulate and organise a concrete social formation are executed (Heller 2016). Daily life is the expression of the real life of the subjects that are part of it, it is the immediate unity of action and thought and expression of concepts, values and norms formed from the hegemonic ideology conveyed and foisted upon individuals (Chauí 2016; Heller 2016). Everyday life is ordinary thinking, common sense, and the expression of uncritical thinking. It is the embodiment of men's life, and it is from it that they express their truth, build their beliefs, and guide their lives (Heller 2016). Everyday thought, the common sense, is based on experience in the complex ideological network that maintains the socio-metabolic functioning of capital and aims at the “orientation towards stability and relatively quiet social reproduction” (Mészáros 2004, p. 486- 487). The process of stigmatisation in the case of disabled people permeates the complex social construction of everyday life. The distancing of adaptation to the patterns of normality established in everyday life crystallises the stigma and removes from the person with an impairment the condition of ‘human’ and projects it socially as the ‘non-human’ – as Marx’s pointed out a spectre to political economy. The representation of the stigma occurs by a reduction of the subject to only one of its characteristics - usually that which is downgraded or socially overvalued (Goffman 1963). The possible overcoming of these conditions, or even the performance of more basic daily actions, can raise the stigmatised subject to the condition of superhuman, keeping them still in a non-human status. A stigmatised person may, however, reformulate the rules when they reach a position a social prestige. They are taken to the level of representation of their group and will be considered the example of self-determination, meritocracy, and success (Goffman 1963; McNamee & Miller 2009; Wayne & Cabral 2021). Leonard Kriegel (1987) scrutinised the images of representation of disabled characters reproduced in literature and narrowed them down to four categories, namely: Demonic ~~cripple~~, Charity ~~cripple~~, Realistic ~~cripple~~, and Survivor ~~Cripple~~. I will not discuss all of these categories, but the last one may be useful here to illustrate my previous arguments. The Survivor ~~Cripple~~ “[…] is the man who endures and, in his endurance, discovers survival as a cause in itself […]. His endurance is attractive, both to himself and to the audience, for it is constructed around his understanding of the limitations it has imposed on him.” (KRIEGEL, 1987, p. 38). The survivor ~~cripple~~ is the counterpart of the disabled person as pitiable and pathetic, as an object of pity, it is the representation of meritocratic values - the one who fights against all odds and thrives. The bridge between class conditions and the idea of a (disabled) survivor relies on capitalist meritocracy that seems to be reproduced in the image of the survivor, both in the lower and in the middle classes. The image of the disabled person has been used as a motivational strategy, to trigger feelings of determination, and has been associated with struggle and the power to overcome difficulties, usually followed by the question “What is your excuse?”. This may be perceived in the real-life based cinematic representations of disability, as they may imprint more credibility and cause a greater effect on the audiences. The Survivor ~~Cripple~~ makes the impairment a tragedy and overcoming it the objective or the solution to the problem. The use of disability in motivational campaigns and films projects the disabled person as an object of ridicule and as their own worst and only enemy – “if they wanted, they could.” – and cement meritocratic values – “if they did, what’s your excuse?”. As examples, I could mention the biographical films based on the lives of Christy Brown (Sheridan 2008), Gabriela Brimmer (Mandoki 1987), and Stephen Hawking (Marsh 2014). The decades after 1990 have been marked by various events and political and social reviews on the role and place of disabled people in society (Jannuzzi 2004). However, the system of justification and ideological reproduction of stereotypes in the categorisation of the socially conceived human body, the labour body and mind, as perfect permeates concrete social relationships in everyday life and triggers processes of stigmatisation of the deviants (Samuels 2014; Stone 1984). Stigma is thus very much in constant relation with the ideologies that are working through culture – as I have demonstrated with some examples in the previous paragraph. Competence, structured by bourgeois ideological pillars, conveyed by the media, and absorbed by the cultural industry, sells signs and images of youth, health and happiness (Chauí 2016). It is a powerful method of manipulation that “inoculate[s] individuals with the bourgeois appetite for personal success” (Freire 1970, p. 147). The social process of constructing the discourse of the competent produces its dialectical counterpart, the incompetent. The social and ideological role of the competent, valued by the social power of science, as an unquestionable source of knowledge, underlies and justifies the domination and economic exploitation of one class, considered superior in material and cultural capital, over the other, expropriated from the whole (Chauí 2016; Samuels 2014). The analysis of perfection, based on a neoliberal ideology, established mainly after the 1980s (Harvey 2011), subjugates disability in the working class mainly to spaces of pauperism, marginalisation and segregation and is marked by the sociopolitical order and the power of science. The ideological projection of the perfection of productivity, sociability, independence, meritocracy characterises in the opposite pole the lack and the insufficiency, emphasising the defect and erasing individuals beyond their disability and making the construction of their social relations unfeasible (Barnes 2012; Heller 2016; Soldatic & Meekosha 2012a; 2012b; Vygotski 1993). The naturalising element of capital is propagated and foisted upon individuals that reproduce the social structure through complex ideological systems of conservation, keeping individuals locked in the relationships of everyday life. Everyday life is, therefore, the life of every social subject, without being able to be totally out of it or completely trapped by it. It is in everyday life that the dominant metabolic ideological processes are emptied and reified as absolute and natural truths (Heller 2016; Mészáros 2004; 2016). Mészáros (2005, p. 401) argues that the dominant ideology of capitalism is “[…] sustained by the practical evidence of the established material structures within which people have to reproduce the material and cultural conditions of their existence and ‘feel at home as a fish in water’”. Most of the population is conditioned by the ideological standards set by the ruling class. Its ideological structure is: a logical, systematic, and coherent set of representations (ideas and values) and norms or rules (of conduct) that indicate and prescribe to the members of a society what they should think and how they should think about it, what they should value and how they should value it, what they should feel and how they should feel it, what they should do and how they should do it. (Chauí 2016, p. 53). The dominating force of ideology lies in pacification, naturalisation of the hegemonic social organisation and unity of interests, although they are conflicting (Mészáros 2008; Wayne 2020; Zizek 2012). Ideology, in its hegemonic sense, structures life lived and represents “a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives” (Williams 1980, p. 38). It is in the everyday life that the ideological patterns of normality are executed. Heller (2016, p. 37) indicates that [t]he maturation of man means, in any society, that the individual acquires all the essential skills for the daily life of the society (social layer) in question. It is an adult who is able to live his daily life for himself. Ideological patterns of normality are socially and historically established attributes and characteristics that are reproduced as natural and ordinary and that categorise subjects as normal and abnormal deviant. They establish the norms that define what it means to be a socially desired human (Amaral 1995; Everlles 2011; Heller 2011). Stigma disqualifies the individual due to a singular characteristic that deviates from the ideological norms and standards imposed and determines the limits of their social participation. Lastly, I would like to go back to inclusion. Inclusion is part of the ideological process of self-correctness and self-preservation of the bourgeois society. It is an attempt to lessen the weight of structural injustices, inequalities, segregations/exclusions that are part of the ontological foundations of the capital. Marx’s thought elucidates how contradictory the concept is: when analysing the production of relative surplus-value, that within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productivity of labour are put into effect at the cost of the individual worker; that all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become means of domination and exploitation of the producers. (Marx 1990, p. 799). Some lines below, he famously concludes that: Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e., on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital. (Marx 1990, p. 799). Inclusion, therefore, is the movement of opening opportunities to share material and cultural capital with (some of) those who were deprived from access to them. It does so without questioning or challenging the very essence of the society that created deprivation in the first place. Inclusion and exclusion are part of the same dialects. One is the dialectical inversion of the other. The need to include only exists because of a society that engenders exclusion. Thus, as I suggested, exclusion might not be a real thing, in immediate cultural and material access perhaps it does, but not as part of the structure of the system itself, i.e., the individual is not excluded from the system, they are a product of it. Inclusion and exclusion were uncritically adopted by all postmodern studies of identity, and inclusion became a motto to be fought for - as Wayne suggested (2020, p. 39), “change without real change”. In other words, these changes are constrained within the limits of capitalism and do not represent a threat to the structure of the system. Notwithstanding its core contradictions, it is something we shall all fight for. If within the limits and contradictions of the capital this is the only possibility - or the closest possibility - some individuals will have to access a flourishing life - meaning access to education, health, cultural expressions, housing, food - then until the whole system changes, perhaps it is what one should fight for. In the case of disabled people, it applies even to the access or opportunity of access to be exploited – as cruel as this may sound; that is what the “inclusion for disabled people” is in fact fighting for. In that sense, “[b]asic changes must be made in the economic, social, and political structure in order to advance economic solutions that reach beyond capitalism’s instability. The reserve army, itself, must be made a disposable concept” (Russel 2019, p. 77). Despite the limitations of what Wayne calls (following Gramsci) passive revolution – “the paradox of massive change within the social relations of capitalism: change without real change” (Wayne 2020 p. 39, author's highlights) -, these seem to represent a possibility to improve the lives of those who are now in need, not only focusing on disabled people, but also on other forms of discrimination as well. My favourite and paramount argument in that regard is that Every reasonable and reasoned action proposed in an attempt to accelerate the social and political inclusion of the poor in the process of economic development in order to bring equality to social development is historically welcomed. As much within the scope of the State and its public policies as within civil society. It would be equally wicked to deny the diversity of the aspirations and intervention actions in the problematic reality. (Martins 2012, p. 1). Nonetheless, we should not be satisfied with them, for they do not interrupt the flow and the logics of the capital.

#### Capitalism’s drive for productivity forms the basis for Modern ableism by bracketing out those deemed as “un-productive”. Only resolving capitalism makes it possible to fracture and resolve existing ableist structures.

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Capitalism prioritizes productivity: your value and worth lie in how much you can produce for profit. The idea of constantly striving toward production is interwoven at the individual level, as evidenced by the urge to ask kids what job they want when they grow up — as if we dream about labor — and at the societal level, where a price tag is put on everything we do. This productivity-driven mindset permeates everything in a capitalist society. I grew up idolizing certain jobs: doctors, lawyers and scientists. But, my admiration wasn’t based on how these professions helped people. It was mostly because I was taught to prioritize their salary, recognition and prestige. In turn, people who didn’t choose a traditional corporate job were knocked to the bottom and unfairly branded as lazy, useless and undeserving of respect. I’m still working to dismantle this mindset that has become ingrained in me, but I’ve realized it’s even more important to do so when capitalism is integral to modern day ableism. So, what does capitalism have to do with ableism? Ableism is a product of capitalism. Simply put, the system isn’t made for people who are different. This includes people who have different ambitions, prioritize happiness or family over work, or have a different scope of ability. The ableist-capitalist relationship means that even if not explicitly, society makes it unnecessarily difficult for disabled people to find work. Non-manual labor jobs often tack on extraneous physical requirements that are inherently discriminatory, despite claiming to hire regardless of disability. Especially in academia, when jobs listings require “walking, talking and hearing,” for example, it sends a very clear message. When a disabled person secures a job, the employer might have to shift the functions of their role, or spend small sums of money to comply with requirements set by the Americans with Disabilities Act. So, the net profit exploited from a disabled worker may be less than that from an able-bodied worker. To compensate, many businesses use a loophole in the Fair Labor Standards Act to justify paying disabled workers subminimum wage. It’s worse than it sounds — disabled workers often earn pennies, or even gift cards, and are labeled as “substandard” because their disability can affect productivity. Before 2014, disabled people who received benefits such as Medicaid payments or Social Security Disability Insurance were disqualified if they had assets totaling more than $2,000 or if their monthly earnings exceeded $700. The job hunt is very discouraging when you know you’re going to face these obstacles and could eventually be forced to forfeit your benefits. If you were to lose your job, you would have to reapply for these programs, which often have waitlists a mile long. The Achieving a Better Life Experience Act was passed in December of 2014, allowing disabled individuals to open savings accounts for certain disability costs such as education, housing, transportation, health and basic living expenses. But the limitations of the ABLE Act still put disabled people at a disadvantage — the annual gift tax exclusion, which was $15,000 in 2020, is the limit for account contributions, and individuals must be diagnosed with a disability before turning 26 to be eligible. As if that’s not enough, the ableist-capitalist treatment extends beyond the workplace into daily life. Social Security rules create penalties for disabled people who want to get married. Sure, they’re legally allowed to marry. But if they do so, they’re faced with the possibility of losing their health insurance, earning a lower monthly income or losing their benefits altogether. Why do people have to choose between basic necessities and love? Able-bodied, heterosexual people can joke about getting married for the “tax benefits” while disabled people are forced to forfeit their right to marry so they can survive. By only rewarding those who are able-bodied, capitalism feeds into ableism. It produces and then exacerbates inequalities between the “normal bodies” and those who are disabled. It seems obvious a system that relies on the exploitation of individuals would in turn enable the devaluing of disabled people because they may require more accommodations and aren’t as easily exploited. During the pandemic, it’s also become obvious that accessibility is possible. Remote work is possible. But until a global pandemic struck, our capitalist society has not considered it a possibility — even for disabled people who could greatly benefit from these accommodations. It certainly makes one thing very clear: capitalism deems disabled people unworthy of the time and effort it takes to dismantle the barriers it is responsible for. If we able-bodied people want to be allies for those who are disabled, we need to take on an anti-capitalistic lens. You can’t separate the two. If you want to fight ableism, you must be able to recognize that it is, and has been for a long time, rooted in capitalism.

### 2NC --- Alt solves

#### Crip theorizations are currently organized around material change to cut back against capitalism.

Hamraie and Fritsch 19 – Aimi Hamraie (they/them) is Associate Professor of Medicine, Health, & Society and American Studies at Vanderbilt University, and director of the [Critical Design Lab](https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mapping-access.com%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cm.potts%40vanderbilt.edu%7Cf09928c5480a414ccff808d92f712515%7Cba5a7f39e3be4ab3b45067fa80faecad%7C0%7C0%7C637592985283552686%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=CrxT6KEX9CXcvxkANQLiJ0PgkXu4cydUk7KSvCtUs4M%3D&reserved=0). Trained as a feminist scholar, Hamraie’s interdisciplinary research spans critical disability studies, science and technology studies, critical design and urbanism, critical race theory, and the environmental humanities. They are author of [*Building Access: Universal Design and the Politics of Disability*](https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.upress.umn.edu%2Fbook-division%2Fbooks%2Fbuilding-access&data=04%7C01%7Cm.potts%40vanderbilt.edu%7Cf09928c5480a414ccff808d92f712515%7Cba5a7f39e3be4ab3b45067fa80faecad%7C0%7C0%7C637592985283562642%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=eE3rV5Mn2%2Bb3gTZRjR03ahDezHWFSHuGLUwlbrjCzzA%3D&reserved=0)(University of Minnesota Press, 2017) and host of the [Contra\* podcast](https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mapping-access.com%2Fpodcast&data=04%7C01%7Cm.potts%40vanderbilt.edu%7Cf09928c5480a414ccff808d92f712515%7Cba5a7f39e3be4ab3b45067fa80faecad%7C0%7C0%7C637592985283572601%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=oN2wvGFKfghJtWHQyCbrRxJTznJb6cqrtImUDSTIOwM%3D&reserved=0)on disability and design. With Kelly Fritsch, Mara Mills, and David Serlin, Hamraie co-edited a special issue of *Catalyst: feminism theory technoscience*on “[Crip Technoscience.](https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcatalystjournal.org%2Findex.php%2Fcatalyst%2Fissue%2Fview%2F2199&data=04%7C01%7Cm.potts%40vanderbilt.edu%7Cf09928c5480a414ccff808d92f712515%7Cba5a7f39e3be4ab3b45067fa80faecad%7C0%7C0%7C637592985283572601%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=wQ12Mx6yNMjDf2xcxxzt5z3ykU0lKkS%2FS%2F%2BSCYeG59g%3D&reserved=0)” Hamraie’s research is funded by the Social Science Research Council, the Smithsonian Institution, the Mellon Foundation, the Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Arts, and the National Humanities Alliance; Prior to joining the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Kelly Fritsch earned her Ph.D. in Social and Political Thought at York University (2015) and was a Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at the Women & Gender Studies Institute and Technoscience Research Unit, University of Toronto (2015-2018). Her research broadly mobilizes crip, queer, and feminist theory to engage disability, health, technology, risk, accessibility, and social justice. Fritsch is also cross-appointed to the Pauline Jewett Institute of Women’s and Gender Studies and the Institute of Political Economy.  , [“Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience”, Crip Technoscience Manifesto, Volume 5 Section 1, 7-8, SGH]

Crip technoscience centers the work of disabled people as knowers and makers. Crip technoscience privileges disabled people as designers and world-builders, as knowing what will work best and developing the skills, capacities, and relationships to make something from our knowledge. Unlike typical approaches to disability that objectify disabled people and situate expertise in medical professionals and non-disabled designers or engineers, crip technoscience posits that disabled people are active participants in the design of everyday life. Not only do disabled people make access in our everyday lives in ways that do not get recognized as design, but the lived experience of disability, and the shared experience of disability community creates specific expertise and knowledge that informs technoscientific practices.

We call for greater acknowledgement of the lived experiences and material design practices of disabled people in the work of technoscientific intervention. There is a widespread perception that access technologies are made for us by non-disabled experts, but there is little recognition of our own practices of remaking the material world. Yet the field of disability scholarship grew out of activism against rehabilitative models of medical expertise and intervention (UPIAS, 1976), crafting a materialist politics with anti-capitalism at its center (Oliver, 1990; Russell, 1998), and continues to struggle against “compulsory ablebodiedness” (McRuer, 2006). Crip knowing-making forms the basis of political slogans such as Nothing About Us Without Us (Charlton, 2000), framing disabled people not just as design experts but also as epistemic activists whose politicized ways of knowing the material world also situate us to produce the material conditions that allow disability to thrive, in addition to remaking how disability is known and experienced. Without glorifying do-it-yourself design practices, crip technoscience recognizes that disabled peoples’ world-dismantling and world-building labors stem from situated experiences of “misfitting” in the world (Garland-Thomson, 2011). Crips are not merely formed or acted on by the world—we are engaged agents of remaking.

### 2NC --- Perm Fails

**Aff fails – doesn’t account for neoliberal exploitation and categorization is key to activism**

**Vehmas & Watson 13** (Simo Vehmas & Nick Watson, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, p. 646-648)

Critical disability studies and justice

The influence of CDS and its challenge to the assumption that disability is a uniform condition have enabled the emergence of new ideas on disability. In particular, this has enabled the development of a theory that can take account of not only impairment effects but also can include class, ethnicity, sexual orientation or cultural identities. It has also argued for the re-emergence of a new political identity, one where a solidarity that was previously built on a common single identity is replaced by one that incorporates multiple voices including representatives from across the range of constituencies. The politics that it seeks to develop will be the ending of the single interest group identity of the disability movement to be replaced by single-issue groups campaigning for different social issues. To paraphrase Lister (1998, 74), if disability and impairment are simply to be ‘deconstructed into a kaleidoscope of shifting identities’ and ableist discourses, **there will be no disabled people left to either fight for the right to be, or to be a citizen.** If the principles of CDS are evaluated critically in the light of disadvantage, its analytical and political value becomes questionable. Its relativism and its suggestions that impairments are ethically and politically merely neutral differences are false. Impairments often have very tangible effects on people’s well-being, many of which cannot be explained away by deconstruction (for example, Shakespeare 2006; Thomas 1999). Recognizing impairment effects is necessary in order to secure proper treatment and social arrangements that enhance disabled people’s well-being and social participation. CDS runs the risk of dismissing not only the personal experiences of living with impairment, but also the significance of the differences between socially created disadvantages. These disadvantages that often result from oppressive social arrangements, are very much real and take place in different ways for different disadvantaged groups. Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; **they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement** (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require **more than ideological change**, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change. CDS **fails to account for the economic basis of disability** and offers only the tools of deconstruction and the abolishment of cultural hierarchies to eradicate economic injustice. This, as Fraser (2000) has argued, would be possible in a society where there were no relatively autonomous markets and the distribution of goods were regulated through cultural values. In such a society, oppression based on identity would translate perfectly into economic injustice and maldistribution. This is far from the current reality where ‘marketization has pervaded all societies to some degree, at least partially decoupling economic mechanisms of distribution from cultural patterns of value and prestige’ (Fraser 2000, 111). Markets are not controlled by nor are they subsidiary to culture; ‘as a result they generate economic inequalities that are not mere expressions of identity hierarchies’ (Fraser 2000, 111–112). The disadvantage related to disability is to a great extent a matter of economic injustice, and before this injustice can be corrected we have to be able to identify those individuals and social groups that have been disadvantaged by social arrangements. Whilst this does create and foster categories and binaries between groups of people, it also requires some sort of categories to start with; namely, the various categories of disadvantage. Both the social and physical mechanisms that produce human diversity are real, and they produce tangible differences that cannot be challenged, let alone abolished, merely by pointing out the wanton nature of difference, and deconstructing the meanings attached to disability. Changing the social conditions that disadvantage and disable some people demands that the diverse, sometimes dualistic, reality of social advantage and disadvantage between different groups of people is recognized. This is exactly why group identities based on, for example, impairment, gender, or sexuality have been invaluable tools in the resistance against discrimination and oppression – in the fight against socially produced disadvantage. Confident, positive disability identity has enabled many disabled people to actively challenge the status quo that disadvantages them and to claim rights and power and participation in dominant institutions. Being different from the so-called normal majority is no longer considered to conflict with a good life, equality and respect. Quite the opposite, positive realization of one’s difference has been liberating and empowering to many disabled people (Shakespeare 2006; Morris 1991). For a radical and active disability movement to emerge and for disabled people to take action on their own account, they have to see themselves as an unfairly marginalized or disadvantaged constituency and a minority group (Shakespeare and Watson 2001). The category disabled/ non-disabled is a good abstraction that can **enable the development of communities of resistance**, and without it is hard to see how these could develop. CDS is premised on the idea that difference acts as a precursor to the normalizing of behaviour and a requirement to treat people differently and, importantly, less favourably. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the categories that are applied to disabled people create an unnecessary divide between disabled and nondisabled people. You could equally make the point that without these categories we would not know what it is we have to do, what actions we have to take or what services we have to put in place to include disabled people. Indeed, for many disabled people the disadvantages they are subjected to arise not as the result of domination but through neglect and the denial of services and through society failing to take responsibility for those in need. As Wolff (2009, 114) points out: ‘anti-discrimination policy needs to identify a group to be protected.’ In other words, it is impossible to fight the oppression of a group of people that does not exist. Recognition of impairment is also crucial regarding legislation and policy that aim to protect disabled people against discrimination. The point of anti-discrimination legislation is to protect people from discrimination on the basis of their physical and mental properties, not on their opportunity to achieve equal participation and respect. Thus, ‘the parallel to race and gender is not disability but impairment’ (Wolff 2009, 135).

## Ballot K

### 1NC---Ballot K

#### Radical care work is impossible within the paradigm of competition. Their call for the ballot individualizes and neoliberalizes care relationships, turning the case.

Laurence Simard-Gagnon 16, Department of Geography, Queen’s University, “Everyone is fed, bathed, asleep, and I have made it through another day: Problematizing accommodation, resilience, and care in the neoliberal academy,” April 2016, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cag.12274

Following the principle of competition, if some are to succeed it is necessary that some fail. Neoliberalism entails letting die, smothering even, the casualties of marketization. It entails individualization of life circumstances, including needs and, importantly, struggles and failures that occur when needs come in the way of an individual’s capacity to compete. Neoliberalism entails exhaustion.

As I am making the final revisions on this paper, I have been experiencing partial deafness for over a year, related to an untreated inner ear infection which will now result in permanent hearing loss. I did not attend to it sooner—it was not urgent, and time and energy are so scarce. They have been made even more so this year as my son has not been attending school full-time: some weeks he won’t go for more than two or three half days. The recent neoliberal cuts to public services in the province of Québec—where I reside—have translated into losses here and there, from removal of school transportation services to cuts in hours of specialized education, effectively reducing the amount of time an autistic child can spend at school. It is now late at night, and I write these lines on an old and very slow netbook as my computer broke down: when I bought it I had very limited financial resources, so I got a cheap model with no guarantee. I could have had it fixed sooner, instead I was striving to pass my PhD comprehensive examination these last months. There is nothing extraordinary in these circumstances, no one trait that could be neatly identified and removed, no one issue that could be adjusted or fixed, so that I could at last perform as a competitive and unencumbered individual.

The liberal normative prescription of atomic independence, combined with the neoliberal imperative of competition, have ~~debilitating~~ [massive] implications for mental health, particularly for those who are, like me, struggling to meet their needs and those of the ones they care for. Their overlapping actions individualize and decontextualize not only our needs and the circumstances in which needs arise, but also our personal failures to meet both these needs and the demands of individuated functionality.

Academia, care, and resilience

One of the ways in which liberal and neoliberal versions of independence and needs are most debilitating is through the idea of resilience. Resilience is often used as a term to celebrate the ongoing efforts of those who continue to perform despite difficulties and struggles related to their particular circumstances (see Jackson et al. 2007). When thinking in terms of care, the idea of resilience is problematic because, as Cindy Katz points out, social reproduction, almost by definition, must be accomplished (Katz 2001). No matter how difficult our circumstances or how bare our resources get, we, and the persons we care for, need to eat, sleep, be clothed, warmed, and loved, at least at a minimal level, in order to go on. Thus people will go to great lengths (of resilience) to perform care. Resilience, therefore, cannot be taken as an indicator that people are thriving despite the obstacles they encounter, despite the inhumane and unjust expectations they face, particularly in this moment of increasingly harsh neoliberalism (Diprose 2015). Resilience is in fact incredibly stressful. Beyond the financial and logistical stress associated with both pursuing an academic path and caring for others, being resilient implies sustaining the ever underlying stress of feeling that one is never adequately filling their own needs and those of their dependents.

In this context, resilience implies a projection into the future perfect (see Povinelli 2011 for a discussion on tenses in late liberal capitalist economies). It is the idea that there will be a future moment when the unsustainability of (poor) caring practices will abate. “When this article is written, this presentation done, this chapter completed—these hardships that I am inflicting on myself and the ones I care for will be over, and it will all have been worth it.” Except that this moment never comes. Within an increasingly competitive academic context, demands are ever emerging and there is no final moment of grace. As I am writing these lines, everyone in my house is finally fed, bathed, asleep, and I have made it through another day. It is an exhausting victory, yet nothing has been achieved that will not have to be recommenced tomorrow. I have made it through another day, yet the days of ‘another day’ are endless.

As problematic as it is, however, there are not many alternatives to being resilient, to reconcile as well as we can the ever emerging needs of existence and caring with the expectations for independent and competitive accomplishments, while waiting for an ever elusive future perfect. Resilience is indeed fuelled by the fear of breaking down, or, of falling behind.

Centering our vision of productive contributions as engagements of atomic and individuated individuals fosters a logic of “if you can’t take the heat, you had better get out of the kitchen.” In that context, asking for help is complicated or hindered by the apprehension that responses, even from compassionate and concerned peers and superiors, will be grounded in that logic: “It might be better for you to stop or take a break at this point,” or “Maybe later when your circumstances are better…”. This, however, is not going to happen; these circumstances will not get better, because once again they are not a punctual and discrete appendage of a self—or a cohort—that can be circumscribed or cut out. They are embedded in one’s very subjectivity, relationships, and existence.

Meanwhile the ways we care for one another within the context of academia are grounded in the dominant logic of independence and resilience. Our paths as academics are tightly woven in an institution fuelled by individualism and its correlate ideal of independence, and the ways in which we care for one another most often fail to radically challenge this, and to acknowledge the infinity and relationality of our needs. Caring others—people who care about struggling individuals, about inequalities in general—will attempt to facilitate academic paths, but often their actions are limited to more or less punctual accommodations, such as being a sympathetic listener, providing tissues in which to cry, and granting extensions. This entails, for the person receiving this type of support, the stress of navigating academic life through often last minute actions of generosity that are entirely dependent on the good will of others, and of knowing that this path of navigation is unsustainable. In my case it also entails a dissonant feeling of gratitude for this generosity and trust—it somehow entails being in the position where I am genuinely grateful for being allowed to continue maintaining my own existence and that of those who depend on me.

Punctual acts of generosity and trust are also costly for those who bestow them. Unsurprisingly in a liberal institution, and particularly in these neoliberal times, the burden of it rests on individuals. In addition to the logistical complications that supporting struggling individuals can entail, there is also the anxiety and dangers of venturing out of the current academic logic of individualism and competition. Watching struggling individuals struggle, and attempting to care for them, generates strain—I have seen it in the faces of compassionate peers and professors, I have felt it in my face when confronted by the needs of struggling peers. There again, future perfect is often our false and cold comfort: “I know it’s hard, but just get this thing done, give a good hard push this time around, and then it’ll be done”.

Caring, however, is necessary as a way to escape the debilitating effects of liberal and neoliberal paradigms of individualism and competition in the academy. On every university campus there are officially designated places of care. Although necessary, these services tend to respond to punctual and neatly delineated needs—such as discrete episodes of illness or mental distress. But the type of caring that truly facilitates my existence is one that does not seek out the independent and functional person within the grounded, slow, and encumbered mess that I am. Places of care are indeed those places that resist this sort of surgical violence.

In my institution one such place is found at a centre offering services for students who are older women and/or women with children. There, one can find a free meal, a bed to rest on, companionship, or silence. The centre is open everyday, to anyone, as the needs it addresses are understood to be universal, rather than punctual traits or shortcomings of a subjectivity that is dysfunctional in one (or a few) specific ways. Where needs are not failures, one does not have to identify as such. And so every moment spent in this place of care preserves for a little while longer the possibilities of my sustained presence in the academia—the possibilities of an alternative social project (see Povinelli 2011).

Although it may seem unsatisfactory and insufficient, maintaining possibilities in the face of exhaustion is critical—it is the basis of everything, including change (Katz 2001; Povinelli 2011). The type of caring that sustains my continued existence as an academic implies inserting a logic of relationality, responsibility, and inter-dependency within a structure grounded on individualism and independence—it implies inserting a transgressive current within an institution which doesn’t have the eyes to recognize it. Caring, then, is very much like Certeau’s perruque (Certeau 1991): a wig made from scrap material by a factory worker, who opportunistically appropriates glimpses of company resources to create something unseen and unforeseen by the power in place—to serve a subversive purpose. Like making a wig, caring within the academy is a creative diversion—of time, of attention, of affection, of academic positions designed to foster individual achievements and competition. It is a wink of recognition to other meanings within a totalizing space. It is an act of resistance.

#### The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation.

Dr. Kendall R. Phillips 99, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses.

Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism.

Rhetorical resistance

That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice.

The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups.

The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn.

Resistance criticism

Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63).

Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse).

By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance.

What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered:

(1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice.

(2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center?

(3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative.

(4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized.

The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between

resistance and rhetorical criticism.

Rhetorical criticism

As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism.

The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

### 2NC---Care Turn

#### C---The radical care ethic of the 1ac gets weaponized against black and brown folks—history is on our side—prefer methods which break down structural inequality

Hobart & Kneese, 20

Hi‘ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese, Radical Care Survival Strategies for Uncertain Times, Social Text 142 • Vol. 38, No. 1 • March 2020

Finally, because care can be mobilized as a way to privilege some groups at the expense of others, the “radical” aspect of care can bleed into right-wing and white supremacist politics as much as it upholds leftist utopian visions. In describing her current book project on machine learning and segregation, Discriminating Data: Neighborhoods, Individuals, Proxies, media theorist Wendy Hui Kyong Chun argues that social networking platforms rely on a logic of homophily: birds of a feather flock together, so you will want to date, love, and be neighborly with those who are just like you, who share your fundamental values and interests.33 The problem with care attached to fellow feeling or sympathy is that all too often it means that care is reserved for those deemed worthy. As Cotten Seiler’s article in this issue underscores, radical care is also potentially dangerous: affective feelings of compassion and empathy toward poor whites during the Great Depression, for instance, could be used as justifi­cation for caring for fellow whites over others, despite the state-backed care offered by the New Deal. What happens when images of suffering or violence fail to inspire warm feelings and subsequent charitable action? Care is unevenly distributed and *cannot be disentangled* *from structural racism and inequality*. In addition to the kind of commercialized co-optation of neoliberal self-care we describe above, political leaders also take advantage of stereotypes about caregiving to extract unpaid labor from citizens. Care is a collective capacity to build an alternative to colonialism and capitalism, but those in power can also instrumentalize empathy and care to their own ends. For example, Andrea Muehlebach has shown how the post-Fordist Italian state valorizes and manipulates compassion in order to absolve itself of responsibility to its most marginalized citizens.34 In the context of the United States, the American health care and childcare systems are kept afloat by a vast corpus of unpaid or devalued domestic work performed by poor immigrant women and kin members.35 Domestic workers are some of the most exploited workers, not just in the United States but globally; in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh they are often poor migrant women and are without labor unions or other protections, often subjected to sexual assault and other forms of violence.36 To be clear, the problems that radical care seeks to remedy are not just a product of neoliberal policy or the election of Donald Trump and other authoritarian leaders. Older histories of settler colonialism and centuries of exploitation inform the inequalities entangled with care today. As Leanne Betasamosake Simpson and Dionne Brand put it, “The monster has arrived, and the monster was always here.”3

## Environmental Justice CP

### 1NC --- Solvency

#### Creating intersectional movements and policy is the only way to address ableist and discriminatory policy

Jampel, 18 (Catherine Jampel), “Intersections of disability justice, racial justice and environmental justice.” Environmental Sociology. <https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10058562>. Accessed 7-22-2021. ALS

Philosopher Anna Carastathis (2013) recuperates one of Crenshaw’s early metaphors in order to illustrate this point. Crenshaw’s (1989) metaphor of a basement with a trap door illustrates how single-axis or limited-axis movements may fail people facing multiple systems of oppression. By system of oppression, I mean historical and institutionalized patterns that disadvantage a particular group of people based on their social identity. Systems of oppression include racism, sexism, heterosexism, ableism and so forth. In the ‘basement’ metaphor, ‘all people who are disadvantaged on the basis of race, sex, class, sexual preference, age, and/or physical ability’ occupy a basement with ‘those on the bottom being disadvantaged by the full array of factors, up to the very top, where the heads of those disadvantaged by a singular factor brush up against the ceiling’ (Crenshaw 1989, 151). In Crenshaw’s initial work on intersectionality, which examined why Black women facing discrimination did not have legal recourse, White women and Black men could say they would be out of the basement ‘but for’ the ceiling. However, Black women faced two ‘but fors’ – racism and sexism – and became legally invisible. Truly intersectional work aims to address all of the systems of oppression that might leave someone in the metaphorical basement. The ‘Applications: bringing intersectionality and disability justice to EJ work’ section of this paper will include examples of how EJ work can avoid perpetuating ableism, the system that oppresses people with nonnormative bodies and minds.

#### Understandings ableism in environmental justice is a precursor to policy action

Jampel, 18 (Catherine Jampel), “Intersections of disability justice, racial justice and environmental justice.” Environmental Sociology. <https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10058562>. Accessed 7-22-2021. ALS

Analytical strategy for explanation: deepening understanding of EJ issues by critically attending to disability Attention to multiple systems of oppression and axes of social difference also enhances the capacity for explaining a phenomenon, in this case environmental injustice. Here, I turn to three ways in which thinking about ableism and disablement can enrich explanations of environmental injustice. Differential exposure and vulnerability – the traffic crash Exposure. People with disabilities are specifically exposed to and vulnerable to environmental injustice as a result of ableism. Just as people occupying marginalized race and class positions are geographically segregated, so are people with disabilities more likely than those without to be geographically segregated, unemployed or underemployed, and poor (Russell 1998; Hemingway and Priestley 2006). This makes people with disabilities more likely to live in areas with disproportionate burden of environmental bads, such as near current or legacy factory sites. Moreover, those most likely to be subject to and bear the greatest burdens of environmental injustice often occupy multiple marginalized social locations. Scholars have demonstrated this with respect to disability, gender and race in the case of Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina, established in the academic literature as an issue of EJ (Sze 2006), climate justice (Schlosberg and Collins 2014) and racial justice (Elliott and Pais 2006), illustrates how disability status contributed to the lived experiences of people in New Orleans, and why Hurricane Katrina also presented issues of disability justice (Finger 2005; NCD 2005). Public health researchers found that those, who did not evacuate ‘lacked public transportation, misjudged the storm, were limited by their own or a family member’s physical disability, and were more likely to be lifetime New Orleans residents’ (Brodie et al. 2006, 1407). Among those who were evacuated, 27,000 people moved from the Superdome in New Orleans to the Astrodome in Houston, Texas. Some of the arrivals had lost their mobility devices and, until donated wheelchairs arrived, had difficultly accessing the restrooms in the large arena, while other arrivals who see and hear with different strategies than typically seeing and hearing people had to adapt to the new environment until accessibility was addressed after several days (Bloodworth et al. 2007). Lack of access to disability-aware spaces and underestimation of disability-specific supplies meant that evacuees were further harmed even after leaving the hurricane area. Evacuation exacerbated previous chronic health conditions as well given the extent to which lowincome people relied on public hospitals decimated by the storm (Brodie et al. 2006). A disability justice framework understands that it is not people with disabilities who are ‘unprepared’ but rather ableism that has contributed to a larger system that has failed them and their families (Fenney Salkeld 2016; Kim 2016, 198–212). Likewise, Hurricane Katrina created conditions for further disablement. For example, demographer Narayan Sastry and economist Jesse Gregory (2013) explicitly focus on disability as an ‘effect’ of Hurricane Katrina – making disability the dependent variable and accounting for age, race and sex as independent variables. Their analysis of data from the American Community Survey revealed that the increase in disability in New Orleans was disproportionately concentrated among young and middle-aged Black women, with the young faring the worst. Sastry and Gregory draw on the extant literature to review the potential factors contributing to multiple marginalization – young black women were caught at the intersection of race, gender and age in such a way that adverse outcomes compounded. As Black people, they were more likely to live in dwellings and communities that suffered the most damage, leading to loss of property and neighborhood ties. As women, they were more likely to be left with children after households broke up, and the difficulties children in their care faced post-hurricane may have been sources of stress and consequent mental health effects. As young people, new mental and physical impairments were more 6 C. JAMPEL Downloaded by [66.189.72.133] at 06:07 11 January 2018 disabling, the researchers speculated, because of their effects on ability to work, having younger children not as easily able to help with daily tasks such as shopping, and more limited access to financial resources. In their explanation, the researchers imply a contextual model of disablement as a result of historical processes.

#### Environmental impacts are uniquely magnified against disabled bodies – only a critical intersectional lens towards political processes can identify vulnerability

Jampel, 18 (Catherine Jampel), “Intersections of disability justice, racial justice and environmental justice.” Environmental Sociology. <https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10058562>. Accessed 7-22-2021. ALS

Vulnerability. People whose bodies diverge from the ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ may face greater exposure to environmental injustice than other people. For some people, their bodily differences may also make them especially vulnerable to the effects of certain environmentally unjust conditions. For example, people who are immunosuppressed or have biological variations such as ‘slow acetylation’ bear a greater burden when exposed to air pollution, pesticides, industrial chemicals and a host of other toxic trespasses, a phrase Sandra Steingraber (2010, 279) uses to describe involuntary human exposure to a pollutant. As she explains, people who are slow acetylators have low levels of the enzymes that detoxify aromatic amines, a class of organic compounds used in pesticides and strongly associated with bladder cancer (2010, 268). Slow(er) acetylation becomes a disability when high level of aromatic amine exposure is part of society and culture. Biological variation compounded with racialized, classed and gendered exposures to toxics demonstrates how disability status ends up being created and then exacerbated through a political– economic context. As mainstream discourses shape an understanding through which the most ‘vulnerable populations’ are ‘expected’ to be further impaired or harmed (Fjord 2007), a critical and intersectional EJ lens can direct attention toward the political processes that lead to unnecessary occupational and everyday exposures to compounds such as the aromatic amines used in dyes, pesticides and plastics.

## Framework

### 2NC --- Fairness

#### Disability justice can only be achieved through attempts to promote fairness through policy engagement. Only policy can engage the algorithms of AI and correct ableist notions behind AI.

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Disability justice Rather than attempting to promote fairness solely through technical adjustments to training data and input–output relations, data scientists should take up a disability justice approach. This view acknowledges that factors such as error rates and accuracy are necessary but insufficient to understand, identify, and address algorithmic bias. Disability justice serves as a framework for reasoning about how ableist structures and norms subtly configure and restrict the ostensibly objective aspects of AI design. A deeper analysis of disability and capacity not only draws attention to the value-laden nature of design processes but illuminates how data analytics and machine learning help to define and redefine those concepts. Instead, a disability justice approach suggests drawing a wider circle of considerations relevant to AI ethics; centering analysis of assumptions and values in design; closing gaps between stakeholders; and pursuing policies that empower further activism. Disability justice calls into question fair-ML’s dogged quest for objectivity and failure to confront broader socio-political norms, demanding that data scientists attend to the subjective choices intrinsic to algorithm design. This shifts from a sole focus on technical aspects of design—such as input–output relations and training data—and expands the problem space to include the social responses and outcomes that algorithms generate. While data scientists need not abandon technical considerations, these decisions must follow from an analysis of the normative choices that go into, e.g., generating classifications, formulating problems, labelling data, and selecting proxy variables. That is, designers should take a broader socio-technical perspective, which considers systems as not merely technological but enmeshed with embodied, organizational, social, and political factors (Simon et al., [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR92); van der Bijl-Brouwer & Malcom, [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR100)). By considering how these dynamics interact and affect AI design together instead of assessing them in isolation, data scientists can better conceptualize, identify, and respond to biased algorithms. For instance, by reflecting on values woven into targets like ‘fit,’ one can parse out legitimate indicators of employability, such as word choice, from ones steeped in ableist norms and unrelated to performance, such as speech patterns and tone. Widening the circle of factors considered relevant to ethical AI design beyond data and input–output relations not only alters design processes but also renders thinkable a wider range of alternatives. Looking beyond the optimization of technical fairness criteria intervenes in solutionism and reveals a variety of other mechanisms for combatting bias and promoting social transformation. Notably, this gives us the tools to situate algorithms in a socio-technical context and raise the question of whether algorithms are appropriate instruments to measure and shape certain domains in the first place. For instance, given concerns about algorithms’ ability to capture shifting, contextual aspects of disability, what amount of discretion should they have over disabled people’s hiring outcomes, if any? While simply omitting groups from algorithmic models would exacerbate inequality, there may be reason to be much more skeptical of their inferences. Already, protests by Google employees about collaboration with the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security on Projects JEDI and MAVEN (Wakabayashi & Shane, [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR102)) and pledges by computer science students to refuse work at Palantir in light of its cooperation with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (Birnbaum, [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR10)) point to the ways in which data scientists can affect change beyond the algorithm itself. As such, disability justice indicates that we ought to expand the scope of AI ethics and situate algorithms in their socio-technical context. Moreover, a disability justice approach suggests that data scientists should critically analyze the ways in which disability is defined, measured, and labelled. Given that most data about disability are medical, inferences from them typically are limited to the medical model, reducing disability to a biological dysfunction. Yet, by drawing on disability scholarship, we can uncover the ways in which these categories shift and trace their roots to ableist assumptions. For instance, consider proposals to increase the amount and quality of disability data by drawing from people’s electronic health records. While well-intentioned, these efforts would further entrench the medical model of disability, leave little room for self-identification, and underrepresent disabled people who lack access to health care. Making explicit the ways in which algorithms model disability creates space to imagine it differently through methods like value-sensitive design (Friedman & Hendry, [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR35); Simon et al., [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR92)). Such an approach melds conceptual, empirical, and technical elements, e.g., assessing models of disability in terms of their assumptions, impact on data gathering, relationship to outcomes, and so on. In so doing, data scientists could better attend to the ways that different models influence people’s claims about their disabilities and how those claims are mediated by intersecting hierarchies of class, race, and gender. By investigating how different definitions and measures of disability shape who ‘counts’ as disabled, data scientists can intervene in these ongoing omissions. This requires altering how disabilities are operationalized so they are defined not solely as medical diagnoses but also in terms of how people navigate institutions, norms, and each other. While fair-ML idealizes abstraction so that data can be applied across contexts, (in)capacities emerge from a multitude of contextual factors like competing values and built environments. Instead, a disability justice framework suggests that an algorithm’s accuracy does not always trade off with its ability to accommodate contingency because many disabilities are intrinsically situational and resist quantification. Implementing this approach might involve, e.g., assigning more weight to contextual factors, assessing how aspects of a given disability shift over time, and designing scales that are sensitive to social values and attitudes. For example, some researchers have demonstrated that disability data can be disaggregated to more easily study the variables that cooccur with certain disabilities or contexts (Brown & Broido, [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR15); Peña et al., [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR77)). Others have called for analyzing how people’s capacities expand and contract in relation to built accessibility, office culture, and the type of labor at hand (Bennett et al., [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR9)). This suggests that data scientists could model disability differently by altering processes of data collection, label generation, and proxy selection so as not to abstract away its context. In addition, disability justice demands more fundamental shifts in access, communication, and ownership across the AI design pipeline. Indeed, the biases that hiring algorithms exhibit are inseparable from developers’ sole focus on employer values and widening asymmetries between firms and applicants. Although applicants’ ability to secure jobs is shaped by these AI, they cannot examine or offer input on them easily, if at all. Expanding opportunities for these engagements and removing barriers to access is essential to designing more equitable algorithms. Already, initiatives like Access Computing offer accessible training in computer science (Trewin et al., [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR99)) and groups like (Dis)Ability in AI provide support to disabled people at conferences about AI (Whittaker et al., [2019](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR104)). Despite efforts to increase disability representation at design forums and in training datasets, the mere presence of disability is not enough to transform existing institutions and restore trust. That is, vendors must design with disabled people, not merely for them. As the scope of design expands, data scientists ought to draw insights from other disciplines, including disability studies and socio-technical design, and team up with a wider range of stakeholders. This process cannot simply tack on these perspectives but must integrate and consult with them throughout the design pipeline. By collaborating with a diverse array of disciplines and voices, data scientists could better identify stakeholders in AI hiring, explore their values and needs, study how AI might implicate them, and involve them in design processes. This bears similarities to a participatory design perspective, in which workers are empowered by directly influencing the design of technologies they will take up (Korsgaard et al., [2016](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR54)). Using a variety of techniques—from prototyping and mock-ups to future-oriented workshops and scenarios—stakeholders reflect on the situation, imagine innovative solutions, and transform those speculative approaches into realistic, concrete alternatives. This might involve, to give an example, asking stakeholders to evaluate whether automated interviews that assess affect and gestures align with their values, what they communicate about disabled applicants, and how they might be navigated. In parallel, insights from disability studies suggest granting disabled people’s perspectives significant weight in debates about, e.g., generating labels and selecting proxies for disability status. For instance, developers might look to data platform co-ops operated by people with rare disabilities, in which they oversee the use of their data and share profits (Scholz, [2016](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR86); Treviranus, [2018](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR97)), to inform their own decisions about responsible data use. By working alongside these other disciplines and voices from the start of the design process, data scientists could help bridge gaps in knowledge, foster a common conceptual language, and develop new research methods. Beyond expanding the scope of AI ethics concerns, redefining design values, and changing stakeholder dynamics, a disability justice approach suggests pursuing policy measures that can empower data activism. While legislation often lags behind advances in computing, existing regulatory uncertainty allows AI vendors to selectively endorse transparency and fairness criteria in ways that preserve existing arrangements. Greater transparency could help promote the conditions necessary for activists and data scientists alike to study, uncover, and contest algorithmic bias. Despite the explanatory difficulties associated with the black box, policies ought to be introduced mandating that AI developers regularly audit and disclose the purview, inputs and outputs, and limitations of their algorithms. For example, some have suggested requiring employers to make public the automated inferences they make about applicants (Hoffman, [2019a](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR72)) and tasking them with retaining detailed records of their bias mitigation procedures (Hoffman, [2019b](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR71)). Developing legislation to establish minimum standards for data transparency and disclosure of bias mitigation measures—even for opaque machine learning AI—is necessary to identify and make claims against discriminatory algorithms. In addition to setting baselines for transparent design and implementation, recognizing how ableist structures can affect people’s identification with and disclosure of disability status highlights the importance of more robust privacy regulations. Existing protections are ill-equipped to grapple with the ethical risks posed by automated hiring tools or predictions of disability status. The ADA (1990) only shields those who are disabled, treated as disabled, or were disabled, while GINA (2008) and HIPAA (OCR, [2021](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR73)) protect health data while it is being stored, transferred, and analyzed by certain classes of covered entities. However, since these laws neither cover AI vendors and data brokers nor explicitly forbid discrimination based on inferred risk factors for disabilities, AI can circumvent them (Givens & Morris, [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR38)). Similarly, while the ADA prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation, it does not explicitly include algorithms, social media platforms, and so on (Rothstein, [2020](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007/s10676-022-09633-2#ref-CR82)). Expanding existing privacy protections would help make disability disclosure less precarious and, in so doing, assist efforts to gather more representative datasets.